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Rios v. CWGS Enterprises, LLC, CV 17-03614 RSWL-AFMx. (2017)

Court: District Court, C.D. California Number: infdco20170815e94 Visitors: 21
Filed: Aug. 11, 2017
Latest Update: Aug. 11, 2017
Summary: ORDER Re: PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO REMAND [10]; DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO [13] CHANGE VENUE RONALD S.W. LEW , Senior District Judge . I. INTRODUCTION Plaintiff Roy Rios ("Plaintiff") filed this Action in the Superior Court of California for the County of Los Angeles on April 10, 2017. Compl., ECF No. 1-1. Plaintiff alleged that Defendant CWGS Enterprises, LLC's ("Defendant") website, www.campingworld.com, violates California's Unruh Civil Rights Act because it imposes barriers to access for blind
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ORDER Re: PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO REMAND [10]; DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO [13] CHANGE VENUE

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Roy Rios ("Plaintiff") filed this Action in the Superior Court of California for the County of Los Angeles on April 10, 2017. Compl., ECF No. 1-1. Plaintiff alleged that Defendant CWGS Enterprises, LLC's ("Defendant") website, www.campingworld.com, violates California's Unruh Civil Rights Act because it imposes barriers to access for blind and other visually-impaired individuals. Id. at ¶ 1. Currently before the Court is Plaintiff's Motion to Remand ("Motion" or "Motion to Remand") this Action back to Los Angeles Superior Court, and Defendant's Motion to Change Venue to the Northern District of California ("Motion to Change Venue"). See Pl.'s Mot. to Remand ("Mot."), ECF No. 10; Def.'s Mot. to Change Venue ("Mot. to Change Venue"), ECF No. 13. The Court, having reviewed all papers and arguments submitted pertaining to both Plaintiff's Motion to Remand and Defendant's Motion to Change Venue, NOW FINDS AND RULES AS FOLLOWS: the Court GRANTS Plaintiff's Motion to Remand and DENIES as MOOT Defendant's Motion to Change Venue.

II. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background

Plaintiff is permanently blind and uses a screen reader to access the internet and read website content. Compl. ¶ 4. Blind individuals can only access websites by using keyboards with screen-reading software that vocalizes the information. Id. at ¶ 9. However, unless a website is designed to be read by screen-reading software, visually-impaired individuals cannot access its information. Id.

Defendant owns and operates retail store locations around the world, including in California. Id. at ¶ 5. These locations are public accommodations within the definition of Title III of the 1990 Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") and are business establishments within the definition of California Civil Code §§ 51 et seq. Id. Defendant's website, www.campingworld.com, provides access to an array of services such as store locators and product descriptions. Id.

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant has denied him and other blind and visually-impaired individuals access to the services and information made available through www.campingworld.com. Id. at ¶ 12. Plaintiff alleges Defendant's website lacks alternative text, an invisible code embedded beneath a graphic image. Id. at ¶ 14. Without this code, screen readers cannot accurately vocalize a description of the graphic. Id. Additionally, Defendant's website is riddled with redundant links that go to the same URL address, which result in additional navigation and repetition for keyboard and screen-reader users. Id. Finally, Defendant's website includes missing form labels. Id. If a form control does not have a proper text label, the function of that form control may not be presented to screen-reader users. Id.

Plaintiff filed a lawsuit against Defendant in state court alleging a violation of the Unruh Civil Rights Act, California Civil Code § 51. Id. at ¶¶ 17-18. In his Complaint, Plaintiff seeks a preliminary and permanent injunction requiring Defendant to take the necessary steps to make its website readily accessible to visually-impaired individuals and statutory damages as set forth by California Civil Code § 52(a). Id. at 6:11-18.

B. Procedural Background

On May 5, 2017, Plaintiff filed this Action in the Superior Court of California for the County of Los Angeles [1-1]. On May 12, 2017, Defendant removed the case to this Court on the basis of federal question jurisdiction. Def.'s Ntc. of Removal [1]. On June 12, 2017, Plaintiff filed the instant Motion to Remand [10]. Defendant filed its Opposition on June 20, 2017 [11] and Plaintiff's Reply followed on June 27, 2017 [12]. On June 30, 2017, Defendant filed a Motion to Change Venue to the Northern District of California [13]. On July 18, 2017 Plaintiff filed his Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Change Venue [20] and Defendant's Reply followed on July 25, 2017 [21].

