MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER

SUZANNE H. SEGAL, Magistrate Judge.

I.

INTRODUCTION

David Allen Highfill ("Plaintiff") seeks review of the final decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration ("the Commissioner") denying his application for Supplemental Security Income ("SSI"). The parties consented, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), to the jurisdiction of the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge. For the reasons stated below, the decision of the Commissioner is AFFIRMED.

II.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff filed an application for Supplemental Security Income ("SSI") on June 30, 2010. (Administrative Record ("AR") 15, 189). Plaintiff alleged disability beginning on June 29, 2005, due to major depressive disorder, chronic headaches, and a heart impairment. (AR 129). Plaintiff's application was initially denied on April 6, 2011 (AR 70-73), and denied on reconsideration on August 4, 2011 (AR 75-79). Plaintiff requested a hearing on August 17, 2011. (AR 82). A hearing was held before Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") Joseph D. Schloss on August 20, 2012 ("ALJ hearing"). (AR 29). Plaintiff was represented by counsel. (Id.). Plaintiff testified at the hearing, as did Vocational Expert ("VE") Abbe May and Medical Expert ("ME") Dr. David Jarmon. (AR 29-52). The ALJ issued an unfavorable decision on August 29, 2012, finding that Plaintiff was not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act. (AR 15-24). Plaintiff requested review of the ALJ's decision October 17, 2012, which the Appeals Council denied on February 20, 2014. (AR 1-6). As a result, the ALJ's decision became the final decision of the Commissioner. Plaintiff filed the instant complaint on April 22, 2014.

III.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff was born on August 28, 1965. (AR 125). He was thirty-nine years old on June 29, 2005, his alleged disability onset date (see AR 23) and forty-six years old on the date of the ALJ hearing (see generally AR 29, 36). Plaintiff was released from prison on September 16, 2010 (AR 428) and was discharged from parole on October 16, 2011. (AR 422). Plaintiff told an examining psychologist that he had been arrested more than ten times and convicted seven times for assault and battery, inflicting bodily injury, driving with a suspended license, driving under the influence and possession of firearms. (AR 222). Plaintiff also admitted to alcohol and street drug use, including the use of "speed" for over twenty years. (Id.). He has been sober for the last nine years. (AR 44, 222). Plaintiff last worked in 2001.1 (AR 38). Prior to becoming unable to work, his primary employment experience was as a plumber's assistant. (AR 130). He has completed the twelfth grade. (Id.). In his SSI application, Plaintiff alleged that he suffered from depression, chronic headaches, and a heart impairment. (AR 129).

A. Plaintiff's Medical History

1. Treating Physicians

On December 22, 2009, Dr. Joseph Davis at Arrowhead Regional Medical Center ("ARMC") performed surgery on Plaintiff to remove his gallbladder. (AR 405-08). On or around July 29, 2011, Plaintiff was treated at ARMC by Dr. Linna Kho for chronic diarrhea (AR 369-70) and tested for colitis and Crohn's disease per the direction of Dr. Bruce Sabha. (AR 380). On April 16, 2012, Dr. Andrew Song conducted an MRI scan of Plaintiff's left knee at the Center. (AR 365). The MRI showed an intact reconstructed anterior cruciate ligament, tears of the medial and lateral menisci and moderate-sized joint effusion in the left knee. (Id.). Plaintiff had previously had knee surgery at Arrowhead Regional in 1996. (Id.).

