MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER REVERSING COMMISSIONER

JEAN ROSENBLUTH, Magistrate Judge.

I. PROCEEDINGS

Plaintiff seeks review of the Commissioner's final decision denying her applications for Social Security disability insurance benefits ("DIB") and supplemental security income benefits ("SSI"). The parties consented to the jurisdiction of the undersigned U.S. Magistrate Judge under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). The matter is before the Court on the parties' Joint Stipulation, filed December 28, 2015, which the Court has taken under submission without oral argument. For the reasons stated below, the Commissioner's decision is reversed and this action is remanded for further proceedings.

II. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff was born in 1956. (Administrative Record ("AR") 155.) She completed 12th grade and worked as a secretary for a moving company. (AR 191, 218.)

On February 6, 2013, Plaintiff filed applications for DIB and SSI (AR 12), alleging that she had been unable to work since January 15, 2013, because of an enlarged heart, diabetes, carpal-tunnel syndrome, poor kidney function, high blood pressure, and shortness of breath. (AR 190.) After her applications were denied initially and on reconsideration, she requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge. (AR 100-01.) A hearing was held on July 9, 2014, at which Plaintiff, who was represented by counsel, testified, as did a vocational expert. (AR 23-43.) In a written decision issued September 5, 2014, the ALJ found Plaintiff not disabled. (AR 10-21.) This action followed.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), a district court may review the Commissioner's decision to deny benefits. The ALJ's findings and decision should be upheld if they are free of legal error and supported by substantial evidence based on the record as a whole. See id.; Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); Parra v. Astrue, 481 F.3d 742, 746 (9th Cir. 2007). Substantial evidence means such evidence as a reasonable person might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Richardson, 402 U.S. at 401; Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1035 (9th Cir. 2007). It is more than a scintilla but less than a preponderance. Lingenfelter, 504 F.3d at 1035 (citing Robbins v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 466 F.3d 880, 882 (9th Cir. 2006)). To determine whether substantial evidence supports a finding, the reviewing court "must review the administrative record as a whole, weighing both the evidence that supports and the evidence that detracts from the Commissioner's conclusion." Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 720 (9th Cir. 1996). "If the evidence can reasonably support either affirming or reversing," the reviewing court "may not substitute its judgment" for the Commissioner's. Id. at 720-21.

IV. THE EVALUATION OF DISABILITY

People are "disabled" for purposes of receiving Social Security benefits if they are unable to engage in any substantial gainful activity owing to a physical or mental impairment that is expected to result in death or has lasted, or is expected to last, for a continuous period of at least 12 months. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A); Drouin v. Sullivan, 966 F.2d 1255, 1257 (9th Cir. 1992).

A. The Five-Step Evaluation Process

The ALJ follows a five-step sequential evaluation process to assess whether a claimant is disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4); Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 828 n.5 (9th Cir. 1995) (as amended Apr. 9, 1996). In the first step, the Commissioner must determine whether the claimant is currently engaged in substantial gainful activity; if so, the claimant is not disabled and the claim must be denied. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i), 416.920(a)(4)(i).

If the claimant is not engaged in substantial gainful activity, the second step requires the Commissioner to determine whether the claimant has a "severe" impairment or combination of impairments significantly limiting her ability to do basic work activities; if not, the claimant is not disabled and her claim must be denied. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii), 416.920(a)(4)(ii).

If the claimant has a "severe" impairment or combination of impairments, the third step requires the Commissioner to determine whether the impairment or combination of impairments meets or equals an impairment in the Listing of Impairments ("Listing") set forth at 20 C.F.R. part 404, subpart P, appendix 1; if so, disability is conclusively presumed. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iii), 416.920(a)(4)(iii).

If the claimant's impairment or combination of impairments does not meet or equal an impairment in the Listing, the fourth step requires the Commissioner to determine whether the claimant has sufficient residual functional capacity ("RFC")1 to perform her past work; if so, she is not disabled and the claim must be denied. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv), 416.920(a)(4)(iv). The claimant has the burden of proving she is unable to perform past relevant work. Drouin, 966 F.2d at 1257. If the claimant meets that burden, a prima facie case of disability is established. Id.

If that happens or if the claimant has no past relevant work, the Commissioner then bears the burden of establishing that the claimant is not disabled because she can perform other substantial gainful work available in the national economy. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v), 416.920(a)(4)(v); Drouin, 966 F.2d at 1257. That determination comprises the fifth and final step in the sequential analysis. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v), 416.920(a)(4)(v); Lester, 81 F.3d at 828 n.5; Drouin, 966 F.2d at 1257.

