NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

WILLHITE, Acting P. J.

INTRODUCTION

The juvenile court declared appellant A.L. a ward of the court (§ 602)1 based upon its finding that A.L. had committed animal cruelty (Pen. Code, § 597, subd. (a)) (hereafter section 597, subd. (a)) and placed him on home probation.

A.L.'s appeal raises two contentions. The first is that the evidence is insufficient to support the trial court's finding that he committed animal cruelty. The second is that the evidence is insufficient to support the trial court's finding that at the time of the incident when he was 13 years and 10 months old, he understood the wrongfulness of his conduct. We are not persuaded by either contention and therefore affirm the judgment (order of wardship).

STATEMENT OF FACTS

1. The Competency Hearing

Prior to the adjudication hearing, the juvenile court conducted a hearing to determine if A.L. was competent, to wit, whether he understood the nature of the proceeding and was able to assist counsel in conducting a defense. The trial court found that A.L. was competent. Although A.L.'s appeal does not challenge that ruling, he relies now—as he did in the trial court—upon some of the evidence adduced at that hearing to argue that the evidence does not support the trial court's subsequent finding that he understood the wrongfulness of his conduct. We therefore briefly summarize that evidence.

A.L.'s IQ is 52. Robert Rome, a licensed psychologist, interviewed A.L. and prepared a psychological evaluation for the court. Rome's findings include the following: (1) A.L.'s "[i]ntellectual functioning generally appears at the low end of the mildly retarded range relative to peers"; (2) his "[a]daptive functioning appears generally at the low end of the borderline range relative to peers"; and (3) "[i]n the emotional and behavioral areas, there is no evidence of hallucinations, delusions, or bizarre thought processes." A.L. is a client of a regional center catering to developmentally disabled individuals.

2. The 602 Hearing

Norma Rosas brought this matter to the attention of law enforcement. She lives next to the Gaedas delicatessen owned by Maria Guerrero, A.L.'s aunt. A.L. went to the delicatessen every day after school. On August 6, 2007, Rosas saw a group of boys, including A.L., in the yard behind the delicatessen "throwing . . . kittens up in the air." Rosas heard the kittens loudly meow. She thought one of the boys "was going to throw the kittens into [her] backyard." She shouted to the boys: "Don't throw them up. Don't throw them up in the air like that." When the boys failed to obey her, Rosas told her daughter to contact animal control.

Shortly thereafter, several officers from the Animal Cruelty Task Force of the Los Angeles Police Department arrived at the delicatessen. The officers met with A.L. and two other boys. A.L. directed them to a box containing two kittens: one white and one brown. The white kitten "was almost completely unresponsive" and appeared to be "dead." The brown kitten was alive but looked "injured."

The officers spoke with Rosas. She told them that she had seen A.L. "swinging the kittens by their tails and hitting them on top of their heads" and "placing the kitten on his head and allowing it to fall as he dipped his head forward." She thought A.L. "was about to throw kittens into her backyard." A.L. was the only boy she had seen handling the kittens.

At first, A.L. falsely told the police that he had not touched the kittens. Then he said that he had only pet them. He claimed that one of the other boys had hurt the kittens. A.L. was advised of and waived his Miranda rights. He was placed under arrest and transported to the police station. In route, A.L. "confessed that he had been holding the kittens by the tail and that he did not mean to hurt the kittens." In addition, he admitted that he had shaken the kittens. "[H]e apologized for what he had done." He "was remorseful and said that he did not mean to hurt the kittens." He also apologized for initially lying to the officers, explaining "he was scared of getting in trouble." Lastly, A.L. admitted that he had changed T-shirts after being observed by Rosas but before the police arrived.

At the police station, Officer Lisset Aviles asked A.L. questions (the "Gladys R. questions")2 to determine whether he knew the difference between right and wrong. A.L. stated that he knew the difference between right and wrong. A.L. said "walking an elderly lady across the street" was an example of doing something right and killing someone was an example of doing something wrong. He knew it was wrong to hurt kittens because his mother had taught him that. He knew it was wrong to hurt animals because "they might die." When asked "What happens to you when you do something wrong?", A.L. replied: "You get arrested."

The white kitten died. Dr. David Bruyette, a veterinarian, examined the dead animal. Dr. Bruyette testified that the kitten had died as a result of blood loss "due to an injury to the main artery." The "artery had been torn off of the aorta which is the major blood vessel, and as a result of that the animal bled to death into its chest." This injury could have been caused by "holding a cat and swinging it by its tail" or "letting it fall to the ground."

A.L.'s aunt (Guerrero) testified on his behalf. She claimed that on August 6, 2007, her two young sons had found the kittens in a box and brought them home. The kittens looked sick. After trying to feed them, she told her oldest son to put them in the backyard. Later that day, A.L. arrived at the delicatessen. She never saw A.L. throw or pick up the kittens.

DISCUSSION

A. Sufficiency of the Evidence to Sustain the Finding that A.L. Violated Section 597, subdivision (a)

Section 597, subdivision (a) makes it a crime if a person "maliciously and intentionally maims, mutilates, tortures, or wounds a living animal, or maliciously and intentionally kills an animal." The statute creates a general intent crime. (People v. Alvarado (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 1179, 1185-1190.) The words "`willfully,' `knowingly,' `intentionally,' and `maliciously' are expressions of general, not specific, intent when used in a penal statute. [Citations.]" (Id. at p. 1188.) Thus, in order to establish animal cruelty in violation of this statute, the prosecutor is not required to prove that a defendant "acted with the specific intent to maim, mutilate, torture, wound or kill a living animal." (Id. at p. 1190.) Instead, the prosecution need only show that a defendant "`acted intentionally in engaging in the proscribed conduct.'" (Id. at p. 1188; see also People v. Turner (1983) 145 Cal.App.3d 658, 682 ["General intent is present `[w]hen a person intentionally does that which the law declares to be a crime . . . even though he may not know that his act or conduct is unlawful.'"].)