Plaintiff also received treatment at the Department of Corrections Parole Outpatient Clinic ("POC") from April 12, 2010, until August 8, 2011.2 (AR 422-36). On September 17, 2010, Plaintiff saw Carolyn Riordan, a licensed clinical social worker, for an Initial Mental Health Evaluation. (AR 200-202, 429). On September 27, 2010, Plaintiff was seen by POC psychiatrist Robert T. Allen. (AR 428). At that time, Plaintiff reported that he had begun to feel depressed about seven years earlier and that he felt depressed most of the time, although sometimes he experienced a normal mood. (AR 428). Dr. Allen wrote that it "[s]ounds like [Plaintiff] goes from depressed mood to euthymia." (Id.). Plaintiff also reported hearing voices, especially when he was depressed. (Id.). In her evaluation, Riordan diagnosed Plaintiff with polysubstance abuse, major depressive disorder, single episode, severe with mood-congruent delusions and schizoaffective disorder, depressive type. (AR 201). Riordan also assessed Plaintiff with a Global Assessment of Functioning ("GAF") score of sixty. (AR 202).3 Plaintiff was prescribed Seroquel and Wellbutrin in September 2010 (AR 203), and at times during his treatment, he was prescribed Abilify, Effexor and Remeron (AR 422-24).4 On March 14, 2011, Plaintiff told Dr. Allen that he felt "pretty good" since beginning treatment and that he only suffered auditory hallucinations "[a] little bit one day." (AR 425). However, on July 11, 2011, Plaintiff reported that he "still hear[d] [his] name being called." (AR 423). On August 8, 2011, Plaintiff said that Abilify was "working OK" for his voices. (AR 422). Plaintiff consistently reported that he took his medications daily. (AR 422-36). Plaintiff was discharged from parole on October 16, 2011 and ended treatment at POC. (AR 422).

2. Examining Physicians

Dr. Banafshe Ardebili, a state agency examining psychologist, conducted a Complete Mental Evaluation of Plaintiff on February 21, 2011 at MSLA — Palm Springs. (AR 220-26). She assessed Plaintiff with a GAF score of fifty-eight. (AR 224). Dr. Ardebili found that Plaintiff was able to understand and carry out short, simple instructions and perform basic self-care skills, including preparing simple meals and managing his own funds. (AR 225). She determined that Plaintiff was able to make simple work-related decisions without additional supervision, maintain attention and concentration, maintain persistence and maintain day-to-day activities. (Id.). However, she found that Plaintiff had a mild inability to understand and carry out detailed instructions, to accept instructions from supervisors and to maintain pace. (Id.). Dr. Ardebili also found that Plaintiff had a moderate inability to interact appropriately with supervisors, coworkers and peers. (Id.). She opined that "[Plaintiff] would optimally thrive in a supervised, structured environment," and that medication compliance was "crucial" for Plaintiff to manage his symptoms. (Id.).

Dr. Sohail Afra, a state agency examining internist, performed a Complete Internal Medicine Evaluation of Plaintiff on February 7, 2011 at MSLA — Palm Springs. (AR 215-19). Dr. Afra found that Plaintiff had hypertension, latent tuberculosis, and a significant psychiatric history. (AR 219). However, he concluded that Plaintiff had no functional restrictions. (Id.).

3. Consulting Physicians

Dr. Andres Kerns, a non-examining consulting psychologist, completed a Mental Residual Functional Capacity Assessment of Plaintiff on April 1, 2011. (AR 232-35). Dr. Kerns found that Plaintiff was able to meet the basic mental and emotional requirements of competitive, remunerative, unskilled work and that he would be able to understand, carry out and remember simple instructions, make simple work-related decisions, respond appropriately to supervision, co-workers and work situations, and deal with changes in a routine work setting on a sustained basis. (AR 234). He also opined that Plaintiff would "do best" in a job requiring minimal social interaction. (Id.).

Dr. J. Frankel, a non-examining consulting physician, completed a Physical Residual Functional Capacity Assessment of Plaintiff on March 25, 2011. (AR 227-31). Dr. Frankel diagnosed Plaintiff with latent tuberculosis. (AR 227). He found that Plaintiff had no functional restrictions (AR 228-30), but that he should avoid concentrated exposure to extreme cold and heat, wetness, humidity, fumes, odors, dusts, gases, poor ventilation and hazards because of his latent tuberculosis. (AR 230).