B. The ALJ's Application of the Five-Step Process

At step one, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since January 15, 2013, the alleged onset date. (AR 14.) At step two, he concluded that Plaintiff had severe impairments of supermorbid obesity with insulin-dependent diabetes mellitus type II, diabetic peripheral neuropathy, asthma, and essential hypertension. (Id.) At step three, he determined that Plaintiff's impairments did not meet or equal a listing. (Id.)

At step four, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had the RFC to perform sedentary work but must stand and stretch every 15 minutes for one minute and use an oxygen tank on wheels. (AR 15.) Plaintiff could be exposed to no more air pollutants than found in an air-conditioned environment, and she could frequently handle and constantly finger. (Id.)

Based on the VE's testimony, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff could perform her past relevant work as a secretary. (AR 17.) Accordingly, he found her not disabled. (AR 18.)

V. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff claims that the ALJ failed to pose a complete hypothetical question to the VE, properly consider her obesity, and properly assess her credibility. (J. Stip. at 2-3.) Because the ALJ's findings concerning Plaintiff's credibility were insufficient, the matter must be remanded for further analysis and findings. The Court therefore does not reach the other two issues.

A. The ALJ Failed to Adequately Explain Why He Found Plaintiff Only Partially Credible

Plaintiff contends that the ALJ improperly rejected her testimony based solely on a lack of corroborating medical findings. (J. Stip. at 16 (citing Vertigan v. Halter, 260 F.3d 1044, 1049 (9th Cir. 2001).)

1. Applicable law

An ALJ's assessment of symptom severity and claimant credibility is entitled to "great weight." See Weetman v. Sullivan, 877 F.2d 20, 22 (9th Cir. 1989); Nyman v. Heckler, 779 F.2d 528, 531 (9th Cir. 1986). "[T]he ALJ is not required to believe every allegation of disabling pain, or else disability benefits would be available for the asking, a result plainly contrary to 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(5)(A)." Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Fair v. Bowen, 885 F.2d 597, 603 (9th Cir. 1989)).

In evaluating a claimant's subjective symptom testimony, the ALJ engages in a two-step analysis. See Lingenfelter, 504 F.3d at 1035-36. "First, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant has presented objective medical evidence of an underlying impairment [that] could reasonably be expected to produce the pain or other symptoms alleged." Id. at 1036. If such objective medical evidence exists, the ALJ may not reject a claimant's testimony "simply because there is no showing that the impairment can reasonably produce the degree of symptom alleged." Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1282 (9th Cir. 1996) (emphasis in original).

If the claimant meets the first test, the ALJ may discredit the claimant's subjective symptom testimony only if he makes specific findings that support the conclusion. See Berry v. Astrue, 622 F.3d 1228, 1234 (9th Cir. 2010). Absent a finding or affirmative evidence of malingering, the ALJ must provide "clear and convincing" reasons for rejecting the claimant's testimony. Brown-Hunter v. Colvin, 806 F.3d 487, 493 (9th Cir. 2015) (as amended); Treichler v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 775 F.3d 1090, 1102 (9th Cir. 2014). The ALJ may consider, among other factors, (1) ordinary techniques of credibility evaluation, such as the claimant's reputation for lying, prior inconsistent statements, and other testimony by the claimant that appears less than candid; (2) unexplained or inadequately explained failure to seek treatment or to follow a prescribed course of treatment; (3) the claimant's daily activities; (4) the claimant's work record; and (5) testimony from physicians and third parties. Rounds v. Comm'r Soc. Sec. Admin., 807 F.3d 996, 1006 (9th Cir. 2015) (as amended); Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 958-59 (9th Cir. 2002). If the ALJ's credibility finding is supported by substantial evidence in the record, the reviewing court "may not engage in second-guessing." Thomas, 278 F.3d at 959.

2. Relevant background

In reports dated March 25, 2013, Plaintiff wrote that she was unable to stand for more than 20 minutes, bend down, or squat because of painful, swollen legs. (AR 201, 207.) She could not sit "for a long time" and could walk only 30 yards before needing a 10-minute rest. (Id.) Her diabetes affected her eyesight, and she needed to urinate "often on some days." (AR 207, 209.) Her daily activities included straightening up around the house, watching television, watering the front and back yards with her left hand, and feeding the dog. (AR 202.) She cooked once a week, did laundry twice a week, shopped for groceries in stores once a week for 30 minutes, cared for her seven-year-old granddaughter once a week, and attended her granddaughter's sports games twice a week. (AR 203-06.) She reported that someone needed to accompany her to the store and her granddaughter's games. (AR 206.) She had no problems with memory, attention, concentration, ability to complete tasks, personal care, or getting along with others. (AR 207.)

