NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

CHAVEZ, J.

Plaintiff and appellant April Stanfield (plaintiff) appeals from the summary judgment entered in favor of defendant and respondent Southern California Permanente Medical Group (defendant) in plaintiff's action for sexual harassment and retaliation in violation of the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) (Gov. Code, § 12940 et seq.)1 We conclude the trial court did not err by granting defendant's motion for summary judgment because the acts of alleged harassment do not establish the existence of a hostile work environment as a matter of law. Summary judgment was also properly granted because defendant offered legitimate, nonretaliatory reasons for the various personnel actions plaintiff alleges were taken against her in retaliation for her complaints of sexual harassment, and plaintiff presented no substantial evidence that those reasons were pretextual. We therefore affirm the judgment.

BACKGROUND

1. Factual Background

Plaintiff is currently employed by defendant as a health evaluation assistant. She began working at defendant's Carson facility in 1983 and transferred to defendant's South Bay facility in 1993. From late 2006 to 2008, plaintiff was assigned to work in module 5 and reported to her supervisors, Francene Alexander and Sandra Fitts. Brenda Thomas (Thomas) became the lead nurse in plaintiff's work module in 2006.

Plaintiff claims she was subjected to lewd remarks by Thomas on several occasions at her workplace during working hours. On one such occasion in December 2006, Thomas allegedly told plaintiff and two other employees that she had met her husband while he was a patient at defendant's Sunset facility and that the two of them had gone to Griffith Park and had sex there. On another occasion in January 2007, Thomas purportedly told plaintiff "don't wear [your] hair in a ponytail anymore . . . because [you] look like a prostitute. And there was a prostitute in [Thomas's] building that [Thomas's] husband had been checking out and `next thing you know, he'll be wanting to have sex with you too.'"

Plaintiff alleges that in May or June 2007, Thomas showed her and several other employees a photographic image stored on Thomas's cellphone showing Thomas nude and seated on a toilet. Thomas remarked at the time that her husband liked to take "crazy" pictures of her. Approximately one month later, Thomas purportedly told plaintiff that sometimes she liked to have sex with her husband and sometimes with women.

Plaintiff alleges that over the course of a year, she was subjected to views of Thomas's partially exposed rear end while Thomas was seated at the nurse's station because she wore ill-fitting pants. Plaintiff further alleges that Thomas and other employees regularly talked about sex openly in her work area, but these comments were not directed at her.

Plaintiff contends she first complained about Thomas's alleged harassment in May 2007 by calling an internal compliance hotline. Plaintiff again complained about Thomas at a July 18, 2007 disciplinary meeting at which plaintiff was placed on an investigatory suspension in response to an allegation by Thomas that plaintiff had threatened her.

On September 14, 2007, plaintiff was informed that she was receiving a one-day paid suspension as a Level 4 Corrective Action. The documentation for the Level 4 Corrective Action indicates that the discipline was imposed as the result of plaintiff's unprofessional conduct and inappropriate workplace behavior, including the incident Thomas found threatening, as well as complaints from other coworkers who found plaintiff's behavior to be rude, intimidating, threatening, insulting, and divisive.

On November 10, 2008, plaintiff was placed on an investigatory suspension in response to a report that she had threatened another employee named Jeri Wiley.

2. Procedural Background

Plaintiff filed a charge of discrimination with the California Department of Fair Employment and Housing (DFEH) on September 13, 2007, alleging that she was forced to take administrative leave because of Thomas's allegation that plaintiff had threatened her. The DFEH issued a notice of case closure later that same month. Plaintiff filed this action in August 2008, alleging causes of action for sexual harassment and retaliation in violation of FEHA, and for intentional infliction of emotional distress.

Defendant moved for summary judgment on the grounds that plaintiff could not establish a prima facie case of sexual harassment, intentional infliction of emotional distress, or retaliation, and that defendant had a legitimate reason for imposing the Level 4 Corrective Action on plaintiff. Plaintiff opposed the motion, arguing that she had presented evidence sufficient to establish a prima facie case of both direct and indirect sexual harassment, retaliation, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.

After hearing argument from the parties, the trial court granted defendant's motion. Judgment was subsequently entered in defendant's favor, and this appeal followed.

CONTENTIONS ON APPEAL

Plaintiff contends the trial court erred by granting summary judgment because she presented sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case of sexual harassment based on a hostile work environment and of retaliation in violation of FEHA. Plaintiff does not challenge the trial court's summary adjudication of her claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.

DISCUSSION

I. Standard of Review

Summary judgment is granted when a moving party establishes the right to entry of judgment as a matter of law. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).) "The purpose of the law of summary judgment is to provide courts with a mechanism to cut through the parties' pleadings in order to determine whether, despite their allegations, trial is in fact necessary to resolve their dispute. [Citation.]" (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843 (Aguilar).)