B. Medical Expert Testimony

Medical Expert David Jarmon testified at the ALJ hearing regarding Plaintiff's mental health history. (AR 31-36). Dr. Jarmon stated that Plaintiff had been diagnosed with bipolar disorder, but noted that Plaintiff's symptoms were well-managed when he took medication. (AR 33). Dr. Jarmon also testified that although Plaintiff had been diagnosed with schizoaffective disorder on September 27, 2010,5 there was only "slim" objective medical evidence to support this finding. (AR 33-34). He described the evidence as "slim" because the diagnosis was based on Plaintiff's subjective complaints of auditory hallucinations when he did not take medication. (AR 34). Though Dr. Ardebili had rated Plaintiff at fifty-eight on the GAF scale, Dr. Jarmon stated that there was insufficient evidence for this score when Plaintiff was evaluated. (AR 35-36). He opined that Plaintiff's GAF score did not suggest the presence of severe mental illness. (AR 36).

At the hearing, Dr. Jarmon also pointed out that the record did not show evidence of psychosis, despite Dr. Ardebili's diagnosis, and found that Dr. Ardebili's record did not indicate the severity of Plaintiff's depression. (AR 35-36). Dr. Jarmon noted that when Plaintiff was compliant with his medication, he was moderately limited in activities of daily living, mildly limited in social functioning and moderately limited in concentration and pace. (AR 34). He also noted that Plaintiff had not had any episodes of decompensation with the medication, and that the record showed no evidence that Plaintiff had abused drugs after his alleged disability onset date. (Id.).

C. Vocational Expert Testimony

Vocational Expert ("VE") Abbe May identified Plaintiff's past relevant work in the Dictionary of Occupational Titles ("DOT") as a plumber's assistant. (AR 47). According to the VE, this was semi-skilled work requiring vocational preparation level four and performed at a heavy level of exertion. (AR 47-48).

The ALJ posed two hypotheticals to the VE. In the first hypothetical, the ALJ asked if a forty-seven year old individual with a high school education and the same past relevant work as Plaintiff, who had no exertional limitations but should not be exposed to extreme cold, heat, wetness, humidity, fumes, dust, odors, gases or poor ventilation would be able to perform the plumber's job. (AR 48). Ultimately, it was determined that such an individual would not be able to perform Plaintiff's past relevant work. (AR 48-49). However, the hypothetical individual would be capable of other jobs such as a hand packager and laundry worker. (AR 49-50).

In the second hypothetical, the ALJ asked whether the same individual could perform these alternative jobs if he were limited to lifting and carrying twenty pounds occasionally and ten pounds frequently, could occasionally push, pull and kneel with the left lower extremity and had no limitations on the right, could not crawl, work with ladders, ropes or scaffolds or work at unprotected heights, and could not have public contact or perform team-oriented tasks.6 (AR 50-51). The VE testified that the individual would be able to perform the job of a laundry worker, collator or mail sorter but not the job of a hand packager. (See AR 50-51).

D. Plaintiff's Hearing Testimony

Plaintiff testified at the ALJ hearing that he had supported himself with general relief and food stamps for the past two years. (AR 36-37). He also stated that he had lived alone in a trailer without water or electrical power since his release from prison in September 2010. (AR 37-38). During the day, Plaintiff read occasionally but did not watch television or listen to radio. (AR 46). Plaintiff prepared his own meals and testified that he mainly ate "tortillas and peanut butter." (AR 46-47). Plaintiff admitted that he had been arrested ten times and convicted at least seven times. (See AR 38). Plaintiff admitted that he had been diagnosed with polysubstance abuse in September 2010 (AR 34), but stated that had not consumed alcohol in the past twelve years and had not used methamphetamine in the past nine years. (AR 44).

Plaintiff testified that it was very difficult for him to work or to exercise, and that he had gained about forty pounds in the previous two years. (AR 38-39). He also "stay[ed] in bed a lot." (Id.). He did not work because he "just [couldn't] function anymore," and "[it was] hard . . . to get places on time." (AR 39). Tasks that previously took two hours now took "days" to finish, and Plaintiff did not "function in society very much anymore." (AR 39-40). He also stated that he had not applied for a job in the previous two years. (AR 47).

