ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT AGAINST DEFENDANTS MATT JOHNSON FINANCE, INC., FAX87, ONE VOIX, MIRALUNA CABERTE YARDAN, ONLINEFAXES, SOLIDFAX, FAXVISION, EFAX4LESS, MYPHONEFAX AND RESELLFAX

DEAN D. PREGERSON, District Judge.

Presently before the court is Plaintiffs j2 Cloud Services, LLC and Advanced Messaging Technologies, Inc.'s (collectively, "j2") Motion for Default Judgment Against Defendants Fax87, Matt Johnson Finance, Inc. ("MJF"), One Voix, Miraluna Caberte Yardan ("Ms. Yardan"), OnlineFaxes, SolidFax, FaxVision, eFax4Less, MyPhoneFax, and ResellFax (collectively, "Defaulting Defendants"). (Dkt. 155.) Having considered the parties submissions and heard oral argument, the court adopts the following Order.

I. BACKGROUND

The court assumes the parties familiarity with the facts, which have been set forth more fully in prior Orders. (See Dkts. 32, 106, 167.) In brief, j2 is the owner of U.S. Patents No. 6,208,638 ("'638 patent") and 6,350,066 ("'066 patent"). (First Amended and Supplemental Complaint ("FASC") ¶ 25, 29.) In a prior action, j2 brought suit against Defendants Farjad Fani, Fax 87, and MJF for patent infringement. (Id. ¶ 45.) The parties settled the case, and j2 entered into a patent licensing agreement. (Id. ¶¶ 46-47.)

On July 24, 2013, Plaintiffs filed a new action asserting, inter alia, that Fani and associated entities breached the settlement agreement, violated the licensing agreement, and infringed j2's patents. (FASC ¶ 42.) While the original suit pertained only to Fani, Fax87, and MJF, this new action names a number of additional defendants, including alleged alter egos of the Fax87 companies and corporate officers from the various affiliate companies. According to j2, these affiliate companies continued to operate out of the Philippines and provided infringing services in violation of j2's patents and the various contractual agreements among the parties. j2 was able to serve MJF at the outset of this litigation but had difficulty locating and properly serving several other Defendants. (See Dkt. 32, 106.) By June 2016, however, j2 was able to locate and validly serve all Defaulting Defendants. (Dkt. 80.) Defaulting Defendants failed to respond to the Complaint, and the Clerk entered default against each of these defendants. (Dkts. 76, 94, 119-120.)

Pursuant to Rule 54(b), j2 now seeks default judgment against the Defaulting Defendants. (Mot. Default J. 2.) In particular, j2 seeks (1) an award compensatory damages, enhanced damages and attorneys fees, totaling $25,990,870.00; (2) preliminary and permanent injunctive relief to prevent future infringement of j2's patents and trademarks, as well as future unfair competition; and (3) an order requiring Defaulting Defendant MJF to pay the judgment from undistributed corporate assets and/or to recover assets wrongly distributed to its shareholders and officers. (Id.)

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(b) authorizes the court to enter default judgment against a defendant whom the clerk has previously entered default. After the clerk enters default against a defendant, the factual allegations of the complaint, except those relating to damages, are taken as true. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(b)(6); TeleVideo Sys., Inc. v. Heidenthal, 826 F.2d 915, 917-18 (9th Cir. 1987). A plaintiff, however, is not automatically entitled to a court-entered default judgment simply by virtue of the clerk's default. Draper v. Coombs, 792 F.2d 915, 924-25 (9th Cir. 1986). The court has discretion to enter default judgment. Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 446 U.S. 1, 8 (1980).

The following factors are relevant in deciding whether to enter default judgment: (1) the possibility of prejudice to the plaintiff; (2) the merits of plaintiff's substantive claim; (3) the sufficiency of the complaint; (4) the sum of money at stake; (5) the possibility of a dispute concerning material facts; (6) whether default was due to excusable neglect and (7) the strong policy favoring decision on the merits. Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1471-72 (9th Cir. 1986). Where multiple parties are involved, "the court may direct entry of a final judgment as to one or more, but fewer than all, claims or parties only if the court expressly determines that there is no just reason for delay." Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b).

In the Central District of California, motions for default judgment must set forth the following information: (1) when and against which party the default was entered; (2) the identification of the pleading to which default was entered; (3) whether the defaulting party is an infant or incompetent person, and if so, whether that person is adequately represented; (4) that the Soldiers02b9 and Sailors02b9 Civil Relief Act of 1940 does not apply; and (5) that notice of the application has been served on the defaulting party, if required. C.D. Cal. L. R. 55-1.

