MOORE, J.
Christopher Binkley appeals from an adverse judgment in his action for partition of real property. He sued his former domestic partner, James Burns, seeking a determination that he had the right to a 50 percent interest in a piece of real property pursuant to a grant deed. Burns argued that he never intended to transfer a present interest in the property to Binkley, and that if he did so, it was the result of Binkley's undue influence. Ultimately, the trial court agreed, declaring Burns the sole owner of the property. We conclude that the facts support a presumption that Binkley had an undue influence over Burns, and that Binkley did not sufficiently rebut the presumption at trial. We therefore affirm the trial court's judgment.
James Burns and Christopher Binkley met in 1995, when Binkley was 24 and Burns was 28 years old. At the time, Binkley was working at a supermarket, earning approximately $11 an hour. He also had substantial credit card debt and he lived paycheck to paycheck. Burns was a college graduate and had earned his teaching credential in 1994. He went on to become a second grade teacher in a public school.
Burns and Binkley met at the store where Binkley worked, and they started seeing each other in a romantic relationship. A few months later, they began living together in Burns's home.
Burns encouraged Binkley to pursue an education, and Binkely enrolled in community college. He eventually transferred from community college to USC. During this period, Burns paid for all of Binkley's living expenses. The couple intended that after he graduated, Binkley would eventually make partner in a tax accounting firm.
In 1999, Burns sold the home in which he and Binkley were living. The couple moved into Burns's grandparents' home while awaiting completion of a new house (the Evening Star property), which Burns had purchased with the title in his name only. The Evening Star property, which was new construction, was approximately 4,000 square feet and located in a new gated community.
According to Burns, not long after he purchased the Evening Star property, Binkley began raising the subject of adding his name to the property. Binkley told Burns that Burns did not respect him and treated him like a roommate. He also asked what would happen to him if something happened to Burns. These arguments continued sporadically between 1999 and 2003, arising on approximately 20 occasions. Burns felt "terrible" and guilty every time the issue arose.
While still a student, Binkley completed an internship with Deloitte. After Binkley received his undergraduate degree in accounting, he began working for Deloitte full time in 2002. Burns paid off student loans that Binkley had accrued, and Deloitte paid for Binkley to complete a master's degree. By 2003, he was earning approximately $50,000 a year, which had increased to about $75,000 by 2007. In February 2003, Burns and Binkley established a joint checking account into which both men deposited their income.
Once Binkley began earning an income, the couple had discussions about finances, including the status of the Evening Star property, which had been purchased by Burns with title in his name. The two had some arguments about the property in particular. Burns testified that Binkley threatened to "out" him at work and to cause him tax problems with the IRS if he did not put Binkley on the title to the Evening Star property. Binkley testified that he never threatened Burns, but admitted that they had arguments about the subject.
Individuals outside the relationship learned of the disagreement. Lisa Ann Holevas was a neighbor who socialized with Burns and Binkley, along with her husband. She testified that Binkley had commented to her that he felt he should be on the title, and he "seemed to be rallying for myself or whoever else was in — in the conversation to agree with that or help him with this." Binkley would raise the issue with her frequently, and she felt he was trying to get her to assist him in lobbying Burns to put him on the title. Kristen Thais Burns, Burns's sister-in-law, testified that in December 2002, Binkley told her that he and Burns had been fighting because he wanted Burns to put him on title.
Prior to August 2003, Burns and Binkley consulted with two different lawyers. When they saw the first lawyer, Binkley said the goal was "moving forward, to combine everything together," although Binkley did not own anything at the time. He stated the goal in seeing the second lawyer was to "set up what our estate would be," though again, Binkley did not own any property to leave Burns. From Burns's perspective, the goal of seeing the lawyers was to provide for Binkley in the event of his death. He said the subject kept arising because Binkley kept asking him what would happen to Binkley if something happened to Burns. Ultimately, Burns did not pursue action with either attorney because he had "conflicting thoughts" as to whether it was appropriate for him to leave his home to Binkley.
In August 2003, however, Burns signed a grant deed conveying the Evening Star property to himself and Binkley as joint tenants. The deed was prepared by an escrow company. He testified that he did so "to make him stop the bitter conversations and the . . . aggravating rants." He stated that he believed he was leaving his home to Binkley in the event of his death, but acknowledged that no particular language in the deed led him to that belief. After he signed the deed, Burns told people that he had put Binkley on title, and used phrases such as "our property" and "our home" when referring to the property. Binkley testified that after Burns signed the deed, he brought it home and showed it to Binkley; Burns said that did not happen.
