MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

JOHN D. EARLY, Magistrate Judge.

Plaintiff Kimberly Sue Fox ("Plaintiff") filed a Complaint on September 7, 2016, seeking review of the Commissioner's denial of her application for disability insurance benefits ("DIB"). The parties filed consents to proceed before the undersigned Magistrate Judge. In accordance with the Court's Order Re: Procedures in Social Security Appeal, the parties filed a Joint Stipulation ("Jt. Stip.") on June 22, 2017, addressing their respective positions. The Court has taken the Joint Stipulation under submission without oral argument and as such, this matter now is ready for decision.

I.

BACKGROUND

On September 29, 2010, Plaintiff applied for DIB, alleging disability beginning October 2, 1999. (Administrative Record ["AR"] 160-68.) After her application was denied initially (AR 63-66), and on reconsideration (AR 69-75), Plaintiff requested an administrative hearing, which was held on April 6, 2012. (AR 29-60, 76-77.) Plaintiff, represented by counsel, appeared and testified at the hearing before an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ"). (AR 29-60.)

On July 23, 2012, the ALJ issued a written decision finding Plaintiff was not disabled. (AR 12-25.) Plaintiff filed a request with the Appeals Council for review of the ALJ's decision. (AR 10-11.) On September 27, 2013, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request for review. (AR 7-9.)

Plaintiff then filed an appeal in the United States District Court for the Central District of California, which reversed and remanded the matter for further proceedings to consider the medical evidence regarding Plaintiff's neck limitation. (AR 514-22.) On January 28, 2015, the Appeals Council vacated the Commissioner's prior decision and remanded the case to the ALJ for further proceedings consisted with the District Court's order. (AR 523-25.) ALJ John W. Wojciechowski convened a second hearing on July 6, 2015. (AR 424-65.) Plaintiff testified during the hearing, as did Alan Boroskin, a vocational expert. (Id.) On August 12, 2015, the ALJ issued an unfavorable decision. (AR 406-18.)

The ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity during the period from her alleged onset date of October 2, 1999 through her date last insured of March 31, 2005. (AR 411.) The ALJ determined that Plaintiff suffered from the following severe impairments: cervical degenerative disc disease, status post discectomy and fusion; and bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome with chronic pain. (Id.) The ALJ found that Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically equaled a listed impairment. (AR 413.) The ALJ also found that Plaintiff had the residual functional capacity ("RFC") to perform light work, with the following limitations. Plaintiff could: (1) lift and/or carry at least 20 pounds occasionally and up to 10 pounds frequently; (2) stand and/or walk for at least six hours out of an eight-hour workday; (3) sit for at least six hours out of an eight-hour workday; (4) occasionally climb, balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl, but could not use ladders, ropes, and scaffolds; (5) occasionally reach overhead bilaterally; (6) frequently handle, finger, and feel with the upper extremities; and (7) only perform jobs that required no more than the completion of simple repetitive tasks. (Id.) The ALJ further found that Plaintiff was unable to perform her past relevant work, but, considering her age, education, work experience, and RFC, the ALJ found that there were jobs existing in significant numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff could perform, including work as a (1) photocopy machine operator, (Dictionary of Occupational Titles ("DOT") 207.685-014); and (2) mail clerk (DOT 209.687-026). (AR 416-18.) Accordingly, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff was not under a "disability," as defined in the Social Security Act. (AR 418.)

Plaintiff filed exceptions to the ALJ's decision with the Appeals Council, and on July 9, 2016, the Appeals Council declined to assume jurisdiction, making the ALJ's decision the Commissioner's final decision. (AR 400-03.) This action followed.

