NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

OPINION

LEVY, Acting P.J.

Respondent, Canandaigua Wine Company, Inc., filed a petition for writ of mandate challenging the base year value set by the Madera County Assessment Appeals Board (AAB) for a winery that was purchased by Canandaigua as part of a wine business. After obtaining an order from the trial court remanding the case to the AAB, Canandaigua sought recovery of attorney fees and costs from appellant, the County of Madera (County). The trial court concluded Canandaigua was the prevailing party and awarded Canandaigua its costs in the amount of $19,788.92.1

The County asserts that this cost award must be reversed because Canandaigua was not the prevailing party. The County further argues that, even if Canandaigua qualified as the prevailing party, the trial court erred in granting Canandaigua its costs as a matter of right because Canandaigua recovered something other than monetary relief and therefore, under Code of Civil Procedure2 section 1032, costs were discretionary.

As discussed below, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that Canandaigua was the prevailing party. Further, the trial court correctly applied section 1032. Therefore, the order will be affirmed.

BACKGROUND

In 1994, Canandaigua purchased the Almaden and Inglenook wine businesses for approximately $128 million. As part of this sale, Canandaigua acquired the Mission Bell Winery (Winery) located in Madera County. This sale also included interests in real property located in other counties, tangible personal property, inventory, and intangible assets such as brand names, good will, and going concern value. Canandaigua promptly recorded a preliminary change of ownership report for the Winery stating a total purchase price of $72,896,000 for the real property alone.

Although required to appraise this property at its full cash value as of the date the change in ownership occurred (Rev. & Tax. Code, § 75.10), the Madera County Assessor (Assessor) did not issue a supplemental assessment or otherwise establish a new base year value reflecting this change. Consequently, Canandaigua filed an application for changed assessment for the 1995 tax year with the AAB. Thereafter, Canandaigua filed applications for changed assessment for the 1996, 1999, 2000, 2001, and 2002 tax years.

The AAB conducted a hearing on Canandaigua's applications in December 2003. Both Canandaigua and the Assessor presented evidence to support their opinions of the Winery's value. However, rather than adopt either party's value, the AAB based its value determination on the preliminary change of ownership report.

Canandaigua filed the underlying petition for writ of administrative mandamus or mandate in the trial court setting forth three causes of action. The first cause of action challenged the AAB's decision on the ground that Canandaigua's appeals were not timely heard. The second cause of action alleged that for each of the tax years after 1995, the AAB failed to enroll the property's trended base year value. In the third cause of action, Canandaigua challenged the AAB's new base year value for the Winery. The third cause of action alleged: that the AAB erroneously relied on the preliminary change in ownership report rather than the actual purchase price of the Winery; the AAB's base year value was not supported by the evidence and was excessively high; and the AAB failed to set individual values for the specific appraisal units and for the specific types of property involved.

The parties filed cross-motions for summary adjudication of the writ petition's third cause of action. The matter was heard on October 29, 2007. Canandaigua argued: that the AAB should have used the purchase price actually paid by Canandaigua as allocated in the contract; the methodology used by the AAB, i.e., relying on the preliminary change of ownership report, was incorrect as a matter of law; and the AAB failed to set individual values for the specific appraisal units and types of property as required by the California Code of Regulations. In contrast, the County asserted that the AAB was correct in its determination that the fair market value of the Winery was the value set forth in the preliminary change of ownership report. However, the County did not oppose Canandaigua's claim that the AAB did not set individual values for the specific appraisal and agreed to a remand to the AAB to complete that one task. The County further noted that, if the court disagreed with its position and concluded that the AAB's findings were not supported by substantial evidence, the court was required to remand the matter to the AAB rather than determine the value of the Winery on its own.

The trial court granted Canandaigua's motion in part holding that the AAB erred when it adopted the preliminary change of ownership report as the Winery's purchase price. However, the court declined Canandaigua's request to determine, as a matter of law, both the transaction purchase price and the fair market value for the Winery based on a pro rata allocation of that purchase price. Rather, the court remanded the matter to the AAB with directions to recalculate the value of the subject property.

Cross-motions for summary adjudication on the first cause of action were heard in December 2008. The trial court granted the County's motion and the second cause of action was dismissed as moot.

Canandaigua filed appeals from both writ orders. Regarding the ruling on the third cause of action, Canandaigua argued that, while the trial court correctly reversed the AAB's decision, the court erred when it remanded the case to the AAB rather than determining the base year as a matter of law. This court affirmed the trial court's judgment. (Canandaigua Wine Company, Inc. v. County of Madera (Oct. 5, 2010, F058029) [nonpub. opn.].)

While its appeals were pending, Canandaigua filed a memorandum of costs. The County responded with a motion to strike costs arguing that Canandaigua should not be considered the prevailing party. The trial court determined that Canandaigua recovered other than monetary relief, i.e., a remand to the AAB, and thus was the prevailing party and should be awarded its costs. Accordingly, the court denied the County's motion to strike costs and awarded Canandaigua costs in the amount claimed.

DISCUSSION

In general, a prevailing party is entitled to recover costs as a matter of right. (§ 1032, subd. (b).) If a plaintiff receives a net monetary recovery, that plaintiff is the prevailing party and is entitled to recover costs. (§ 1032, subd. (a)(4).) However, when a party recovers other than monetary relief, "the `prevailing party' shall be as determined by the court, and under those circumstances, the court, in its discretion, may allow costs or not ...." (Ibid.)