III. DISCUSSION

A. Legal Standard

Federal courts are of limited jurisdiction, and therefore, a federal court can only adjudicate cases that create a federal question because they "arise under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States," or those in which the parties have diversity of citizenship. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332.

Federal question jurisdiction exists only where federal law creates the cause of action asserted, where under the artful pleading doctrine one or more state law claims should be re-characterized as federal claims, or where state law claims necessarily turn on the construction of a substantial, disputed federal question. Rains v. Criterion Sys., Inc., 80 F.3d 339, 343 (9th Cir. 1996)(citing Merrell Dow Pharms. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 807-10 (1968)).

However, the "mere presence of a federal issue in a state cause of action does not automatically confer federal-question jurisdiction." Wander v. Kaus, 304 F.3d 856, 858 (9th Cir. 2002)(citing Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 808). The federal issue must be a "necessary element" of one of the state law claims. Id. The federal issue must also be "actually disputed and substantial." Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng'g & Mfg, 545 U.S. 308, 314 (2005).

Generally, the plaintiff "decide[s] what law he will rely upon . . . and, if he can maintain his claim on both state and federal grounds, he may ignore the federal question and assert only a state law claim and defeat removal." Sullivan v. First Affiliated Sec., Inc., 813 F.2d 1368, 1373 (9th Cir. 1987)(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). The "burden of establishing jurisdiction falls on the party invoking the removal statute . . . which is strictly construed against removal." Id. at 1371 (citing Hunter v. United Van Lines, 746 F.2d 635, 639 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 863 (1985)(citation omitted)). Courts resolve all ambiguities in favor of remand to state court. Hunter v. Philip Morris USA, 582 F.3d 1039, 1042 (9th Cir. 2009).

B. Analysis

There is a presumption against removal and Defendant bears the burden of proving federal question jurisdiction. There are three bases for federal question jurisdiction: (1) where federal law creates the cause of action, (2) where under the artful pleading doctrine a plaintiff's state law claims should be re-characterized as federal claims, or (3) where one or more state law claims necessarily turn on the construction of a disputed, substantial federal question. Rains, 80 F.3d at 343.

1. Plaintiff's Request for Judicial Notice is

DENIED

Plaintiff requests the Court take judicial notice of five Central District of California orders by Judges Kronstadt, Hatter, Carney, and Fitzgerald pursuant to Federal Rules of Evidence 201. Pl.'s Req. for Jud. Ntc., ECF No. 10-1.1 It is unnecessary to take judicial notice of opinions from other courts because this Court can consider other legal authorities without judicially noticing the opinions. McVey v. McVey, 26 F.Supp.3d 980, 984-85 (C.D. Cal. 2014). "Judicial notice of law is outside the scope of Rule 201, and derives from practical considerations and case law that do not rely on Rule 201 or principles of evidence." Id. at 985 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). While the Court can consider these decisions as non-binding precedent, the Court DENIES Plaintiff's request for judicial notice of the decisions. BP West Coast Prods. LLC v. May, 347 F.Supp.2d 898, 901 (D. Nev. 2004).

2. Whether Federal Law Creates the Cause of Action

"The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Defendant first argues that Plaintiff directly alleges a claim under the ADA, giving this Court federal question jurisdiction. Def.'s Opp'n to Pl.'s Mot. to Remand ("Opp'n") 3:1-5. Defendant argues that because Plaintiff's Complaint alleges that Defendant's actions also violate provisions of the ADA, Plaintiff explicitly invokes federal question jurisdiction. Id. Plaintiff argues that he did not allege a violation of the ADA in his Complaint and just because he pointed to the fact that a violation of California's Unruh Civil Rights Act also constitutes a violation of the ADA, that does not invoke federal question jurisdiction. Mot. 1:6-12, 5:5-6.

