DENNIS R. BAGNERIS, SR., Judge.
Defendant-Appellant, the Housing Authority of New Orleans ("HANO") appeals from a trial court judgment in favor of Appellee, Hamp's Construction, L.L.C. ("Hamp"), granting a writ of mandamus and preliminary injunction. For the following reasons, we hereby affirm.
On December 16, 2009, HANO issued an invitation for bids, No. 09-130-12-37, HANO SCATTERED SITES REMEDIATION AND DEMOLITION. The bids for this project were opened on February 4, 2010. The results of the bid opening showed that Hamp was the lowest economic bidder, with Young General Contractors being the second lowest economic bidder. Thereafter, on March 9, 2010, HANO issued a letter to Hamp indicating its bid had been rejected because Hamp is considered "non-responsible due to its record of improper business practices and history of non-compliance with public policy." The letter further stated that "HANO is not required and has elected not to hold an informal hearing" due to the fact that the project was funded by the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act "ARRA" Grant and was procured in accordance with HANO's Capital Fund Stimulus Grant Procurement Policy.
On March 15, 2010, Hamp filed a petition for a writ of mandamus and preliminary injunction, alleging that HANO acted arbitrarily and capriciously, and in violation of the Louisiana Public Bid Law, La. R.S. 38:2211 et seq., by rejecting it as the lowest responsive bid, on the basis that Hamp was a "non-responsible" bidder. Additionally, Hamp argues that HANO violated the Louisiana Public Bid Law because it did not afford Hamp a hearing prior to determining it a non-responsible bidder.
Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court granted the order of mandamus and the preliminary injunction. In the reasons for judgment, the trial court found that neither of the misdemeanor pleas "rise to the level of severity, breach of trust, integrity, false filing, etc., which would act to serve as grounds for disqualification of a bidder such as Hamp's Construction as being non-responsible." The trial court ordered HANO, as a public body, to award the contract for this project to Hamp as the lowest economic, responsive and responsible bidder. On appeal, HANO asserts the following assignments of error: (1) the trial court erred in holding that, under state law, Hamp was entitled to a hearing with regard to the award of a contract for Demolition Work funded by ARRA; (2) the trial court erred in applying state law to HANO's conduct in awarding an ARRA-funded contract; (3)
To obtain a preliminary injunction, a petitioner must demonstrate that he will suffer irreparable injury, that the petitioner is entitled to the relief sought, and must make a prima facie showing that he will likely prevail on the merits of the case. Saunders v. Stafford, 2005-0205, p. 5 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1/11/06), 923 So.2d 751, 754. A "[r]eview of the granting or denial of a preliminary injunction is whether the trial court committed an error of law or made a factual finding which is manifestly erroneous or clearly wrong." Id.
Where one or more legal errors interdict the trial court's fact-finding process, however, the manifest error standard becomes inapplicable, and the appellate court must conduct its own de novo review of the record. South East Auto Dealers Rental Ass'n, Inc. v. EZ Rent To Own, Inc., 2007-0599, p. 5 (La.App. 4 Cir. 2/27/08), 980 So.2d 89, 93. A legal error occurs when a trial court applies incorrect principles of law and such errors are prejudicial. Id. Legal errors are prejudicial when they materially affect the outcome and deprive a party of substantial rights. Id. Because we find the trial court applied the correct principles of law, we will review the record under the "manifestly erroneous or clearly wrong" standard of review.
Further, a mandamus is an extraordinary remedy, which must be used sparingly by the court and only to compel action that is clearly provided by law. Allen v. St. Tammany Parish Police Jury, 96-0938, p. 4, (La.App. 1 Cir. 2/14/97), 690 So.2d 150, 153. Mandamus will not lie in matters in which discretion and evaluation of evidence must be exercised. Id. The remedy is not available to command the performance of an act that contains any element of discretion, however slight. Fire Protection Dist. Six v. City of Baton Rouge Dept. of Public Works, 2003-1205, p. 3 (La.App. 1 Cir.12/31/03), 868 So.2d 770, 772. Although the granting of a writ of mandamus is considered improper when the act sought to be commanded contains any element of discretion, it has, nevertheless, been allowed in certain cases to correct an arbitrary and capricious abuse of discretion by public boards or officials. See Fire Protection Dist. Six, 2003-1205 at p. 3, 868 So.2d at 772, citing State ex rel. Torrance v. City of Shreveport, 231 La. 840, 93 So.2d 187, 189 (1957) (where the Louisiana Supreme Court held that mandamus will lie to correct the performance (or nonperformance) of an administrative or quasi-judicial act, such as the arbitrary refusal to grant a license).
The issue to address is whether the trial court erred in its finding that HANO acted arbitrarily in disqualifying Hamp, the lowest bidder, as not responsible. HANO argues that it is not required and has elected not to hold an informal hearing regarding HANO's non-responsibility because the project is funded by ARRA.
Hamp argues that it is irrelevant which law applies in this situation (i.e., the Louisiana Public Law, the provision of the Federal CFR, and/or the HUD Handbook), because a public entity cannot waive the Constitutional safeguards of due process and fair play that are required to be honored when a public entity places a contract at large for public bids and solicits open competition for the work. Thus, Hamp alleges that HANO's action in disqualifying it without a hearing or an opportunity to refute the charges was arbitrary whether under state or federal law. We agree.
After reviewing the applicable local, state and federal laws, we find no legal bases for dispensing with Louisiana's Public Bid Law's requirement that a hearing be held to afford a bidder a chance to refute allegations of irresponsibility. As the Louisiana Supreme Court stated in Haughton Elevator Division v. State, Through Division of Administration, 367 So.2d 1161, 1165 (La.1979), "the requirements of procedural due process apply to the deprivation of interests encompassed by the Fourteenth Amendment's protection of liberty and property. When protected interests are implicated, the right to some kind of prior hearing is paramount." The trial court correctly stated the following as to why HANO was arbitrary in denying Hamp a hearing:
As further stated in the reasons for judgment: "... it is offensive to have a low, responsive bidder with a long track record of performing similar projects such as that possessed by Hamp's Construction, L.L.C. to be simply disqualified upon the subjective and unilateral decision of a public entity, without affording that bidder the opportunity to discuss or refute the challenges against it."
The Louisiana Public Bid Law set forth in La. R.S. 38:2211, et seq., is a "prohibitory law founded on public policy." Broadmoor, L.L.C. v. Ernest N. Morial New Orleans Exhibition Hall Authority, 2004-0211, p. 6 (La.3/18/04), 867 So.2d 651, 656.
La. R.S. 38:2212 provides, in pertinent part:
In Haughton Elevator Division, the Louisiana Supreme Court addressed the jurisprudence interpreting this statute as follows:
367 So.2d at 1164-65. Further, the Court in Haughton, provided the following procedural safeguards, none of which were followed by HANO, before a low bidder is disqualified as not responsible:
Haughton Elevator Division, 367 So.2d at 1166.
Because Hamp was not provided a fair opportunity to rebut HANO's finding that it was non-responsible based on two unrelated misdemeanor offenses, we hereby affirm the trial court's judgment, which granted the writ of mandamus and ordered the contract to be awarded to Hamp as the lowest responsive and responsible bidder.