NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

ROTHSCHILD, J.

Gohar Niazian appeals from the order denying her petition to compel arbitration of her dispute with Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company over her claim for underinsured motorist benefits. Because Niazian's request to compel arbitration was part of a prior action she brought against Nationwide, and judgment was entered in that action dismissing it with prejudice in its entirety, we affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

1. Niazian's Prior Action Against Nationwide and Resolution of the Action

On May 1, 2009, Niazian filed a complaint against Nationwide asserting causes action for: (1) breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing; (2) breach of fiduciary duty; (3) fraud; (4) violation of Insurance Code section 790.03; and (5) action to compel underinsured motorist arbitration.1 According to the allegations, Niazian, while in the course and scope of her employment for Nationwide, was driving a vehicle on September 19, 2006, when she was rear ended by another motorist. As a result of the accident, Niazian obtained medical care and treatment and suffered loss of earnings, earning potential and property damage. Niazian recovered the policy limits from the insurance company of the other driver involved in the accident, but sought underinsured motorist benefits from Nationwide pursuant to a policy of insurance that covered Nationwide's employees, including herself. Although Niazian contacted Nationwide repeatedly to discuss and resolve her claim for underinsured motorist benefits, she received no response. Nationwide failed and refused to respond to her demand for arbitration and to submit her claim to and participate in arbitration, despite a policy provision for arbitration of benefits disputes, as required by Insurance Code section 11580.2, subdivision (f). Niazian sought compensatory and punitive damages, as well as an order compelling arbitration of the dispute over her claim for underinsured motorist benefits.

On September 28, 2009, Niazian served on Nationwide an offer to compromise pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 998.2 The offer provides that Niazian "does hereby offer to allow judgment to be taken in this matter, pursuant to CCP § 998, in favor of [Niazian] against . . . Nationwide . . . in the amount of Twenty Five Thousand Dollars ($25,000.00). It further states, "PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that if this offer is not accepted prior to trial or arbitration, or within 30 days after it is made, whichever occurs first, it shall be deemed withdrawn pursuant to CCP § 998, and cannot be given in evidence upon the trial or arbitration." It also says that, if the offer is not accepted and Nationwide fails "to obtain a more favorable judgment or award . . . in any action or proceeding . . ., the court or arbitrator, in its discretion, may require [Nationwide] to pay a reasonable sum to cover costs of the services of expert witnesses, who are not regular employees of any party, actually incurred and reasonably necessary in either, or both, preparation for trial or arbitration, or during trial or arbitration, of the case by [Niazian], in addition to [Niazian's] costs."

Within the time period specified in the offer, on October 22, 2009, Nationwide accepted it. The acceptance provides, "By signing this `Acceptance of CCP § 998 Offer To Allow Judgment' . . . Nationwide . . . agrees that judgment may be entered in favor of . . . [Niazian] and against [Nationwide] . . . in the amount stated therein, Twenty Five Thousand Dollars ($25,000), and accept(s) all of the terms and conditions of the Offer hereinabove stated, pursuant to CCP 998(b)."

The executed offer and acceptance were filed with the trial court on October 23, 2009. On January 6, 2010, Nationwide served a proposed judgment on Niazian. She did not object to it. Accordingly, on January 19, 2010, Nationwide submitted the proposed judgment to the court. Niazian did not file any objections to the proposed judgment. On February 2, 2010, the court signed and filed the judgment. The judgment provides, "Plaintiff having offered to compromise this matter pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure Section 998, and Defendant Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company having accepted such offer to compromise, . . . and good cause therefore appearing, [¶] IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that: [¶] 1. Judgment is entered in favor of Plaintiff in the amount of $25,000.00; and, [¶] 2. This action is dismissed, with prejudice, as against Defendant Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company, each party to bear its own attorneys' fees and costs."

2. The Petition to Compel Arbitration and the Trial Court's Order of Denial

Several weeks after judgment was entered, on February 26, 2010, Niazian filed a petition to compel arbitration, asking the trial court, as she had in her prior action, to send to arbitration her dispute with Nationwide over her claim for underinsured motorist benefits based on an arbitration provision, as required by Insurance Code section 11580.2, subdivision (f), in the policy of insurance covering Nationwide's employees.

Nationwide responded to the petition, arguing that Niazian could not compel arbitration because the judgment in her prior action had disposed of the entire matter, including her request for arbitration. According to Nationwide, having compromised her prior action, including the request for arbitration, pursuant to section 998 and obtained a judgment, Niazian could not reassert any right to arbitration.

