NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

OPINION

RAMIREZ, P. J.

INTRODUCTION

In this matter, we have reviewed the petition, the opposition filed by real parties in interest, and petitioner's reply. We have determined that resolution of the matter involves the application of settled principles of law, and that issuance of a peremptory writ in the first instance is therefore appropriate. (Palma v. U.S. Industrial Fasteners, Inc. (1984) 36 Cal.3d 171, 178.)

DISCUSSION

In our view, this case turns simply on whether or not there is any evidence that the officer who shot real parties in interest's decedent acted unreasonably. Although real parties in interest provided a great deal of argument, they introduced no evidence to contradict petitioners' version of the tragic shooting.

Real parties in interest's arguments to the effect that the officers should have elected a different strategy in approaching or negotiating with decedent must fall on deaf ears because courts are extremely reluctant to second-guess law enforcement personnel faced with a potentially dangerous situation. (See generally Munoz v. City of Union City (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 1077, and cases cited.) The law does impose on law enforcement the duty to act reasonably if deadly force is to be used, but "reasonableness" is determined under a highly deferential standard with respect to an officer's need to protect himself and others. (Martinez v. County of Los Angeles (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 334.) In this case, the officer who shot decedent provided a description of the event that indisputably made the use of deadly force reasonable within the legal standards. Decedent was armed with a substantial knife, had expressed a willingness to die, and appeared to be attempting to commit "suicide by cop." He approached the officer to within a distance of several feet before being shot. The officer's use of deadly force under this scenario was legally justified.

DISPOSITION

Real parties in interest presented nothing more than speculation to counter this declaration, the credibility of which could not be doubted by the trial court in the absence of contrary evidence. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).) Accordingly, petitioners were entitled to summary judgment.

Let a peremptory writ of mandate issue directing the Superior Court of Riverside County to vacate its order denying petitioners' motion for summary judgment, and to enter a new order granting said motion.

Petitioners are directed to prepare and have the peremptory writ of mandate issued, copies served, and the original filed with the clerk of this court, together with proof of service on all parties.

Petitioners to recover their costs.

We concur:

McKINSTER, J.

RICHLI, J.