The Ninth Circuit has held that the "mere presence of a federal issue in a state cause of action does not automatically confer federal-question jurisdiction." Wander, 304 F.3d at 858 (quoting Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 813). While Defendant is correct that Plaintiff is seeking both injunctive relief and damages, Defendant is incorrect in stating that fact necessarily invokes federal question jurisdiction. Opp'n 8:6-15; see Toys R Us, Inc., No. 5:16-cv-02672-JAK-AGR (finding that the plaintiff's request for injunctive relief and damages did not necessitate a finding of federal question jurisdiction because "[w]hen a claim can be supported by alternative and independent theories—one of which is a state law theory and one of which is a federal law theory—federal question jurisdiction does not attach because federal law is not a necessary element of the claim")(internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

Plaintiff alleges an ADA claim only so far as it independently constitutes a violation of the California Unruh Civil Rights Act. A reading of Plaintiff's Complaint and California Civil Code § 51(f) makes this clear.2 This does not constitute an independent claim for relief under the ADA. Plaintiff's "state law cause of action claim does not `arise under federal law' even though it is premised on a violation of federal law." Wander, 304 F.3d at 859. Therefore, Defendant's manipulation of the language of Plaintiff's Complaint is not sufficient to support federal question jurisdiction.

While not binding precedent, the ruling in Thurston v. Container Store, Inc., No. 5:16-cv-02658-SVW-DTB, 2017 WL 658806 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 16, 2017) mirrors the facts and allegations in this case and this Court finds it persuasive. In Container Store, the plaintiff brought a similar claim regarding website accessibility for visually-impaired individuals, alleged a violation of the Unruh Civil Rights Act, and requested both damages and injunctive relief. Id. at *1-2. The court remanded the action back to state court after concluding that the question of whether there was federal question jurisdiction was ambiguous and all ambiguities should be resolved in favor of remand. Id. at *3.

The court similarly remanded an action regarding website accessibility where a plaintiff alleged a violation of the Unruh Civil Rights Act and requested both injunctive relief and damages. Toys R Us, Inc., 5:16-cv-02672-JAK-AGR (holding the plaintiff's claim was not solely based on alleged violations of the ADA because the relief sought is available under California Civil Code § 51(b)). It is clear that Plaintiff did not directly allege a federal cause of action and federal law does not create the cause of action in the instant case. Therefore, federal question jurisdiction is not appropriate on this basis.

3. Whether the Artful Pleading Doctrine Applies

Under the artful pleading doctrine, federal question jurisdiction is also proper when a plaintiff's state law claims should be re-characterized as federal claims. Rains, 80 F.3d at 344. A plaintiff "may not defeat removal by omitting to plead necessary federal questions in a complaint." JustMed, Inc. v. Byce, 600 F.3d 1118, 1125 (9th Cir. 2010)(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Courts most frequently deal with artful pleading where state law claims are preempted, or even precluded by federal law, or alternatively, where federal issues are embedded in state law claims. Removal Based on Federal Question Jurisdiction-Removal Based on Artful Pleading, 14B Fed. Prac. & Proc. Juris. § 3722.1 (4th ed.).

Here, Defendant does not assert preemption of federal law. This is because it is established that the ADA's anti-discrimination provision does not preempt California state claims. See City of Los Angeles v. AECOM Servs., Inc., 854 F.3d 1149, 1156 (9th Cir. 2017)("[t]he ADA expressly disavows preemptive federal occupation of the disability-rights field").

Instead, Defendant argues the Court has jurisdiction under the artful pleading doctrine because Plaintiff has engaged in forum shopping by alleging a violation of the ADA but only naming the Unruh Civil Rights Act as a cause of action. Opp'n 6:1-8. Defendant alleges Plaintiff is forum shopping to avoid this District's ruling in Robles v. Dominos Pizza LLC, No. CV-1606599-SJO-SPX, 2017 WL 1330216 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 20, 2017). Id. at 6:10-12. Defendant also points to Plaintiff's decision not to remand nearly identical actions as evidence that Plaintiff is engaging in forum shopping and declining to remand cases where he prefers the assigned federal judge over the state judge. Id. at 6:20-7:5. These frivolous allegations are inappropriate in the instant Motion and do nothing to convince the Court or bolster Defendant's contention that there is a basis to find federal question jurisdiction.

