NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

GILBERT, P.J.

This case arises from a business dispute. The defendants, who were engaged in a business with plaintiff, formed a second business entity to exclude plaintiff from participating in the business. The trial court found a breach of fiduciary duty, but no damages arising therefrom. We affirm.

FACTS

Saturnino "Roy" S. Ador Dionisio and Regina O. Reyes were married in June 1997 and separated in January 2001. A status only judgment of dissolution was entered May 2002. Issues of property division and attorney fees remained unresolved.

During the marriage, the parties engaged in a number of business activities relating to long distance telephone service between the United States and the Philippines. To that end, the parties formed Pacific Communication Network, LLC (PCN). PCN was formed under the laws of the State of Delaware.

The parties' personal and business attorney was Wilbank Roche, a principal in the law firm of Roche & Holt. Shortly before the parties separated, Reyes and Holt formed a separate business entity, PCN Broadband, LLC (PCNB). PCNB was formed without Dionisio's knowledge or consent. It was formed for the purpose of excluding Dionisio from any further participation in PCN's business and business opportunities.

In December 2001, Dionisio filed a complaint on behalf of himself and PCN alleging causes of action for breach of fiduciary duty, usurpation of business opportunity, legal malpractice, unfair business practices and requesting an accounting and the imposition of a constructive trust. Named as defendants were Reyes, Roche, Roche & Holt, and Rebecca Holt. The complaint alleged that Rebecca Holt was "of counsel" to Roche & Holt, that she had an ownership interest in Roche & Holt, as well as PCNB, that she was an agent of the other defendants, and that she worked to deprive PCN of business.

The trial court sustained Holt's demurrer to the complaint without leave to amend. Roche and Roche & Holt, obtained summary judgment. We dismissed an attempted appeal from the summary judgment as untimely. The matter proceeded to trial against Reyes in October 2006. Because PCN was community property, the matter was tried together with property division issues arising from the dissolution of the parties' marriage.

After trial, the court granted judgment against Dionisio and in favor of Reyes. The court found: "While . . . actions by Reyes and Roche . . . may have violated their fiduciary obligations to PCN, the evidence established that PCN suffered no damage thereby. The Court finds that changes in the telecommunications industry made it impossible for PCNB to remain financially viable, and it ceased operations. There is no evidence that PCN would have been any more successful than PCNB; in fact, by reason of the conflicts between Dionisio and Reyes, it is unlikely that PCN would have been able to remain in business as long as PCNB did. If PCNB had never come into existence and all of the business transacted by PCNB had been transacted by PCN instead, by the time of trial, PCN would have been in no different position than it was already: defunct.

DISCUSSION

I

The record in this case consists of over 7,700 pages of clerk's transcripts and hundreds of exhibits. Dionisio did not designate a reporter's transcript. Instead, we granted his request to take judicial notice of a portion of the reporter's transcript.

Dionisio's opening brief should serve as a guide through this prolix but incomplete record. Unfortunately, it does not. Dionisio has a duty to summarize the facts fairly and in a light most favorable to the judgment except where the court makes specific findings to the contrary. (See Ajaxo, Inc. v. E*Trade Group, Inc. (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 21, 50.) This duty grows with the complexity of the record. (Ibid.) Here Dionisio states the facts in a light most favorable to himself. His statement of facts constitutes nothing more than argument. Under the circumstances, we may deem any argument based on the state of the evidence as having been waived. (Ibid.) We elect not to do so. But Dionisio will not be heard to complain in our assessment of the facts.

In any event, Dionisio has the burden of proof. (See Evid. Code, § 500; Gebert v. Yank (1985) 172 Cal.App.3d 544, 552.) Where, as here, the judgment is against the party who has the burden of proof, it is almost impossible for him to prevail on appeal by arguing the evidence compels a judgment in his favor. That is because unless the trial court makes specific findings of fact in favor of a losing plaintiff, we presume the trial court found plaintiff's evidence lacks sufficient weight and credibility to carry the burden of proof. (See Rodney F. v. Karen M. (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 233; Kunzler v. Karde (1980) 109 Cal.App.3d 683, 688 [judgment appealed from is presumed correct].) We have no power on appeal to judge the credibility of witnesses or to reweigh the evidence. (Kimble v. Bd. of Education (1987) 192 Cal.App.3d 1423, 1427.)

