SUZANNE H. SEGAL, Magistrate Judge.
Susan F. Wyatt ("Plaintiff") seeks review of the final decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (the "Commissioner" or the "Agency") denying request for her social security benefits. The parties consented, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), to the jurisdiction of the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge. For the reasons stated below, the decision of the Commissioner is REVERSED and REMANDED for further administrative proceedings consistent with this decision.
Plaintiff filed an application for Title XVI Supplemental Security Income ("SSI") on January 25, 2012.
A hearing before an ALJ was scheduled for June 28, 2013 at the Agency's office in Boise, Idaho. (AR 135-36). However, upon Plaintiff's request, the Agency transferred jurisdiction of the claim to the Agency's office in Moreno Valley, California on June 28, 2013. (AR 141-46). A hearing was then scheduled at the Agency's Moreno Valley, California office for January 27, 2014. (AR 155-59). However, on January 8, 2014, Plaintiff's counsel withdrew from representation following the transfer of jurisdiction. (AR 179). On January 13, 2014, Plaintiff requested a continuance from the Agency to retain new counsel. (AR 181). Plaintiff retained Mario A. Davila as her representative on January 17, 2014. (AR 207). Plaintiff retained Valerie Garcia as her representative on February 17, 2014. (AR 225).
Plaintiff testified at a hearing before ALJ Marti Kirby on February 19, 2014 ("Hearing"). (AR 44-65). Vocational Expert ("VE") Luis Mas also testified. (AR 61-64).
The ALJ issued an unfavorable decision on March 6, 2014. (AR 21-43). Plaintiff filed a timely request for review with the Appeals Council ("Council") on April 2, 2014, (AR 19), which the Council denied on July 25, 2015. (AR 1-5). The ALJ's decision thus became the final decision of the Commissioner. Plaintiff filed the instant action on September 23, 2015. (Dkt. No. 1).
To qualify for disability benefits, a claimant must demonstrate a medically determinable physical or mental impairment that prevents her from engaging in substantial gainful activity and that is expected to result in death or to last for a continuous period of at least twelve months.
To decide if a claimant is entitled to benefits, an ALJ conducts a five-step inquiry. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920. The steps are:
The claimant has the burden of proof at steps one through four, and the Commissioner has the burden of proof at step five.
The ALJ employed the five-step sequential evaluation process. At step one, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful employment since January 25, 2012.
At step four, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff retained a Residual Functional Capacity ("RFC") to "perform a full range of work at all exertional levels" subject to the following non-exertional limitations:
(AR 29).
In making this finding, the ALJ considered Plaintiff's subjective allegations, but found them not credible and "inconsistent with the objective medical evidence." (AR 30). The ALJ also rejected the statements of Plaintiff's husband. (AR 31). The ALJ gave "great weight" to the opinions of the State agency psychological consultants in his decision and rejected the opinion of Plaintiff's treating physician, Dr. Denise Dittemore, as "inconsistent with the objective medical evidence as a whole." (AR 35-36).
Finally, at step five the ALJ considered Plaintiff's age, education, work experience and RFC, and concluded that she could perform jobs available in significant numbers in the national economy. (AR 37). The ALJ noted that, due to Plaintiff's "nonexertional limitations," she could not be expected to perform work at "all exertional levels." (AR 37). However, considering the VE's testimony, the ALJ found that Plaintiff could find employment in small parts assembly, as a swatch clerk, or as a photocopy machine worker. (AR 37). Therefore, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff was not disabled under the Agency's rules. (AR 38).
Under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), a district court may review the Commissioner's decision to deny benefits. The court may set aside the Commissioner's decision when the ALJ's findings are based on legal error or are not supported by "substantial evidence" in the record as a whole.
"Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla, but less than a preponderance."
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to provide reasons supported by substantial evidence for rejecting the opinion of her treating physician, Dr. Dittemore. (Plaintiff's Memorandum in Support of Complaint (the "MSC"), Dkt. No. 17, at 5). Plaintiff further argues that the Appeals Council erred in refusing to consider new medical evidence material to the determination of disability. (MSC at 12). The Court agrees with both contentions.
The record demonstrates that the ALJ failed to provide legitimate reasons for rejecting the opinion of Plaintiff's treating physician. In addition, the Appeals Council improperly excluded new medical information, which may be material to the disability determination. Accordingly, for the reasons discussed below, the Court finds that the ALJ's decision must be REVERSED and REMANDED.
Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ erred in rejecting the treating physician's opinion by improperly relying on isolated evidence of conservative medical treatment and intermittent improvements in Plaintiff's condition. (MSC at 7-9). The Court agrees.
In a disability determination before the Agency, the opinions of treating physicians are entitled to special weight because the treating physician is hired to cure, and therefore has a better opportunity to know and observe the claimant as an individual.
Dr. Dittemore treated Plaintiff from August 2013 through June 2014. (
Plaintiff saw Dr. Dittemore again on January 3, 2014. (AR 467-69). Dr. Dittemore noted that Plaintiff suffered from "depression and low energy," and had "difficulty keeping up hygiene." (AR 468). She opined that Plaintiff's mental impairments had a moderate impact on her "ability to make judgments on simple work-related decisions." (AR 468). She also stated that Plaintiff had "extreme" limitations in her ability to "respond appropriately to usual work situations and to changes in a routine work setting." (AR 468).
The ALJ gave "little weight" to Dr. Dittemore's opinion that Plaintiff "did not have the mental capacity to engage in sustained work activity" because the opinion was "inconsistent with the objective medical evidence as a whole." (AR 36). Specifically, the ALJ rejected Dr. Dittemore's opinion because:
(AR 36) (internal citations omitted).
