NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

YEGAN, Acting P.J.

Donald Bell, proceeding in propria persona, appeals from the denial of his motion to vacate a judgment entered after a court trial at which he had failed to appear. The judgment awarded attorney's fees to appellant's former counsel, Myers, Widders, Gibson, Jones & Schneider, L.L.P. (respondent). Appellant contends that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion to vacate because his failure to appear was excusable. He also contends that (1) the judgment is void because he was not given the requisite 15 days' notice of the trial, and (2) the trial court was without jurisdiction because the summons and complaint had been improperly served. We affirm.

Procedural Background

In December 2008 respondent filed an action against appellant to recover unpaid attorney's fees. Trial was set for December 7, 2009, and both parties appeared in court on that date. Appellant appeared in propria persona. The court (Judge Vincent J. O'Neill, Jr.) ordered that the case be trailed on a day-to-day basis until a courtroom became available. The court informed the parties that they would be given four hours notice of the trial. The court asked appellant to provide the court clerk with a telephone number at which he could be contacted. The court said that appellant might receive "a call early in the morning to get you here at 1:30." Appellant told the clerk that he could be contacted at the following telephone number: (805) 984-2230.

On December 9, 2009, the case was assigned to Judge Henry J. Walsh for trial. That afternoon, the court contacted respondent and informed it that pretrial motions would be heard on December 10, 2009, at 1:30 p.m. The next day, respondent appeared in court at 1:30 p.m., but appellant was absent.

Judge Walsh stated: "We've been unable to contact with [appellant]. My secretary has called the number we have for him several times yesterday and today, and there is no answer. She tells me she's getting a signal that indicates the message machine is full. We've left a message with his sister and also two messages on his cell phone, and, yet, we have no [appellant]." The court trailed the case to the following morning.

In the morning on December 11, 2009, respondent appeared in court but appellant was again absent. Judge Walsh stated: "Efforts were made to contact [appellant] by telephone starting on Wednesday, the 9th when he was told that pretrial motions would be heard on Thursday at 1:30. Those included trying to contact him at the telephone number he gave us for himself as his contact number as well as leaving messages on what was determined to be his cell phone and with his sister. And none of those have elicited a call back or any response at all. So I'm satisfied that notice of trial has been given to the extent that we're able to give it." Judge Walsh listed the telephone numbers that his secretary had called: "Her draft declaration says that on the 9th [of December] at 4:53, 4:55, and 4:57 p.m. she made calls to [appellant] at [(805)] 984-2230. A further call was made yesterday morning [December 10] at 8:06. . . . [¶] She then left a message for [appellant] at the number of his sister Sandra Jones at [(805)] 302-3032. . . . [T]hose are the numbers that were called."1

The court concluded that "all of the appropriate and statutorily required notices have been given." The court granted respondent's pretrial motion and proceeded with the trial. After hearing respondent's evidence, the court awarded respondent attorney's fees of $86,929.17 plus costs of $390. Judgment was entered on December 11, 2009, and notice of entry was mailed to appellant on the same date.

On February 6, 2010, appellant moved to vacate the judgment pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (b).2 In making the motion, appellant was represented by counsel. The motion was supported by declarations of appellant and Fred Dowler. According to the declarations, appellant was conducting a barbecue at his residence in Oxnard on December 9, 2009, between 4:00 p.m. and 9:00 p.m. Guests were present, including Fred Dowler. Between 4:00 and 6:00 p.m., neither appellant nor Dowler heard the telephone ring at (805) 984-2230, and no messages were left on the answering machine. On December 10, 2009, from 8:00 a.m. until 9:00 a.m., appellant was talking on the telephone to Dowler and was therefore unable to receive messages on his answering machine. Appellant declared that "the phone number (805) 302-3032 is a prepaid cell phone that doesn't belong to Sandra Jones and doesn't work out at the ocean areas; it doesn't get reception out by the beach areas."3

On March 4, 2010, the court conducted a hearing on appellant's motion to vacate the judgment. Appellant's counsel argued that the motion should be granted based on appellant's excusable neglect. In denying the motion, the trial court stated: "I was standing next to my secretary when she was making some of the efforts to contact Mr. Bell. And you're asking that he be given a different standard of attentiveness to the procedures than a lawyer would. And there are areas where pro pers get that. But I don't see here where, considering the totality of the efforts that were made to get hold of him, to leave a message with the sister, I think there was even a third number that we tried to get hold of him."

The Trial Court Reasonably Concluded that Appellant's Failure to Appear Was Not Excusable

Section 473, subdivision (b), grants a court discretion to "relieve a party . . . from a judgment . . . taken against him or her through his or her mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect." "Neither mistake, inadvertence, [n]or neglect will warrant relief unless upon consideration of all of the evidence it is found to be of the excusable variety. [Citations.]" (Conway v. Municipal Court (1980) 107 Cal.App.3d 1009, 1017.) "In determining whether the attorney's mistake or inadvertence was excusable, `the court inquires whether "a reasonably prudent person under the same or similar circumstances" might have made the same error.' [Citation.]" (Zamora v. Clayborn Contracting Group, Inc. (2002) 28 Cal.4th 249, 258.)