In reply, Niazian asserted that the compromise of the prior action involved only the bad faith and breach of fiduciary duty claims and not her request for arbitration of the dispute over her claim for underinsured motorist benefits, which, she maintained, should proceed despite the judgment disposing of the prior action. Niazian attached to her reply several letters from her counsel to Nationwide's counsel suggesting that the prior action had two components, one being bad faith and one being arbitration of the dispute over her claim for underinsured motorist benefits, and that the bad faith component was being settled, while the dispute over her claim for underinsured motorist benefits would be arbitrated.

After reviewing the parties' papers and hearing argument, the trial court denied the petition to compel arbitration. Niazian filed a timely notice of appeal. [§ 1294, subd. (a) [order denying petition to compel arbitration is appealable].)3

DISCUSSION

"The doctrine of res judicata rests upon the ground that the party to be affected, or some other with whom he is in privity, has litigated, or had an opportunity to litigate the same matter in a former action in a court of competent jurisdiction, and should not be permitted to litigate it again to the harassment and vexation of his opponent. Public policy and the interests of litigants alike require that there be an end to litigation. [Citation.] The doctrine applies when (1) the issues decided in the prior adjudication are identical with those presented in the later action; (2) there was a final judgment on the merits in the prior action; and (3) the party against whom the plea is raised was a party or was in privity with a party to the prior adjudication. [Citation.] Even if the threshold requirements are established, res judicata will not be applied `if injustice would result or if the public interest requires that relitigation not be foreclosed. [Citations.]' [Citation.]" (Citizens for Open Access to Sand & Tide, Inc. v. Seadrift Association (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 1053, 1065.)

Here, based on the judgment in the prior action, the doctrine of res judicata precludes Niazian from reasserting her request to arbitrate her dispute with Nationwide over her claim for underinsured motorist benefits.

First, Niazian's prior action and her petition to compel arbitration sought the same relief: an order compelling arbitration of the dispute between Nationwide and her over her claim for underinsured motorist benefits as a result of the September 19, 2006 accident, based on a policy of insurance that covered Nationwide's employees, including herself, and that contained an arbitration provision pursuant to Insurance Code section 11580.2, subdivision (f).4 Thus, one of the issues resolved by the judgment in her prior action—her right to compel Nationwide to arbitration—is identical to the issue raised in her petition to compel arbitration.

Second, the judgment in the prior action, entered after Nationwide accepted Niazian's section 998 offer to compromise the matter, is a final judgment on the merits. "`"A judgment entered . . . by consent or stipulation, is as conclusive a . . . bar as a judgment rendered after trial." [Citations.]' [Citation.]" (Citizens for Open Access to Sand & Tide, Inc. v. Seadrift Association, supra, 60 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1065-1066 [settlement agreement incorporated into judgments was final judgment on the merits for res judicata purposes].) A compromise settlement pursuant to section 998 is "`"decisive of the rights of the parties thereto and operates as a bar to the reopening of the original controversy."'" (Doran v. North State Grocery, Inc. (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 484, 492.)

Third, Niazian, against whom the doctrine of res judicata is to be applied, was a party to the prior adjudication. Indeed, she is the one who brought the action, drafted the section 998 offer and allowed judgment to be entered against Nationwide for $25,000, along with a dismissal of the action with prejudice.

Because all three elements of res judicata are satisfied, Niazian's attempt to reassert a right to arbitrate through a petition to compel arbitration properly was denied. Niazian nevertheless contends that, despite the judgment in the prior action, her request to arbitrate the dispute over her claim for underinsured motorist benefits still is viable. We disagree.

Initially, the plain and unambiguous language of Niazian's section 998 offer demonstrates that she offered to compromise her prior action in its entirety and that she did not limit the offer to exclude her request to arbitrate. The offer states that it is an "offer to allow judgment to be taken in this matter." (Italics added.) It also considers arbitration in setting a time limit for acceptance: "[I]f this offer is not accepted prior to trial or arbitration, or within 30 days after it is made, whichever occurs first, it shall be deemed withdrawn pursuant to CCP § 998, and cannot be given in evidence upon trial or arbitration." (Italics added.) And it cautions that, if the offer is not accepted and Nationwide fails "to obtain a more favorable judgment or award . . . in any action or proceeding . . ., the court or arbitrator, in its discretion, may require [Nationwide] to pay a reasonable sum to cover costs of the services of expert witnesses, who are not regular employees of any party, actually incurred and reasonably necessary in either, or both, preparation for trial or arbitration, or during trial or arbitration, of the case by [Niazian], in addition to [Niazian's] costs." (Italics added.) Nothing in the offer suggests that the request for arbitration is carved out and will remain to be decided if Nationwide accepts the offer. By its plain and unambiguous language, the section 998 offer, therefore, contemplates that it is to resolve Niazian's entire action, including her request for arbitration. (See Berg v. Darden (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 721, 728 ["If no other `terms and conditions' apart from the consideration required to consummate the settlement are specifically set forth, then the offer, by virtue of default to the statutory language, is simply intended as one to `allow judgment to be taken' in exchange for the specified amount of funds"]; see also Stiles v. Estate of Ryan (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 1057, 1062 [interpreting § 998 offer according to its "plain, unambiguous language"].)5