A defendant moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden of proving that there is no merit to a cause of action by showing that one or more elements of the cause of action cannot be established or that there is a complete defense to that cause of action. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2); Cucuzza v. City of Santa Clara (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 1031, 1037.) Once the defendant has made such a showing, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to that cause of action or as to a defense to the cause of action. (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 849.) If the plaintiff does not make such a showing, summary judgment in favor of the defendant is appropriate. In order to obtain a summary judgment, "all that the defendant need do is to show that the plaintiff cannot establish at least one element of the cause of action . . . . [T]he defendant need not himself conclusively negate any such element . . . ." (Id. at p. 853.)

On appeal from a summary judgment, an appellate court makes "an independent assessment of the correctness of the trial court's ruling, applying the same legal standard as the trial court in determining whether there are any genuine issues of material fact or whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. [Citations.]" (Iverson v. Muroc Unified School Dist. (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 218, 222.) In doing so, we "[consider] all the evidence set forth in the moving and opposition papers except that to which objections have been made and sustained. [Citation.]" (Guz v. Bechtel National, Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 317, 334 (Guz).)

II. Sexual Harassment Claim

A. Applicable Legal Principles

"FEHA prohibits an employer from harassing an employee on the basis of sex, holds an employer liable for harassment of an employee by another employee if the employer knew or should have known of the harassment and failed to take immediate and appropriate corrective action, requires the employer to take all reasonable steps to prevent harassment from occurring, and prohibits retaliation against any person opposing any forbidden practice. (§ 12940, subds. (f), (i) and (j).)" (Fisher v. San Pedro Peninsula Hospital (1989) 214 Cal.App.3d 590, 605 (Fisher), fn. omitted.)

Sexual harassment claims under FEHA fall into two distinct categories: quid pro quo and hostile work environment. (Fisher, supra, 214 Cal.App. 3d at p. 607.) "Quid pro quo harassment occurs when submission to sexual conduct is made a condition of concrete employment benefits." (Ibid.) Plaintiff makes no claim of quid pro quo harassment in this case.

To establish a prima facie case of sexual harassment because of a hostile work environment, a plaintiff must show she was subjected to sexual advances, conduct, or comments that were unwelcome, because of sex, and sufficiently severe or pervasive so as to alter the terms or conditions of her employment and create a hostile or abusive work environment. (Lyle v. Warner Bros. Television Productions (2006) 38 Cal.4th 264, 279 (Lyle).)

1. Conduct Because of Sex

A plaintiff claiming she was subjected to unwelcome conduct because of sex must show "`the conduct at issue was not merely tinged with offensive sexual connotations, but actually constituted "discrimina[tion]... because of . . . sex."' [Citation.]" (Lyle, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 280, quoting Oncole v. Sundowners Offshore Services, Inc. (1998) 523 U.S. 75, 81.) "[I]t is the disparate treatment of an employee on the basis of sex—not the mere discussion of sex or use of vulgar language—that is the essence of a sexual harassment claim" under FEHA. (Ibid. )

"[E]vidence of hostile, sexist statements is relevant to show discrimination on the basis of sex." (Lyle, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 281.) For example, a hostile work environment sexual harassment claim under FEHA may be established when a male employee constantly refers to a female employee using demeaning, gender-specific terms. (Id. at p. 282.) "However, while the use of vulgar or sexually disparaging language may be relevant to show such discrimination, it is not necessarily sufficient, by itself, to establish actionable conduct." (Id. at p. 281.) "[A] hostile work environment sexual harassment claim is not established where a supervisor or coworker simply uses crude or inappropriate language in front of employees or draws a vulgar picture, without directing sexual innuendos or gender-related language toward a plaintiff or toward women in general." (Id. at p. 282.)

2. Severity and Pervasiveness

Whether sexual conduct was sufficiently severe or pervasive to create a hostile or offensive work environment must be determined from the totality of the circumstances. (Fisher, supra, 214 Cal.App.3d at p. 609.) To evaluate the totality of the circumstances, the following factors are considered: "(1) the nature of the unwelcome sexual acts or works (generally, physical touching is more offensive than unwelcome verbal abuse); (2) the frequency of the offensive encounters; (3) the total number of days over which all of the offensive conduct occurs; and (4) the context in which the sexually harassing conduct occurred." (Id. at p. 610.)

"[A]n employee generally cannot recover for harassment that is occasional, isolated, sporadic, or trivial; rather, the employee must show a concerted pattern of harassment of a repeated, routine, or a generalized nature. . . . [W]hen the harassing conduct is not severe in the extreme, more than a few isolated incidents must have occurred to prove a claim based on hostile working conditions. (See Herberg v. California Institute of the Arts (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 142, 150-153 [liability for sexual harassment may not be imposed based on a single incident that does not involve egregious conduct akin to a physical assault or the threat thereof] . . . .) Moreover, when a plaintiff cannot point to a loss of tangible job benefits, she must make a `"commensurately higher showing that the sexually harassing conduct was pervasive and destructive of the working environment."' [Citations.]" (Lyle, supra, 38 Cal.4th at pp. 283-284.)

