JOHN E. McDERMOTT, Magistrate Judge.
On October 3, 2018, Marisa Rodusky ("Plaintiff" or "Claimant") filed a complaint seeking review of the decision by the Commissioner of Social Security ("Commissioner") denying Plaintiff's applications for Child's Insurance benefits and for Supplemental Security Income benefits. (Dkt. 1.) The Commissioner filed an Answer on February 4, 2019. (Dkt. 16.) On May 10, 2019, the parties filed a Joint Stipulation ("JS"). (Dkt. 19.) The matter is now ready for decision.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), both parties consented to proceed bef ore this Magistrate Judge. After reviewing the pleadings, transcripts, and administrative record ("AR"), the Court concludes that the Commissioner's decision must be affirmed and this case dismissed with prejudice.
Plaintiff is a 25 year-old female who applied for Child's Insurance benefits and Supplemental Security Income benefits on July 30, 2015, alleging disability beginning January 1, 2014. (AR 23.) The ALJ determined that Plaintiff has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since January 1, 2014, the alleged onset date.
Plaintiff's claims were denied initially on January 26, 2016. (AR 23.) Plaintiff filed a timely request for hearing, which was held before Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") James Carberry on June 15, 2017, in Norwalk, California. (AR 23.) Plaintiff appeared and testified at the hearing and was represented by counsel. (AR 23.) Vocational expert ("VE") Joseph H. Torres also appeared and testified at the hearing. (AR 23.)
The ALJ issued an unfavorable decision on July 6, 2017. (AR 23-31.) The Appeals Council denied review on August 8, 2018. (AR 1-3.)
As reflected in the Joint Stipulation, Plaintiff raises the following disputed issues as grounds for reversal and remand:
Under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), this Court reviews the ALJ's decision to determine whether the ALJ's findings are supported by substantial evidence and free of legal error.
Substantial evidence means "`more than a mere scintilla,' but less than a preponderance."
This Court must review the record as a whole and consider adverse as well as supporting evidence.
The Social Security Act defines disability as the "inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or . . . can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months." 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A). The Commissioner has established a five-step sequential process to determine whether a claimant is disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920.
The first step is to determine whether the claimant is presently engaging in substantial gainful activity.
If the claimant cannot perform his or her past relevant work or has no past relevant work, the ALJ proceeds to the fifth step and must determine whether the impairment prevents the claimant from performing any other substantial gainful activity.
In this case, the ALJ determined at step one of the sequential process that Plaintiff has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since January 1, 2014, the alleged onset date. (AR 25.)
At step two, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff has the following medically determinable severe impairments: morbid obesity; degenerative disc disease with spondylosis; and a depressive disorder with anxiety. (AR 25.)
At step three, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of one of the listed impairments. (AR 26-27.)
The ALJ then found that Plaintiff has the RFC to perform medium work, as defined in 20 CFR §§ 404.1567(c) and 416.967(c), with the following limitations:
(AR 27-29.) In determining the above RFC, the ALJ made a determination that Plaintiff's subjective symptom allegations were "not entirely consistent" with the medical evidence and other evidence of record. (AR 28.) Plaintiff does not challenge this finding.
At step four, the ALJ found that Plaintiff has no past relevant work. (AR 29.) The ALJ, however, also found at step five that, considering Claimant's age, education, and RFC, there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy that Claimant can perform, including the jobs of janitorial worker and warehouse worker. (AR 29-30.) Consequently, the ALJ found that Claimant is not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act. (AR 30-31.)
The ALJ decision must be affirmed. The ALJ's RFC is supported by substantial evidence. The ALJ did not fail to fully develop the record.
Plaintiff contends that the ALJ improperly rejected the opinions of consulting examiner Dr. Zhang and State agency reviewing physician Dr. Myles Friedland. The Court disagrees.
The ALJ's RFC is not a medical determination but an administrative finding or legal decision reserved to the Commissioner based on consideration of all the relevant evidence, including medical evidence, lay witnesses, and subjective symptoms. See SSR 96-5p; 20 C.F.R. § 1527(e). In determining a claimant's RFC, an ALJ must consider all relevant evidence in the record, including medical records, lay evidence, and the effects of symptoms, including pain reasonably attributable to the medical condition. Robbins, 446 F.3d at 883.
In evaluating medical opinions, the case law and regulations distinguish among the opinions of three types of physicians: (1) those who treat the claimant (treating physicians); (2) those who examine but do not treat the claimant (examining physicians); and (3) those who neither examine nor treat the claimant (non-examining, or consulting, physicians).
Where a treating doctor's opinion is not contradicted by another doctor, it may be rejected only for "clear and convincing" reasons.
Plaintiff, a 25-year-old woman, alleges she is unable to work due to obesity, depression, high blood pressure, back and right leg problems, anxiety, and skin fungus. (AR 28.) She claims she has difficulty sitting or standing and cannot lift even five pounds. (AR 28.) She says she has a mass on her neck, but the consulting examiner did not observe any mass and the medical evidence of record does not document any mass. (AR 28.) She also alleges panic attacks every week or two. (AR 28.) The ALJ did find that Plaintiff has the medically determinable impairments of morbid obesity, degenerative disc disease with spondylosis, and depressive disorder with anxiety. (AR 25.) The ALJ, however, also found that Plaintiff had the residual functional capacity to perform a restricted range of medium work limited to "only simple, routine tasks, requiring no more than occasional interaction with the general public, co-workers, or supervisors." (AR 27.)