Unless the issue involves interpretation of the statute, a trial court's determination that a litigant is a prevailing party is reviewed for abuse of discretion. (Goodman v. Lozano (2010) 47 Cal.4th 1327, 1332.) Accordingly, the reviewing court will not disturb the trial court's conclusion unless it exceeds the bounds of reason. (Id. at p. 1339.)

The County contends that the trial court failed to properly analyze whether Canandaigua was the prevailing party under section 1032, and that, if it had, it would have concluded that Canandaigua did not prevail. The County further argues that the trial court incorrectly awarded costs as a matter of right rather than as an exercise of its discretion.

1. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that Canandaigua was the prevailing party on its base year value challenge.

As noted above, when a party recovers other than monetary relief, the court determines which party is the prevailing party. (§ 1032, subd. (a)(4).) In this situation, there being no applicable technical definition of "prevailing party," a rigid definition should not be used. (Donner Management Co. v. Schaffer (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 1296, 1310.) Rather, the trial court must determine prevailing party status "based on an evaluation of whether a party prevailed `"on a practical level."'" (Ibid.)

Among the factors the trial court must consider in determining whether a party prevailed is the extent to which each party realized its litigation objectives. (Zuehlsdorf v. Simi Valley Unified School Dist. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 249, 257.) In doing so, courts should respect substance rather than form. (Hsu v. Abbara (1995) 9 Cal.4th 863, 877.) "For example, a party who is denied direct relief on a claim may nonetheless be found to be a prevailing party if it is clear that the party has otherwise achieved its main litigation objective." (Ibid.) A plaintiff need only succeed on any significant issue in the litigation that achieves some of the benefit the party sought in bringing suit. (Graciano v. Robinson Ford Sales, Inc. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 140, 153.)

The County first argues that the trial court failed to analyze or make any finding as to whether the remand to the AAB was Canandaigua's goal in filing the lawsuit. In making its ruling the court stated,

While it is true that the trial court did not make a specific finding in this order that remand to the AAB was Canandaigua's goal in filing the petition, such a finding was not required. This order was a supplement to the order awarding Canandaigua attorney fees. The court noted that this ruling on the motion to strike the cost memorandum was inadvertently omitted from the earlier order. In the order on the attorney fees, the court analyzed the relief sought by Canandaigua in the petition's third cause of action and found that Canandaigua prevailed.

The County also asserts that Canandaigua did not prevail because it did not realize the central litigation objectives of any of the three causes of action that together constitute the "civil action." The County notes that the first cause of action alleging that the AAB did not timely hear the matter was summarily adjudicated in the County's favor. Further, the second cause of action asserting that the Assessor erred in failing to enroll the property's trended base year value after 1995 was dismissed with prejudice. Finally, the County argues that, although Canandaigua prevailed in part on its third cause of action challenging the Winery's base year value, Canandaigua cannot be considered the prevailing party because the court refused to determine, as a matter of law, the Winery's full cash value as Canandaigua requested. Rather, the court vacated the AAB's decision and remanded the matter to the AAB with directions to recalculate the value of the Winery. The County further points out that Canandaigua filed an unsuccessful appeal. Thus, the County argues, in defending against Canandaigua's civil action, it was the County that realized a significantly greater percentage of its litigation objectives.

In its petition for writ of mandate, Canandaigua sought a peremptory writ of mandate commanding the AAB to vacate its decision and to determine the Winery's correct base year value pursuant to California law. Thus, Canandaigua's primary litigation goal was to obtain an order invalidating the AAB's base year value determination. Thereafter, Canandaigua argued that the trial court should determine the actual fair market value for the Winery and, on remand, direct the AAB to enter that value on the tax roll.

In partially granting Canandaigua's motion for summary adjudication on the petition's third cause of action, the court granted Canandaigua's request to vacate the AAB decision. However, the court refused to make the value determination. Accordingly, on a practical level, Canandaigua achieved its main litigation objective, i.e., the AAB's base year value determination was vacated. The fact that Canandaigua lost its bid to direct the AAB to enter a specific value on the tax roll, both in the trial court and on appeal, does not diminish the fact that Canandaigua prevailed on a significant issue that achieved some of the benefit Canandaigua sought in filing its petition. Under these circumstances, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that Canandaigua was the prevailing party.

2. The trial court did not award costs as a matter of right.

In making its ruling, the trial court first quoted the general rule on costs that "Except as otherwise expressly provided by statute, a prevailing party is entitled as a matter of right to recover costs in any action or proceeding." (§ 1032, subd. (b).) The County argues that, because this subdivision is inapplicable to the court's finding that Canandaigua recovered "other than monetary relief," the court failed to properly apply section 1032. According to the County, the court awarded costs to Canandaigua as a matter of right.

However, after quoting this general rule, the court quoted the applicable part of section 1032, i.e., section 1032, subdivision (a)(4). The court then found that, because Canandaigua recovered other than monetary relief, it was the prevailing party within the meaning of section 1032 and "should be awarded its costs." (Italics added.) There is no indication that the court believed it must award costs. Rather, the court's explanation of Canandaigua's status as a prevailing party under section 1032, subdivision (a)(4), and its use of the word "should" signifies that the court awarded costs based on an exercise of its discretion.

DISPOSITION

The order is affirmed. Costs on appeal are awarded to Canandaigua.

WE CONCUR.

CORNELL, J.

FRANSON, J.