JUDGMENT

DALE S. FISCHER, District Judge.

Pursuant to the Order Accepting Findings, Conclusions and Recommendations of United States Magistrate Judge,

IT IS ADJUDGED that plaintiff take nothing by her Second Amended Complaint and that this action is dismissed with prejudice.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE RE TERMINATING SANCTIONS

This Report and Recommendation is submitted to the Honorable Dale S. Fischer, United States District Judge, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636 and General Order 194 of the United States District Court for the Central District of California.

ORDERS COMPELLING DISCOVERY

On November 11, 2016, defendants Anthony Colannino and Vittorio Racowschi (the "County Defendants") filed three motions to compel discovery responses (the "motions"). (Docket Nos. 218-220.) Collectively, the motions asserted that plaintiff failed to respond to two sets of interrogatories and one set of requests for production of documents, all of which were served on plaintiff on August 26, 2016. (See generally id.) Plaintiff did not oppose any of the County Defendants' motions. (See generally Docket.)

On December 14, 2016, the Court granted the motions and ordered plaintiff to respond to the discovery requests by January 3, 2017. (Docket No. 222.) Plaintiff thereafter failed to answer or object to the interrogatories and failed to produce documents within the time allowed by the Court. (See Docket No. 225.) Instead, on December 27, 2016, she filed a motion to vacate the December 14th order. (Id.)

In that motion, plaintiff claimed that the County Defendants had lied about mailing the discovery requests, lied about mailing the motions, and conspired with certain non-parties to wrongfully "lock [her] out" of her Pacoima residence. Confusingly, plaintiff also implied that she had lost track of the mailed requests in the course of an alleged "partial move" to Monterey County. (See Docket No. 225 at 12, 16-17; see id., Ex. 3 (referring to receipt of interrogatories); see also Docket No. 228, ¶¶ 7, 10-11.) Plaintiff further argued that the discovery requests were invalid because the Court had issued its July 29, 2016 scheduling order (the "Scheduling Order") without first requiring the parties to file reports or attend a scheduling conference under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(f) ("Rule 26(f)"). (See Docket No. 225 at 17-18; see also Docket No. 228, ¶¶ 8-9.)

On January 26, 2017, the Court denied the motion to vacate, finding that plaintiff had essentially admitted that she received the discovery but not responded to it. (Docket No. 233 at 2 n.1, 3-5.) The Court noted:

(Id. at 4.) The Court further noted that plaintiff had sufficient notice of the County Defendants' motions to oppose them or seek a continuance, but had not done so. (Id. at 4-5.) Finally, the Court explicitly rejected plaintiff's contention that the lack of Rule 26(f) procedures invalidated the Scheduling Order or relieved her of her discovery obligations. (Id.) Nonetheless, the Court extended the deadline for plaintiff to respond to the County Defendants' discovery to February 15, 2017. (Id. at 5.)

Plaintiff did not respond to the discovery by the proscribed deadline. Accordingly, on February 24, 2017, the County Defendants moved for sanctions, including dismissal. (Docket No. 234.) The Court issued an Order to Show Cause on February 27, 2017, requiring plaintiff to show cause no later than March 20, 2017, why the action should not be dismissed for her failure to comply with the Court's order. (Docket No. 235.) Plaintiff thereafter filed a motion to disqualify the undersigned. (Docket No. 236.)1 Plaintiff subsequently filed a response to the Order to Show Cause that essentially repeated the assertions she had made in her motion to vacate the Court's discovery order and claimed that she "has since responded to defendants' discovery and raised objections as their discovery violated Federal Rules." (Docket No. 241.) In reply, the County Defendants stated that circa March 2017, plaintiff had responded to the discovery by serving responses consisting entirely of objections and argued that plaintiff's objections-only responses did not comply with the Court's January 2017 order. (See Docket No. 242, ¶ 12 and Exs. 1-3 thereto.)

On March 24, 2017, the Court noted that the December 14, 2016 and January 26, 2017 orders had required plaintiff to "respond" to defendants' discovery and that plaintiff had "responded" by serving only objections. Construing defendants' request for sanctions as a motion to compel plaintiff to serve answers without objection to the discovery, the Court ordered plaintiff to file her opposition to the motion, if any, by April 13, 2017. (Docket No. 244.) Plaintiff timely filed her opposition to the motion to compel answers without objection. (Docket No. 251.)

