NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
ASHMANN-GERST, J.
Plaintiffs and appellants Jeffrey Forward (Forward) and Elisabeth Howard (Howard) appeal a trial court order sustaining a demurrer without leave to amend brought by defendants and respondents County of Los Angeles (County) and various individuals employed by the County, including Zev Yaroslavsky, Soheila Kalhor, Craig Philips, Mo Kajbaf, Susan Nissman, Laren Bunker, and George Osborne to plaintiffs' complaint. They contend that the trial court erred in finding that (1) Howard failed to file a claim as required by the Government Tort Claims Act (Gov. Code, § 910);1 (2) Forward's tort claim was untimely; and (3) essential elements of plaintiffs' claims were not, and could not, be pled.
We conclude that the trial court properly sustained defendants' demurrer without leave to amend. Accordingly, we affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Factual Background2
In 1997, plaintiffs purchased a vacant lot next to their home that they eventually developed into a theater arts academy to present live performances. Over the course of several years, plaintiffs attended numerous meetings and spoke with certain persons regarding the development of the property. They applied for and received various permits.
Yet, during this process, defendants engaged in a pattern of harassment designed to "delay, deny, prevent, and forestall [them] from constructing and operating [their] business on" the property. Plaintiffs even avoided foreclosure multiple times.
On November 1, 2007, plaintiffs received a foreclosure notice for the property. Between November 2007, and January 2008, plaintiffs put on several plays at the property and raised monies in order to keep the property from being sold in foreclosure. On February 25, 2008, they received another foreclosure notice, but this time they were unable to make their monthly payments for their mortgage on the property. The lender recorded a notice of default and election to sell under deed of trust on April 1, 2008. On or about August 29, 2008, the property was sold in a foreclosure sale.
Procedural Background
Claim for Damages
On January 8, 2009, a claim for damages was submitted to the County pursuant to section 910, alleging that County officials were responsible for the foreclosure of the property. The claim identified Forward as the claimant, identified the loss of "Forward's property" as the injury, and was signed by Forward. Attached to the claim was an addendum that further described how the damage or injury occurred. It provides, in relevant part, that defendants' negligence and misconduct, "with respect to property owners, [Forward and Howard], delayed issuance of permits, added substantially to the cost of development, and prevented the owners from utilizing their property" and caused over $11 million in damages. The addendum then details conduct by defendants from 2001 through 2007, sometimes referring to "owners," but not listing their names and sometimes referring to "owner [Forward]." Like the claim form, the addendum is signed only by Forward.
Plaintiffs' Complaint
On September 17, 2009, plaintiffs filed the instant complaint against defendants. Their 137-page complaint alleges seven causes of action: (1) negligence, (2) nuisance, (3) negligent infliction of emotional distress, (4) intentional infliction of emotional distress, (5) negligent interference with a prospective economic advantage, (6) intentional interference with a prospective economic advantage, and (7) inverse condemnation. They sought over $12.5 million in damages for, inter alia, the loss of the property, the depletion of construction funds, loss of monies invested in the development of the property, loss of past, present, and future income from business operations on the property, emotional distress, and severe emotional distress causing Forward to contract cancer.
Defendants' Demurrer; Trial Court Order
Defendants demurred.3 They argued that (1) Howard failed to file a government claim as required by section 910, (2) Forward's claim was untimely (§§ 911.2, 945.4), (3) the first six causes of action failed to allege sufficient facts, (4) defendants were immune from liability, and (5) plaintiffs failed to state a claim for inverse condemnation.
Plaintiffs opposed defendants' demurrer. They argued that Forward "filed a Claim with the County of Los Angeles on January 8, 2009, in which [Forward], who filled out the Claim form on behalf of himself and [Howard], inadvertently and mistakenly neglected to include the name [Howard] in the Claim form Section 1[], NAME OF CLAIMANT." They submitted that "Forward signed the claim on behalf of [Howard]," as evidenced by the facts that (1) the identifying data relates to both Forward and Howard, (2) Forward and Howard reside together, (3) the information in the claim is the same for both plaintiffs, (4) and they are identified as coowners of the property in the addendum. They further argued that Howard substantially complied with the requirement that she file a claim under section 910.
Regarding the timeliness of the claim, plaintiffs argued that their claim was timely because it was filed four months after the foreclosure of their property. According to plaintiffs, their causes of action against defendants were not ripe until the actual foreclosure sale.
Finally, plaintiffs asserted that each cause of action was proper, and that defendants were not immune from liability.
