RONALD S.W. LEW, Senior District Judge.
Currently before the Court is Plaintiffs Kate Scott and James Babinski's (collectively, "Plaintiffs") Ex Parte Application for Temporary Restraining Order and Order to Show Cause re Preliminary Injunction [6]. Specifically, Plaintiffs seek to enjoin Defendant City Council for the City of Santa Monica ("Defendant") from taking any action to shorten the runway of the Santa Monica Municipal Airport ("Airport"). Pls.' Ex Parte Appl. for TRO and Order to Show Cause re Prelim. Inj. ("Appl.") 1:21-26, ECF No. 6-1. The Court, having reviewed all papers and arguments submitted pertaining to this Application,
On April 28, 2017, Plaintiffs filed a Verified Petition for Writ of Mandate and Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief ("Complaint") [1-2] in Los Angeles County Superior Court ("Superior Court"). In their Complaint, Plaintiffs allege that Defendant violated California law, including the Brown Act, by entering into a consent decree ("Consent Decree") with the United States of America and the Federal Aviation Administration ("FAA") in a closed session.
After the Superior Court dismissed Plaintiffs' Brown Act claims with prejudice, Plaintiffs filed their Amended Complaint [1-19] on September 28, 2017. Defendant then removed the Action to this Court on October 5, 2017 based on federal question jurisdiction. Notice of Removal, ECF No. 1.
On October 6, 2017, Plaintiffs filed their Ex Parte Application for Temporary Restraining Order and Order to Show Cause re Preliminary Injunction ("Application") [6]. Defendant failed to file an opposition.
Later on October 8, 2017, Defendant filed its Ex Parte Application for Reconsideration re Order on Motion for TRO [14]. This Court subsequently denied reconsideration based on Defendant's failure to satisfy procedural requirements but granted expedited briefing on the Order to Show Cause ("OSC") re Preliminary Injunction. Order re Def.'s Appl. for Recons., ECF No. 32. Defendant opposed issuance of a preliminary injunction [33], and Plaintiffs replied [50].
Ex parte applications are for extraordinary relief. For ex parte relief to be granted, "the evidence must show that the moving party's cause will be irreparably prejudiced if the underlying motion is heard according to regular noticed motion procedures."
Injunctive relief is also an "extraordinary remedy."
The Ninth Circuit employs a sliding scale when considering a plaintiff's showing as to the likelihood of success on the merits and the likelihood of irreparable harm.
Defendant requests the Court take judicial notice of twenty-one public and historical records. Def.'s Req. for Judicial Notice ("RJN"), ECF No. 33-3. Plaintiffs did not oppose these requests. Because public and historical records are properly subject to judicial notice pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 201, the Court
Defendant objects to the Declaration of R. Christopher Harshman ("Harshman Declaration") [6-1] filed in support of Plaintiffs' Application. Specifically, Defendant contends that the Harshman Declaration is improper expert opinion, irrelevant, lacking in foundation, and not helpful to the trier of fact. Def.'s Objs. to Decl. of R. Christopher Harshman ("Objs.") 2:8-9, ECF No. 33-1. Additionally, Defendant claims that "given that [Harshman] is a counsel of record in this case, any testimony he provides is especially inappropriate."
The Harshman Declaration is relevant and helpful to the trier of fact in that it provides information about the effects of shortening the runway.
Finally, Harshman may properly provide expert testimony as he is "a certificated pilot with an instrument rating, and fl[ies] airplanes from and to the [Airport] regularly."
As such, Defendant's objections to the Harshman Declaration are
Defendant also objects to the Declarations of Plaintiff James Babinski [22], Plaintiff Kate Scott [24], and Howard Israel [23], which Plaintiffs mention in their Reply.
On October 13, 2017, the Court denied Plaintiffs' Ex Parte Application for Reconsideration of Superior Court Decisions Regarding Interpretation of the Brown Act ("Order re Reconsideration"). Order re Pls.' Ex Parte Appl. for Recons., ECF No. 43. Plaintiffs were not entitled to the extraordinary remedy of ex parte relief since Plaintiffs failed to establish they were not at fault for, or that only excusable neglect caused, the urgency.
The Court did not rule on the merits of Plaintiffs' Request for Reconsideration, including whether Plaintiffs could have successfully brought a motion for reconsideration in the Superior Court. Rather, the Court found Plaintiffs did not meet the standard for ex parte relief due to their delay in seeking relief. California Civil Procedure Code section 1008(a) is one example of how Plaintiffs could—and should—have sought relief sooner. Plaintiffs themselves suggest the alternative avenue of seeking a writ from the California Court of Appeal. Req. for Recons. 1:26-27.
The problem with Plaintiffs' original Ex Parte Application for Reconsideration of Superior Court Decisions Regarding Interpretation of the Brown Act is that Plaintiffs did nothing until October 12, 2017—two months after the Superior Court's decision—despite believing that construction was set to begin October 9, 2017. At this late stage, Plaintiffs can only blame themselves for the urgency necessitating ex parte relief, as opposed to other relief, including on a regularly noticed motion. Thus, Plaintiffs' Request for Reconsideration [45] is
National Business Aviation Association and Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association ("NBAA & AOPA") and Santa Monica Airport Association ("SMAA") filed two Ex Parte Applications to File Amicus Briefs [47, 48] in conjunction with Plaintiffs' Application. Each applicant maintains that ex parte relief is warranted based on the expedited briefing schedule for the OSC re Preliminary Injunction. SMAA's Ex Parte Appl. to File Amicus Br. ("SMAA's Appl.") 5:19-23, ECF No. 47; NBAA & AOPA's Ex Parte Appl. to File Amicus Br. ("NBAA & AOPA's Appl.") I:7-10, ECF No. 48.
