JUDE G. GRAVOIS, Judge.
Plaintiff, Hacienda Construction, Inc. ("Hacienda") appeals the trial court's April 29, 2009 judgment on a Motion for Judgment on Offer of Judgment taxing Hacienda with certain costs and fixing the defendant's costs. For the following reasons, we affirm.
The following statement of the case is taken from Hacienda's first appeal in this matter:
In the first appeal, Hacienda argued the trial court erred in awarding costs in the April 30, 2009 judgment. This Court found the April 30, 2009 judgment was
On December 11, 2009, Hacienda filed a Motion and Order for Devolutive Appeal requesting an appeal from the April 30, 2009 Judgment on Offer of Judgment. This motion was granted by the trial court on December 22, 2009.
In their reply brief file in this appeal, the Newmans argue Hacienda's appeal is untimely. They contend that although Hacienda stated in its Motion and Order for Devolutive Appeal that no notice of signing of judgment was mailed for the April 30, 2009 judgment, Hacienda had actual notice of the judgment as evidenced by Hacienda's act of attaching a copy of the judgment to its brief in its first appeal.
This appeal stems from a case filed in Second Parish Court for the Parish of Jefferson. Pursuant to La. C.C.P. art. 5002, the delay for an appeal from a judgment rendered by a parish court is ten days. This time period commences upon receipt of notice of judgment rather than upon mailing of said notice in cases wherein such notice is necessary. Myles v. Turner, 612 So.2d 32, 35, (La.1993). Notice of the signing of a final judgment in cases in parish courts shall be given as required by La. C.C.P. art. 1913. Article 1913 A provides as follows:
The appellate record from Hacienda's first appeal was submitted as an exhibit in the instant appeal. That record is void of any notice of mailing of judgment for the April 30, 2009 judgment. While we agree with the Newmans that Hacienda obviously had actual notice of the April 30, 2009 judgment at some time before it filed its appellate brief in the first appeal, we decline to hold that actual notice of the judgment prevails over the plain wording of La. C.C.P. art. 1913, which clearly requires that the clerk of court mail notice of the signing of a final judgment to the counsel of record for each party. See, Jackson v. Julien, 01-1024 (La.App. 4 Cir. 9/25/02), 828 So.2d 1147; Johnson v. East Carroll Detention Center, 27,075 (La.App. 2 Cir. 6/21/95) 658 So.2d 724. Appeals are favored in the law and any doubt shall be resolved in favor of maintaining, rather than dismissing an appeal. Gourgues v. City of New Orleans, Dept. of Health, 95-2190 (La.App. 4 Cir. 3/14/96), 671 So.2d 1023, 1025. Thus, given the record before us, we find Hacienda's appeal of the April 30, 2009 judgment to be timely.
In its only assignment of error, Hacienda argues that the trial court erred in rendering a Judgment on an Offer of Judgment taxing it with costs without holding a contradictory hearing. Hacienda further argues that the trial court erred in assessing it with legal case expenses, expert witness investigation, and a reduction in legal interest payable in connection with the judgment when the offer of judgment includes an allegation of fraud and accepting the offer would have constituted a stipulation by Hacienda that it was a party to fraud against an insurance company. We find no merit to Hacienda's arguments.
The record indicates that on July 22, 2008, the Newmans made a written offer
The trial court taxed the Newmans with all costs of the proceedings incurred prior to July 23, 2008, and Hacienda with all costs incurred as of July 23, 2008. The function of Article 970 is to compensate the rejected offeror who was forced to incur greater trial litigation costs than he would have if the offeree had accepted his settlement offer. The article is punitive in nature and therefore must be strictly construed. Crawford v. United Service Auto. Ass'n, 03-2117 (La.App. 1 Cir. 3/24/05), 899 So.2d 668, 671. Based on the above jurisprudence, we find no error in the trial court's judgment taxing Hacienda with costs after the date it rejected the Newmans' offer.
Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Article 1920 gives a trial court great discretion in taxing court costs in any manner it considers equitable, and the trial court's assessment will not be reversed on appeal in the absence of an abuse of discretion. Cleland v. City of Lake Charles, 02-805 (La.App. 3 Cir. 3/5/03), 840 So.2d 686, 697, writs denied, 03-1380, 03-1385 (La.9/19/03), 853 So.2d 644, 645. Further, La. C.C.P. art. 1920 states costs "may" be taxed by a rule to show cause. Given the permissive rather than mandatory language in the code article, we find that there was no abuse of discretion by the trial court in awarding costs in the instant case without a contradictory hearing. See, Palacios v. Louisiana & Delta Railroad, Inc., 2005-590 (La.App. 3 Cir. 12/30/05), 918 So.2d 561, 563.
Finally, we find no merit to Hacienda's argument that the offer of judgment includes an allegation of fraud and accepting the offer would have constituted a stipulation by Hacienda that it was a party to fraud against an insurance company. Hacienda sought to recover $13,812.72 to repair damages from Hurricane Katrina. The trial court found insufficient evidence of repairs in this amount and that finding was affirmed by this Court on appeal. Additionally, the letter representing the Newmans' offer to settle indicates that Hacienda was trying to recover 25% overhead and profit for these repairs. Hence, we find no evidence to support Hacienda's argument that accepting the offer to settle would have required that Hacienda stipulate to fraud.
For the foregoing reasons, the April 30, 2009 judgment of the trial court is affirmed. Hacienda is to pay all costs of this appeal.