Plaintiff testified that he wore a knee brace on his left knee because he fell off a ladder in 1996 or 1997. (AR 40). The injury had required surgery. (Id.). He had chronic knee pain after the fall and wore a custom knee brace. (AR 40-41). He had purchased a new knee brace a month before the hearing. (AR 41). Plaintiff experienced chronic pain in his left shoulder due to a self-inflicted gunshot wound from a 2009 suicide attempt. (AR 41-42). He had not made any other suicide attempts. (AR 42). Plaintiff testified that his shoulder often felt numb and that he experienced pain when he raised his left elbow above the shoulder level. (Id.). Although Plaintiff was hospitalized after he shot himself in 2009, he had not been hospitalized for mental health reasons since filing the disability claim. (AR 43).

Plaintiff testified that he suffered from back pain and headaches. (AR 43). He added that he had a "really bad migraine" "[a]t least every two weeks for about three days." (Id.). He took prescription Ibuprofen to treat the migraines, and also took Codeine to treat his knee pain. (Id.). Plaintiff took Seroquel and Wellbutrin as prescribed because "[He didn't] want to kill [himself] anymore." (Id.).

Plaintiff testified that his mental health problems were more debilitating than his physical issues. (AR 44). Even a trip to the supermarket was overwhelming because "there's just too many things going on." (Id.). He had no friends and opined that he was difficult to get along with. (AR 44-45). He lived near his mother, but they did not socialize often. (AR 46). When the ALJ asked if Plaintiff had any additional mental health symptoms, Plaintiff testified that he had auditory and visual hallucinations and heard voices weekly. (AR 45-46).

E. Plaintiff's Function Report

Plaintiff completed a Function Report in conjunction with his application on October 11, 2010. (AR 138-47). He reported that he lived in a trailer without power or water. (AR 140). He went into town to shop for food and water daily, but had trouble with personal care and needed his mother's help to get places. (AR 140-42). He needed "hours" to wash three pairs of socks and two pairs of shorts. (AR 142). He reported that he "[didn't] like people" and was unable to keep a job. (AR 143, 145). He also used a brace on his knee sometimes and always wore glasses. (AR 146). In answering the question "How well do you follow written instructions?" Plaintiff stated, "You tell me." (AR 145).7

F. Third Party Function Report

Plaintiff's mother, Frances Douglas, completed a Third Party Function Report on October 12, 2010. (AR 150-58). She described Plaintiff as "in pain, can't work, sleeps 12 [hours] a day, moody and antisocial." (AR 151). He also had anxiety and was unable to sleep. (AR 152). After Plaintiff ceased being able to work, he became more depressed and "[did] less." (AR 155). She also described Plaintiff as "suicidal" and "more remote" since he stopped working. (AR 155-56). Plaintiff also needed reminders to change his clothes and put on a coat. (AR 153).

Ms. Douglas stated that Plaintiff had trouble getting along with other people because "people [didn't] like him" and because of his bipolar disorder. (AR 156-57). She also suggested that Plaintiff's bipolar disorder prevented him from keeping a job. (AR 157). Plaintiff "stay[ed] away if possible" from authority figures, and he did not handle stress or changes in routine well. (Id.).

She reported that Plaintiff took his medication, filled out "this kind of paperwork," and took sleeping pills every day. (AR 151). He ate junk food and could not cook. (AR 153). Ms. Douglas also verified that Plaintiff wore a brace on his left knee that had been prescribed to him in 1996 and that he wore glasses every day. (AR 157).

IV.

THE FIVE STEP SEQUENTIAL EVALUATION PROCESS

To qualify for disability benefits, a claimant must demonstrate a medically determinable physical or mental impairment that prevents him from engaging in substantial gainful activity and that is expected to result in death or to last for a continuous period of at least twelve months. Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 721 (9th Cir. 1998) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A)). The impairment must render the claimant incapable of performing the work he previously performed and incapable of performing any other substantial gainful employment that exists in the national economy. Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A)).

To decide if a claimant is disabled and therefore entitled to benefits, an ALJ conducts a five-step inquiry. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920. The steps are:

Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1098-99; see also Bustamante v. Massanari, 262 F.3d 949, 953-54 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Tackett); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i)-(v), 416.920(a)(4)(i)-(v).