While Defendant raises the artful pleading doctrine, Defendant fails to provide any evidence or factual support to bolster this contention. "Courts should invoke the doctrine only in limited circumstances as it raises difficult issues of state and federal relationships and often yields unsatisfactory results." Lippitt v. Raymond James Fin. Servs., Inc., 340 F.3d 1033, 1041 (9th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). The artful pleading doctrine has been used in: (1) complete preemption cases and (2) substantial federal questions cases. Id. Within this second category are cases "where the claim is necessarily federal in character .. . or where the right to relief depends on the resolution of a substantial, disputed federal question." Id. at 1042 (internal citations omitted).

As stated above, the ADA does not preempt state law claims regarding discrimination based on a disability. Accordingly, Defendant must prove that Plaintiff's federal question is necessary, disputed, and substantial to confer federal question jurisdiction. As this is a separate basis to confer federal question jurisdiction, the Court answers this question below.

4. Whether One or More State Law Claims Necessarily Turn on a Disputed, Substantial Federal Question

Federal question jurisdiction may also be invoked where one or more state law claims necessarily turn on the construction of a disputed, substantial federal question. Rains, 80 F.3d at 343.

a. Disputed and Substantial Federal Question

Federal question jurisdiction may be proper where a "state-law claim necessarily state[s] a federal issue, actually disputed and substantial, which a federal forum may entertain without disturbing a congressionally approved balance of federal and state judicial responsibilities." Grable & Sons, 545 U.S. at 315.

Defendant claims that website accessibility is a disputed area of federal law under the ADA and thus any claims arising under website accessibility need to be adjudicated in federal court. Opp'n 3:18-27. Defendant also notes that the Department of Justice ("DOJ"), the federal agency responsible for promulgating regulations under the ADA, has issued opinions requiring certain institutions make their websites compliant, but it has stopped short of promulgating formal regulations. Id. at 4:1-3. Defendant asserts that jurisdiction exists because this federal question is both disputed and substantial and the recent ruling in Dominos Pizza makes clear that the issue of website accessibility is an unresolved issue of federal law. Id. at 5:3-23. Plaintiff argues that the fact that the DOJ or any other federal entity has not laid out specific guidelines regarding website accessibility does not transform all claims under the Unruh Civil Rights Act regarding websites into federal cases. Mot. 10:14-18.

Because the DOJ has yet to issue formal regulations, federal courts have interpreted the ADA in different ways regarding website accessibility. Defendant suggests that the ruling in Dominos Pizza mandates this Court's analysis. It does not. In Dominos Pizza, the plaintiff brought two causes of action under the ADA and two causes of action under California state law claims regarding website accessibility, whereas here, Plaintiff did not allege a federal cause of action. 2017 WL 1330216, at *1. The court there granted the defendant's motion to dismiss pursuant to the primary jurisdiction doctrine after finding that the lack of formal guidance by the DOJ in regards to website accessibility made it difficult to determine what criteria websites and mobile applications must meet. Id. at *7. Dominos Pizza is easily distinguishable from the case at bar. There, the plaintiff filed the case in federal court, directly alleging claims under the ADA. 2017 WL 1330216 at *3. This is vastly different from this case, where Plaintiff filed in state court and only alleged a state cause of action under the Unruh Civil Rights Act. Although certain points of the court's legal analysis in the Dominos Pizza opinion may be helpful in the determination of this case on the merits, the ruling is not factually similar for the purposes of establishing federal question jurisdiction.

Moreover, Dominos Pizza was distinguished by Gorecki v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., CV 17-1131-JFW (SKx), 2017 WL 2957736, at *7 (C.D. Cal. June 15, 2017), where the court denied the defendant's motion to dismiss finding the plaintiff was not seeking a "remedy that adopts a specific rule. Instead, he requests an order requiring [the defendant] to comply with the DOJ's directive to ensure disabled individuals have as full and equal enjoyment of its website as non-disabled individuals." The court also found that the DOJ has "repeatedly affirmed that Title III applies to websites that meet the definition of a public accommodation," thereby calling into question the Dominos Pizza finding that this is an unsettled area of federal law. Id. at *4. Defendant relies too heavily on a case that is both factually and legally distinguishable. Moreover, based on the ruling in Gorecki, Defendant has failed to show that website accessibility is a disputed and substantial federal question.

