NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

DOI TODD, Acting P. J.

Appellant Fabiola Wright appeals from the trial court's denial of her petition for writ of mandate, seeking an order of demolition of an accessory storage building in her neighbors' backyard. Wright complained to various government agencies—including the City of Los Angeles, the Los Angeles Department of Building and Safety (LADBS) and the Los Angeles Planning Department (collectively City)—that the LADBS violated building and zoning laws in issuing permits for the building. Wright eventually appealed the LADBS's action to three different administrative bodies, the Board of Building and Safety Commissioners (BBSC), the Zoning Administrator (ZA) and the West Los Angeles Area Planning Commission (WLAAPC), all of which denied her appeals following public hearings. The trial court entered judgment in favor of the City, and we affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Defendants and real parties in interest Robert Duncan McNeill and Carol McNeill applied for building permits to construct an accessory storage building in the backyard of their property, located at 861 West Burrell Street in Venice, California, which abuts the backyard of Wright's property. The McNeills' property is 7,199 square feet and contains a two-story, single family dwelling built in 1967 that is 2,692 square feet. The LADBS issued five building permits to the McNeills:

1. On June 12, 2007, Building Permit No. 07010-30000-02095 was issued, describing the work as a "new accessory storage building 201 sf." (Building Permit No. 1).

2. On August 13, 2007, Building Permit No. 07010-30001-02095 was issued, describing the work as "supplemental to 07010-30000-02095, to reflect a slot opening in masonry wall, to save a tree & revised increased distance of 6" to the property lines." (Building Permit No. 2.)

3. On October 23, 2007, Building Permit No. 07010-30002-02095 was issued, describing the work as "supplemental permit to 07010-30000-02095; reclassification of the new acc. storage bldg of 201 sf from R-3 to U-1; remove plumbing and heating work reference from main permit (see comments); to document that plans only allowed non-glazed entry doors, no fee per under Master Permit, 07010-30000-02095; plumbing and heating were not included in box 5 (checklist items); an `n' was placed in front of plumbing and heating lines. But the fees were still calculated by the program in error." (Building Permit No. 3.)

4. Building Permit No. 07010-30003-02095 was issued on an unidentified date, and described the work as "supplemental permit to acc. storage building, issued under 07010-30000-02095. To remove plumbing and heating work reference from main permit. No fee permit, department error. (See comments.) Under Master Permit 07010-30000-02095: plumbing and heating were not included in box 5 (checklist items); in box 11 (project valuation & fee information) an `n' was placed in front of plumbing and heating lines, but the fees were still calculated by the program in error." (Building Permit No. 4.)

5. On December 21, 2007, Building Permit No. 07010-30004-02095 was issued, describing the work as "supplemental permit to 07010-30000-02095; to revise the entrance door to storage building from a double solid wood door, to a single leaf solid door." (Building Permit No. 5.)

In short, while the accessory building was originally classified as R-3 occupancy, Building Permit No. 3 reclassified the structure as U-1 (U stands for utility), and Building Permit Nos. 3 and 4 removed plumbing and heating references from the building permits.

On August 13, 2007, the Community Planning Bureau on behalf of the Director of Planning signed off on the project for the City of Los Angeles Planning Department, as required by the Venice Coastal Specific Plan (Ordinance No. 175,693) (Sign-Off). The Sign-Off erroneously described the construction as "a non-habitable garage." On January 23, 2008, the Sign-Off was corrected to describe the construction as "a new 201 square foot non-habitable accessory storage building." The Sign-Off stated that a "Specific Plan Project Permit Compliance" was not required because the project was "an improvement to an existing single-or-multiple-family structure that is not on a Walk Street." It is undisputed that Burrell Street is not a walk street.

On May 29, 2008, the LADBS issued a Certificate of Occupancy. It listed all five building permits, and identified the primary use of the building as "Miscellaneous Bldg/Structure," and other use as "Storage Building." Under the "Comments" section, the certificate stated: "`Accessory Storage Structure, not to be used for human occupation or Recreation Room.'"

The masonry accessory storage building constructed by the McNeills is one story and 201 square feet; it is 15 feet, 8 inches tall; 24 feet wide; and 11 feet, 7 inches long. The structure is two and a half inches from the rear property line shared with Wright, and four inches from the side property line.

Wright was unhappy with the construction almost from the beginning. She and other neighbors considered the building an eyesore. Wright complained that the building partially blocks sunlight from her backyard and has diminished her property's value. Wright lodged numerous complaints with various City agencies.