The claimant has the burden of proof at steps one through four and the Commissioner has the burden of proof at step five. Bustamante, 262 F.3d at 953-54. Additionally, the ALJ has an affirmative duty to assist the claimant in developing the record at every step of the inquiry. Id. at 954. If, at step four, the claimant meets his burden of establishing an inability to perform past work, the Commissioner must show that the claimant can perform some other work that exists in "significant numbers" in the national economy, taking into account the claimant's residual functional capacity, age, education, and work experience. Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1100; see Reddick, 157 F.3d at 721; see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv)-(v), 416.920(a)(4)(iv)-(v). The Commissioner may do so by the testimony of a vocational expert or by reference to the Medical-Vocational Guidelines appearing in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 2 (commonly known as "the Grids"). Osenbrock v. Apfel, 240 F.3d 1157, 1162 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Tackett). When a claimant has both exertional (strength-related) and non-exertional limitations, the Grids are inapplicable and the ALJ must take the testimony of a vocational expert. Moore v. Apfe, 216 F.3d 864, 869 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing Burkhart v. Bowen, 856 F.2d 1335, 1340 (9th Cir. 1988)).

V.

THE ALJ'S DECISION

The ALJ employed the five-step sequential evaluation process and concluded that Plaintiff was not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act. (See AR 15-17).

At step one, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not been engaged in substantial gainful employment since his alleged disability onset date of June 30, 2010. (AR 17).

At step two, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had the severe impairments of headaches, essential hypertension, latent pulmonary tuberculosis, meniscal tears in the left knee and polysubstance abuse. (AR 17). Although Plaintiff also alleged having a heart impairment implant, the ALJ found no objective medical evidence that a heart implant had been installed. (Id.).

At step three, the ALJ found that Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically equaled the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(d), 416.1525, 414.1526, 416.920(d), 416.925, 416.926). (AR 17-19). The severity of Plaintiff's mental impairments did not meet or medically equal the criteria of listings 12.03, 12.04, 12.08 or 12.09.8 (AR 18). The ALJ found that Plaintiff's mental impairments did not cause at least two "marked" limitations or one "marked" limitation and "repeated" episodes of extended decompensation, and therefore the "paragraph B" criteria were not satisfied. (Id.). The ALJ also found that the evidence did not establish the presence of the "paragraph C" criteria. (AR 19). The ALJ then found that Plaintiff had the residual functional capacity ("RFC") to perform light work as defined in 20 CFR 416.967(b), including:

(AR 19). In reaching this opinion, the ALJ specified that he had considered all of Plaintiff's symptoms and the extent to which they could reasonably be accepted as consistent with the objective medical evidence and other evidence, based on the requirements of 20 C.F.R. 416.929 and SSRs 96-4p and 96-7p. (Id.). The ALJ also stated that he considered opinion evidence in his finding, in accordance with the requirements of 20 C.F.R. 416.927 and SSRs 96-2p, 96-5p, 96-6p and 06-3p. (Id.).

In assessing Plaintiff's credibility, the ALJ followed a two-step process in which he first determined whether there was an underlying medically determinable physical or mental impairment(s) that could have reasonably been expected to produce the Plaintiff's pain or other symptoms. (AR 19-20). Then, after the underlying impairment(s) had been shown, he evaluated the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of Plaintiff's symptoms to determine the extent to which they limited Plaintiff's functioning. (AR 19-22). Ultimately, the ALJ found that Plaintiff's medically determinable impairments could have reasonably been expected to have caused the alleged symptoms. (AR 20). However, the ALJ also found that Plaintiff's statements regarding the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms were not credible to the extent that they were incompatible with Plaintiff's RFC. (Id.).