The Court thereafter granted the motion to compel with certain exceptions not relevant here.2 The Court concluded that plaintiff's objections "for the most part did not appear to have been made in good faith. Indeed, plaintiff objected to every discovery request with the same boiler plate objections, most of which appeared to be entirely without merit." (Docket No. 255 at 1.) The Court ordered plaintiff to "answer" the discovery requests, as limited, in full and without objections by May 16, 2017. (Id. at 3.) Furthermore, the Court stated:

(Id. (emphasis in original).)

FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH ORDERS COMPELLING DISCOVERY

On February 23, 2018, the County Defendants filed a second motion seeking dismissal of plaintiff's claims against them. (Docket No. 283.) Defendants contend that plaintiff has still not responded to the discovery requests as ordered by the Court in January 2017.3 (Id., ¶ 15.) Defendants argue that dismissal is therefore warranted under, inter alia, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 37(b)(2)(A)(v) and 41(b). (Id.)

On March 5, 2018, plaintiff filed an opposition to the motion. (Docket No. 285.) Plaintiff does not attempt to rebut the County Defendants' assertion that she has failed to respond to the discovery requests. (Id., ¶¶ 1-13.) Rather, plaintiff argues that she is under no obligation to comply with any of the undersigned's orders regarding discovery, because such orders are "NULL AND VOID." (Id., ¶ 3 (emphasis in original).) To support these contentions, plaintiff repeats arguments made in her December 2016 and March 2017 motions. (See id., ¶¶ 1-13.)

SANCTIONS UNDER RULES 37 AND 41

Under Rule 37(b)(2)(A) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court has broad discretion to fashion a remedy sanctioning a party for failing to obey a discovery order. The options available to the Court include, among other things, dismissing the action in whole or in part. Id. at (b)(2)(A)(v). Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes the Court to dismiss the action, upon a defendant's motion, for the plaintiff's failure to comply with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or a court order. A Rule 41(b) dismissal may be premised on the plaintiff's failure to obey "any" order of the court, In re Phenylpropanolamine (PPA) Prod. Liab. Litig., 460 F.3d 1217, 1227 (9th Cir. 2006), and thus may be premised on the failure to obey a discovery order.

In reviewing a dismissal of an action imposed as a sanction for violating a discovery order, the Ninth Circuit has explained:

Valley Engineers Inc. v. Electric Engineering Co., 158 F.3d 1051, 1057 (9th Cir. 1998).

In reviewing the third factor, prejudice, the Court looks to the impact the recalcitrant party's actions have had on the other party. "A defendant suffers prejudice if the plaintiff's actions impair the defendant's ability to go to trial or threaten to interfere with the rightful decision of the case." In re Phenylpropanolamine (PPA) Prod. Liab. Litig., 460 F.3d at 1227 (internal quotation marks omitted). "Failing to produce documents as ordered is considered sufficient prejudice." Id. (citing Adriana Int'l, 913 F.2d at 1412).

Here, plaintiff has refused to provide answers to interrogatories and documents responsive to document requests exploring the basis of her claims. These actions have obstructed the County Defendants' attempts to learn what, if any, support plaintiff has for her claims. Thus, the Court finds that plaintiff's actions have prejudiced defendants' ability to defend themselves in this action and hampered the search for the truth. And as noted, plaintiff's failure to produce documents is sufficient prejudice.

In evaluating the fifth factor (the availability of less drastic sanctions), the Ninth Circuit has developed a three part test: whether the court considered lesser sanctions, whether it tried lesser sanctions, and whether the court warned the disobedient party. Valley Engineers, 158 F.3d at 1057; In re Phenylpropanolamine (PPA) Prod. Liab. Litig., 460 F.3d at 1228-29. However, depending on the facts, the court need not try lesser sanctions before ordering dismissal. Valley Engineers, 158 F.3d at 1057 ("[W]e have said that it is not always necessary for the court to impose less serious sanctions first, or to give any explicit warning"); In re Phenylpropanolamine (PPA) Prod. Liab. Litig., 460 F.3d at 1229 ("[W]e focus more closely on the lack of warning and absence of consideration of less drastic alternatives when the dismissal is sua sponte rather than in response to a noticed motion").