B. No prima facie case of harassment

Plaintiff bases her hostile work environment sexual harassment claim on five incidents involving Thomas: (1) Thomas's recounting to her coworkers, including plaintiff, about how she met her husband while he was a patient and had sex with him in a public park; (2) Thomas's comment to plaintiff that plaintiff looked like a prostitute when she wore her hair in a ponytail, that Thomas's husband had been eyeing a prostitute in Thomas's building and that he might want to have sex with plaintiff too; (3) Thomas showing her coworkers, including plaintiff, a cell phone image of herself naked and seated on a toilet and stating that her husband liked to take "crazy" pictures of her; (4) Thomas's comment to plaintiff that Thomas liked to have sex with her husband and with other women; and (5) Thomas's wearing ill-fitting clothing that exposed part of her rear end when she sat down.

Many of the foregoing incidents do not involve conduct that was "because of sex." (Lyle, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 279.) Three of the incidents involved conduct or comments by Thomas that were not directed at plaintiff or any other particular employee. Thomas's comments about how she had sex in the park with her husband, her conduct in displaying a cell phone image of herself nude and seated on a toilet, and her ill-fitting wardrobe, while possibly "tinged with offensive sexual connotations," do not show any disparate treatment based on sex. (Id. at p. 280.) As discussed, "a hostile work environment sexual harassment claim is not established where a supervisor or coworker simply uses crude or inappropriate language in front of employees or draws a vulgar picture, without directing sexual innuendos or gender-related language toward a plaintiff." (Id. at p. 282.)

The incidents on which plaintiff bases her sexual harassment claim were not sufficiently severe to establish the existence of a hostile work environment. None of the alleged incidents involved physical contact, threats, or explicit language. Thomas's comments regarding her sexual preferences or the sexual preferences of her husband, and her remarks about plaintiff's appearance, while offensive or vulgar to plaintiff, do not constitute actionable harassment. "FEHA is `"not a `civility code' and [is] not designed to rid the workplace of vulgarity."' [Citation.]" (Haberman v. Cengage Learning, Inc. (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 365, 385 (Haberman), quoting Lyle, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 295.) Comments that are "too personal and inappropriate for the workplace," without more, do not constitute actionable sexual harassment under FEHA. (Haberman, at p. 386.)

The alleged incidents involving Thomas were isolated and sporadic, occurring over a seven-month period. (See, e.g., Haberman, supra, 180 Cal.App.4th at pp. 382-386 [six comments over 13-month period, where some comments were not based on sex, no physical contact alleged, and no threatening or explicit language used was not pervasive harassment sufficient to establish hostile work environment]; Mokler v. County of Orange (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 121, 144 [three incidents over five-week period, involving no physical threats, where harasser asked plaintiff about her marital status, where she lived, and put his arm around her, insufficient to support hostile work environmental claim].) Plaintiff thus failed to establish a concerted pattern of sexual harassment of a repeated or routine nature.

In an effort to overcome this shortfall in her evidentiary showing, plaintiff argues that in addition to the incidents involving Thomas, she was regularly subjected to other general comments in the workplace about sex. Plaintiff admitted, however, that none of these other comments were directed at her, and she could provide no specific facts regarding these comments. Plaintiff cannot rely on unspecified, general comments to establish sexual harassment based on a hostile work environment. "[I]t is not enough to allege that harassment occurred . . . a plaintiff who is not a direct victim must also allege exactly what occurred in her presence in her immediate work environment and describe that work environment." (Fisher, supra, 214 Cal.App.3d at p. 611.)

The totality of the circumstances show that the incidents on which plaintiff bases her sexual harassment claim were not conduct or comments because of sex and were not sufficiently severe or pervasive to create a hostile or offensive work environment.

III. Retaliation Claim

Section 12940, subdivision (h) makes it unlawful for any employer "to discharge, expel, or otherwise discriminate against any person because the person has opposed any practices forbidden under this part or because the person has filed a complaint, testified, or assisted in any proceeding under this part." Subdivision (a) of the statute specifies the unlawful employment practices that are prohibited, including sexual harassment.

To establish a prima facie case of retaliation in violation of FEHA, a plaintiff must show that he or she engaged in a protected activity, that the employer subjected the employee to an adverse employment action, and that a causal link exists between the protected activity and the adverse action. (Fisher, supra, 214 Cal.App.3d at p. 614.) A causal link may be established with evidence demonstrating that the employer was aware of the protected activity and the adverse action followed within a relatively short time. (Morgan v. Regents of University of California (2000) 88 Cal.App.4th 52.)

