NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

OPINION

THE COURT*

It was alleged in a juvenile wardship petition (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602)1 that appellant, Dylan T., a minor, committed first degree burglary (Pen. Code, §§ 459, 460, subd. (a)) and misdemeanor vandalism (Pen. Code, § 594, subd. (b)(2)(A)). Appellant admitted the vandalism allegation, and the court dismissed the burglary allegation, adjudged appellant a ward of the court pursuant to section 602, placed him on probation for a period not to exceed three years, and, following a hearing, ordered that he pay victim restitution (§ 730.6) in the amount of $950.26. That amount included $350.26 for the victim's moving expenses.

On appeal, appellant challenges the moving-expenses portion of the restitution award. We will affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Facts2

Angelina Hernandez left her house (the house) on March 2, 2010, and returned on March 7, 2010, at approximately 5:30 p.m. After parking her car in the garage, she entered the house, at which point she saw a white male, approximately 16 years old, sitting in her recliner watching television. Hernandez yelled at the boy, and he jumped up and started running. Hernandez saw another white male running down the hallway. Moments later, she saw the two white males running through the backyard. She called the KCSD.

When KCSD deputies arrived they walked through the house with Hernandez. It appeared that the house had been "ransacked" and that it had been "used like someone had been living there." Deputies found various items that did not belong to Hernandez, including clothing and two cell phones.

Deputies located and made contact with the owner of the cell phones, a 13-year-old girl, who stated she and some of her friends had been "`hanging out'" at the house. Deputies later made contact with 14-year-old Brandon L. who stated appellant and another minor told him "of an abandoned house that they recently broke into," and "invited [him] over."

Deputies later made contact with appellant, who stated that "a week prior to the instant offense, he wedged the door open with a screwdriver and went inside with [another minor] because he thought the owner had been evicted." Appellant admitted taking a bracelet and a ring from the house. He said he "threw the bracelet back," but "took the ring" and "threw [it] down the street."

The Restitution Hearing

Hernandez testified to the following: She rented the house for the "first year" under a lease arrangement, but the "second year, we didn't bother with a lease." She would "just send ... the rent" each month. The house, which was owned by a family, had "belonged to their dad," and the "family really didn't want to sell [it]." However, "when that break-in happened[,] ... they just had enough," and they "said that they were [going to] close the house down because of what happened." Subsequently, Hernandez "received a letter saying that [she] should move by the 31st." As a result, she moved. She would not have moved had the landlord not told her to do so.

Based on information provided by Hernandez, the court ordered that appellant pay restitution to Hernandez, based on her lost wages, jewelry that was taken, bedding that was damaged, and expenses incurred as a result of moving. As indicated above, the moving-expenses portion of the restitution award was $350.26.

DISCUSSION

Appellant contends the court erred in ordering restitution for the victim's moving expenses.

Governing Principles

"In 1982, by initiative, the voters of California added a provision to the state Constitution establishing a new constitutional right: the right of every crime victim to obtain restitution from the perpetrator of the crime for losses suffered." (People v. Crow (1993) 6 Cal.4th 952, 956.) This constitutional provision directed the Legislature to enact implementing legislation. (Ibid.)

Section 730.6 is one of the implementing statutes. (In re Tommy A. (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 1580, 1587.) Section 730.6 "governs restitution in cases where a minor is adjudicated a ward of the court pursuant to section 602." (In re Johnny M. (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 1128, 1131 (Johnny M.).)

Subdivision (a)(2) of section 730.63 provides, in relevant part, that the court, upon finding a minor to be a person described in section 602, "shall order the minor to pay, in addition to any other penalty provided or imposed under the law, ... the following: [¶] ... [¶] (B) Restitution to the victim or victims, if any, in accordance with subdivision (h)." Section 730.6(h) provides, in relevant part: "The court shall order full restitution unless it finds compelling and extraordinary reasons for not doing so, and states them on the record. ... A restitution order pursuant to [section 730.6(a)(2)(B)] ... shall be of a dollar amount sufficient to fully reimburse the victim or victims for all determined economic losses incurred as the result of the minor's conduct for which the minor was found to be a person described in Section 602, including [certain specific categories of economic loss, e.g., medical expenses and the value of stolen or damaged property]."

"A minor shall have the right to a hearing before a judge to dispute the determination of the amount of restitution." (§ 730.6(h)(4).) "The standard of review of a restitution order is abuse of discretion. `A victim's restitution right is to be broadly and liberally construed.' [Citation.] `"When there is a factual and rational basis for the amount of restitution ordered by the trial court, no abuse of discretion will be found by the reviewing court."'" (Johnny M., supra, 100 Cal.App.4th at p. 1132.)