On February 11, 2010, the trial court entertained oral argument on defendants' demurrer. After taking the matter under submission, the trial court sustained defendants' demurrer without leave to amend. In a 16-page minute order, it found that Howard failed to file a government tort claim; that Forward failed to file a timely government tort claim; that there was no statutory basis for the first six causes of action; and that plaintiffs lacked standing to pursue the inverse condemnation claim.
On March 11, 2010, plaintiffs filed a motion for reconsideration. Defendants opposed plaintiffs' motion, and the trial court denied the motion as untimely and on the grounds that plaintiffs failed to present new facts or argument.
A judgment of dismissal was entered on May 6, 2010, and this timely appeal ensued.
DISCUSSION
I. Standard of Review
In reviewing a judgment of dismissal after a demurrer is sustained without leave to amend, we must assume the truth of all facts properly pleaded by the plaintiff. Regardless of the label attached to the cause of action, we must examine the complaint's factual allegations to determine whether they state a cause of action on any available legal theory. (Black v. Department of Mental Health (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 739, 745.)
We will not, however, assume the truth of contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law and may disregard allegations that are contrary to the law or to a fact which may be judicially noticed. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318 [matters subject to judicial notice may be considered in ruling on a demurrer, along with the truth of all properly pleaded allegations in the complaint]; Unruh-Haxton v. Regents of University of California (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 343, 358 (Unruh-Haxton).) When a ground for objection to a complaint, such as the statute of limitations, appears on its face or from matters of which the court may or must take judicial notice, a demurrer on that ground is proper. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.30, subd. (a); Black v. Department of Mental Health, supra, 83 Cal.App.4th at p. 745.) "`The running of the statute must appear "clearly and affirmatively" from the dates alleged.' [Citation.]" (Lee v. Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 848, 854 (Lee).)
"`[I]t is an abuse of discretion to sustain a demurrer without leave to amend if the plaintiff shows there is a reasonable possibility any defect identified by the defendant can be cured by amendment. [Citation.]' [Citations.]" (Payne v. National Collection Systems, Inc. (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 1037, 1044.)
II. Plaintiffs' Claim was Untimely4
Pursuant to the California Tort Claims Act (the Act) (§ 910 et seq.), an individual seeking to sue a government entity for damages must first present a claim to the entity within one year after accrual of the cause of action. (§ 911.2, subd. (a).) Presentation of a timely claim is a condition precedent to commencing suit against a governmental entity. (§ 945.4; Illerbrun v. Conrad (1963) 216 Cal.App.2d 521, 524.) If a plaintiff fails to comply with or obtain relief from the requirements of the Act, his or her legal action is barred. (§ 945.4.)
The date of accrual for a cause of action subject to the Act is the date the cause of action would be deemed to have accrued under the applicable statute of limitations. (§ 901; Jefferson v. County of Kern (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 606, 610.) The statute of limitations for the first six causes of action in the complaint began to run when plaintiffs suspected, or should have suspected, that their injury was caused by wrongdoing or that someone had done something wrong to them. (Bernson v. Browning-Ferris Industries (1994) 7 Cal.4th 926, 932; Norgart v. Upjohn Co. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 383, 397-398 (Norgart).) A plaintiff has reason to suspect a factual basis for his claim when he has notice or information of circumstances to put a reasonable person on inquiry. (Norgart, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 398; see also Unruh-Haxton, supra, 162 Cal.App.4th at pp. 358-359.)
According to the complaint, from 1999 through 2008,5 defendants engaged in a host of wrongdoing, all of which plaintiffs were aware while it was occurring. Defendants' alleged misconduct caused them ongoing damages, with the pinnacle being the foreclosure of their property. Because plaintiffs did not file their tort claim until well after a year after they had suffered these damages, their claim and this action are time-barred.
In an effort to save their lawsuit, plaintiffs argue that their claims accrued on August 29, 2008, when their property was actually sold at a foreclosure sale. After all, as pled in their complaint, they had avoided foreclosure numerous other times. Thus, this one foreclosure notice could not have triggered the statute of limitations. We are not convinced. Plaintiffs' claim for damages includes far more than damages stemming from the loss of the property at the foreclosure sale. Rather, they seek damages6 for, inter alia: (1) defendants'"unreasonable interference" in their ability to timely construct a theatre, (2) the depletion of funds to finish construction, (3) the loss of monies invested in the development of the property, (4) the loss of past, present, and future income from business operations on the property, and (5) emotional distress incurred over a period of years from 1999 through the present. Because plaintiffs incurred substantial damages separate from, and prior to, the foreclosure of the property, their claims against defendants are time-barred. They cannot seize upon the foreclosure as the "last straw" of damages, and then file a multi-million dollar complaint based upon the entirety damages they suffered over many years.