II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), a district court may review the Commissioner's decision to deny benefits. The ALJ's findings and decision should be upheld if they are free from legal error and supported by substantial evidence based on the record as a whole. Brown-Hunter v. Colvin, 806 F.3d 487, 492 (9th Cir. 2015) (as amended); Parra v. Astrue, 481 F.3d 742, 746 (9th Cir. 2007). Substantial evidence means such relevant evidence as a reasonable person might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1035 (9th Cir. 2007). It is more than a scintilla, but less than a preponderance. Id. To determine whether substantial evidence supports a finding, the reviewing court "must review the administrative record as a whole, weighing both the evidence that supports and the evidence that detracts from the Commissioner's conclusion." Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 720 (9th Cir. 1998). "If the evidence can reasonably support either affirming or reversing," the reviewing court "may not substitute its judgment" for that of the Commissioner. Id. at 720-21; see also Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1111 (9th Cir. 2012) ("Even when the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, [the court] must uphold the ALJ's findings if they are supported by inferences reasonably drawn from the record."). However, a court may review only the reasons stated by the ALJ in his decision "and may not affirm the ALJ on a ground upon which he did not rely." Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 630 (9th Cir. 2007).

Lastly, even when the ALJ commits legal error, the Court upholds the decision where that error is harmless. Molina, 674 F.3d at 1115. An error is harmless if it is "inconsequential to the ultimate nondisability determination," or if "the agency's path may reasonably be discerned, even if the agency explains its decision with less than ideal clarity." Brown-Hunter, 806 F.3d at 492 (citation omitted).

III.

DISPUTED ISSUES

1. Whether the ALJ properly considered the issue of neck motion in the RFC assessment. (Jt. Stip. at 5-17.)

2. Whether the ALJ properly considered Plaintiff's testimony concerning her limitations. (Jt. Stip. at 17-31.)

3. Whether the vocational evidence constituted substantial evidence. (Jt. Stip. at 31-38.)

IV.

DISCUSSION

A. The ALJ erred in failing to properly consider the issue of neck motion in the RFC assessment.

Plaintiff contends that the ALJ failed to properly consider the opinion of Dr. Harry Marinow — an agreed medical examiner, who conducted a medical evaluation of Plaintiff in connection with her workers' compensation claim on March 2, 2005. In particular, Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred in rejecting Dr. Marinow's opinion that Plaintiff had a prophylactic work restriction that limited her to light work with no repetitive motion of the neck. Defendant, in turn, contends that the ALJ reasonably gave no weight to Dr. Marinow's opinion.

1. Applicable law

In determining a claimant's RFC, an ALJ must consider all relevant evidence in the record, including medical records, lay evidence, and "the effects of symptoms, including pain, that are reasonably attributable to the medical condition." Robbins v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 466 F.3d 880, 883 (9th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted). In weighing medical source opinions, the Ninth Circuit distinguishes among three types of physicians: (1) treating physicians, who actually treat the claimant; (2) examining physicians, who examine but do not treat the claimant; and (3) non-examining physicians, who neither treat nor examine the claimant. Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th Cir. 1995) (as amended). "Generally, a treating physician's opinion carries more weight than an examining physician's, and an examining physician's opinion carries more weight than a reviewing physician's." Holohan v. Massanari, 246 F.3d 1195, 1201-02 (9th Cir. 2001).

If a treating or examining physician's opinion is uncontradicted, an ALJ may reject it only by offering "clear and convincing reasons that are supported by substantial evidence." Bayliss v. Barhnart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1216 (9th Cir. 2005). If a treating or examining physician's opinion is contradicted by another physician's opinion, "an ALJ may only reject it by providing specific and legitimate reasons that are supported by substantial evidence." Id. Also, "[t]he ALJ need not accept the opinion of any physician . . . if that opinion is brief, conclusory, and inadequately supported by clinical findings." Bray v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 554 F.3d 1219, 1228 (9th Cir. 2009); Tonapetyan v. Halter, 242 F.3d 1144, 1149 (9th Cir. 2001).