The ALJ questioned Plaintiff's testimony and subjective complaints and found inconsistencies that diminished his overall credibility. (AR 19-22). The ALJ noted that when Plaintiff saw Dr. Afra, the state agency examining physician, he said that his main complaints were hypertension and headaches. (AR 21). However, Plaintiff alleged knee, shoulder and back pain. (AR 21-22). The ALJ also opined that Plaintiff provided inconsistent statements regarding his daily activities. (AR 22). For example, the ALJ remarked that Plaintiff told Dr. Ardebili, the examining psychologist, that he did household chores, made simple meals, shopped and walked his dog. (Id.; see AR 222). However, at the hearing, the ALJ observed that Plaintiff "portray[ed] himself . . . as being unable to do anything except stay inside his trailer." (AR 22; see generally AR 39-40, 45-47). The ALJ also noted that despite Plaintiff's allegations of inactivity, he exhibited no muscle dystrophy and had gained only eleven pounds between February 2011 and the ALJ hearing in August 2012. (AR 22). The ALJ further opined that Plaintiff had not received the medical treatment that would have been expected for a totally disabled individual. (Id.). Although Plaintiff's mother corroborated Plaintiff's representations in a third party function report, the ALJ did not give her statement significant weight because it was inconsistent with objective findings in the medical record. (AR 22).

The ALJ also reviewed the specific findings of Plaintiff's physicians and questioned the objective medical evidence. The ALJ noted that Dr. Frankel, the non-examining consulting physician, assessed limitations due to latent tuberculosis that exceeded Plaintiff's own complaints. (AR 20-21). The ALJ also noted that Dr. Afra, the state agency examining physician, assessed Plaintiff with no functional restrictions despite an MRI of Plaintiff's left knee from April 16, 2012, showing an intact reconstructed anterior cruciate ligament, tears of the medial and lateral menisci and joint effusion. (AR 20). The ALJ gave minimal weight to the opinions of Drs. Frankel and Afra in order to give great consideration to Plaintiff's allegations that he had functional restrictions beyond those assessed by Drs. Frankel and Afra. (AR 21). The ALJ found that the opinions of Drs. Ardebili and Kerns, who had assessed Plaintiff's mental health, to be consistent with Plaintiff's description of his difficulties with dealing with others and consistent with the medical record as a whole. (Id.).

At step four, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was unable to perform his past relevant work as a plumber's assistant. (AR 23). However, at step five, the ALJ found that, considering Plaintiff's age, education, work experience and RFC, he could perform jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy. (AR 23). The ALJ found that Plaintiff could perform other jobs such as laundry worker, collator or mail sorter. (AR 24). Accordingly, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act. (Id.).

VI.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), a district court may review the Commissioner's decision to deny benefits. "[The] court may set aside the Commissioner's denial of benefits when the ALJ's findings are based on legal error or are not supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole." Auckland v. Massanari, 257 F.3d 1033, 1035 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Tackett, 180 F. 3d at 1097); Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1279 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing Fair v. Bowen, 885 F.2d 597, 601 (9th Cir. 1989)).

"Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla, but less than a preponderance." Reddick, 157 F.3d at 720 (citing Jamerson v. Chater, 112 F.3d 1064, 1066 (9th Cir. 1997)). It is "relevant evidence which a reasonable person might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Id. (citing Jamerson, 112 F.3d at 1066; Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1279). To determine whether substantial evidence supports a finding, the court must "`consider the record as a whole, weighing both evidence that supports and evidence that detracts from the [Commissioner's] conclusion.'" Auckland, 257 F.3d at 1035 (quoting Penny v. Sullivan, 2 F.3d 953, 956 (9th Cir. 1993)). If the evidence can reasonably support either affirming or reversing that conclusion, the court may not substitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner. Reddick, 157 F.3d at 720-21 (citing Flaten v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 44 F.3d 1453, 1457 (9th Cir. 1995)).

VII.

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff contends that the ALJ improperly rejected the opinion of examining psychologist Banafshe Ardebili in assessing Plaintiff's residual functional capacity and thus propounded an incomplete hypothetical to the vocational expert that did not take all of Plaintiff's limitations into consideration. (Memorandum in Support of Complaint ("MSC"), Dkt. No. 18, at 3-5). The Court disagrees.