In addition, Niazian's failure to object to the proposed judgment demonstrates that she compromised her prior action in its entirety, without excluding her request for arbitration. After accepting Niazian's section 998 offer, Nationwide served a proposed judgment on Niazian on January 6, 2010, providing for resolution of the action and a dismissal with prejudice. After referring to Niazian's offer "to compromise this matter" pursuant to section 998 and Nationwide's acceptance, the proposed judgment states that "[j]udgment is entered in favor of [Niazian] in the amount of $25,000.000" and "[t]his action is dismissed, with prejudice, as against . . . Nationwide . . . ." Niazian did not object to the proposed judgment, and Nationwide accordingly submitted it to the trial court. Niazian did not file any objections to the proposed judgment. The court signed and entered the proposed judgment on February 2, 2010, dismissing the entire action.

Niazian's reliance on various letters from her counsel to Nationwide's counsel during the time period the parties were discussing a settlement and shortly after Nationwide accepted the section 998 offer does not change the result. Although several of the letters before acceptance of the section 998 offer suggest a settlement of the bad faith component of the action separately from arbitration of the dispute over the claim for underinsured motorist benefits, that is not what ultimately transpired between the parties. The section 998 offer presented to Nationwide was to resolve "this matter," was not qualified or limited in any respect and referred to "trial or arbitration," thus specifically accounting for Niazian's request to arbitrate the dispute over her claim for underinsured motorist benefits. In addition, although after acceptance of the offer Niazian's counsel wrote to Nationwide's counsel on October 29, 2009, making efforts to commence proceedings on the claim for underinsured motorist benefits, Nationwide's counsel responded on November 23, 2009, setting forth the terms of the section 998 offer to "`allow judgment to be taken in this matter'" and stating that "Nationwide accepted [Niazian's] offer to enter judgment against it in the entire action, and all of [Niazian's] claims against Nationwide have been terminated." As a result, despite Niazian's raising the issue of arbitration to resolve the dispute over her claim for underinsured motorist benefits after Nationwide accepted the section 998 offer, Nationwide alerted Niazian that her entire action had been resolved, and she did not object to that resolution in the proposed judgment, instead allowing entry of judgment and a dismissal with prejudice of her action. Accordingly, nothing about the correspondence between Niazian's counsel and Nationwide's counsel is contrary to a finding that the judgment in the prior action precludes Niazian from reasserting a request for arbitration.

Niazian also contends that her request for arbitration could not have been disposed of by virtue of the judgment in her prior action because Insurance Code section 11580.2 mandates that a dispute over a claim for underinsurance motorist benefits be resolved by arbitration. That contention, too, lacks merit. While Insurance Code section 11580.2 gives both the insurer and insured the contractual right to arbitration of a benefits dispute, "there is no requirement that issues subject to contractual arbitration may be resolved only by means of contractual arbitration, or at least only by means of some kind of `arbitration' resulting in a binding and final decision. For reasons of their own, the parties may choose to litigate such questions. [Citation.] A trial court is not obligated to force them to contractual arbitration sua sponte. . . . [¶] . . . [¶] . . . Even in the presence of a petition to compel contractual arbitration, there is no requirement that these questions [under Insurance Code section 11580.2] be resolved only by such means in such manner." (Mercury Ins. Group v. Superior Court (1998) 19 Cal.4th 332, 346-347.) Here, assuming Niazian had the right to resolve the dispute with Nationwide over her claim for underinsured motorist benefits through arbitration, Niazian and Nationwide chose instead to resolve the dispute through section 998, and judgment was entered disposing of the prior action, including Niazian's request for arbitration. Under those circumstances, Niazian cannot reassert a request for arbitration to resolve the dispute over her claim for underinsured motorist benefits.

DISPOSITION

The order is affirmed. Nationwide is entitled to recover its costs on appeal.

We concur:

MALLANO, P. J.

CHANEY, J.