Here the trial court found a breach of fiduciary duty, but that Dionisio failed to prove any damages arose from the breach.

II

Dionisio contends the trial court should have applied Delaware law.

Dionisio points out that PCN was formed in Delaware. Corporations Code section 17450, subdivision (a) provides: "The laws of the state . . . under which a foreign limited liability company is organized shall govern its organization and internal affairs and the liability and authority of its managers and members."

Dionisio lists a number of matters that he apparently believes would have been decided in his favor if the court had properly applied Delaware law. Inexplicably, however, Dionisio fails to cite a single Delaware statute, case, or regulation to support his argument. This failure makes it impossible for us to determine whether any of the trial court's findings were contrary to Delaware law.

We are not required to undertake an unassisted study of Delaware law. Every brief must contain citation of authority in support of its legal argument. (Horowitz v. Noble (1978) 79 Cal.App.3d 120, 139.) If no authority is furnished on a particular point, we may treat the point as waived. (Ibid.) We do so here.

III

Dionisio contends the trial court improperly denied his request for an accounting.

In fact, the trial court granted Dionisio's request to order Reyes to account for the business activities of PCN and PCNB. Reyes filed the accounting on June 12, 2006. Dionisio requested a further accounting. In denying the request for a further accounting, the court found: "[Dionisio] presented no evidence that any additional information is available to [Reyes]. In addition, there was no evidence any of the business entities conducted any activities after the date covered by the accountings previously rendered. `The law neither does nor requires idle acts.' Civil Code § 3532. The court sees nothing to be accomplished by granting Dionisio's request."

Dionisio argues the court refused to require Reyes to account fully for the assets of PCN. He claims those assets included a $1,440,000 receivable from its customer, Access International, as of September 30, 2002. But Dionisio also states that the $1,440,000 was shown on a balance sheet provided by Reyes. Clearly, Reyes disclosed that amount. Dionisio points to no evidence the trial court found credible to show that the $1,440,000 or any other asset was not fully accounted for.

Dionisio claims it is undisputed that Reyes and Roche continued to participate in the Philippines telecommunications market through their partnership, Roche, Reyes, and that the partnership did business with the Phil-AM Phone Club. He claims Reyes did not provide any information about the partnership or Phil-AM Phone Club.

Of course, without the complete reporter's transcript we cannot tell what is undisputed. In any event, Dionisio confuses undisputed evidence with credible evidence. The trial court as the finder of fact is entitled to reject even undisputed evidence as lacking sufficient credibility. (See Sprague v. Equifax, Inc. (1985) 166 Cal.App.3d 1012, 1028.) Dionisio points to no express finding that Reyes had any further information to offer bearing on this case. In fact, the trial court found she has none.

Dionisio complains the trial court prevented him from impeaching Roche's testimony concerning the Roche and Reyes partnership. But without the reporter's transcript we cannot make a fair assessment of Dionisio's argument. Dionisio has failed to overcome the presumption that the trial court's order is correct. (See Kunzler v. Karde, supra, 109 Cal.App.3d at p. 688.)

IV

Dionisio contends the trial court erred in denying his claim under the unfair competition law.

Business and Professions Code section 17200, provides in part: "[U]nfair competition shall mean and include any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice . . . ."

The trial court found that although some of Reyes's behaviors toward Dionisio and PCN were "reprehensible," Dionisio failed to establish that there was any violation of Business and Professions Code section 17200. The court further found that even if such a violation had been established, Dionisio failed to establish he has suffered any injury as a result. Business and Professions Code section 17204 requires that a private party show he has lost money or property as a result of the unfair competition.

Dionisio argues Reyes's reprehensible conduct constitutes an "unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act" within the meaning of Business and Professions Code section 17200. Assuming that to be so, Dionisio failed to prove damages. His argument on the issue of damages amounts to nothing more than a reiteration of his own view of the evidence. That evidence was insufficient to carry his burden of proof at trial. On appeal we have no power to reweigh the evidence. (Kimble v. Bd. of Education, supra, 192 Cal.App.3d at p. 1427.)