For this reason, plaintiffs' reliance upon Garver v. Brace (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 995 is misplaced. Notwithstanding their unfounded legal conclusion to the contrary, plaintiffs' complaint confirms that they sustained actual and appreciable harm7 well before a year before January 8, 2009, the date on which plaintiffs filed their tort claim. (Id. at pp. 999-1000.)
Plaintiffs further assert that the determination of the date of the accrual of their causes of action is a question of fact that cannot be decided on demurrer. We agree that generally "the date of accrual of a cause of action is subject to jury determination when the issue is raised in connection with a tort claim." (Jefferson v. County of Kern, supra, 98 Cal.App.4th at p. 611.) But, "`where reasonable minds can draw but one conclusion from the evidence that . . . question becomes a matter of law.'" (Ibid.)
Here, the allegations of plaintiffs' complaint can lead to only one conclusion—plaintiffs suffered appreciable damage for many years prior to the foreclosure of the property. The only reasonable inference to be drawn from plaintiffs' allegations is that they should have learned the facts essential to their claims by some date outside the one-year limitations period. (Cleveland v. Internet Specialties West, Inc. (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 24, 31.) There is no question of fact that saves plaintiffs' claims from dismissal. (Lee, supra, 107 Cal.App.4th at pp. 858-859.)
In light of our conclusion that plaintiffs' tort claim was untimely as a matter of law, we need not reach the merits of whether plaintiffs adequately pled the first six causes of action against defendants.
III. Plaintiffs' Inverse Condemnation Claim Fails
Plaintiffs were not required to present a claim on their cause of action for inverse condemnation. (Lee, supra, 107 Cal.App.4th at p. 855.) We thus turn our attention to whether plaintiffs have stated a proper cause of action for inverse condemnation against the County.8
Because plaintiffs admit that they no longer own the property, they lack standing to pursue a claim for inverse condemnation against the County. (County of San Luis Obispo v. Superior Court (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 288, 291-293 (Munari).) The loss of the property by foreclosure prevents the trial court from granting plaintiffs any relief.
Plaintiffs argue that pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 319, they can still pursue their inverse condemnation claim even though they no longer own the property. That statute provides, in relevant part: "No cause of action . . . arising out of the title to real property . . . can be effectual, unless it appear that the person prosecuting the action . . . was seized or possessed of the premises in question within five years before the commencement of the act in respect to which such action is prosecuted." (Code Civ. Proc., § 319.) According to plaintiffs, because they owned the property within five years of bringing this action, they have standing.
Code of Civil Procedure section 319 does not support plaintiffs' assertion. The statute "provides a five-year statute of limitations for actions impacting the title to real property." (Robertson v. Superior Court (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 1319, 1327.) In other words, "actions relating to . . . [the] title to real property . . . must be commenced within five years from the end of possession or seizin[g] of that property." (Id. at p. 1328.) The statute sheds no light on standing.
Citing City of Los Angeles v. Ricards (1973) 10 Cal.3d 385 (Ricards) and Brick v. Cazaux (1937) 9 Cal.2d 549 (Brick), plaintiffs claim that they have the right to pursue a claim for inverse condemnation. Plaintiffs' argument is inadequate and incomplete. They have not met their burden of explaining how these cases establish that they have standing. (Benach v. County of Los Angeles (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 836, 852 [appellant bears the burden of supporting a point with reasoned argument]; County of Sacramento v. Lackner (1979) 97 Cal.App.3d 576, 591 [appellant must present argument on each point made].)
Setting this procedural obstacle aside, it appears that plaintiffs are arguing that they can pursue a claim for inverse condemnation based upon wrongful conduct committed by defendants while plaintiffs owned the property, before the foreclosure sale. Ricards and Brick do not support plaintiffs' novel proposition that defendants' alleged misconduct in forestalling, delaying, denying, and preventing plaintiffs from developing their business on the property amounts to inverse condemnation as a matter of law. In fact, Munari indicates otherwise: "Had [plaintiffs] believed the [County] was unreasonably delaying the processing of [their paperwork], [they] had a remedy in ordinary mandate. . . . [They could not] wait until [they lost] the property to act." (Munari, supra, 90 Cal.App.4th at p. 295.)
DISPOSITION
The trial court's order is affirmed. Defendants are entitled to costs on appeal.
We concur:
DOI TODD, Acting P. J.
CHAVEZ, J.
