NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

OPINION

LEVY, Acting P.J.

Under Government Code section 800 and Revenue and Taxation Code section 1611.6, if a reviewing court determines that the findings made by a county assessment appeals board are so deficient that a remand is required, the complaining taxpayer, as the prevailing party, may collect reasonable attorney fees from the county.

In this matter, respondent, Canandaigua Wine Company, Inc., filed a petition for writ of mandate challenging the base year value set by the Madera County Assessment Appeals Board (AAB) for a winery that was purchased by Canandaigua as part of a wine business. After obtaining an order from the trial court remanding the case to the AAB, Canandaigua sought recovery of attorney fees from appellant, the County of Madera (County). The trial court awarded Canandaigua $186,342.54 as an approximation of the attorney fees Canandaigua expended on its challenge to the AAB's base year value.

The County asserts that this attorney fee award must be reversed because the trial court never made a finding as to whether Canandaigua was the prevailing party in the underlying action. According to the County, it never contested Canandaigua's position that the AAB did not make the findings required under the Revenue and Taxation Code and therefore Canandaigua was not the prevailing party on this issue.

As discussed below, the trial court did find that Canandaigua was the prevailing party. Although Canandaigua did not prevail on its entire petition, it did prevail, as a practical matter, on its challenge to the AAB's base year value. Therefore, the order will be affirmed.

BACKGROUND

In 1994, Canandaigua purchased the Almaden and Inglenook wine businesses for approximately $128 million. As part of this sale, Canandaigua acquired the Mission Bell Winery (Winery) located in Madera County. This sale also included interests in real property located in other counties, tangible personal property, inventory, and intangible assets such as brand names, good will, and going concern value. Canandaigua promptly recorded a preliminary change of ownership report for the Winery stating a total purchase price of $72,896,000 for the real property alone.

Although required to appraise this property at its full cash value as of the date the change in ownership occurred (Rev. & Tax. Code, § 75.10), the Madera County Assessor (Assessor) did not issue a supplemental assessment or otherwise establish a new base year value reflecting this change. Consequently, Canandaigua filed an application for changed assessment for the 1995 tax year with the AAB. Thereafter, Canandaigua filed applications for changed assessment for the 1996, 1999, 2000, 2001, and 2002 tax years.

The AAB conducted a hearing on Canandaigua's applications in December 2003. Both Canandaigua and the Assessor presented evidence to support their opinions of the Winery's value. However, rather than adopt either party's value, the AAB based its value determination on the preliminary change of ownership report.

Canandaigua filed the underlying petition for writ of administrative mandamus or mandate in the trial court setting forth three causes of action. The first cause of action challenged the AAB's decision on the ground that Canandaigua's appeals were not timely heard. The second cause of action alleged that for each of the tax years after 1995, the AAB failed to enroll the property's trended base year value. In the third cause of action, Canandaigua challenged the AAB's new base year value for the Winery. The third cause of action alleged that: the AAB erroneously relied on the preliminary change in ownership report rather than the actual purchase price of the Winery; the AAB's base year value was not supported by the evidence and was excessively high; and the AAB failed to set individual values for the specific appraisal units and for the specific types of property involved.

The parties filed cross-motions for summary adjudication of the writ petition's third cause of action. The matter was heard on October 29, 2007. Canandaigua argued: that the AAB should have used the purchase price actually paid by Canandaigua as allocated in the contract; the methodology used by the AAB, i.e., relying on the preliminary change of ownership report, was incorrect as a matter of law; and the AAB failed to set individual values for the specific appraisal units and types of property as required by the California Code of Regulations. In contrast, the County asserted that the AAB was correct in its determination that the fair market value of the Winery was the value set forth in the preliminary change of ownership report. However, the County did not oppose Canandaigua's claim that the AAB did not set individual values for the specific appraisal and agreed to a remand to the AAB to complete that one task. The County further noted that, if the court disagreed with its position and concluded that the AAB's findings were not supported by substantial evidence, the court was required to remand the matter to the AAB rather than determine the value of the Winery on its own.

The trial court granted Canandaigua's motion in part holding that the AAB erred when it adopted the preliminary change of ownership report as the Winery's purchase price. However, the court declined Canandaigua's request to determine, as a matter of law, both the transaction purchase price and the fair market value for the Winery based on a pro rata allocation of that purchase price. Rather, the court remanded the matter to the AAB with directions to recalculate the value of the subject property.

Cross-motions for summary adjudication on the first cause of action were heard in December 2008. The trial court granted the County's motion and the second cause of action was dismissed as moot.