III. DISCUSSION

Defaulting Defendants have not yet appeared in this action, and thus have not submitted any opposition to j2's Motion for Default Judgment. Moreover, no appearing party opposes the merits of j2's Motion for Default Judgment as to the Defaulting Defendants. In the court's own review of the Eitel factors, the court concludes that j2 has satisfied its burden for entry of judgment against Defaulting Defendants. j2's Complaint lays out in detail the allegations against the Defaulting Defendants. Accepting these allegations as true, j2 have adequately stated a claim against Defaulting Defendants on all counts. See TeleVideo Sys, Inc. v. Heidenthal, 826 F.2d 915, 917-18 (9th Cir. 1987). Moreover, j2 has adequately made a case that delaying the entry of judgment will prejudice j2, as it has suffered and continues to suffer substantial damages and diminished goodwill as a result of Defaulting Defendants activities. Finally, although the court recognizes the strong policy in favor of a decision on the merits, there is no evidence that the default was a result of excusable neglect. Rather, the Defaulting Defendants were properly served and at least some defendants previously participated in litigation against j2. Were the defaulting parties the only Defendants, the court's inquiry might end at this point. However, at least one Defendant, Farjad Fani, has timely responded to the Complaint and opposes the Motion for Partial Default Judgment.

Fani contends argues that partial entry of default risks inconsistent judgments and deprives Fani of the ability to present a full defense. (Opp'n 1.) Rule 54(b) provides in relevant part that "when multiple parties are involved, the court may direct entry of a final judgment as to one or more, but fewer than all, claims or parties only if the court expressly determines that there is no just reason for delay." Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b); see Curtiss-Wright Corp., 446 U.S. at 8 (noting that the court has discretion to enter a default judgment as to less than all defendants).

When a defendant who is jointly liable defaults, judgment against that defendant generally should not be entered until the claims against all other defendants have been fully adjudicated. Frow v. De La Vega, 82 U.S. 552, 545-55 (1872). In addition to claims asserting actual joint and several liability, the principle espoused in Frow also applies to instances where the defendants have closely related defenses or are similarly situated. In re First T.D. & Inv., Inc., 253 F.3d 520, 532 (9th Cir. 2001). As one court has explained, the key question in applying Frow is "whether under the theory of the complaint, liability of all the defendants must be uniform." Shanghai Automation Instrument Co. v. Kuei, 194 F.Supp.2d 995, 1008 (N.D. Cal. 2001).

The present case does not present a circumstance that requires a uniform finding of liability against all Defendants. A determination that Defaulting Defendants breached their obligations under the licensing agreement, infringed on the patents and trademarks at issue, and committed fraud does not require a finding of liability against Fani personally nor should it be construed as such. j2 would still need to prove that Fani participated in the wrongful conduct. See Shanghai Automation Instrument Co. v. Kuei, 194 F.Supp.2d 995, 1009 (N.D. Cal. 2001) ("Defendant Tsai02b9s liability, either derivative of the corporate defendants under an alter ego theory or as a joint participant with defendant Kuei, turns on the facts proven with respect to his own conduct and involvement.") Further, the defenses Fani has represented he intends to present underscore the court's determination that the parties need not be jointly liable. For instance, Fani alleges that he "sold Fax87.com on December 31st 2012 and [has] nothing to do with Fax87.com since then." (Dkt. 168-2.) By contrast, j2's operative Complaint asserts that the breaches of licensing agreement date back to January 2013. (See FAC ¶ 183.) If Fani is able to prove this point, the court can simultaneously conclude that Fani is not liable for any wrongdoing but the subsequent owners of the defaulting entities are liable. Accordingly, the court concludes there is no just reason for delaying entry of final judgment against the Defaulting Defendants.

In light of the foregoing, the court adopts the following points:

Judgment as to Liability

Monetary Award

Injunctive Relief

Recovering Corporate Assets

Entry of Final Judgment

Enforcement

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the court GRANTS Plaintiffs' Motion for Default Judgment Against Defendants Matt Johnson Finance, Inc., Fax87, One Voix, Miraluna Caberte Yardan, Onlinefaxes, Solidfax, Faxvision, Efax4less, Myphonefax And Resellfax. Nothing in this order shall be read to preclude any defenses or arguments that Defendant Farjad Fani may raise in the case against him personally.

IT IS SO ORDERED.