In 2005, Binkley's grandmother added him to the title of her home in Bakersfield. He sold the property later that year and deposited approximately $180,000 into an individual account. He then purchased a condominium in Huntington Beach (the Plumas property) for $370,000, with the goal of relocating his mother to that property. Binkley took title to the property as a single man. Burns was aware of the transaction.
In early 2006, Burns and Binkley met with Michael W. Brown, an attorney, for estate planning purposes. Binkley executed a quitclaim deed transferring the Plumas property to himself and Burns as joint tenants. They then executed quitclaim deeds transferring both the Evening Star and Plumas properties to the James Burns & Christopher Binkley Living Trust 2006 (the Trust).
At some point during their discussions, Burns told Brown that he had added Binkley to the Evening Star deed as a joint tenant. Based on this information, he prepared a gift tax return which Burns signed prior to filing with the IRS. Burns testified that he did not know he was reporting to the IRS that he had made a gift of a one-half interest to the Evening Star property, but thought "this is what I had to do to make the Trust."
After the estate plan was completed, Burns decided to take a one-year leave from his teaching position. In order to qualify for health insurance through Binkley's employment, they registered as domestic partners with the State of California.
In November 2007, Burns and Binkley separated. In 2008, Binkley filed a Notice of Revocation pertaining to the Trust. In June 2008, Binkley filed the instant complaint for partition of real property. Burns cross-complained, seeking cancellation of the August 2003 grant deed and the deed quitclaiming the Evening Star property to the Trust.
At the conclusion of the bench trial, the court made a number of findings. First, the court found there was no intent by Burns to convey a full beneficial interest to the Evening Star property. The court further found that the deed had been obtained by undue influence and that Binkley received an undue benefit. Additionally, the court determined there had been no delivery of the purported gift, and there was no oral contract between the parties to share their assets.
The court next found that Evidence Code section 622
Citing pertinent facts, the court found that all three elements existed, raising the presumption of undue influence, which Binkley had failed to rebut. This, in the court's view, was sufficient to overcome the presumption of section 662, which states that the owner of legal title is also the owner of beneficial title.
Finally, the court found that the execution of the trust did not change the status of the property ownership, finding that the quitclaim deed was intended to fund the trust and was revocable. The court also determined that the gift tax return did not shed light on Burns's intent, given the totality of the circumstances.
The court thereafter entered judgment in Burns's favor, cancelling the pertinent deeds and finding that Binkley had no rights or title in the Evening Star property. Binkley now appeals.
Binkley argues that the standard of review is de novo; Burns argues that it is substantial evidence. Both are right, and both are wrong. To the extent the trial court's findings of fact are called into question, "we are bound by the familiar principle that `the power of the appellate court begins and ends with a determination as to whether there is any substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted,' to support the findings below. [Citation.] We view the evidence most favorably to the prevailing party, giving it the benefit of every reasonable inference and resolving all conflicts in its favor. [Citation.]" (Oregel v. American Isuzu Motors, Inc. (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 1094, 1100.)
We cannot reweigh the credibility of witnesses or resolve conflicts in the evidence. (Rufo v. Simpson (2001) 86 Cal.App.4th 573, 622.) Further, this court is bound by implied findings made by the trial court, such as rejecting a witness's testimony. (Stafford v. Mach (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 1174, 1182.) Pure questions of law, such as the applicability and construction of a statute, are reviewed de novo. (Ghirardo v. Antonioli (1994) 8 Cal.4th 791, 799.)
The trial court found that section 622, which states in part that "facts recited in a written instrument are conclusively presumed to be true as between the parties thereto . . ." applies to this case. "[S]ection 622, formerly in Code of Civil Procedure section 1962, subdivision 2, codifies the common law doctrine of `estoppel by contract.'" (Plaza Freeway Ltd. Partnership v. First Mountain Bank (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 616, 625-626.) There can be no estoppel if the contract itself was itself invalid. "[C]ontractual estoppel based on factual recitations in an instrument is inapplicable to the extent that the agreement is void." (City of Santa Cruz v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 1167, 1177.) If a deed, like a contract, is procured by undue influence, it is void. (In re Marriage of Bonds (2000) 24 Cal.4th 1, 28, fn.11.) Thus, if the deed is void, then there is no valid "instrument" and the conclusive presumption would not apply.