"In reviewing the evidence in support of a section 473 motion, we extend all legitimate and reasonable inferences to uphold the judgment. The disposition of such a motion rests largely in the discretion of the trial court, and its decision will not be disturbed on appeal unless there has been a clear abuse of discretion. . . . [I]t is generally accepted that the appropriate test of abuse of discretion is whether or not the trial court exceeded the bounds of reason, all of the circumstances before it being considered. [Citation.] . . . [W]hen two or more inferences can reasonably be deduced from the facts, a reviewing court lacks power to substitute its deductions for those of the trial court. [Citations.]" (In re Marriage of Connolly (1979) 23 Cal.3d 590, 597-598.)

The trial court did not exceed the bounds of reason in impliedly concluding that appellant's acts and omissions were not those of a reasonably prudent person under the same or similar circumstances. Appellant knew that he would be required to appear for trial upon four hours notice by telephone. He told Judge O'Neill's clerk that he could be contacted at (805) 984-2230.4 It was appellant's responsibility to assure that someone would be present to answer the telephone or, if someone were not present, that his answering machine would receive messages. Shortly before 5:00 p.m. on December 9, 2009, McIntyre telephoned appellant's contact number three times. No one answered, and the secretary was unable to leave a message because the answering machine was full. The court could have reasonably concluded that a reasonably prudent person in appellant's situation would have regularly checked the messages on his answering machine to assure that it did not become full and incapable of receiving further messages. Appellant presented no evidence that the answering machine had malfunctioned or that it had not been full when the secretary called. Appellant merely declared that "nothing [was] left on [his] answering machine" for the two hour period from 4:00 to 6:00 p.m. Appellant and Dowler declared that they did not hear the telephone ring, but the trial court could have reasonably found that it did ring.

At 8:06 a.m. the following morning, December 10, 2009, Judge Walsh's secretary again telephoned appellant at his contact number. But according to appellant and Dowler, she was unable to contact appellant because they were having a telephone conversation that morning from 8:00 until 9:00 a.m. Appellant declared that, while he was on the telephone, his answering machine was incapable of receiving messages. The trial court could have reasonably concluded that a reasonably prudent person in appellant's situation would not have been talking on the telephone for one hour between 8:00 and 9:00 a.m. Appellant knew that he could expect a telephone call from the court during this time period. When appellant was in court on December 7, 2009, the court told him that he might receive "a call early in the morning to get you here at 1:30." The trial court could also have reasonably concluded that a reasonably prudent person in appellant's situation would have telephoned the court to assure that he had not missed any calls made to his contact number from 8:00 to 9:00 a.m. Although appellant had not received notice that the case had been transferred to Judge Walsh's court for trial, he could have telephoned Judge O'Neill's clerk, who would have informed him of the case transfer.

Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the judgment was not taken against appellant through his excusable mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or neglect. (§ 473, subd. (b).) "The courts do not act as guardians for those who are grossly careless with their affairs. [Citations.]" (Conway v. Municipal Court, supra, 107 Cal.App.3d at p. 1018.)

The Judgment Is Not Void

Section 594, subdivision (a), provides that if an issue of fact is to be tried in a party's absence, "proof shall first be made to the satisfaction of the court that the . . . party has had 15 days' notice of such trial . . . ." Appellant contends that the judgment is void because he was not provided with the requisite 15 days' notice.

Appellant's contention lacks merit. On our own motion, we augmented the record to include (1) Notice of Court Trial, dated September 17, 2009, informing the parties that trial has been scheduled for December 7, 2009, at 1:30 p.m.; and (2) Clerk's Certificate of Mailing showing that said notice was mailed to the parties on September 18, 2009. Appellant therefore received more than two months' notice of the December 7, 2009 trial date.

We reject appellant's claim that the judgment is void because he was not given 15 days' notice of the actual trial date of December 11, 2009. "When a trial date is initially set more than 15 days in the future and then is further continued [or trailed], a party has had notice of the trial more than 15 days before it actually begins." (Au-Yang v. Barton (1999) 21 Cal.4th 958, 965.)

Any Irregularity in the Service of Process Has Been Waived

Appellant contends that the trial court was without jurisdiction because the summons and complaint had been improperly served. By filing an answer on June 1, 2009, appellant made a general appearance that waived any irregularity in the service of process. (Kriebel v. City of San Diego, City Council (1980) 112 Cal.App.3d 693, 699-700; Terzich v. Medak (1978) 78 Cal.App.3d 636, 639.) (CT 25)

Appellant's Remaining Contentions

Appellant's remaining contentions are forfeited because they are not supported by reasoned argument, citations to pertinent legal authority, or citations to the record on appeal. (Durell v. Sharp Healthcare (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1350, 1371-1372; Moulton Niguel Water Dist. v. Colombo (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 1210, 1215.)

Disposition

The order denying appellant's motion to vacate the judgment is affirmed. Respondent shall recover its costs on appeal.

We concur:

COFFEE, J.

PERREN, J.