A. The ALJ Properly Weighed The Opinion Of Examining Psychologist Ardebili

The Ninth Circuit recognizes three types of physicians: (1) treating physicians who examine and treat, (2) examining physicians who examine but do not treat, and (3) non-examining physicians who neither examine nor treat. Valentine v. Comm'r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 574 F.3d 685, 692 (9th Cir. 2009). Generally, the opinion of a treating physician is given greater weight than the opinion of a non-treating physician, and the opinion of an examining physician is given greater weight than the opinion of a non-examining physician. Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1012 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Ryan v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 528 F.3d 1194 (9th Cir. 2008)); Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th Cir. 1995). Accordingly, where the treating or examining physician's opinion is contradicted by another doctor, the ALJ may only reject it by providing specific and legitimate reasons supported by substantial evidence in the record. Id.; see Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 633 (9th Cir. 2007). However, treating and examining physicians' opinions are not given more weight if they are conclusory or are not supported by the medical evidence. See Batson v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 359 F.3d 1190, 1195 (9th Cir. 2004).

Plaintiff contends that the ALJ improperly rejected Dr. Ardebili's medical opinion because he did not provide specific and legitimate reasons for rejecting part of her opinion. (MSC at 4-5). Plaintiff contends that the ALJ implicitly rejected Dr. Ardebili's opinion because the ALJ did not adopt the assessment that Plaintiff needed to work in a "supervised, structured environment" in the RFC. (MSC at 5).

After taking a medical history and performing an examination of Plaintiff, Dr. Ardebili completed a Functional Assessment in a report prepared for the Commissioner. (AR 220-26). In her assessment, Dr. Ardebili identified Plaintiff's specific functional limitations. (AR 225). She found that Plaintiff had a moderate inability to interact appropriately with supervisors, coworkers and peers and that he had a mild inability to understand and carry out detailed instructions, to accept instructions from supervisors and to maintain pace. (AR 225). Dr. Ardebili opined that Plaintiff could understand and carry out short, simple instructions, perform basic self-care skills, perform simple work-related decisions with additional supervision, maintain attention and concentration, and maintain persistence and day-to-day activities. (Id.).

In her assessment, Dr. Ardebili also included the opinion that Plaintiff "would optimally thrive in a supervised, structured environment." (Id.). Given the explicit limitations that Dr. Ardebili assessed for Plaintiff, the plain language of her statement shows that Dr. Ardebili was proposing an ideal work environment, not assessing a limitation. (See id.).

The ALJ gave Dr. Ardebili's opinion great weight and found "the opinion[] to be consistent with the record as a whole." (AR 21). The ALJ assessed Plaintiff with the RFC to perform light work and appropriately factored Dr. Ardebili's limitations into Plaintiff's RFC. (Compare AR 19, with AR 224-25; see AR 22). Dr. Ardebili opined that Plaintiff had a moderate inability to interact with supervisors, coworkers and peers. (AR 225). These findings are consistent with the residual functional capacity adopted by the ALJ, who opined that Plaintiff was limited to working in a "non public environment with no team oriented tasks, or requiring hyper vigilance." (AR 19).

Furthermore, the ALJ specifically considered Dr. Ardebili's opinions on Plaintiff's limitations and incorporated her limitations in Plaintiff's RFC:

(AR 22). Contrary to Plaintiff's contention, the ALJ did not reject Dr. Ardebili's findings. (Compare AR 19, with AR 224-25; see AR 22). The ALJ gave Dr. Ardebili's opinion great weight and incorporated her opinion into Plaintiff's RFC accordingly. (AR 22). Therefore, the ALJ properly weighed the opinion of examining psychologist Ardebili.

B. The ALJ Propounded A Complete Hypothetical To The Vocational Expert

Under the five-step evaluation process, if a claimant shows that he cannot return to his or her previous job, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to show that the claimant can do other work. Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1011 (quoting Embrey v. Bowen, 849 F.2d 418, 422 (9th Cir. 1988)). In order to show that the claimant can do other work, the ALJ may call upon a vocational expert to testify as to what jobs the claimant would be able to perform, given his or her RFC, and the availability of those jobs in the national economy. Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1101. When a claimant has both exertional and nonexertional limitations, the ALJ must take the testimony of a vocational expert. Moore, 216 F.3d at 869 (citing Burkhart, 856 F.2d at 1340). At the hearing, the ALJ may pose hypothetical questions to the vocational expert about the claimant's ability to work considering all of the claimant's impairments. Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1011 (citing Gamer v. Sec. of Health & Human Servs., 815 F.2d 1275, 1279 (9th Cir. 1987), superseded by statute, Social Security Disability Benefits Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-460, 98 Stat. 1794 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(5)(A) (1988))). "The ALJ's depiction of the claimant's disability must be accurate, detailed, and supported by the medical record." Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1101 (citation omitted). The assumptions in the hypothetical presented to the VE must be supported by the record because "[t]he testimony of a [VE] is valuable only to the extent that it is supported by medical evidence." Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1011 (quoting Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 756 (9th Cir. 1989) (citations omitted)). The VE then testifies about what kinds of jobs Plaintiff can perform, given the hypothetical, and whether there are a sufficient number of these jobs available to support a finding of "not disabled." Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1101.