In a disability report dated May 21, 2013, Plaintiff reported an increase in the severity of her symptoms, including difficulty balancing and gripping with her right hand. (AR 210.) Her listed diagnoses included anxiety, depression, "difficulties with social functioning," emotional withdrawal, and isolation. (AR 214.) She could not eat without spilling food and needed help with personal care and administering insulin. (AR 210, 213.)

In an August 18, 2013 function report, Plaintiff reiterated the symptoms from March 2013 and added decreased kidney function, an inability to stand, rashes on both hands and arms, and a tingling sensation in her fingers. (AR 237.) She reported that her illnesses affected her memory, concentration, and ability to complete tasks. (AR 242.) Her daily activities had not significantly changed from the March 2013 function report. (AR 238-41.) Plaintiff listed side effects from her prescribed medications, such as numbness, swelling, blurred vision, rash, dizziness, and joint pain. (AR 244.) She had no problem with personal care but could pay attention for only 20 minutes. (AR 238, 242.)

At the July 2014 ALJ hearing, Plaintiff testified that she had trouble picking things up, as her hands would get numb and heavy. (AR 32-33.) She could not sit for more than approximately 10 minutes, including at the ALJ hearing, without her legs feeling numb and requiring her to stand up, which had led to her losing her balance and falling. (AR 33.) She was able to walk a distance of approximately six house lengths before becoming tired. (AR 34.) Walking that distance and returning home would take between 20 and 45 minutes. (AR 34-35.) Finally, Plaintiff testified that she had used a prescribed oxygen tank since October 2013, after suffering a "mini stroke." (AR 28-37.)

3. Analysis

The ALJ credited some of Plaintiff's subjective complaints, such as her asserted inability to stand or walk for prolonged periods, and he therefore limited her to a range of sedentary work. (AR 17.) But the ALJ discredited Plaintiff's complaints to the extent they were inconsistent with her RFC, finding that although her "medically determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to cause the alleged symptoms[,] . . . [her] statements concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms [were] not entirely credible." (AR 16.) As discussed below, the ALJ's findings were insufficient.

The ALJ discounted Plaintiff's subjective complaints because they were unsupported by the medical record. (AR 17.) As to Plaintiff's complaints of shortness of breath, foot pain, and hand numbness, the ALJ found "scant evidence of any neurological or pulmonary problems when [Plaintiff] was hospitalized for six days at the end of September 2012." (AR 16; see AR 255-56, 318-19.) Furthermore, "she did not complain of hand numbness until January 2013 with minimal decrease in grip strength bilaterally." (AR 16; AR 322-23.) Plaintiff first saw a pulmonologist on February 3, 2014; she reported a history of shortness of breath with wheezing, cough and phlegm, and asthma. (AR 16, 367-68.) The ALJ noted that the treatment record was incomplete but showed that Plaintiff was not using a rescue inhaler at the time of the pulmonary consultation, her lungs were clear to auscultation bilaterally, and her breathing was normal. (Id.) The ALJ also noted that on July 5, 2014, Plaintiff was treated in an emergency room for an asthma attack. (AR 16, 352.) The ALJ found that a brain MRI and chest x-ray did not show "anything of medical [significance]," and emergency-room records did not include any physical-examination or laboratory findings. (AR 16, 351-66.) Finally, the ALJ also found that Plaintiff's poor eyesight had been corrected to "20/20-1" by her optometrist as of April 19, 2011. (AR 16; see AR 343.)

Although the ALJ's findings appear to be supported by substantial evidence, the lack of objective medical evidence corroborating Plaintiff's subjective symptom testimony cannot alone support the ALJ's adverse credibility finding. See Robbins, 466 F.3d at 883 (explaining that ALJ may not make negative credibility finding "solely because" claimant's symptom testimony "is not substantiated affirmatively by objective medical evidence"); Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 681 (9th Cir. 2005) (stating that ALJ may consider "lack of medical evidence" as factor in credibility analysis, but it "cannot form the sole basis for discounting pain testimony"). The ALJ did not provide any other reasons for discounting Plaintiff's credibility.2

Thus, even if the Court were to agree that the objective medical evidence did not support Plaintiff's allegations of disabling pain, remand is still warranted because the ALJ failed to give any other clear and convincing reason for discounting her credibility. See Moisa v. Barnhart, 367 F.3d 882, 885 (9th Cir. 2004) (reversing Commissioner when ALJ rejected plaintiff's pain testimony solely for lack of objective medical evidence); Figueroa v. Colvin, No. CV 14-06522-GJS, 2015 WL 4331300, at *2 (C.D. Cal. July 15, 2015) (remanding for further proceedings because ALJ failed to provide clear and convincing reason for discounting plaintiff's credibility "apart from the lack of objective medical evidence").