As discussed more fully below, the Court finds that the ALJ's reasons for rejecting Dr. Dittemore's opinions were not "specific and legitimate reasons." Therefore, remand is required.
The ALJ rejected Dr. Dittemore's opinion because Plaintiff's "medication regimen was effective in controlling [Plaintiff's] symptoms." (AR 36). The ALJ cited treatment notes from the staff of the Lifeways mental clinic ("Lifeways") from April 2011 — March 2013, (AR 333-71), indicating that Plaintiff's medication regimen was effective "even when [Plaintiff] complained of increased symptoms related to psychological stressors, lack of medicine use, or drug use." (AR 36).
While the cited treatment note passages appear to show an improvement in Plaintiff's condition, the ALJ failed to mention that the records also show frequent fluctuations over the same period. For example, the ALJ cited a January 23, 2013 Lifeways report in which clinical staff noted that Plaintiff stated, "I feel so much better." (AR 445). However, the same medical report noted that the Plaintiff "is still having panic attacks, a couple times a week." (AR 445). Moreover, the ALJ ignored a follow-up medical report from February 19, 2013, in which Lifeways staff said Plaintiff "went from severe agitation, to crying, to having panic symptoms, all within minutes of one another." (AR 443).
Thus, the ALJ's reliance on a finding that the "medication regimen was effective in controlling [Plaintiff's] symptoms" reflects an overly selective reading of the record. This selective reading fails to constitute substantial evidence to discredit Dr. Dittemore's opinion.
Moreover, even if the record consistently showed that medication improved Plaintiff's condition, this fact alone would not demonstrate that the Plaintiff was not disabled under Agency rules.
Because the medical evidence demonstrates that Plaintiff continued to suffer from a serious mental impairment, the ALJ's finding that the medication regimen was "effective" in controlling her symptoms is not a legitimate reason to reject Dr. Dittemore's opinion.
The ALJ found that Dr. Dittemore's opinion was inconsistent with Plaintiff's medical records because she received "conservative treatment despite complaints of increased psychological symptoms." (AR 36). In rejecting Dr. Dittemore's opinion, the ALJ only considered Dr. Dittemore's treatment records and not past records prepared by Lifeways staff. (AR 36). The full record shows that Plaintiff regularly sought mental health treatment since at least April 2011. (AR 370-71). Doctors prescribed Plaintiff a variety of medications to treat her mental illness, including Clonazepam, Seroquel, Sertraline, Trazadone and Wellbutrin. (
The ALJ's characterization of Plaintiff's treatment as "conservative" is questionable. An ALJ may use evidence of "conservative care" to discount testimony regarding the severity of an impairment.
Plaintiff asserts that the Appeals Council improperly excluded new medical evidence relating to Plaintiff's condition prior to the ALJ's decision. (MSC at 13). The Court agrees.
When making a disability determination, "[i]f new and material evidence is submitted, the Appeals Council shall consider the evidence only where it relates to the period on or before the date of the administrative law judge hearing decision." 20 C.F.R. § 404.970(b). Medical evaluations done after the relevant time period are still relevant, if they relate back to the Plaintiff's condition during the time period at issue.
This Court may remand a matter to the Agency if the new evidence is "material" to a determination of disability, and Plaintiff shows "good cause" for having failed to produce that evidence earlier. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). To be material, the new evidence must bear directly and substantially on the matter at issue and there must be a "reasonable possibility" that the new evidence would have changed the outcome of the administrative hearing.
Here, Plaintiff submitted a Mental Impairment Questionnaire, completed by Dr. Dittemore, to the Appeals Counsel along with her request for review. (AR 307). Dr. Dittemore completed the questionnaire on March 11, 2014, five days after the ALJ's decision. (AR 307). In the questionnaire, Dr. Dittemore diagnosed Plaintiff with bipolar I disorder, generalized anxiety and PTSD. (AR 307). She also opined that Plaintiff was "markedly limited in understanding and memory; concentration and persistence; social interactions, and adaptation; and would likely experience episodes of decompensation or deterioration in a work or work-like setting." (AR 307).
In denying Plaintiff's Request for Review, the Appeals Council acknowledged that it received new medical records dated March 11, 2014 and June 16, 2014. (AR 2). Plaintiff contends that the new evidence "could essentially have supported [Dr. Dittemore's] January 2014 opinion" regarding Plaintiff's mental health during the period under consideration by the ALJ. (MSC at 12). However, the Appeals Council summarily refused to consider the evidence because "the new information [was] about a later time." (AR 2). While the Appeals Council could have properly rejected new medical evidence relating to the five-day period between the ALJ's decision and the questionnaire's completion, it should have considered any information pertaining to the period prior to the ALJ's decision. The March 11, 2014 questionnaire included diagnoses for bipolar I disorder, generalized anxiety and PTSD. (AR 307). That diagnosis, made within five days of the ALJ's decision, was not "about a later time," but was consistent with Dr. Dittemore's diagnosis of the Plaintiff dating back to their first meeting on August 15, 2013. (AR 461, 480). The new evidence appeared to include the time period of Dr. Dittemore's treatment of Plaintiff, which includes the time period under consideration by the ALJ. Accordingly, the Appeals Council erred in excluding Dr. Dittemore's questionnaire from its consideration because the new evidence related to the period before the date of the ALJ's decision.
Remand for further proceedings is appropriate where additional proceedings could remedy defects in the Commissioner's decision.
Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that Judgment be entered REVERSING the decision of the Commissioner and REMANDING this matter for further proceedings consistent with this decision. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court serve copies of this Order and the Judgment on counsel for both parties.