Viewing the evidence presented at the adjudication hearing in the light most favorable to the judgment, as we are required to do (In re Roderick P. (1972) 7 Cal.3d 801, 808-809; In re Ryan N. (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 1359, 1371-1373), we find that substantial evidence supports the trial court's finding that A.L. intentionally and maliciously committed an act of animal cruelty.

Rosas saw A.L. swinging the kittens, hitting them on top of their heads, and letting them drop to the ground. A.L., after first denying any culpability, admitted that he had been holding the kittens by their tails and that he had shaken them. The fatal injuries to the kitten were consistent with A.L.'s actions: swinging a cat or dropping it to the ground. Further, A.L.'s words and actions evidenced consciousness of guilt. Initially, he lied to the police, first telling them he had not touched the kittens and then falsely stating one of the other boys had hurt them. And before the police arrived, he changed out of the T-shirt he had been wearing when observed by Rosas in an apparent attempt to disguise his identity as the perpetrator of the cruelty. Taken together, this constitutes substantial evidence to sustain the finding A.L. committed an act of animal cruelty.

A.L.'s contrary argument is not persuasive. He recites in some detail the facts in three published opinions upholding convictions for section 597, subdivision (a).3 He correctly characterizes those facts as showing "terribly violent and vile acts upon an animal" and states that the facts in this case "are far different from the torture and maiming present in [those] cases." From this, he argues that "the case law is clear that the acts must be extremely violent or neglectful or both" and that "more than some form of mishandling of a animal is required under section 597, subdivision (a)." (Italics added.) This approach misses the mark. None of those cases stated, or even implied, that its respective facts established the minimum showing required to sustain a conviction under section 597, subdivision (a). And indeed they could not, as sufficiency of the evidence is a fact-driven inquiry, informed by the specific evidence presented in each individual case. As explained in the preceding paragraph, the evidence is more than sufficient to sustain the juvenile court's finding that A.L. committed animal cruelty in violation of section 597, subdivision (a).

B. Sufficiency of the Evidence to Sustain the Finding that A.L. Understood the Wrongfulness of his Conduct

After the People rested in the adjudication hearing, defense counsel moved to dismiss on the basis that the People had not met their burden to establish that A.L. knew his conduct was wrongful. Defense counsel relied upon evidence produced at both the prior competency hearing and the adjudication hearing. After hearing the prosecutor's opposition argument, the court denied the motion without explanation. A.L. challenges that ruling.

"Penal Code section 26, which applies to proceedings under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602, articulates a presumption that a minor [such as A.L.] under the age of 14 is incapable of committing a crime. To defeat this presumption, the prosecution must prove by clear and convincing evidence that at the time the minor committed the charged act he . . . knew of its wrongfulness. [Citations.] . . . [¶] In determining whether the minor knows of the wrongfulness of his conduct, the court must often rely on circumstantial evidence such as the minor's age, experience, and understanding, as well as the circumstances of the offense, including its method of commission and concealment. [Citations.] Generally, the older a child gets and the closer he approaches the age of 14, the more likely it is that he appreciates the wrongfulness of his acts. [Citations.]" (In re James B. (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 862, 872-873.)

We review the trial court's finding that A.L. understood the wrongfulness of his conduct under the deferential substantial evidence standard. (In re Paul C. (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 43, 52.) Applying that principle, we uphold the juvenile court's finding.

A.L. was 13 years and 10 months old at the time of the incident. "Age is an important consideration in determining a child's knowledge of the wrongfulness of his acts. The closer the child is to the age of 14, the more likely it is that he appreciates the wrongfulness of his acts." (In re Nirran W. (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 1157, 1161.)

Further, A.L.'s statements indicate that he understood that his conduct was wrongful. He told the police that he understood the difference between right and wrong; that his mother had taught him that it was wrong to hurt kittens; and that he knew that it was wrong to hurt animals because such actions could cause their death. A.L.'s expression of remorse to the police (he had not meant to hurt the kittens) indicated that he appreciated the wrongfulness of his actions as did his attempts to conceal his guilt by lying to the officers and by changing his T-shirt. In sum, the record contains substantial evidence to support the trial court's implied finding that the People presented clear and convincing evidence to rebut the presumption found in Penal Code section 26.

To defeat this conclusion, A.L. argues that "there was ample evidence presented [at the] competency hearing[] and a psychological evaluation [prepared by Rome] to suggest [A.L.] functioned at such a low level he may not have believed his actions were wrong." This argument constitutes nothing more than an improper request that we reweigh the evidence presented to and rejected by the trial court. We decline to do so. "It is not our function to reweigh the evidence, reappraise the credibility of witnesses or redetermine factual conflicts, those functions being within the province of the trier of fact." (In re Frederick G. (1979) 96 Cal.App.3d 353, 367.)

Lastly, A.L. argues that "there is no evidence the juvenile court applied the governing standard of proof. While [decisional law] require[s] that the prosecution show by `clear proof' that [A.L.] appreciated the wrongfulness of his conduct, the juvenile court made no record of such finding of `clear proof.'" The argument is not persuasive. The trial court is presumed to have been aware of and followed the applicable law in making its ruling. We cannot and will not presume error where the record does not establish on its face that the trial court misunderstood the applicable burden of proof. (In re Jacob J. (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 429, 437-438; accord, Evid. Code, § 664.)

DISPOSITION

The judgment (order of wardship) is affirmed.

We concur:

MANELLA, J.

SUZUKAWA, J.