2. Analysis

After reviewing Plaintiff's medical records and conducting an examination, Dr. Marinow recommended, in relevant part, prophylactic work restrictions of no repetitive motion of the neck. (AR 150.) In assessing Plaintiff's impairments, the ALJ found that Plaintiff suffered from two severe impairments: cervical degenerative disc disease, status post discectomy and fusion; and bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome with chronic pain (AR 411.) The ALJ discussed Dr. Marinow's findings, but concluded that "there was little evidence to support Dr. Marinow's opinion that [Plaintiff] could not perform repetitive motion of the neck." The ALJ noted: (1) Dr. Marinow did not treat Plaintiff and evaluated her only once; (2) Plaintiff's own treating physician noted minimal objective findings and no functional limitations during the relevant period; (3) the diagnostic records showed a moderate cervical pathology at most; (4) Dr. Marinow's own evaluation showed moderately limited range of motion of the neck with no neurological deficits that would prevent Plaintiff from moving it throughout the normal workday; (5) Dr. Marinow did not consider other factors affecting Plaintiff's credibility, such as her admission that she drove, ran errands, and did household chores; (6) Dr. Marinow did not weight the lack of any significant treatment since his evaluation of Plaintiff; and (7) Dr. Marinow's limitations were prophylactic in nature and he recommended a "rather conservative course of treatment." As such, the ALJ found Dr. Marinow's limitation from repetitive neck movement unpersuasive. (AR 415-16.)

Having carefully reviewed the record, the Court is persuaded that the ALJ's rejection of Dr. Marinow's opinion regarding Plaintiff's neck movement is not legally sufficient or supported by substantial evidence.

First, as Plaintiff noted, the length of the treatment or examination relationship is relevant to weight. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c). It is not a legitimate ground to entirely reject a medical opinion. See Suseyi v. Astrue, 2010 WL 842329, at *5 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 8, 2010). Dr. Marinow was hired to provide an agreed medical examination for purposes of the workers' compensation case. He reviewed Plaintiff's medical records and conducted a physical examination. There is no evidence to indicate that his review was cursory or that that the tests he performed were invalid. To reject the opinion of an examining physician merely because he met with the claimant only once would require the opinions of many examining physicians to be rejected since they often only see a claimant one time. Similarly, under this argument, "the medical opinions of treating doctors who saw a patient once to perform a test, surgery, X-ray or MRI, or other medical procedure should be excluded." Id. The Court concludes that the fact that Dr. Marinow only saw Plaintiff once is not a legitimate and substantial reason for rejecting his opinion, particularly given that the ALJ did not identify a specific conflicting opinion that he considered instead.

The Court also concludes that the ALJ's reasoning that Dr. Marinow's opinion is not supported by the objective medical evidence is contradicted by the record. The ALJ found that Plaintiff's treating physician noted only minimal objective findings and no functional limitations during the relevant period, and that the diagnostic records showed moderate cervical pathology at most. (AR 415.) However, the ALJ did not identify any specific treating physician that concluded that Plaintiff did not have any functional neck limitations or explain why the findings of Dr. Marinow were insufficient to support his functional assessment. See Regennitter v. Comm'r of the Soc. Sec. Admin., 166 F.3d 1294, 1299 (9th Cir. 1999) ("To say that medical opinions are not supported by sufficient objective findings or are contrary to the preponderant conclusions mandated by the objective findings does not achieve the level of specificity our prior cases have required, even when the objective factors are listed seriatim. The ALJ must do more than offer his own conclusions. He must set forth his own interpretations and explain why they, rather than the doctors', are correct.") (quoting Embrey v. Bowen, 849 F.2d 418, 421-22 (9th Cir. 1988)). The June 2004 MRI of the cervical spine confirmed postoperative findings of status post fusion at C5-6 and the presence of disc herniation at C6-7 measuring 4-5 mm in depth, with moderate cord effacement on the left side and spinal stenosis. (AR 253.) Dr. Marinow found that Plaintiff had 50 degree flexion and 25 degree extension of her cervical spine, noting that Plaintiff exhibited a decrease in forward flexion. (AR 145, 148.) Such findings were consistent with the findings of Plaintiff's treating physician in March 2005. (AR 265.) Findings from January 2011 were similar: 45 degree flexion and 30 degree extension. Dr. Thomas Bunnell indicated that Plaintiff was experiencing a decrease in range of motion. (AR 308.) Medical Consultant Dr. J. Sands also noted that Plaintiff's history of "c-spine fusion may somewhat restrict reaching overhead." (AR 283.)