On October 29, 2007, Wright appealed to the BBSC, claiming the LADBS had erred "by allowing an industrial shed in a[n] R-1 zone—in square feet it does not seem big 201 but the wall 16' height 24' width + 12 feet length is not a shed for R-1 zone." Wright attached her written objections, arguing that the building needed to be five feet from the rear lot line, photographs and a copy of the June 12, 2007 Building Permit No. 1, among other documents.

The agenda of the BBSC for the public hearing on May 20, 2008 describes the issue on appeal as follows: "Determine that the [LADBS] erred or abused its discretion by classifying the 15'-8" high, 24'x11'-7" (201 square feet) accessory storage structure permitted by Building Permit No. 07010-30000-02095 as a U-1 Occupancy Group (`utility'), pursuant to Section 91.0301 of the Los Angeles Municipal Code (LAMC)." The agenda also states that action by the BBSC is not appealable. The minutes for the hearing indicate that numerous people were in attendance for Wright's appeal, including Wright, her daughters and her attorney; Robert McNeill and his attorney; a member of the Venice Neighborhood Council; the Chief of the Code Enforcement Bureau and former Chief of the Engineering Bureau; the Assistant Bureau Chief, Residential Inspection, Inspection Bureau; the Principal Inspector, Inspection Bureau; the Staff Engineer representing the LADBS; the City Attorney representative; and at least two other people, all of whom had an opportunity to speak.

The representative of the LADBS presented its case first and explained why it had not erred or abused its discretion. Wright then presented her case, stating that "the plan checker had violated the Code by not verifying that Planning had issued a permit," the building was being used as a music room, it set a dangerous precedent and the permits were illegal. Following her presentation, the president of the BBSC asked Wright "to state exactly how or where the Department had made an error or abused its discretion." (Italics added.) Wright's attorney responded that "the intent proves there was an error, that the UBC [Uniform Building Code] and the California Code limit the size of storage rooms and that a variance is needed." After the BBSC closed public testimony, it commenced deliberations. Its president commented that the building "is a nice structure," and the vice-president stated that the LADBS "followed all the rules and the permit was issued correctly." On May 29, 2008, the BBSC issued its formal written determination that the LADBS did not err or abuse its discretion by classifying the accessory storage structure as a U-1 Occupancy Group.

Meanwhile, on March 13, 2008, in response to Wright's direct appeal to the LADBS on October 29, 2007, the same date Wright filed her appeal with the BBSC, the LADBS issued its own written determination that it had not erred or abused its discretion in finding that the location, area and height of the accessory structure allowed by Building Permit No. 1 was consistent with, and did not violate, zoning regulations for accessory structures.

On March 28, 2008, Wright appealed the LADBS's determination to the Director of Planning. The issue on appeal was whether the LADBS erred "in issuing a building permit for the construction, use and maintenance of a 201 square-foot, 15-foot-8-inch high, accessory storage building observing 2.5-inch rear and 4-inch side yard setbacks on property located in the R-1 Zone." Following a public hearing on July 17, 2008 in which Wright, her attorney and at least four other people testified on her behalf, the ZA, acting on behalf of the Director of Planning, denied Wright's appeal and affirmed the action of the LADBS in a written decision dated January 9, 2009.

On January 23, 2009, Wright appealed the ZA's decision to the WLAAPC. A public hearing was held on March 18, 2009, at which Wright and others testified. During the hearing, two commissioners stated that they thought allowing the structure was "terrible," but they could not find anything in the applicable codes that would let them conclude that the permit had been issued in error. On April 14, 2009, the WLAAPC mailed its written determination denying Wright's appeal and sustaining the determination by the ZA that the LADBS did not err in issuing Building Permit No. 1.

On April 22, 2009, Wright filed a petition for writ of mandate in the trial court. She filed a first amended petition on May 5, 2009, seeking a writ of mandamus directing the City to revoke all permits and the Certificate of Occupancy, and an order for demolition. A hearing on the petition was held on December 18, 2009. Following oral argument, the trial court entered judgment in favor of the City and denied the writ petition. This appeal followed.