Canandaigua filed appeals from both writ orders. Regarding the ruling on the third cause of action, Canandaigua argued that, while the trial court correctly reversed the AAB's decision, the court erred when it remanded the case to the AAB rather than determining the base year as a matter of law. This court affirmed the trial court's judgment. (Canandaigua Wine Company, Inc. v. County of Madera (Oct. 5, 2010, F058029) [nonpub. opn.].)

While its appeals were pending, Canandaigua filed a motion for attorney fees under Revenue and Taxation Code section 1611.6 seeking reimbursement of the fees it incurred in litigating the petition's third cause of action. Canandaigua argued that, because the trial court ordered remand of the matter for the AAB to issue proper findings of fact, it was entitled to the fees necessary to secure that aspect of the trial court's order. Canandaigua submitted that one-third of the total fees incurred was a reasonable estimate of the fees spent obtaining the remand.

In its order after hearing, the trial court first noted that at issue in this motion was "whether and to what extent Canandaigua is the prevailing party in this action, and whether the fees requested by Canandaigua are reasonable." The court then found that Canandaigua was entitled to attorney fees under Revenue and Taxation Code section 1611.6 for obtaining a remand due to the failure of the AAB to make specific findings and that $170,362.54 in fees was reasonable. The court further concluded that Canandaigua was entitled to an additional $15,980 for fees incurred in litigating the attorney fees motion. The court explained

Accordingly, the court calculated the fees based on one-third of the cost of litigation up to the beginning of October 2007.

DISCUSSION

The County contends that the trial court failed to properly interpret the interplay between Government Code section 800 and Revenue and Taxation Code section 1611.6 in that the court "never made a finding as to whether Canandaigua was the prevailing party in the `civil action.'" Alternatively, the County argues that even if the court had properly considered the issue, it would have been required to conclude that Canandaigua was not the prevailing party because Canandaigua did not realize its litigation objectives.

1. Standard of review.

The propriety or amount of an attorney fee award is normally reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard. (Castro v. Superior Court (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 1010, 1017.) Nevertheless, if the determination of whether the criteria for an attorney fees award in the particular context have been satisfied requires statutory construction, i.e., is a question of law, de novo review is warranted. (Carver v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 132, 142.) However, in the context of Government Code section 800, it has been held that the trial court's decision regarding prevailing party status should be affirmed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion. (Zuehlsdorf v. Simi Valley Unified School Dist. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 249, 257.)

2. The trial court determined that Canandaigua was the prevailing party.

Government Code section 800 provides, in part:

Thus, as pointed out by the County, Government Code section 800 requires: (1) a civil action appealing an administrative proceeding award; (2) the showing of arbitrary or capricious action or conduct by a public entity; and (3) the complainant prevailing in the civil action. Under Revenue and Taxation Code section 1611.6, a county board's action is deemed to be arbitrary and capricious within the meaning of Government Code section 800 if the county board either fails to make findings or if findings made are found to be so deficient by a reviewing court that a remand to the county board is ordered.

Here, Canandaigua's petition for writ of mandate qualified as a civil action appealing an administrative proceeding. Further, because the trial court remanded the matter to the AAB for proper findings, the AAB's action was deemed to be arbitrary and capricious. Accordingly, before attorney fees could be awarded, the court had to find that Canandaigua was the prevailing party on the petition for writ of mandate.

The County argues that the trial court did not make a finding that Canandaigua prevailed on its civil action. However, the record belies the County's claim.

In its written order after hearing, the trial court set forth the issue presented to it in the motion for attorney fees as "whether and to what extent Canandaigua is the prevailing party in this action, and whether the fees requested by Canandaigua are reasonable." Thus, it is clear that the court was aware that prevailing party status was a prerequisite to an attorney fees award.

Thereafter, the court noted that, while initially contesting the entire action, the County ultimately conceded that the AAB had failed to comply with Revenue and Taxation Code section 1611.5 and that the AAB decision was therefore vacated and remanded. The court then stated that "[i]t would be difficult to argue that Canandaigua was not the prevailing party on this ground." Thus, although phrased indirectly, the court made a finding that Canandaigua was the prevailing party on its base year value challenge set forth in the third cause of action.

The County argues that it never contended the AAB made proper findings but, rather, conceded from the earliest stages of the litigation that the matter needed to be remanded for the AAB to make certain required findings. However, the County's offer was limited to the AAB's failure to set individual values for the specific appraisal units and for the specific types of property involved, not the base year value. In its opposition to Canandaigua's summary adjudication motion and in its own motion for summary adjudication of the third cause of action, the County defended the AAB's use of the preliminary change of ownership report as the base year value of the Winery. Regarding remand, the County argued that, if the court were to make findings contrary to the County's position, the only available remedy for Canandaigua would be a remand to the AAB. Accordingly, agreeing to a remand on the base year value was merely the County's fallback position.

3. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that Canandaigua was the prevailing party on its base year value challenge.

Government Code section 800 does not contain a technical definition of "prevailing party" applicable to this particular statutory scheme. (Zuehlsdorf v. Simi Valley Unified School Dist., supra, 148 Cal.App.4th at p. 257.) In this situation, the courts have concluded that a rigid definition of prevailing party should not be used. (Donner Management Co. v. Schaffer (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 1296, 1310.) Rather, the trial court must determine prevailing party status "based on an evaluation of whether a party prevailed `"on a practical level."'" (Ibid.) The trial court's decision on this issue will be affirmed absent an abuse of discretion. (Ibid.)

Among the factors the trial court must consider in determining whether a party prevailed is the extent to which each party realized its litigation objectives. (Zuehlsdorf v. Simi Valley Unified School Dist., supra, 148 Cal.App.4th at p. 257.) In doing so, courts should respect substance rather than form. (Hsu v. Abbara (1995) 9 Cal.4th 863, 877.) "For example, a party who is denied direct relief on a claim may nonetheless be found to be a prevailing party if it is clear that the party has otherwise achieved its main litigation objective." (Ibid.) A plaintiff need only succeed on any significant issue in the litigation that achieves some of the benefit the party sought in bringing suit. (Graciano v. Robinson Ford Sales, Inc. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 140, 153.)

The County asserts that Canandaigua did not prevail because it did not realize the central litigation objectives of any of the three causes of action that together constitute the "civil action." The County notes that the first cause of action alleging that the AAB did not timely hear the matter was summarily adjudicated in the County's favor. Further, the second cause of action asserting that the Assessor erred in failing to enroll the property's trended base year value after 1995 was dismissed with prejudice. Finally, the County argues that, although Canandaigua prevailed in part on its third cause of action challenging the Winery's base year value, Canandaigua cannot be considered the prevailing party because the court refused to determine, as a matter of law, the Winery's full cash value as Canandaigua requested. Rather, the court vacated the AAB's decision and remanded the matter to the AAB with directions to recalculate the value of the Winery. The County further points out that Canandaigua filed an unsuccessful appeal. Thus, the County argues, in defending against Canandaigua's civil action, it was the County that realized a significantly greater percentage of its litigation objectives.

In its petition for writ of mandate, Canandaigua sought a peremptory writ of mandate commanding the AAB to vacate its decision and to determine the Winery's correct base year value pursuant to California law. Thus, Canandaigua's primary litigation goal was to obtain an order invalidating the AAB's base year value determination. Thereafter, Canandaigua argued that the trial court should determine the actual fair market value for the Winery and, on remand, direct the AAB to enter that value on the tax roll.

In partially granting Canandaigua's motion for summary adjudication on the petition's third cause of action, the court granted Canandaigua's request to vacate the AAB decision. However, the court refused to make the value determination. Accordingly, on a practical level, Canandaigua achieved its main litigation objective, i.e., the AAB's base year value determination was vacated. As the trial court explained:

The fact that Canandaigua lost its bid to direct the AAB to enter a specific value on the tax roll, both in the trial court and on appeal, does not diminish the fact that Canandaigua prevailed on a significant issue that achieved some of the benefit Canandaigua sought in filing its petition. Under these circumstances, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that Canandaigua was the prevailing party on the petition's third cause of action.

4. Attorney fees on appeal.

Canandaigua seeks an award of attorney fees on appeal. Attorney fees, if statutorily recoverable for services at trial, are also recoverable for services on appeal unless the statute specifically provides otherwise. (Morcos v. Board of Retirement (1990) 51 Cal.3d 924, 927; Akins v. Enterprise Rent-A-Car Co. (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 1127, 1134.) Government Code section 800 and Revenue and Taxation Code section 1611.6 do not restrict recoverable attorney fees to those incurred in the trial court. Accordingly, attorney fees on appeal may be awarded here.

Canandaigua is the prevailing party on appeal and thus may be awarded its attorney fees. Although we have the power to appraise and fix attorney fees on appeal, the better practice is to leave that determination to the trial court. (Akins v. Enterprise Rent-A-Car Co., supra, 79 Cal.App.4th at p. 1134.)

DISPOSITION

The order is affirmed. Canandaigua may be awarded its attorney fees on appeal, the amount of which is to be determined by the trial court on Canandaigua's motion. Costs on appeal are awarded to Canandaigua.

WE CONCUR.

CORNELL, J.

FRANSON, J.