Here, the ALJ posed two complete hypotheticals to the VE in which the depiction of Plaintiff's disability was accurate, detailed and supported by the medical record. (AR 47-51). In the first hypothetical, the ALJ asked whether an individual who was the same age and had the same educational background and work experience as Plaintiff and had no exertional limitations, but should not be exposed to extreme cold, heat, wetness, humidity, fumes, dust, odors, gases or poor ventilation, would be able to perform the plumber's job. (AR 48). The VE testified that such a hypothetical individual could not perform the job of a plumber, but could be employed as a hand packager or laundry worker. (AR 48-50). In the second hypothetical, the ALJ asked whether the hypothetical individual could perform either of those jobs if he or she could only lift and carry twenty pounds occasionally and ten pounds frequently, could occasionally push, pull and kneel with the left lower extremity and had no limitations on the right, could not crawl, work with ladders, ropes or scaffolds, or work at unprotected heights, and could not have public contact or perform team-oriented tasks. (AR 50-51). The VE testified that the hypothetical individual could perform the job of a laundry worker, collator and mail sorter. (Id.).

The hypotheticals that the ALJ posed are supported by the medical record. In the first hypothetical, the ALJ incorporated the environmental limitations that Dr. Frankel suggested after he examined Plaintiff and diagnosed him with latent tuberculosis. (Compare AR 48, with AR 230). In the second hypothetical, the ALJ incorporated exertional limitations that are supported by medical records from the Arrowhead Regional Medical Center and an MRI of Plaintiff's left knee. (Compare AR 50, with AR 365, 469-74, 479-508, 510-64). Plaintiff contends that the ALJ posed incomplete hypotheticals to the VE because the ALJ did not ask the VE to assume a hypothetical individual who required a "supervised, structured environment." (MSC at 5). However, assumptions in a hypothetical presented to the VE must be supported by medical evidence. See Magallanes, 881 F.2d at 756. Here, there is no medical evidence that Plaintiff was limited to work only in a "supervised, structured environment." Although Dr. Ardebili opined that Plaintiff would "optimally thrive in a supervised, structured environment," she did not limit him to work solely in such an environment. (AR 225). Therefore, the ALJ propounded complete hypotheticals to the VE that were accurate, detailed and supported by the medical record.

Where an ALJ properly weighs the opinions of a claimant's physicians and arrives at a proper RFC, the court must uphold the ALJ's decision. See Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1110-1111 (9th Cir. 2012). Even if the evidence is susceptible to multiple interpretations, the court must uphold the ALJ's findings if they are based on substantial evidence. Id. Here, the ALJ properly weighed the opinion of examining psychologist Banafshe Ardebili and posed complete hypotheticals, supported by medical evidence, to the VE. Where the ALJ's findings are supported by substantial evidence, the Court may not substitute its own judgment for that of the Commissioner. Reddick, 157 F.3d at 720-21 (citing Flaten, 44 F.3d at 1457). Consequently, the decision of the ALJ must be affirmed.

VIII.

CONCLUSION

Consistent with the foregoing, it is ORDERED that the Judgment be entered AFFIRMING the decision of the Commissioner. The Clerk of the Court shall serve copies of this order and the Judgment on counsel for both parties.

THIS DECISION IS NOT INTENDED FOR PUBLICATION IN LEXIS, WESTLAW OR ANY OTHER LEGAL DATABASE.