ORDER DISMISSING ACTION WITH PREJUDICE

CHRISTINA A. SNYDER, Senior District Judge

The Court summarily dismisses Petitioner's habeas action as untimely under 28 U.S.C. § 2244 and for failure to state a constitutional claim.

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1. Petitioner is a state prisoner. In November 1991, he pled guilty to second degree murder involving the use of a firearm. Shortly after, the trial court sentenced him to a prison term of 19 years to life. Petitioner did not appeal his conviction or sentence. His conviction therefore became final in January 1992.

2. In 2015, the United States Supreme Court invalidated a provision of the federal Armed Career Criminal Act. Johnson v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 135 S.Ct. 2551 (2015). The Supreme Court concluded that the "residual clause" of that statute was unconstitutionally vague.

3. In 2016, Petitioner initiated state court habeas proceedings based on the Johnson decision.1 His claim: the state felony-murder murder statute to which he pled guilty has a residual clause too, so it must be unconstitutionally vague under Johnson.

4. Petitioner also claimed — again, in light of Johnson — that California's Board of Parole Hearings arbitrarily denied him parole for the past 30 years.2 Petitioner does not refer to any specific parole hearing or identify any specific procedure involved in those sessions that allegedly violated his constitutional rights. (Docket # 1 at 5-6, 18-19; Docket # 10 at 2-11.)

5. After failing to obtain habeas relief in the state court system, Petitioner filed this action in federal court in April 2017. Magistrate Judge Wilner screened Petitioner's habeas action. The Court expressed "serious doubts" that Petitioner raised a legitimate constitutional claim here. The magistrate judge cited federal judicial decisions rejecting similar claims by state prisoners who sought to use Johnson to challenge historic state criminal convictions. The Court also noted that the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Swarthout v. Cooke, 562 U.S. 216 (2011), severely limited federal court review of state parole denials.

6. Even so, Judge Wilner ordered the petition served on the California Attorney General and directed a response. (Docket # 4.) The Attorney General moved to dismiss the action. The Attorney General contends that the 2017 federal action challenging Petitioner's 1991 guilty plea and conviction is facially untimely. The Attorney General further asserts that, because Johnson does not have any application to Petitioner's state criminal offense, the issuance of that decision in 2015 does not "restart" the time limits under AEDPA. Finally, the Attorney General argues that Petitioner's parole denial challenge is not cognizable; Petitioner has not alleged the denial of any constitutional right available to him under Cooke. (Docket # 7 at 4-8.)

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7. If it "appears from the application that the applicant or person detained is not entitled" to habeas relief, a court may dismiss a habeas action. 28 U.S.C. § 2243; see also Rule 4 of Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in United States District Courts (petition may be summarily dismissed if petitioner plainly not entitled to relief); Local Civil Rule 72-3.2 (magistrate judge may submit proposed order for summary dismissal to district judge "if it plainly appears from the face of the petition [ ] that the petitioner is not entitled to relief").

8. AEDPA imposes a one-year limitation period on state prisoners who seek federal habeas review of their claims. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). The statute of limitations is triggered when, among other things, state court appellate review becomes final or if a constitutional right "has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review." 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A, C); Lee v. Lampert, 653 F.3d 929, 933 (9th Cir. 2011).

9. Petitioner filed his federal action long after the AEDPA period expired. Because Petitioner's judgment became final before AEDPA's effective date (April 24, 1996), he had until April 24, 1997, to file a federal habeas petition. Patterson v. Stewart, 251 F.3d 1243, 1246 (9th Cir. 2001). Petitioner filed his action nearly 20 years after that. His action is clearly untimely under Section 2244(d)(1)(A).

10. Petitioner argues that the Johnson decision "created new precedent" and therefore entitles him to a "later trigger date" of AEDPA's limitations period. (Docket # 10 at 2-3.) The Court construes his argument as invoking the "newly recognized" right provision of Section 2244(d)(1)(C).

11. Petitioner is incorrect. In Johnson, the Supreme Court ruled on a specific provision of a federal criminal statute. Nothing in the Johnson decision or Petitioner's papers supports his claim that the Supreme Court established a new constitutional rule applicable to California's felony-murder statute (Penal Code section 189).

12. Moreover, every district court to look at the issue in this state agrees: Johnson neither identified a new federal constitutional right nor restarts the habeas clock under AEDPA for a state habeas action.3 See, e.g., Walkwek v. Fox, No. CV 17-370 JVS (JCG), 2017 WL 1073343 at *1 (C.D. Cal. 2017) ("Although California Penal Code § 189 [ ] may contain a residual clause, Johnson does not render all such clauses unconstitutionally vague."); Johnson v. Fox, No. CV 16-9245 GW (JCG), 2017 WL 1395512 at *1 (C.D. Cal. 2017) (same); Birdwell v. California, No. CV 16-7221 AG (KS), 2016 WL 5897780 at *2 (C.D. Cal. 2016) ("the Johnson decision is irrelevant here because Petitioner's state prison sentence was not enhanced under ACCA's `residual clause' nor was his conviction based on any state analogue of that federal criminal statute"); Renteria v. Lizarraga, No. CV 16-1568 RGK (SS), 2016 WL 4650059 at *6 (C.D. Cal. 2016) (same); Lopez v. Castelo, No. CV 16-735 LAB (WVG), 2016 WL 8453921 at *4 (S.D. Cal. 2016) ("Fatal to his position, Petitioner attempts to broaden the holding of Johnson to pertain to a clause found in California's penal code, despite the fact that Johnson dealt solely with the ACCA[.] The Johnson decision has absolutely no applicability to the California murder statute under which Petitioner was convicted and his reliance on Johnson is therefore misplaced.").

13. As to Petitioner's parole claim, the scope of this federal court's review of adverse parole determinations is quite narrow. The sole federal constitutional issue that a court may consider is whether a prisoner received "minimal" due process protections: "an opportunity to be heard" and "a statement of reasons" for the denial of parole. Cooke, 562 U.S. at 220. A federal court is not entitled to review the merits of the parole hearing, reweigh the evidence presented to the board, or evaluate a prisoner's claim for parole under state guidelines. Roberts v. Hartley, 640 F.3d 1042, 1046 (9th Cir. 2011).

14. Petitioner's broad and vague challenge to the parole board's procedures does not allege a cognizable claim for federal habeas relief. Petitioner does not reference any specific parole hearing or explain how the Board violated any of the due process protections under Cooke. To the extent Petitioner also premises the timeliness of his parole claim on Johnson, his claim is without merit. See, e.g., Keller v. Hatton, No. CV 16-08709 CJC (RAO), 2017 WL 2771529 at *5 (C.D. Cal. 2017) ("Johnson does not provide a new basis for challenging section 3041.").

15. The Court concludes that Petitioner's habeas claims are untimely and fail to state a constitutional claim for relief.

16. The action is summarily DISMISSED with prejudice.

IT IS SO ORDERED.