The ALJ noted that Dr. Marinow's own evaluation showed moderately limited range of motion of the neck with no neurological deficits that would prevent Plaintiff from moving it throughout the normal workday. However, the ALJ's finding that Dr. Marinow's medical examination results were inconsistent with his own opinion is not supported by substantial evidence. Dr. Marinow advised prophylactic work restrictions of no repetitive motion of the neck. These conclusions are not out of line with the findings documented in his evaluation. As the ALJ noted, Dr. Marinow found that Plaintiff had limited range of motion in the neck. Dr. Marinow also noted that an EMG and nerve conduction study described changes suggestive of a right C6 radiculopathy that was mild in degree and a CT scan showed a fusion at C5-6 and a left-sided disc protrusion at C6-7 with mass effect upon the canal and mild mass effect on the cord and neuroforamina. (AR 148.) Dr. Marinow also opined that Plaintiff had constant slight pain that intermittently progressed from slight to moderate in degree with radiation to her upper back, accompanied by headaches, and tingling and numbness in her hands and fingers. (Id.) Because Dr. Marinow's findings are not inconsistent with his ultimate conclusion, the ALJ's finding is not legally sufficient or supported by substantial evidence.

The ALJ also rejected Dr. Marinow's opinion regarding Plaintiff's neck limitation because Dr. Marinow did not consider other factors affecting Plaintiff's credibility, such as her admission that she drove, ran errands, and did household chores. (AR 415.) Again, this reason is not supported by substantial evidence. Dr. Marinow specifically discussed Plaintiff's daily activities, including that she "pick[s] up around [the] house, watch[es] television, pay[s] bills[,] and run[s] errands, if [she has] to." (AR 143.) His findings are not inconsistent with Plaintiff's daily activities. At the administrative hearing, Plaintiff explained that she does not move her neck while driving, and instead, relies on her rearview mirrors or rotates her entire body. (AR 446, 453.) She also indicated that she only drove a couple days a week for routine errands, and that if she rotated her neck while driving, it caused severe pain. (AR 434-35, 446.) In describing her household chores, Plaintiff explained that she did light dusting, wiped the counters, and cooked, but did not do any "heavy duty" work, such as washing the dishes. (AR 443, 447, 452.) She indicated that she did not use a computer because it hurt her neck, and could only watch television for 20-30 minutes because of neck and back pain. (AR 444, 449-50.) Those limited activities appear to be consistent with Dr. Marinow's opinion that Plaintiff was limited to work that did not require repetitive neck motion, and the ALJ did not explain otherwise. See Ghanim v. Colvin, 763 F.3d 1154, 1162 (9th Cir. 2014) (finding that ALJ erred in rejecting medical opinions when "a holistic review of the record does not reveal an inconsistency between the treating providers' opinions and [the plaintiff's] daily activities").

The ALJ also discounted Dr. Marinow's opinion because he "did not weight the lack of any significant treatment since his evaluation" of Plaintiff. (AR 415.) This reason is vague and conclusory, and does not constitute a specific, legitimate, let alone clear and convincing, reason for discounting Dr. Marinow's opinion. There is no evidence to conclude that Dr. Marinow would have been informed of any treatment following his evaluation, or that there was an opportunity to supplement his evaluation based on subsequent treatment notes or lack thereof. Nor does the ALJ identify what he means by significant treatment. As best the Court can glean, the ALJ appears to be referring to his final reason for rejecting Dr. Marinow's opinion — that Dr. Marinow's recommended limitations were prophylactic in nature and indicated a conservative course of treatment. (AR 415-16.) Although conservative treatment may be grounds for rejecting the opinion of an examining physician, it is not clear that the ALJ's finding is supported by the record. The ALJ fails to explain how Dr. Marinow's opinion is inconsistent with his recommended treatment and it is not accurate to conclude that he did not give any weight to the recommended course of treatment in his findings. He expressly concluded that Plaintiff's condition was permanent and stationary. Dr. Marinow also indicated that Plaintiff may require an anterior cervical discectomy interbody fusion surgery for the disc protrusion at the C6-7 interspace. (AR 150-51.) The ALJ therefore erred in finding that Dr. Marinow only recommended conservative treatment. In any event, even if Plaintiff's conservative treatment was a legally sufficient reason, the Court is unable to deem the ALJ's rejection of Dr. Marinow's opinion as harmless in light of the ALJ's other errors.