Once a prima facie case has been established, the burden shifts to the employer to offer a legitimate nonretaliatory explanation for its conduct. If the employer offers a legitimate, nonretaliatory reason, the burden then shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the employer's proffered explanation is merely a pretext for retaliation. (Flait v. North American Watch Corp. (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 467, 476.)

Plaintiff contends defendant retaliated against her because she complained about sexual harassment. The alleged retaliatory acts include denial of several transfer requests, being placed on a paid administrative leave in July 2007 pending investigation of Thomas's allegation that plaintiff had threatened her, being placed on a paid one-day decision-making leave in September 2007 for unprofessional conduct and inappropriate workplace behavior, being placed on a paid investigatory suspension in the fall of 2008 for allegedly threatening another employee, and being threatened with termination of her employment. As we discuss, plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case of retaliation; defendant presented legitimate, nonretaliatory reasons for imposing the July 2007 and September 2007 and 2008 suspensions on plaintiff.

A. Transfer Requests

Plaintiff contends she made numerous transfer requests beginning in January 2007, and all were denied in retaliation for complaining about sexual harassment. Plaintiff failed, however, to establish the requisite causal nexus between the denial of her transfer requests and her complaints of sexual harassment. The record shows that plaintiff began making requests to transfer out of her work module in January 2007, but that she did not complain about Thomas's alleged harassment until May 2007. Plaintiff presented no evidence as to whether any of her transfer requests were made and denied after her May 2007 complaint about Thomas's alleged harassment. Plaintiff admitted that she did not know why her transfer requests were denied. Although plaintiff believes the transfer requests were denied in retaliation for her complaints, she presented no evidence to substantiate this belief. Plaintiff accordingly failed to raise a triable issue of material fact regarding the existence of a causal link between the denial of her transfer requests and any protected activity. (Doe v. Capital Cities (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1038, 1053 [to establish requisite causal nexus in FEHA retaliation claim, protected activity must precede adverse action].)

B. July 2007 and September 2007 Suspensions

Plaintiff contends the July 2007 paid investigatory suspension and the September 2007 paid disciplinary suspension were imposed on her in retaliation for her complaints about Thomas's alleged harassment. Even assuming plaintiff established a prima facie case of retaliation with regard to these suspensions, defendant presented a legitimate, nonretaliatory reason for imposing the suspensions — plaintiff's aggressive and confrontational conduct toward her coworkers. Defendant presented evidence that since at least 2006, plaintiff had been admonished about her inappropriate workplace behavior, including intimidating other employees, throwing a telephone receiver, and shoving a chair across the room. The disciplinary leave imposed on plaintiff in September 2007 was based not only on an incident between plaintiff and Thomas, but also on complaints from other employees in plaintiff's work module who found plaintiff's behavior to be rude, intimidating, threatening, and insulting.

In light of defendant's evidentiary showing, the burden shifted to plaintiff to present substantial evidence that defendant's reasons for imposing the suspensions were pretextual. She did not meet this burden.

C. 2008 Suspension

The record shows that defendant had a legitimate, nonretaliatory reason for placing plaintiff on an investigatory suspension in the fall of 2008 — an employee named Jeri Wiley had accused plaintiff of threatening her. Plaintiff failed to present any substantial evidence that defendant's reason for imposing the suspension was pretextual.

D. Alleged Threats of Termination

There is no evidence to support plaintiff's claim that she was threatened with termination of her employment in retaliation for her complaints. Plaintiff testified in deposition that her supervisor, Francene Alexander, had told her "here's your termination papers" when Alexander presented plaintiff with a plaque commemorating plaintiff's 25 years of employment, but plaintiff admitted that Alexander had been joking. Plaintiff was admonished during the corrective action process that her employment could be terminated if her aggressive, unprofessional conduct toward her coworkers did not cease. There is no evidence however, that defendant's legitimate, nonretaliatory reasons for issuing these admonishments were a mere pretext.

CONCLUSION

Considering the totality of the circumstances, plaintiff's allegations of harassing conduct do not establish sexual harassment sufficiently severe or pervasive as to alter her conditions of employment and create a hostile or abusive work environment. Defendant presented legitimate, nonretaliatory reasons for the various personnel and disciplinary actions taken against plaintiff, and plaintiff failed to present any substantial evidence that these reasons were pretextual. The record contains no evidence showing a triable issue of material fact as to whether defendant retaliated against plaintiff for complaining about sexual harassment. The trial court accordingly did not err by granting summary judgment in defendant's favor.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. Defendant is awarded its costs on appeal.

We concur:

BOREN, P. J.

DOI TODD, J.