DISCUSSION1

I. Standard of Review.

The parties agree that the standard of review on Wright's appeal from the BBSC's decision under Los Angeles Municipal Code (LAMC) section 98.0403 is by ordinary mandate pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1085. The BBSC was not required to hold an evidentiary hearing in connection with its decision. (LAMC §§ 98.0403.1(b)2; 98.0403.2(b)3.) When an appellant seeks review by ordinary mandate, the inquiry is limited to whether the decision was "arbitrary, capricious or entirely lacking in evidentiary support." (Bunnett v. Regents of University of California (1995) 35 Cal.Ap.4th 843, 849.) "In general if an agency acts pursuant to legislative authority, review of the action is by ordinary mandamus. [Citation.] In ordinary mandamus proceedings courts exercise very limited review `out of deference to the separation of powers between the Legislature and the judiciary, to the legislative delegation of administrative authority to the agency, and to the presumed expertise of the agency within its scope of authority.' [Citation.] The court may not weigh the evidence adduced before the administrative agency or substitute its judgment for that of the agency, for to do so would frustrate legislative mandate. [Citation.] An agency acting in a quasi-legislative capacity is not required by law to make findings indicating the reasons for its action [citation], and the court does not concern itself with the wisdom underlying the agency's action any more than it would were the challenge to a state or federal legislative enactment. [Citations.] In sum, the court confines itself to a determination whether the agency's action has been `"`arbitrary, capricious, or entirely lacking in evidentiary support . . . .'"'" (Shapell Industries, Inc. v. Governing Board (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 218, 230.) "The fact that the proceedings bore some indicia of quasi-judicial action, in that public hearings were held and findings made, does not change their basic legislative character." (Id. at p. 231.) On a petition for writ of mandate brought pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1085, the appellant bears the burden of pleading and proving the facts on which the claim for relief is based. (Evid. Code, § 500; Campbell v. Board of Dental Examiners (1971) 17 Cal.App.3d 872, 876.)

The parties also agree that the standard of review on the WLAAPC's decision under LAMC section 12.26K, which requires an evidentiary hearing to be held, is the substantial evidence test. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1094.5, subds. (b) & (c).) "If the administrative proceedings are quasi-judicial in character, judicial review will be stricter. Whereas quasi-legislative acts involve the formulation of rules of wide application, quasi-judicial action involves `the actual application of such a rule to a specific set of existing facts.' [Citation.] Since such a proceeding adjudicates individual rights and interests, findings are required and the reviewing court looks to see whether the findings are supported by the evidence." (Shapell Industries, Inc. v. Governing Board, supra, 1 Cal.App.4th at p. 231; Breneric Associates v. City of Del Mar (1998) 69 Cal.App.4th 166, 174-175.) Under the substantial evidence test, the trial court and the appellate court have the same scope of review. We are required to "uphold the administrative decision . . . unless the administrative findings `viewed in light of the entire record, [are] so lacking in evidentiary support as to render [them] unreasonable. . . .' [Citation.]" (Cipriotti v. Board of Directors (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 144, 155.) The appellant has the burden to show that there is "no substantial evidence whatsoever" to support the findings. (Saad v. City of Berkeley (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 1206, 1212.)

Finally, the parties agree that statutory interpretation is subject to de novo review. Where, as here, an administrative agency is charged with administering an ordinance, the agency's interpretation of the applicable law is given great deference. (Robinson v. City of Yucaipa (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 1506, 1516.)

II. The BBSC's Decision Was Reasonable.

The narrow issue on appeal before the BBSC was whether the LADBS properly classified the "15'-8" high, 24' x 11'7" (201 square feet) accessory storage structure" as a U-1 Occupancy Group under former LAMC section 91.0301.2

California Building Code section 301 (formerly LAMC section 91.0301), provides that "[a]ny occupancy not mentioned specifically or about which there is any question shall be classified by the building official and included in the group that its use most nearly resembles, based on the existing or proposed fire and life hazard." California Building Code section 312.1 (formerly LAMC section 91.0312.1), provides that "Group U Occupancies shall include buildings or structures, or portions thereof, and shall be: [¶] Division 1. Private garages, carports, sheds and agricultural buildings." The minutes of the BBSC hearing reflect that the staff member representing the LADBS "stated that historically storage buildings accessory to dwellings are classified as U-1 and that the term storage or shed is used interchangeably."

