JAY C. GANDHI, Magistrate Judge.
Robert E. Philbrook ("Plaintiff") challenges the Social Security Commissioner's decision denying his application for disability benefits. Plaintiff contends that the Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") improperly relied on the vocational expert ("VE")'s testimony to determine that Plaintiff could perform light, unskilled work as a bench assembler
Preliminarily, as a rule, "when claimants are represented by counsel, they must raise all issues and evidence at their administrative hearings in order to preserve them on appeal." Meanel v. Apfel, 172 F.3d 1111, 1115 (9th Cir. 1999). This is particularly true in the case of statistical evidence, as "[t]he ALJ, rather than this Court, [is] in the optimal position to resolve the conflict between [a claimant's] new evidence and the statistical evidence provided by the VE." Id.
In the instant case, Plaintiff was represented by counsel at the administrative hearing and was allowed to pose questions to the VE, but she failed to challenge the VE's methodology for calculating the number of estimated jobs or offer any evidence supporting a different figure.
Accordingly, the issue was not properly preserved for appeal.
Plaintiff has failed to identify any legal error for three reasons.
First, Plaintiff's repeated argument that "no reasonable person would ever believe" there are 230,000 bench assembler jobs in the national economy is not the standard by which this Court must review the Agency's decision. (Joint Stip. at 7, 9, 15-16); see Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 750 (9th Cir. 1989) (the court must affirm the Commissioner's decision if it is based on proper legal standards and the findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence in the "record as a whole"); Batson v. Comm'r Soc. Sec. Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 1198 (9th Cir. 2004) ("When the evidence before the ALJ is subject to more than one rational interpretation, [the court] must defer to the ALJ's conclusion.").
Second, even assuming the OOH established a smaller pool of estimated available jobs, Plaintiff has failed to identify any authority that the VE or the ALJ were bound by that source, or that the ALJ was required to ask about any alleged conflict. See Meza v. Berryhill, 2017 WL 3298461, at *8 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 2, 2017) (claimant's argument that DOT and OOH should be on "equal footing" has been rejected by a number of district courts in Ninth Circuit); Walker, 2017 WL 1097171, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 23, 2017) (rejecting argument that OOH precludes claimant from performing jobs VE testified he could do because claimant "cites no authority for the proposition that an ALJ must address conflicts between the testimony of the VE and the OOH"); Simpson v. Colvin, 2016 WL 3091487, at *5 (C.D. Cal. May 31, 2016) (finding no error where VE's job numbers were inconsistent with information from Bureau of Labor statistics in OOH because a VE may rely on any number of sources).
Third, and finally, Plaintiff has failed to show that the VE's testimony itself is not substantial evidence. (AR at 27-28, 78-83); see Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1218 (9th Cir. 2005) (ALJ may rely on a VE's testimony as a reliable source of information about job numbers because a VE's "recognized expertise provides the necessary foundation for his or her testimony" and "no additional foundation is required"); Howard, 330 F. App'x at 130-31(argument challenging foundation of VE's testimony regarding number of jobs available in national and regional economies foreclosed by Bayliss); Moore v. Apfel, 216 F.3d 864 869-70 (9th Cir. 2000) (VE's testimony alone was substantial evidence supporting ALJ's finding that claimant was not disabled because substantial gainful work existed in national economy).
Based on the foregoing,