ORDER ACCEPTING FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

ANDREW J. GUILFORD, District Judge.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636, the Court has reviewed the Petition, records on file, and the Report and Recommendation of the United States Magistrate Judge. Further, the Court has engaged in a de novo review of those portions of the Report to which petitioner has objected. The Court accepts the findings and recommendation of the Magistrate Judge.

In doing so, the Court notes petitioner raises a new argument for equitable tolling in his Objections: that being mentally ill and a layman at law, petitioner had to rely on another inmate for assistance in preparing his petitions, and due to other cases the inmate was working on petitioner was separated from both the inmate and his legal materials from January 2015 through late December 2015. Objections at v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding "a pro se petitioner's lack of legal sophistication is not, by itself, an extraordinary circumstance warranting equitable tolling"). And that petitioner chose to seek aid from another inmate who apparently was not able to work on his petitions in a prompt fashion was a circumstance of petitioner's own creation that likewise does not warrant equitable tolling. See Chaffer v. Prosper, 592 F.3d 1046, 1049 (9th Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (finding petitioner's "reliance on helpers who were transferred or too busy to attend to his petitions" to be "hardly extraordinary given the vicissitudes of prison life," and not a circumstance that "made it `impossible' for him to file on time"; and petitioner "`entrusted [his inmate law clerk] with his legal documents at his peril'") (citations omitted). Indeed, petitioner acknowledges that even during this period when he asserts he was separated from his legal materials and still waiting for assistance from the other inmate, he was nonetheless able to file his first state habeas petition in November 2015. See Objections at 13. Thus, petitioner has shown no causal connection between his delay in filing and his reliance on and transfer of his files to another inmate, as required for equitable tolling. See Bryant v. Arizona Att'y Gen., 499 F.3d 1056, 1060 (9th Cir. 2007).

Petitioner also has shown no causal connection between his delay in filing and any mental illness. The Ninth Circuit has established a two-part test a petitioner must meet in order to establish a basis for equitable tolling arising from a mental illness. Bills v. Clark, 628 F.3d 1092, 1099-1100 (9th Cir. 2010). First, the illness must be shown to be an extraordinary circumstance beyond his control, which requires that either the petitioner was unable "rationally or factually to personally understand the need to timely file," or was unable "personally to prepare a habeas petition and effectuate its filing." Id. Second, the petitioner must show diligence in pursuing claims "to the extent he could understand them, but that the mental impairment made it impossible to meet the filing deadline under the totality of the circumstances." Id. at 1100. Petitioner here does not contend his mental health rendered him unable to understand the need to timely file or to prepare a filing, and the record is inconsistent with any such contention.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that respondent's Motion to Dismiss (docket no. 12) is granted, and Judgment will be entered denying the Petition and dismissing this action with prejudice.