b. Necessity

While the Court finds that Defendant has failed to show there is a disputed and substantial federal question, the Court nevertheless briefly analyzes the necessity requirement for federal question jurisdiction. To invoke federal question jurisdiction, the federal issue must be disputed and substantial, but a plaintiff's claim must also "necessarily turn[] on the construction" of a federal issue. Rains, 80 F.3d at 343. A federal issue does not confer federal jurisdiction where it is "merely collateral" to a state claim. Jackson v. Yoshinoya America Inc., No. 12-08518 MMM (EX), 2013 WL 865596, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 7, 2013)(emphasis in original). Rather, the "question of federal law [must be] a necessary element of one of the well-pleaded state claims." Rains, 80 F.3d at 345.

"When a claim can be supported by alternative and independent theories—one of which is a state law theory and one of which is a federal law theory—federal question jurisdiction does not attach because federal law is not a necessary element of the claim." Id. at 346. Defendant does not argue or address the necessity of the ADA claim under the Unruh Civil Rights Act. In Container Store, which has factually similar claims and legal theories as the present case, the court found that the defendant's possible ADA violation "is only one of two theories of liability presented by the Plaintiff, meaning that the ADA may not be involved at all in the litigation. This would suggest that resolving the federal question is not a necessary element of the Plaintiff's claim." 2017 WL 658806, at *3. Similarly, Defendant has not shown that Plaintiff's cause of action necessarily requires answering a federal question, or that Plaintiff's claims for relief are solely based on the ADA to satisfy the necessity requirement. Toys R Us, Inc., 5:16-cv-02672-JAK-AGR, at 4. Plaintiff has alleged that Defendant's conduct constitutes a violation of the ADA as well as California's Unruh Civil Rights Act. However, on its own, that is not sufficient for this Court to conclude that determining whether there is a violation of the ADA is a necessary question to support a finding that there is federal question jurisdiction.

Finally, Defendant argues this Court has subject matter jurisdiction based on a separate case involving Defendant in the Northern District of California, Son Kim v. CWI, Inc., et al., No. 4:16-cv-01913-JSW (N.D. Cal. Dec. 12, 2016). The parties entered into a settlement agreement and the court there retained jurisdiction over the parties to enforce the settlement agreement. As an initial matter, the Son Kim case does not involve Plaintiff and was not a class-action settlement or a case that is binding on Plaintiff or other individuals not parties to the suit. While the court there retained jurisdiction over the parties, it was only as to those parties and as to that lawsuit. Defendant appears to assert that federal question jurisdiction is appropriate in this case because the court in Son Kim has federal question jurisdiction. However, in Son Kim the plaintiff directly alleged a violation of the ADA. This is distinguishable from this case, and Son Kim has no bearing on this Court's duty to independently determine whether it has subject matter jurisdiction, which the Court finds it does not.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, and because the Court must resolve all ambiguities in favor of remand, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff's Motion to Remand and Remands this Action back to the Superior Court of California for the County of Los Angeles, Central District, Case No. BC657201. The Court DENIES as MOOT Defendant's Motion to Change Venue.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

FootNotes


1. Plaintiff requests judicial notice be taken of orders from the following cases: (1) Cheryl Thurston v. Toys R Us, Inc., No. 5:16-cv-02672-JAK-AGR (C.D. Cal. Feb. 23, 2017), ECF No. 14; (2) Thurston v. Omni Hotels Mgmt. Corp., No. 5:16-cv-02596-TJH-KK (C.D. Cal. May, 19, 2017), ECF No. 15; (3) James Patrick Brown v. BPS Direct, LLC, et al., No. LACV 14-04622 JAK (JEMx)(C.D. Cal. Oct. 6, 2014), ECF No. 30; (4) Penney v. Kohl's Dep't Stores, Inc., et al., No. SACV 14-01100-CJC (DFMx)(C.D. Cal. Sept. 23, 2014), ECF No. 12; and (5) Edward Davis v. Orlando Wilshire Invs., Ltd., No. 5:15-cv-01738-MFW-KK (C.D. Cal. Nov. 2, 2015), ECF No. 17.
2. California Civil Code § 51(f) states: "[a] violation of the right of any individual under the federal Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (Public Law 101-336) shall also constitute a violation of this section."
Source:  Leagle

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