Additionally, California Building Code section 312.2.1 (formerly LAMC section 91.0312.2.1), provides that "[b]uildings or parts of buildings classed as Group U, Division 1 Occupancies because of the use or character of the occupancy shall not exceed 1,000 square feet (92.9m2) in area or one story in height . . . ." Under LAMC section 91.101.5, a permit is not required for a "building accessory to a dwelling and not located in Fire District No.1, provided the building is not more than 64 square feet in area or 8 feet in height and does not contain any heating, plumbing or electrical installation, and is located as permitted by the Los Angeles Zoning Code." Because the McNeill's proposed accessory building was in excess of 64 square feet, taller than eight feet and contained electrical installation, a building permit was required. As the LADBS's representative stated, the accessory storage building would then need to be within 1,000 square feet, and "this building is well under that limit." He also stated that "the location of the building relative to property lines also exceed[s] the minimum Code requirements inasmuch as the Code requires 1-hour fire resistive construction within three feet of a property line, while the exterior walls of the building are constructed on masonry block wall which constitutes a 2-hour fire resistive construction."

When the BBSC's president asked Wright at the hearing how exactly the LADBS had erred or abused its discretion, her attorney responded that the Uniform Building Code and the California Code limit the size of storage rooms and that a variance was required. But Wright ignores that LAMC incorporates these Codes. LAMC section 91.101.1 provides that "The Los Angeles Building Code adopts by reference portions of the California Building Code (CBC)." The California Building Code in turn adopts the International Building Code. (See LAMC § 91.202; Cal. Code of Reg., tit. 24, part 2, § 1.1.1.) The International Building Code replaced the Uniform Building Code in 2000. In any event, the administrative record shows that Wright cited the Uniform Building Code from 1997, which was outdated given that the permits were issued in 2007. Nor did Wright's attorney explain what variance was needed and why it was required.

Because the accessory storage building meets LAMC's area, height and construction requirements for a U-1 Occupancy Group, the BBSC's determination that LADBS did not err or abuse its discretion in classifying the storage accessory building as U-1 Occupancy was not arbitrary, capricious or entirely lacking in evidentiary support.

III. Substantial Evidence Supported the WLAAPC's Decision.

Wright appealed the LADBS's March 13, 2008 decision that it had not erred in issuing the permit to the ZA, acting on behalf of the Director of Planning. As stated by the ZA, the narrow issue on appeal was "restricted to whether the [LADBS] acted appropriately in issuing a building permit for a 201 square-foot, 15-foot 8-inch high, accessory storage structure observing a 2.5 inch rear yard setback and a 4-inch northerly side yard setback" on property located in the R-1 zone. On January 9, 2009, the ZA issued a written determination denying Wright's appeal and finding that the LADBS did not err. On January 23, 2009, Wright appealed the ZA's determination to the WLAAPC. On April 14, 2009, the WLAAPC issued a written determination denying Wright's appeal and sustaining the ZA's denial. The WLAAPC's written determination attached the ZA's written determination.

The ZA's written determination set forth the applicable LAMC provisions. She noted that pursuant to LAMC section 12.26.A, the LADBS "is granted the power to enforce the zoning ordinances of the City." LAMC section 12.03 defines an "accessory building" as a "detached subordinate building, the use of which is customarily incidental to that of the main building or to the main use of the land and which is located in the same or a less restrictive zone and on the same lot with the main building or use." LAMC section 12.21.C.5 addresses the location of accessory buildings, and provides in subdivision (j) that "an accessory building may be located in any portion of a required rear yard, and may be located on that portion of a required side yard which is within 30 feet of the rear lot line. An accessory building may be located in a side yard required for a building more than two stories in height if the accessory building is not closer than five feet to the side lot line. A one-story accessory building for a single-family dwelling may be located in that portion of a required side yard which is within 30 feet of the rear lot line or in a required side yard if not closer than 75 feet to the front lot line nor closer than ten feet to the main building. (Added by Ord. No. 125,278, Eff. 9/16/63.)" The ZA also set forth the review procedures under section 8 of the Venice Coastal Zone Specific Plan (Ordinance No. 175,963 Effective January 19, 2004): "A. DIRECTOR OF PLANNING SIGN-OFF. The following Venice Coastal Development Projects are exempt from the Project Permit Compliance procedures contained in LAMC Section 11.5.7.C. For these projects, no demolition, grading, building permit or certificate of occupancy shall be issued unless the Director of Planning has reviewed the application and determined, by signature, that the Venice Coastal Development Project complies with all applicable provisions of this Specific Plan. [¶] 1. In the Appealable Area, any improvement to an existing single or multiple-family dwelling unit that is not located on a Walk Street; [¶] 2. In the Non-Appealable Area: [¶] a. Any improvement to an existing single or multiple-family dwelling unit that is not located on a Walk Street."