The Court finds that no lesser sanction would be appropriate. Because plaintiff has obstructed important discovery as to her claims against the County Defendants after having received numerous opportunities to comply with her discovery obligations, any lesser sanction would not ameliorate the prejudice suffered by those defendants. Moreover, throughout this litigation, plaintiff has manifested a willful disregard for the Court's orders, the Local Rules, and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

First, plaintiff has willfully ignored the Local Rules requiring her to keep her address of record current. The Court points out this defalcation because plaintiff has repeatedly used it as a shield against her discovery obligations, by claiming not to have received documents duly mailed to that address. Moreover, she has repeatedly made baseless accusations of collusion in the alleged "lock out" as a smokescreen for her discovery noncompliance. See Computer Task Grp., Inc. v. Brotby, 364 F.3d 1112, 1115 (9th Cir. 2004) (magistrate judge's recommendation of terminating sanctions was supported by, inter alia, finding that party made "repeated groundless objections," which were "absurd" and "completely unbelievable," for failing to properly respond to discovery; rejected excuses included residential move).

Second, plaintiff failed to answer the County Defendants' discovery requests upon their initial mailing, despite having received them. She also ignored the County Defendants' motions to compel those requests, despite being aware of their filing. Subsequently, in seeking to vacate the Court's order on the motions to compel, plaintiff was not forthright with the Court regarding her receipt of the discovery requests.

Furthermore, plaintiff did not respond to the January 2017 discovery order before the initially-proscribed deadline. When she (eventually) responded, she did so in bad faith, providing no substantive answers and interposing largely meritless objections. Having been given a second opportunity to comply with the order, she has entirely failed to provided any responses. The foregoing conduct cannot be understood as anything other than plaintiff's knowing, willful, and obdurate refusal to allow the County Defendants to conduct meaningful discovery into her claims.

Third, plaintiff now baldly asserts that she has no intention of following any discovery order issued by the undersigned. Moreover, to justify this intransigence, plaintiff raises (inter alia) arguments previously rejected by Judge Fischer.4 That plaintiff sees fit to disregard not only the undersigned's orders, but Judge Fischer's order as well, strongly suggests that plaintiff is unwilling to be bound by any court ruling she views as adverse to her interests. Given plaintiff's demonstrated aversion to complying with court rulings, an order requiring, e.g., the payment of monetary sanctions would be pointless.

The Court has considered issue sanctions and rejected them as well, because plaintiff's refusal to comply with the Court's discovery orders implicates all of her claims against the County Defendants. Finally, in its April 2017 order, the Court warned plaintiff that a failure to comply with that order would result in a recommendation that the action be dismissed.

The Supreme Court has held that dismissal as a sanction is not appropriate if the recalcitrant party establishes that the failure to comply with the court order was due to an inability to comply. National Hockey League v. Metropolitan Hockey Club, Inc., 427 U.S. 639, 640, 96 S.Ct. 2778, 49 L. Ed. 2d 747 (1976). The plaintiff bears the burden of proving such inability. See, e.g., F.T.C. v. Affordable Media, 179 F.3d 1228, 1241 (9th Cir. 1999) ("[T]he party asserting the impossibility defense must show categorically and in detail why he is unable to comply" (internal quotation marks deleted) (motion for civil contempt)); see also In re Chase & Sanborn Corp., 872 F.2d 397, 400 (11th Cir. 1989) ("To succeed on this defense [of inability to comply], however, the respondent must go beyond a mere assertion of inability and satisfy his burden of production on the point by introducing evidence in support of his claim" (citation deleted)). Plaintiff does not contend that she cannot comply with the discovery orders. Rather, as set forth above, plaintiff has asserted that she will not comply, and she has ignored every order rejecting her asserted grounds for not complying.

Based on plaintiff's overall conduct, her failure to comply with the January 26, 2017 order, her failure to comply with the April 26, 2017 order, and her openly-declared intransigence, the Court finds that the dismissal of all her claims against the County Defendants under Rules 37 (b)(2)(A)(v) and 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is warranted.

VI. RECOMMENDATION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court recommends that (1) an order be entered approving and accepting this Report and Recommendation; and (2) judgment be entered dismissing with prejudice plaintiff's claims against defendants Anthony Colannino and Vittorio Racowschi.

NOTICE

Reports and Recommendations are not appealable to the Court of Appeals, but are subject to the right of any party to timely file Objections as provided in the Local Rules Governing the Duties of the Magistrate Judges, and review by the District Judge whose initials appear in the docket number. No.tice of Appeal pursuant to the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure should be filed until entry of the Judgment of the District Court.