ORDER ACCEPTING FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

DOLLY M. GEE, District Judge.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636, the Court has reviewed the original Complaint, the currently operative First Amended Complaint, all documents filed in support of and in opposition to the motion of Defendant Riverside Community College [District] ("RCC") for judgment on the pleadings ("Defendant's Motion"), and all of the records herein, including the June 13, 2019 Report and Recommendation of United States Magistrate Judge ("Report and Recommendation" or "R&R"), and Plaintiff's objections to the Report and Recommendation ("Objections" or "Obj."). The Court has further made a de novo determination of those portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objection is made. The Court agrees with, and approves and accepts the Report and Recommendation, and overrules all of the Objections. The Court more specifically addresses some of the Objections below.

First, the Objections largely mischaracterize the Report and Recommendation, the facts, and the governing law, and essentially reassert mostly the same rambling, conclusory, and at times unintelligible, arguments Plaintiff previously raised, and which the Report and Recommendation properly concludes have no merit.

Second, Plaintiff's objection that he was not afforded a meaningful opportunity to comply with the September 14, 2018 Case Management and Scheduling Order ("Scheduling Order") is predicated on a distortion of the record and an incorrect conflation of the three current Doe Defendants referenced in the operative First Amended Complaint ("Current Doe Defendants") with Plaintiff's four proposed new defendants ("Proposed New Defendants"), only the latter of whom are the subject of Plaintiff's November 1, 2018 request to amend.1 The September 14, 2018 Scheduling Order notified Plaintiff that in the event he did not amend/seek to amend his pleading to name the Current Doe Defendants within 60 days, the Current Doe Defendants would be dismissed. [Doc. # 13 at 2.] Plaintiff has never sought leave to amend his pleading to name the Current Doe Defendants. The only portion of the Report and Recommendation that is predicated upon the Scheduling Order is the recommended dismissal of the Current Doe Defendants — a recommendation which is entirely appropriate given the record. (R&R at 10). Contrary to Plaintiff's suggestion in the Objections (Obj. at 4), the Scheduling Order is not the predicate for the recommendation to deny Plaintiff leave to amend to add the Proposed New Defendants. In short, Plaintiff's objection that he was not afforded a meaningful opportunity to comply with the Scheduling Order is specious and is overruled.2

Third, Plaintiff's suggestion that the Court should somehow have divined that he was requesting leave to file a second amended complaint suing Drs. Isaac and Hendrick for a "failure to train" based upon his conclusory non-specific allegation that they should "assume liability for their actions and non-actions[]" (Opp. at 2-3; Obj at 5) is simply incorrect. While pro se complaints are to be construed liberally and should not be dismissed if they state a claim under any legal theory — even if the Plaintiff erroneously relies on a different legal theory (see Haddock v. Board of Dental Examiners, 777 F.2d 462, 464 (9th Cir. 1985) — a court may not supply essential elements of a claim that have not been pled. See Chapman v. Pier 1 Imports (U.S.) Inc., 631 F.3d 939, 954 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc) ("[A] liberal interpretation of a ... civil rights complaint may not supply essential elements of [a] claim that were not initially pled.") (quoting Pena v. Gardner, 976 F.2d 469, 471 (9th Cir. 1992) (quotation marks omitted; ellipses in original). Moreover, Plaintiff's Objections reveal that he is merely speculating as to who is responsible for the alleged failure to train the employees about whose conduct he complains and accordingly cannot plausibly allege facts showing that Drs. Isaac and Hendrick caused such alleged violations. (Objs. at 3) ("Some persons in the upper hierarchy must take responsibility for [RCC's] failure to train its employees. These persons are either the President of the College or perhaps the Regents and Trustees of the College. [¶] The president of [RCC] or someone in the upper heirarchy [sic] must take responsibility for the shortcomings of the College.").3

Finally, to the extent Plaintiff otherwise asserts new arguments for the first time in his Objections, the Court exercises its discretion to decline to consider them. See United States v. Howell, 231 F.3d 615, 621 (9th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 831 (2001).

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED: (1) this action is dismissed without prejudice as against the Current Doe Defendants (John Doe No. 1, Jane Doe No. 1, and Jane Doe No. 2); (2) Defendant's Motion is granted to the extent it seeks judgment on the pleadings in favor of RCC on Plaintiff's sole federal claim, i.e., his first claim which arises under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (3) the Court declines to exercises supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff's remaining state law claim against RCC, i.e., his second claim which alleges the intentional infliction of emotional distress; (4) leave to further amend is denied; and (5) the Clerk shall enter Judgment accordingly.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk serve copies of this Order and the Judgment on Plaintiff and counsel for Defendant RCC (the only defendant who has appeared in this action).

IT IS SO ORDERED.