These Applications cannot be heard on regular motions because the preliminary injunction will be decided before any motion can be heard. Moreover, neither applicant is at fault for this urgency. Thus, the Court
While the Court permits SMAA to appear as amicus curiae, the Court declines to permit SMAA to file additional briefing in connection with the Court's OSC re Preliminary Injunction, which would delay the Court's decision.
Plaintiffs fail to satisfy the
Plaintiffs claim that Defendant violated California Public Utilities Code by not holding public hearings and securing permits before it "acquire[d] runway protection zones" and "extend[ed] or realign[ed] an existing runway" under the Consent Decree. Appl. 7:24-8:2;
Under California Public Utilities Code section
21664.5, an amended airport permit is required for every airport expansion, including "acquisition of runway protection zones" and "realignment of an existing runway." This statute is inapplicable to this Action because Defendant is not expanding the Airport under either of the foregoing definitions.
Based on evidence finally before the Court, it is apparent Defendant did not acquire runway protection zones.
Moreover, it is now clear that Defendant did not need an airport permit or public hearing for "realignment of an existing runway." The California Department of Transportation, Division of Aeronautics, ("DOT") is the agency charged with reviewing and approving airport permits under California Public Utilities Code. Def.'s Resp. to Order to Show Cause ("Resp.") 13:6-7, ECF No. 33. The DOT informed Defendant that the runway shortening at issue is not a realignment or extension, so Defendant did not need a permit. Makrides Decl., Ex. 1.
As discussed in the Court's Order granting the TRO, California Public Utilities Code section 21605 did not require Defendant to hold a public hearing because under that statute, a public hearing "may," not must, be conducted. Order re TRO 5 n.2;
Additionally, under California Public Utilities Code section 21661.6, prior to acquisition of land or an interest in land therein with plans to expand or enlarge an existing airport, a political subdivision must conduct a public hearing on the plan. However, this statute is inapplicable for two reasons. First, Defendant did not acquire any interest in land. The construction concerns the Airport land Defendant already owned. Makrides Decl. ¶ 5. Second, Defendant is not expanding or enlarging the Airport; instead, Defendant is reducing the length of an existing runway from 4,973 feet to 3,500 feet.
Plaintiffs contend a shortened runway "creates a risk of physical harm for anyone piloting or being transported in an airplane departing from the Airport, including [Plaintiffs]" and "those living below the departure path of the Airport." Appl. 5:20-22. But according to Defendant's aviation safety expert, a shortened runway will provide safety benefits, such as by introducing 300-foot safety areas, preventing larger and faster aircraft from using the Airport, and reducing the overall frequency of take-offs and landings. Decl. of Tommy McFall ("McFall Decl.") ¶¶ 20-32, ECF No. 38.
Plaintiffs proffer evidence that "pilots who experience engine or other mechanical failure [should] not even attempt to turn back to land on a departure runway below at least 400 [feet]," and pilots will now depart at approximately 300 feet above ground level due to the shortened runway. Decl. of R. Christopher Harshman ("Harshman Decl.") ¶¶ 3, 6, ECF No. 6-1. However, according to the FAA, this turn is the "worst possible action" at the Airport regardless of runway length, thus discounting Plaintiffs' argument. McFall Decl. ¶¶ 13-19.
Plaintiffs are also incorrect in arguing a shortened runway will negatively impact the environment.
Nor is Defendant depriving Plaintiffs access to real property. Plaintiffs still will be able to use the runway in the same condition as everyone else, and Plaintiffs have not shown they have a protectable property interest in the current length of the runway. Resp. 23:10-13. Plaintiffs' cases cited for a contrary proposition are distinguishable. See Reply 9:4-16. For instance, in Peterson v. District of Columbia Lottery & Charitable Games Control Board, No. 94-1643 (JHG), 1994 WL 413357, at *4 (D.C. July 28, 1994), the court found irreparable harm in the foreclosure of the plaintiff's home. In contrast, here, Plaintiffs will still have use of the runway and Airport.
In sum, Plaintiffs are not likely to suffer irreparable harm if construction goes forward.
The balance of equities tips in Defendant's favor. After years of litigation and debate over the Airport's future, Defendant entered into the Consent Decree and began the process to shorten the runway almost immediately thereafter. Resp. 23:21-24:5. Defendant consulted the community in numerous public hearings and the FAA in developing the plans to shorten the runway. Cline Decl., Exs. E-G. Furthermore, Defendant will suffer significant financial penalties for delay. Decl. of Rick Valte, P.E. ¶¶ 5-6, Ex. 1, ECF No. 36.
On the other hand, as discussed, Plaintiffs will not suffer irreparable harm. And Plaintiffs should have involved themselves sooner in the planning process to voice their concerns about the project, instead of allowing Defendant to make this much progress before trying to stop it.
Accordingly, the balance of equities does not tip in Plaintiffs' favor.
When the district court issued the Consent Decree at issue here, it found the Consent Decree was "fair, reasonable and adequate to all concerned." RJN, Ex. 5-6. This finding is persuasive "based on the court's extensive oversight of the decree from the commencement of the litigation."
Likewise, the FAA deemed the Consent Decree "a fair resolution for all concerned." RJN, Ex. 7;
Notably, Santa Monica residents passed Measure LC, placing governance of the Airport in Defendant's hands. Decl. of Denise Anderson-Warren ¶¶ 7-8, Exs. G, I, ECF No. 35. These residents rejected Measure D, which would have mandated voter approval before change in the use of Airport land to non-aviation purposes.
All in all, granting a preliminary injunction would not further the public interest.
Accordingly, Plaintiffs' Application [6] re preliminary injunction is