Dionisio argues that Reyes wrongfully spent PCN's funds on attorneys, and that the trial court only ordered her to return half of the funds.

In fact, the court found that Reyes properly spent some PCN funds on attorneys for the benefit of PCN and improperly spent other PCN funds for her own defense in this action. The court found the improperly spent funds are chargeable to Reyes in the division of the parties' community property. The court ordered reimbursement for all of the improperly spent funds. There is simply no basis for ordering reimbursement for that portion of the funds Reyes properly spent on behalf of PCN.

Dionisio complains that the court ordered reimbursement directly to him instead of PCN. He asserts funds paid to PCN would be available to PCN and its creditors. But PCN ceased doing business in February 2003. Nor does Dionisio cite any authority that would allow him to assert the rights of creditors. Dionisio has failed to show any prejudice in the trial court's order requiring reimbursement directly to him.

Reyes contends the trial court erred in charging her with attorney fees spent in her own defense of this action. But Reyes did not appeal. A respondent who did not appeal may not urge error for the purpose of changing the judgment. (California State Employees' Assn. v. State Personnel Bd. (1986) 178 Cal.App.3d 372, 382, fn. 7.) A nonappealing respondent can only raise error to show that other error is harmless so that the judgment may be upheld. (Ibid.) Here Reyes seeks to change the judgment. She cannot raise such error on appeal.

V

Dionisio contends the trial court erred in sustaining Holt's demurrer.

The function of a demurrer is to test the sufficiency of a pleading by raising questions of law. (Postley v. Harvey (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 280, 286.) In assessing the sufficiency of a demurrer, all facts pleaded in the complaint must be deemed true. (Holland v. Thacher (1988) 199 Cal.App.3d 924, 928.) But we do not assume the truth of contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law. (Moore v. Regents of University of California (1990) 51 Cal.3d 120, 125.) If upon consideration of all the facts stated it appears that the plaintiff is entitled to any relief, the complaint will be held good. (Chase Chemical Co. v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. (1984) 159 Cal.App.3d 229, 242.)

Dionisio's third amended complaint alleges that Holt owns a community property interest in the law firm Roche & Holt; that she is an attorney listed as of counsel to Roche & Holt; that as an attorney she represented PCN and Dionisio personally; and that she is a co-owner of a 50 percent interest in PCNB. The gravamen of Dionisio's claims against Holt is that she used her position as PCN's and Dionisio's counsel to take business from PCN through PCNB.

Those are essentially the same allegations raised against Roche, Roche & Holt and Reyes. After the trial court sustained Holt's demurrer without leave to amend, it granted Roche and Roche & Holt's motion for summary judgment. The court granted the motion on the ground that PCN was not damaged by any alleged wrongful acts of Roche and Roche & Holt. The ensuing judgment has since become final. Dionisio is collaterally estopped from relitigating the same issue against Holt. (See 7 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (5th ed. 2008) Judgment, § 413, p. 1053.)

Moreover, in the case against Reyes that was subsequently tried, the court found Dionisio failed to prove damages. Dionisio does not point to anything in the record to suggest the result would have been any different had Holt also gone to trial.

The appellant has the burden not only of showing error, but also prejudice arising from the error. (In re Marriage of Behrens (1982) 137 Cal.App.3d 562, 575.) Even if the trial court erred in sustaining Holt's demurrer, Dionisio has failed to show it is reasonably probable he would have obtained a better result in the absence of the error. (Thomas v. Lusk (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 1709, 1720; see 9 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (5th ed. 2008) Appeal, § 445, p. 499.)

VI

Finally, Reyes seeks sanctions against Dionisio for a frivolous appeal.

We have the power to sanction a party who prosecutes a frivolous appeal. (Code Civ. Proc., § 907; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.276(a).) But the power must be "used most sparingly to deter only the most egregious conduct." (In re Marriage of Flaherty (1982) 31 Cal.3d 637, 651.)

Here Dionisio's appeal is certainly meritless, and comes very close to being frivolous. But we cannot say it falls into the category of the most egregious conduct. Therefore we deny the request for sanctions.

The judgment is affirmed. Costs are awarded to respondents.

We concur:

COFFEE, J.

PERREN, J.