The Commissioner argues that "[Plaintiff] testified that she believed that she could return to her former work . . . [which] directly contradicts any claim that she is incapable of working." (J. Stip. at 18-19.) Although this may be a valid reason for discounting Plaintiff's credibility, see Rounds, 807 F.3d at 1006 (ALJ may consider claimant's inconsistent statements); Verduzco v. Apfel, 188 F.3d 1087, 1090 (9th Cir. 1999) (in assessing credibility, ALJ can consider whether plaintiff's statements were inconsistent with other statements and evidence), the ALJ did not cite Plaintiff's testimony that she believed she could do her previous job as a reason for discounting her credibility. (See AR 16-17.) As such, the Court cannot rely on it to affirm the ALJ's credibility determination. See Burrell v. Colvin, 775 F.3d 1133, 1139 (9th Cir. 2014) (rejecting government's argument that ALJ's findings concerning claimant's treatment for headaches supported adverse credibility decision because ALJ "never stated that he rested his . . . credibility determination on those findings").

In sum, the ALJ's explanation for his adverse credibility determination was insufficient and remand is appropriate to allow him to reevaluate or more fully explain that finding. Plaintiff is entitled to remand on this ground.

B. Remand for Further Proceedings Is Appropriate

When, as here, an ALJ errs in denying benefits, the Court generally has discretion to remand for further proceedings. See Harman v. Apfel, 211 F.3d 1172, 1175-78 (9th Cir. 2000) (as amended). When no useful purpose would be served by further administrative proceedings, however, or when the record has been fully developed, it is appropriate under the "credit-as-true" rule to direct an immediate award of benefits. See id. at 1179 (noting that "the decision of whether to remand for further proceedings turns upon the likely utility of such proceedings"); Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1019-20 (9th Cir. 2014).

Under the credit-as-true framework, three circumstances must be present before a court may remand to the ALJ with instructions to award benefits:

Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1020; Treichler, 775 F.3d at 1100-01. When, however, the ALJ's findings are so "insufficient" that a court cannot determine whether the rejected testimony should be credited as true, the court has "some flexibility" in applying the credit-as-true rule. Connett v. Barnhart, 340 F.3d 871, 876 (9th Cir. 2003); see also Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1020 (noting that Connett established that credit-as-true rule may not be dispositive in all cases); Treichler, 775 F.3d at 1101 (noting that remand for benefits is inappropriate when "there is conflicting evidence, and not all essential factual issues have been resolved").

Here, remand for further proceedings is appropriate because the ALJ erred in assessing Plaintiff's credibility. It may well be that the ALJ had adequate reasons to find Plaintiff's statements not credible but simply failed to express them. Indeed, as the Commissioner notes (J. Stip. at 18-19), Plaintiff herself believed she could work; moreover, several of her statements regarding her symptoms and abilities were inconsistent. (Compare AR 213 (May 2013, alleging need for help with dressing and caring for hair) with AR 238 (Aug. 2013, alleging "no problem" with personal care including dressing and caring for hair); compare AR 190 (Mar. 2013, alleging that conditions became severe enough to preclude work in Jan. 2013) and AR 100 (Oct. 2013, alleging total disability and inability to work) with AR 31 (July 2014, alleging ability to work at previous job); compare AR 214 (May 2013, alleging "diagnoses" of anxiety, depression, "[d]ifficulties with social functioning," and "[e]motional withdrawal and isolation") with AR 237-46 (Aug. 2013, failing to mention any problems with anxiety, depression, social functioning, and emotional withdrawal) and AR 242-43 (Aug. 2013, alleging that she had no "unusual behavior or fears" and could handle stress well, get along with others, handle changes in routine well, and follow written and spoken instructions well).) Thus, remand for further credibility analysis and findings is appropriate.

Upon remand, the ALJ may, if warranted, make further findings regarding Plaintiff's obesity and solicit additional VE testimony regarding Plaintiff's use of an oxygen tank in the workplace.

VI. CONCLUSION

Consistent with the foregoing and under sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g),3 IT IS ORDERED that judgment be entered REVERSING the decision of the Commissioner, GRANTING Plaintiff's request for remand, and REMANDING this action for further proceedings consistent with this Memorandum Decision. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk serve copies of this Order and the Judgment on counsel for both parties.