DOUGLAS F. McCORMICK, Magistrate Judge.
Plaintiff Markpatrick Jacobs Moore ("Plaintiff") appeals from the final decision of the Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") denying his application for disability benefits. On appeal, the Court concludes that the ALJ did not err by determining that Plaintiff's learning and mood disorders were not severe impairments. The ALJ also gave specific, clear, and convincing reasons for discrediting Plaintiff's testimony and properly considered the medical evidence of record. Therefore, the ALJ's decision is affirmed and the matter is dismissed with prejudice.
Plaintiff was initially found disabled in 2005 based on the child disability standards. Administrative Record ("AR") 58-67. When Plaintiff turned 18 in 2011, his eligibility for disability benefits was automatically reevaluated under the adult disability standard. AR 55. Plaintiff's disability benefits were terminated after the Social Security Administration found that he was no longer disabled. AR 84. A hearing officer denied Plaintiff's request for reconsideration, also finding that Plaintiff was no longer disabled. AR 110-18. Plaintiff then requested a hearing in front of an ALJ. AR 122-24. After the hearing at which Plaintiff testified, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had the medically determinable impairments of learning disorder and mood disorder. AR 23. However, the ALJ discounted Plaintiff's credibility about the severity of his symptoms and concluded that his impairments were not severe. AR 23-26. The ALJ accordingly issued an unfavorable decision. AR 26.
The parties dispute whether the ALJ erred in: (1) not finding Plaintiff's learning and mood disorders to be severe impairments at step two of the sequential evaluation process; (2) negatively assessing Plaintiff's credibility; and (3) failing to properly consider the medical evidence of record.
Under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), a district court may review the Commissioner's decision to deny benefits. The ALJ's findings and decision should be upheld if they are free from legal error and are supported by substantial evidence based on the record as a whole. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g);
Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred in failing to find that his learning and mood disorders were severe impairments. JS at 4-10. The existence of a severe impairment is demonstrated when the evidence establishes that an impairment has more than a minimal effect on an individual's ability to perform basic work activities.
Here, Plaintiff has not offered sufficient evidence to demonstrate that his learning and mood disorders have more than a minimal effect on his ability to perform work-related functions. Although Plaintiff was diagnosed with depressive disorder and learning disorder in January 2012, AR 310-316, a mere diagnosis does not establish a severe impairment.
If Plaintiff believed his learning and mood disorders negatively affected his ability to work, he bore the burden of providing supporting medical documentation. The ALJ specifically asked Plaintiff for supporting medical records during the hearing, even encouraging Plaintiff to tell his treating doctors to cooperate with the ALJ's request that they submit records. AR 25, 43, 47-52, 53-54. As noted by the ALJ, the only objective evidence Plaintiff provided was a letter and an initial assessment from his social worker. AR 25 (citing AR 310). However, Plaintiff's social worker is not an accepted medical source under the regulations.
Nor did Plaintiff's testimony at the administrative hearing establish any functional limitations caused by his learning or mood disorders. In response to a question by the ALJ, Plaintiff testified that he was receiving treatment twice per month for anger and antisocial issues, but he presented no corroborating medical evidence that showed that he suffered from functional limitations. AR 49. In addition, the ALJ noted that Plaintiff produced no evidence that he was taking medication during the relevant period to control his allegedly disabling symptoms. AR 24-25. Nor did Plaintiff require inpatient mental treatment or psychiatric hospitalization. AR 24. Thus, there was no evidence in the medical record that Plaintiff's learning and mood disorders were sufficiently severe to affect his ability to perform work-related functions.
Finally, although Plaintiff presented school records from 2006-2009 revealing failing grades and "far below basic" test results, AR 254-55, such records alone do not establish a severe learning disability, nor do they prove the existence of functional limitations during the relevant period years later.
Although the threshold required to show that an impairment is severe at step two is "minimal," Plaintiff did not meet his burden of showing that his learning and mood disorders were sufficiently severe to negatively affect his ability to perform work-related functions. Accordingly, the ALJ did not err in failing to find Plaintiff's learning and mood disorders to be severe impairments.
Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred by failing to provide clear and convincing reasons for discounting his subjective symptom testimony. JS at 10-15. Plaintiff testified that he suffered from learning disorder and mood disorder, and that he could not maintain concentration, read, write, or talk to people. AR 45-46;
To determine whether a claimant's testimony about subjective pain or symptoms is credible, an ALJ must engage in a two-step analysis.
An ALJ may reject a claimant's credibility upon finding evidence of malingering.
The Court finds that the ALJ properly found that Plaintiff's subjective testimony was not entirely credible because the record contained evidence of malingering, and the ALJ gave specific, clear, and convincing reasons for discrediting Plaintiff's testimony, each of which is fully supported by the record.
First, the ALJ noted that Plaintiff's medical records showed evidence of malingering. AR 25. Specifically, psychiatrist Dr. John Stephenson's evaluation stated that Plaintiff "presented suboptimal level of effort based on the test of memory malingering." AR 269-71. The evidence of malingering here supports the ALJ's finding that Plaintiff's reports of his impairments were not fully credible.
Second, the ALJ considered that Plaintiff's claims of disabling mental disorders were unsupported by the medical evidence. After extensively reviewing the medical record, the ALJ concluded that the medical evidence generally showed no severe mental impairments. Dr. Stephenson found normal mental status and he determined that Plaintiff had no limitations in his mental abilities. AR 270-71. Two other examining psychiatrists, Dr. Sidney Gold and Dr. L. Colsky, also reported that Plaintiff had no severe mental impairments. AR 274, 293. A letter by social worker Linda Lee described an initial assessment of depressive disorder, but contained no subsequent treatment notes thereafter. AR 310. "Although lack of medical evidence cannot form the sole basis for discounting pain testimony, it is a factor that the ALJ can consider in his credibility analysis."
On appellate review, this Court does not reweigh the hearing evidence regarding Plaintiff's credibility. Rather, this Court is limited to determining whether the ALJ properly identified specific, clear, and convincing reasons for discrediting Plaintiff's credibility.
Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred in failing to consider the medical evidence of record. JS at 5-10. An ALJ must provide "clear and convincing" reasons for rejecting the uncontradicted opinion of either a treating or examining physician or psychologist.
The Court finds that the ALJ properly considered the medical evidence from the relevant period, which began on November 1, 2011, when Plaintiff was found no longer disabled under the adult disability standard. On January 3, 2006, Dr. Izzi performed a consultative psychological examination where he noted that Plaintiff had borderline intellectual functioning with a full scale intelligence quotient (IQ) score of 72. AR 264-65. Dr. Izzi also noted a diagnosis of attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD).
The Court also finds that the ALJ properly relied on the available medical evidence of record, including the opinions of examining and consultative physicians who concluded that Plaintiff suffered from no mental limitations. In making his findings, the ALJ gave "great weight" to Dr. Stephenson's opinion. AR 25. Following a psychological examination on October 28, 2011, Dr. Stephenson found that Plaintiff had no significant limitations and gave no diagnosis. AR 268-71. Dr. Stephenson's examination occurred only four days before the start of Plaintiff's relevant period. AR 267-273. The ALJ noted that Dr. Stephenson's opinion was consistent with the opinions of Dr. Colsky and Dr. Gold. AR 25. Specifically, Dr. Gold concluded that Plaintiff's learning disorder was nonsevere and that he had no functional limitations. AR 274-84, 289-90. Likewise, Dr. Colsky opined that Plaintiff had no medically determinable psychiatric impairment and no functional limitations. AR 293-303.
Accordingly, the ALJ did not err in not considering the medical evidence of record, and Plaintiff is therefore not entitled to relief on this claim of error.
For the reasons stated above, the decision of the Social Security Commissioner is AFFIRMED and the action is DISMISSED with prejudice.