The trial court also examined section 662, which states: "The owner of the legal title to property is presumed to be the owner of the full beneficial title. This presumption may be rebutted only by clear and convincing proof." If the deed was void because it was procured by undue influence, then Binkley would no longer be the owner of any legal title, and the presumption in section 662 would not apply. In this case, the clear and convincing evidence the trial court relied upon to rebut the section 662 presumption appears to be that the deed was procured by undue influence, which is rather convoluted, but leads us to the same place: if the deed was procured by undue influence, it was void, and Binkley has no interest in the property.
"Undue influence consists: [¶] 1. In the use, by one in whom a confidence is reposed by another, or who holds a real or apparent authority over him, of such confidence or authority for the purpose of obtaining an unfair advantage over him; [¶] 2. In taking an unfair advantage of another's weakness of mind; or, [¶] 3. In taking a grossly oppressive and unfair advantage of another's necessities or distress." (Civ. Code, § 1575.)
"Undue influence, in the sense we are concerned with here, is a shorthand legal phrase used to describe persuasion which tends to be coercive in nature, persuasion which overcomes the will without convincing the judgment. [Citation.] The hallmark of such persuasion is high pressure, a pressure which works on mental, moral, or emotional weakness to such an extent that it approaches the boundaries of coercion. In this sense, undue influence has been called overpersuasion. [Citation.]" (Odorizzi v. Bloomfield School Dist. (1966) 246 Cal.App.2d 123, 130.)
As the party seeking to void the grant deed, Burns has the burden of demonstrating undue influence. He is helped by a presumption of undue influence which arises when "a confidential relation exists between the parties, and the one in whom confidence is reposed actively participates in a transaction whereby he obtains a gift from, or advantage over, the other . . . ." (Krug v. Meeham (1952) 109 Cal.App.2d 274, 278.) Where such a presumption arises, the burden of rebutting it and showing "fairness and good faith" shifts to the party who received the gift. (Id. at p. 279.)
The trial court broke down the requirements of establishing the undue influence presumption into the following elements: "The analysis is as follows: (1) The parties were in a confidential relationship during the relevant period; (2) the title transfer transaction unduly benefitted Binkley; and (3) Binkley was an active participant in the procurement of that benefit." Assuming that the proper evidentiary standard is the clear and convincing evidence standard of section 662, we conclude there is substantial evidence to support the trial court's finding of clear and convincing evidence.
There is no real doubt that Burns and Binkley were in a confidential relationship, and the parties admitted as much in the trial court. The trial court found that "[a]s to the second element, it is abundantly clear that [Binkley] was the beneficiary of a benefit that was well outside the range of any prior gift he had ever received from Burns, and it was certainly not bargained for, paid for, or earned in any fashion. . . ." Binkley contends
Finally, as to whether Binkley actively participated in the procurement of the benefit, there was clear and convincing evidence. Binkley pursued his desire to be included on the deed continuously and over a period of years, resulting in a number of arguments with Burns. He enlisted others in his quest. There is no real doubt in the record that Binkley wanted to be on the deed to the Evening Star property and actively lobbied Burns to include him on the deed.
The cases Binkley cites on this point are wholly unpersuasive. This is a primarily factual inquiry and must be determined by the totality of the circumstances. While "`some incidental activity'" in the execution of a document is not enough to demonstrate active procurement (Estate of Ausseresses (1960) 178 Cal.App.2d 487, 491) far more was present here. Burns's decision to execute the deed was the result of a four year campaign by Binkley to persuade him to do so. Thus, because Binkley actively procured Burns's execution of the deed, we find the presumption of undue influence properly applies.
Binkley did not produce evidence anywhere near sufficient to overcome this presumption. It is clear from the record that he wanted to combine his financial life with Burns's — this is evidenced by two separate trips to attorneys, among other things, to establish a financial or estate plan, even though Binkely had nothing to contribute to such a joint estate at the time. It is also evident from the record that Burns found Binkley's pressure to be added to the deed a source of distress and guilt, and that he executed the deed to end the arguments. Nothing Binkley presented was sufficient to rebut the presumption that he used his confidential relationship with Burns to obtain an "unfair advantage" over him and persuade him to execute the deed.
We therefore find the trial court's decision was supported by the evidence. While mistake and Burns's lack of donative intent may constitute an independent ground for the court's ruling, the findings regarding undue influence are sufficient to support the judgment, so we need not consider that issue.
The judgment is affirmed. Burns is entitled to his costs on appeal.
WE CONCUR:
RYLAARSDAM, ACTING P. J.
ARONSON, J.