Contentions and Analysis

At the outset, we seek to clarify what is not at issue. Appellant does not argue that the victim did not incur expenses as a result of moving out of the house to a new residence nor does he challenge the moving-expenses portion of the restitution award as excessive. Rather, he challenges the award of restitution on a number of other bases.

First, he argues that section 730.6 simply does not authorize restitution based on moving expenses. He bases this claim on the following: Penal Code section 1202.4, the statute governing restitution in the adult criminal context, requires, in language similar to that of section 730.6, "full[] reimbursement" for the victim(s) "for every determined economic loss incurred as a result of the defendant's criminal conduct," including certain specified categories of economic loss. In 1999, the Legislature amended the adult restitution statute to add relocation expenses to the list of specifically included categories of economic loss. However, section 730.6 has not been similarly amended and does not include relocation expenses as a specified category of reimbursable economic loss.

Appellant further suggests, in the alternative, that if a court can properly order restitution based on moving expenses, such an order is permissible only in "the narrow circumstances of the victim moving away from the defendant for victim safety after a violent crime." Neither of these contentions has merit.

On this point, we find instructive In re M.W. (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 1. In that case, the minor argued that the juvenile court erred in ordering restitution for the cost of mental health services because "although the costs of mental health services are specifically authorized as a restitution award under the adult restitution statute, Penal Code section 1202.4, it is not expressly authorized under section 730.6, subdivision (h)." (Id. at p. 4.) The minor based this argument on the principle, upon which appellant also apparently relies, "that, where the Legislature uses materially different language in addressing related subjects, the courts generally will infer the difference is intentional and compels different understandings." (Ibid.) In rejecting the minor's contention, this court stated: "Although [section 730.6(h)] lists certain categories of economic loss as providing an appropriate basis for a restitution order, it is not intended to be an inclusive list. The term `economic loss' in the juvenile restitution statute must be given an expansive interpretation because any interpretation that limits a victim's rights to restitution would derogate the expressed intent and purposes of Article 1, section 28, and the provisions of the implementing statutes. [Citations.] The court in In re Johnny M. held that the use of the term `including' in section 730.6, subdivision (h), like the use of the term `including, but not limited to,' in Penal Code section 1202.4, suggests a legislative intention to allow broad discretion in providing for recovery of a victim's economic loss from the offender. [Citation.] This language does not create a limitation on the types of economic losses recoverable as restitution. To the contrary, `"including all of the following"—is a phrase of enlargement, meaning the categories of economic losses explicitly identified in the statute are not exhaustive. [Citation.]' [Citations.] Under the statutory authority, the juvenile court is vested with discretion to order restitution to further the legislative objectives of making the victim whole, rehabilitating the minor, and deterring future delinquent behavior." (Id. at pp. 5-6, italics added.) For these same reasons, we conclude that restitution for moving expenses, though not specifically authorized by section 730.6, is included in the categories of economic loss for which restitution may be ordered, and that restitution for moving expenses is not limited to cases in which the offender has committed a violent crime and the victim relocates for safety reasons.

Appellant also argues that even if restitution based on moving expenses is authorized under section 730.6, restitution for such expenses was improper in the instant case because appellant's conduct did not proximately cause the victim's loss. Appellant bases the major legal premise of this claim—that principles of proximate causation under California tort law apply in the juvenile restitution context—on People v. Jones (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 418 (Jones). In that case, the court held such principles apply in determining restitution under Penal Code section 1202.4. The court stated: "There is no reason why the various principles involved in determining proximate causation under California tort law should not also apply in awarding victim restitution under California criminal law. As we have noted, under the governing statute, `[t]o the extent possible, [a] restitution order ... shall be of a dollar amount that is sufficient to fully reimburse the victim or victims for every determined economic loss incurred as the result of the defendant's criminal conduct.' (Pen. Code, § 1202.4, subd. (f)(3), italics added.) The causal connection embodied in the words `as the result of' is certainly indicative of direct causation. Just as in tort law, however, the law must impose limitations on liability for victim restitution other than simple direct causality or else a defendant will face infinite liability for his or her criminal acts, no matter how remote the consequence." (Jones, supra, at p. 425.)

The People first counter that "Interposing a proximate cause limitation on damages is unnecessary and duplicative of [section 730.6]." However, we need not decide whether proximate causation principles apply here. Appellant's argument fails whether it is analyzed in the terms of the statute or in proximate causation terms.

We first address the causation issue under the terms of the statute. Section 730.6 mandates restitution for "all determined economic losses incurred as a result of" the minor's conduct unless there exists "compelling and extraordinary reasons" for not ordering restitution. (§ 730.6(h), italics added.) Appellant argues the victim incurred relocation expenses not because of appellant's conduct, but because what was apparently a month-to-month tenancy "ended on its own terms," and therefore "[the victim] has failed to prove that the appellant's conduct bore the requisite causal relationship to her having to move ...." This claim is belied by the record.