On December 9, 2015, Plaintiff underwent a consultative psychological examination with Dr. J. Zhang, Psy. D. (AR 349-355.) His findings on which the ALJ relied are set forth in Finding No. 4 on severity. (AR 26-27.) Dr. Zhang diagnosed depressive disorder, with anxiety. (AR 352.) Dr. Zhang opined Plaintiff would be moderately impaired in several areas of mental functioning: the ability to understand, remember, and carry out detailed and complex instructions; to maintain concentration, persistence, and pace; to interact appropriately with co-workers, supervisors, and the public; and to respond appropriately to changes in the work setting. (AR 353.) Plaintiff was mildly impaired in daily work activity and in maintaining consistent attendance. (AR 353.)
Plaintiff contends that the ALJ did not discuss Dr. Zhang's opinions when addressing Plaintiff's RFC, did not include any of Dr. Zhang's limitations in Plaintiff's RFC, and rejected Dr. Zhang's opinion without explanation. The ALJ, however, did not reject Dr. Zhang's opinion. He relied on Dr. Zhang's opinions and limitations in Finding No. 4 on severity. (AR 26-27.) Dr. Zhang's opinions (AR 353) were not an RFC determination because Dr. Zhang did not assess whether Plaintiff could perform any unskilled work. There was no reason, therefore, to discuss Dr. Zhang's opinion in Finding No. 5 regarding Plaintiff's RFC.
The ALJ, moreover, translated Dr. Zhang's opinions into the RFC he assessed. The Ninth Circuit has held that an RFC finding of unskilled work (simple, repetitive tasks) is consistent with findings that a claimant had moderate limitations in concentration, persistence, and pace.
The State agency reviewing physician Dr. Myles Friedland did provide an RFC assessment. (AR 29, 76-79.) Like Dr. Zhang, Dr. Friedland made findings regarding Plaintiff's mental limitations, including moderate limitations in concentration and persistence. (AR 78, 92.) Dr. Friedland, however, also assessed an RFC for "simple one and two-step mental tasks" with "limited contact with co-workers and the general public." (AR 79, 93.)
Thus, the ALJ did not reject Dr. Zhang's opinion. There was no reason to discuss Dr. Zhang's mental limitations when addressing Plaintiff's RFC because Dr. Zhang's opinions were not an RFC assessment. Nor was there any reason to include moderate limitations in concentration and pace in the RFC.
Plaintiff makes the same argument regarding Dr. Friedland as he made about Dr. Zhang. Plaintiff contends that Dr. Friedland found Plaintiff has moderate limitations in certain areas of mental functioning that were not discussed in Finding No. 5 regarding Plaintiff's RFC and were not included in Plaintiff's RFC. Again, the limitations Plaintiff identifies are not an RFC because they do not assess Plaintiff's ability to perform in the workplace. Dr. Friedland, however, did limit Plaintiff to "simple one and two-step mental tasks" with "limited contact with co-workers and the general public." (AR 79, 93.) The ALJ did not reject Dr. Friedland's limitations. He incorporated them into Plaintiff's RFC.
The ALJ did not reject the opinions of Dr. Zhang or Dr. Friedland. The ALJ's RFC is supported by substantial evidence.
Dr. Zhang diagnosed Plaintiff with depressive disorder, with anxiety and "Rule out, borderline intellectual functioning." (AR 352.) Plaintiff contends that the ALJ should have developed the record by ordering psychometric testing to determine whether Plaintiff had the impairment of borderline intellectual functioning, whether it was severe, and whether it meets or equals Listing 12.05.
The ALJ does have a special duty to develop the record fully and fairly.
Here, the record evidence is neither ambiguous nor inadequate in regard to Plaintiff's mental status. Dr. Zhang, after noting Plaintiff demonstrates below average intellectual functioning, nonetheless concluded that Plaintiff had no impairment with respect to carrying out simple instructions, and only mild impairments in carrying out routine work activity, including consistent attendance and basic safety. (AR 352-353.) Dr. Friedland found that Plaintiff had only mild limitation in performing activities of daily living. (AR 74.) He concluded that Plaintiff could perform simple one and two-step mental tasks with limited contact with co-workers and the general public. (AR 79, 93.) The ALJ was entitled to rely on Dr. Zhang's findings and Dr. Friedland's RFC opinion and findings regarding Plaintiff's work-related functional limitations. The ALJ, moreover, found Plaintiff's subjective symptom allegations "not entirely consistent" with the medical evidence and other evidence of record. (AR 28.) Plaintiff does not challenge this finding. This Court "must uphold an ALJ's decision so long as it is supported by substantial evidence and it is not based on legal error."
Plaintiff contends that the record is inadequate to evaluate Plaintiff's mental impairments, but it is the ALJ's responsibility to resolve conflicts in the medical evidence and ambiguities in the record.
The ALJ did not fail to fully develop the record.
The ALJ's nondisability determination is supported by substantial evidence and free of legal error.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Judgment be entered affirming the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security and dismissing this case with prejudice.