Accordingly, Plaintiff is entitled to remand on this issue.

B. The remaining issues may be resolved upon further proceedings.

Plaintiff's remaining claims are directly implicated by the resolution of Disputed Issue One. Resolution of Disputed Issues Two and Three — in which Plaintiff challenges the ALJ's credibility assessment and determination that Plaintiff could perform other work that existed in significant numbers — is dependent on the outcome of a proper evaluation of the medical evidence as discussed above. See Struck v. Astrue, 247 F. App'x 84, 86-87 (9th Cir. 2007) (credibility findings are reviewed in light of the record as whole); Hayes v. Astrue, 270 F. App'x 502, 505 (9th Cir. 2008) (RFC findings are reviewed in light of the record as a whole). As such, the Court declines to determine their merits as they may be addressed appropriately by the ALJ as they arise upon further proceedings.

With respect to the credibility determination, however, the Court notes that the ALJ discounted Plaintiff's complaints regarding the severity of her symptoms and limitations as inconsistent with her activities of daily living. (AR 414.) As previously explained, this was not a legally sufficient reason for rejecting Dr. Marinow's opinion regarding Plaintiff's neck limitations. In light of the Court's findings, the ALJ also shall reconsider whether this reason supports the ALJ's credibility determination. The Ninth Circuit has "repeatedly warned that ALJs must be especially cautious in concluding that daily activities are inconsistent with testimony about pain, because impairments that would unquestionably preclude work and all the pressures of a workplace environment will often be consistent with doing more than merely resting in bed all day." Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1016 (9th Cir. 2014); Vertigan v. Halter, 260 F.3d 1044, 1050 (9th Cir. 2001) ("This court has repeatedly asserted that the mere fact that a plaintiff has carried on certain daily activities, such as grocery shopping, driving a car, or limited walking for exercise, does not in any way detract from her credibility as to her overall disability."). "[O]nly if [her] level of activity [was] inconsistent with [a claimant's] claimed limitations would these activities have any bearing on [her] credibility." Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1016. Here, the ALJ discussed in length Plaintiff's ability to drive a car, explaining that the capacity to drive requires some movement of the neck and Plaintiff's ability to drive over a significant period diminishes her allegations of immobility of the neck. (AR 414.) However, as previously noted, Plaintiff explained that she does not move her head when driving, instead, relying on her mirrors and moving her entire body when required. Similarly, the ALJ did not explain how Plaintiff's ability to take care of her own personal needs, clean the house, shop, or run errands translates into an ability to meet the demands of a work environment for a sustained period of time. Rather, it appears that Plaintiff's activities are not inconsistent with her subjective complaints and do not suggest that she was capable of meeting the demands of work on a sustained basis. See Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1015-1016; Vertigan, 260 F.3d at 1049-50. After further proceedings, if the ALJ again discounts Plaintiff's allegations of pain based on her daily activities, he should explain how her level of activity is inconsistent with her subjective complaints and transferable to a work setting. See Fair v. Bowen, 885 F.2d 597, 603 (9th Cir. 1989).

C. Remand is appropriate.

The decision whether to remand for further proceedings is within this Court's discretion. Harman v. Apfel, 211 F.3d 1172, 1175-78 (9th Cir. 2000) (as amended). Where no useful purpose would be served by further administrative proceedings, or where the record has been fully developed, it is appropriate to exercise this discretion to direct an immediate award of benefits. See Benecke v. Barnhart, 379 F.3d 587, 593 (9th Cir. 2004); Harman, 211 F.3d at 1179 (noting that "the decision of whether to remand for further proceedings turns upon the likely utility of such proceedings").

A remand is appropriate, however, where there are outstanding issues that must be resolved before a determination of disability can be made and it is not clear from the record that the ALJ would be required to find the claimant disabled and award disability benefits. See Bunnell v. Barnhart, 336 F.3d 1112, 1115-16 (9th Cir. 2003). Here, remand is appropriate for the ALJ to fully and properly consider Dr. Marinow's opinion as well as the remaining disputed issues.

V.

ORDER

Pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), IT THEREFORE IS ORDERED that Judgment be entered reversing the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security and remanding this matter for further administrative proceedings consistent with this Order.