Hernandez testified that she was forced to move because the family who owned the house had decided that they would no longer rent it out because of the wrongful conduct of appellant and his companions. The court could reasonably credit this testimony. Thus, in statutory terms, Hernandez's forced move from the house, which in turn caused her to incur moving expenses, was the "result" of appellant's conduct. (§ 730.6(h).) Moreover, appellant does not suggest, and we cannot discern, any "compelling and extraordinary reasons" for not ordering restitution based on the losses caused by appellant's conduct. (Ibid.) Therefore, the court's order of restitution for the victim's moving expenses was well within its statutory discretion.

We also conclude that, in tort law terms, the harm suffered by the victim—her having to move—was proximately caused by appellant's conduct. As in Jones, "There are two aspects of causation at play here: cause in fact (also called direct or actual causation), and proximate cause. `An act is a cause in fact if it is a necessary antecedent of an event.'" (Jones, supra, 187 Cal.App.4th at pp. 424-425.) However, "the law must impose limitations on liability other than simple causality." (Id. at p. 425.) These additional limitations are embodied in the proximate cause requirement. (Ibid.) And, the principles for determining whether an actor's conduct is the proximate cause of injury suffered by another include the following: "An intervening cause which breaks the chain of causation from the original negligent act is itself regarded as the proximate cause of the injury and relieves the original negligent actor of liability. [Citation.] [¶] The general test of whether an independent intervening act, which operates to produce an injury, breaks the chain of causation is the foreseeability of the act. [Citation.] [¶] An act is not foreseeable and thus is a superseding cause of the injury `if the independent intervening act is highly unusual or extraordinary, not reasonably likely to happen ....'" (Schrimsher v. Bryson (1976) 58 Cal.App.3d 660, 664.)

When we apply these principles, we conclude appellant's conduct was the actual and proximate cause of the harm suffered by the victim, i.e., the necessity of moving from the house to a new residence. First, as demonstrated above, Hernandez's testimony establishes the following chain of causation: appellant and his companions broke into the house; because of the break-in, the owners of the house decided they no longer wished to rent it; based on that decision, they directed Hernandez to vacate the house; and in accordance with, and only because of, that directive, Hernandez moved, and incurred expenses in doing so. Thus, appellant's conduct was a cause in fact of the incurring of moving expenses because, but for this conduct, Hernandez would not have had to move.

As to proximate cause, there was at least one intervening cause: the landlord's directive that Hernandez move. However, this was "foreseeable," as that term is used in proximate cause analysis, in that it cannot be considered highly unusual or extraordinary that the owners of a house—especially owners who, as it appears here, rented out only one house and were not in the residential rental business on a large scale—would find, after the rental property had been broken into, that being a landlord was no longer worth the effort and attention involved. And, if Hernandez's decision to move can be also considered an intervening cause, it is similarly foreseeable that when a landlord notifies a tenant of the termination of the tenancy, the tenant will move, rather than risk legal action by the landlord to regain possession of the property. Thus, appellant's conduct was the proximate cause of the harm suffered by the victim.

Finally, appellant contends the matter must be remanded because the juvenile court "failed to address the issue of causation ...." Appellant bases this claim on the italicized portion of the following statement by the court: "Now if we're going to make the victim whole in this case, the underlying issue of that I'm not, obviously totally informed on, but have been advised is ... the given rationale for her having to move from her residence was the landlord requiring her to relocate because this burglary had occurred at her house .... For whatever reason he or she thought that was the remedy. I'm not here to litigate that. That's a landlord-tenant dispute. And there are specific statutes that govern whether you have legitimate reasons for giving someone notice to quit as opposed to pay or quit. There are Constitutional issues involved in those types of disputes as well as whatever other issues might arise. But there's no dispute that — at least as I can see that she was told she had to leave because of this incident. [¶] Now, I'm not going to litigate whether that was a legitimate basis for asking her to leave the property. The fact is she left, and that was the reason she left. The question is should she be compensated for having to move regardless of whether or not that was a proper basis for her to be asked to leave and all those issues involved in that. I only mention that because I don't want to get into whether she really had to leave or didn't have to leave other than the landlord says, That's it. ... You are out of here." (Italics added.)

The foregoing demonstrates that the court did, in fact, consider the question of whether appellant's conduct was the cause of Hernandez having to move, and that the court concluded that the landlord's directive was, as the court stated, "the reason [Hernandez] left." The court, in the portion of its statement upon which appellant relies, simply concluded, correctly, that the question of whether Hernandez could have raised a viable defense to a legal action to evict her from the house was irrelevant to the issue of causation. Hernandez, faced with the landlord's directive that she move, was not required to hold over and risk eviction in order to qualify for restitution.4

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.