The ZA noted that at the July 17, 2008 public hearing on Wright's appeal, Wright and her attorney presented their case. Wright began by presenting a history of the case and described the building's negative impacts on her own property. Her attorney stated that the project needed a Specific Plan Project Compliance Permit. The ZA then set forth her reasons for denying the appeal: "As the property is located within the Venice Coastal Zone Specific Plan area, the Planning Department review was required to insure consistency of the project with any applicable provision of the Specific Plan. On August 13, 2007, the Planning Department Specific Plan staff, pursuant to [the] above quoted Section 8-A of the Venice Coastal Zone Specific Plan, signed-off plans for a new non-habitable garage, as being in compliance with applicable sections of the Specific Plan, namely Density, Height and Parking . . . ." The ZA noted Specific Plan reviews are limited to applicable sections of the Specific Plan and that other applicable LAMC requirements, such as yard setbacks, not addressed in the Specific Plan must be compliant with LAMC. The ZA further noted that in response to an inquiry from Wright, the Chief Zoning Administrator, on November 20, 2007, "rightfully confirmed" that the procedure followed by the Planning Department for the sign-off of the non-habitable garage was appropriate, and that the proposed structure was in compliance with all other applicable provisions of LAMC. While the Sign-Off form was later corrected to describe the project as a new 201 square-foot non-habitable accessory storage building, the ZA found "[t]his did not change in any way the accuracy of the Chief Zoning Administrator's communication inasmuch as one-story garages and non-habitable accessory storage buildings may be located anywhere in a rear or side yard pursuant to above quoted Section 12.21.C.5[j] of the Municipal Code."3

The ZA went on to state: "While one cannot but be disturbed by the either gross incompetence or intentional deceit of the original application being represented as a garage . . . the fact is that the 201 square-foot 15-foot 8-inch high accessory storage building currently classified for and restricted to U-1 Occupancy, as determined by the [BBSC], is in compliance with applicable location regulations for accessory structures, pursuant to Section 12.21.C.5[j] of the Municipal Code."

At the public hearing before the WLAAPC on March 18, 2009, the ZA emphasized that the sole issue before the WLAAPC "is the location of the accessory building." She reminded the WLAAPC that the BBSC had already determined that the LADBS did not err in classifying the building as U-1 Occupancy, and therefore the issue of use was final. The majority of the hearing centered on discussions regarding LAMC section 12.21.C.5(j) and whether a five-foot rear setback of the building was required. Wright's attorney argued that it was, and that if the McNeills "wanted to get [less than] five feet away from the property line, they had to get a variance. That's what the law says. And Building and Safety did not require that. And that is the issue." In response, the ZA correctly pointed out that the five-foot setback requirement was found in another subdivision relating to accessory structures that are residential. (LAMC § 12.21.C.5(e).)4 Although at least two commissioners believed that LAMC section 12.21.C.5(j) sets a terrible precedent and should be changed, under the statute as written, the accessory storage building could be located in any portion of a required rear yard, or on that portion of a required side yard which is within 30 feet of the rear lot line.

Because the ZA and the WLAAPC were called upon to decide the narrow issue of whether the location of the accessory building was in compliance with LAMC, and because LAMC section 12.21.C.5(j) allows the building to be located anywhere in the rear yard, substantial evidence supported their decisions.

On appeal, Wright essentially ignores the two narrow issues that were appealed and were decided by the administrative agencies. Instead, she spends much of her brief arguing that the LADBS violated Ordinance No. 175,693 because it issued a permit without prior approval from the Director of Planning. She raised this issue for the first time in the trial court. When asked by the trial court to identify where in the 11-volume administrative record Wright had made this argument relying on this statute to the administrative agencies, Wright's attorney could not do so. The trial court therefore declined to consider this argument or to take judicial notice of the ordinance. As the trial court aptly noted, "there's all this stuff kind of floating around, but you can't really get a hold of anything to find out whether you made this pitch to the administrative authorities or not . . . ." Wright's efforts on appeal are no different. While Wright cites to numerous statutes on appeal, she simply points to an isolated page in the administrative record containing a copy of the statute, including Ordinance No. 175,693. But she has not identified where she actually argued to the administrative agencies a violation of the specific statutes she cites on appeal. We will not consider issues that were not developed before the administrative agencies, which are tasked with determining such issues.

DISPOSITION

The judgment denying the petition for writ of mandate is affirmed. The City is entitled to recover its costs on appeal.

We concur:

ASHMANN-GERST, J.

CHAVEZ, J.