NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
OPINION
O'LEARY, J.
Phyllis Pettiford-Reyes, representing herself in propria persona, appeals from the post-judgment order obtained by her former husband, Frank Peter Reyes,1 directing the court clerk to execute all documents necessary to facilitate and consummate the sale of the family residence. Phyllis raises numerous complaints primarily concerning the underlying stipulated judgment ordering the residence be sold, and perceived mistreatment of her by judicial officers, court staff, and attorneys involved in this case. Her contentions are without merit and we affirm the order.
Frank has filed a motion to dismiss Phyllis's appeal as frivolous and to impose monetary sanctions against her. Although the appeal lacks merit, we decline his request.
FACTS
The record on appeal is sparse. It contains a reporter's transcript from some hearings. The clerk's transcript includes a docket, a few of the orders to show cause (OSC) filed in this case, and a couple of minute orders. Frank's motion to dismiss includes as an exhibit the underlying judgment. From the limited record, we have ascertained the following facts.
In 2005, Frank filed a petition for dissolution of his marriage to Phyllis. The record contains the reporter's transcript (but none of the moving papers) from a hearing on December 1, 2006, before Judge Frederick P. Aguirre. Frank and Phyllis were both represented by counsel. There was discussion on the record about an earlier court order allowing Phyllis to buy out Frank's interest in the family residence for $181,000. Phyllis had already paid Frank $72,101, but she still owed him $108,898.
At a hearing on May 30, 2008, Judge Josephine Staton Tucker granted Phyllis's request that Frank continue paying her health insurance. Phyllis was represented by counsel, but her counsel departed during a recess and did not return. There was discussion about Phyllis's request for clarification of an unspecified order by Judge Francisco F. Firmat concerning the family residence. Judge Tucker declined to address the point and bifurcated trial as to status.
On June 27, 2008, at a hearing before Judge Firmat, Frank and Phyllis, both represented by counsel, entered into a stipulation for entry of judgment. The stipulated judgment provided, among other things, that the family residence would be sold and all parties would cooperate in its sale. Phyllis could remain residing in the house, but she was responsible for paying the mortgage and maintenance until the property sold. The judgment also provided that Phyllis was to pay Frank an equalization payment of $108,898. Upon questioning by Judge Firmat, Phyllis agreed she understood and agreed to the terms of the stipulated judgment, although she was not happy with them. Phyllis was served with notice of entry of the judgment on June 30, 2008, and she did not appeal the judgment.
On August 15, 2008, Frank filed a motion to compel Phyllis to comply with the stipulated judgment. The trial court, Judge Clay M. Smith, signed a temporary order submitted by Frank, that directed Phyllis to vacate the residence and gave Frank sole access (apparently to prepare it for sale). The court again directed that both parties cooperate in the "prompt sale" of the residence. The court modified the order submitted by Frank, to read that "petitioner" (i.e., Frank), rather than "respondent" (i.e., Phyllis) pay mortgage, taxes, and maintenance "pending hearing and subject to reallocation."
Ten days later, on August 26, 2008, Phyllis, now representing herself, filed an OSC to compel Frank to pay the mortgage in accordance with the court's August 15 order. Apparently, Phyllis construed the August 15 order as requiring Frank to bring the mortgage current for her (i.e., pay the mortgage arrearages)—she stated the house was already in "pre-foreclosure" with no payments having been made by her for the past three months. The court denied the request.
On September 18, 2008, Phyllis filed a second OSC to compel Frank to pay the mortgage in accordance with the court's August 15 order. At a hearing on September 26, 2008, Judge Smith denied Phyllis's request. Phyllis agreed with Frank's representations the property was completely "upside down." The loan on the residence was a negative amortization mortgage, and the various liens against the property ($615,000 not including Frank's lien for the $108,000 equalizing payment) significantly exceeded its current value. The trial court stated it would not order Frank to make any payments on the mortgage on the grounds it would constitute economic waste. The court reiterated the parties should cooperate to sell the residence.
On May 20, 2009, Phyllis filed a third OSC seeking to compel Frank to make payments on the mortgage. At a hearing on June 18, 2009, Judge Smith again refused Phyllis's requested relief, noting Phyllis had shown no change in circumstances or conditions. Frank had possession of the residence and was attempting to work out a short sale. In denying the motion, Judge Smith commented that had Frank requested them, he would have awarded attorney's fees.
On October 13, 2009, Frank filed an ex parte application for an order directing the court clerk to execute the necessary documentation to facilitate the sale of the family residence, because Phyllis still would not cooperate in its sale. In her opposition, Phyllis admitted the current value of the property was less than $500,000. She stated that when she agreed to the original buyout amount she was able to obtain some, but not all, the required financing. She did not understand why the court had not "canceled the buyout order." On October 26, 2009, the trial court granted Frank's request and entered an order listing specific documents the court clerk was directed to execute "to ensure that the Court's order to sell the family residence be effectuated."
On December 24, 2009, Phyllis filed a notice of appeal.2 In their briefs, Frank and Phyllis both state the house was sold in a "short sale" in December 2009 for $495,000.
THE APPEAL
As Phyllis represents herself on this appeal, we begin with some basic principles of appellate law.3 A trial court's order is presumed correct, and the appellant bears the burden of establishing error. (County of Sacramento v. Lackner (1979) 97 Cal.App.3d 576, 591.) This burden to establish error includes presentation of a record on appeal that is sufficient to support the argument the trial court erred. (Ballard v. Uribe (1986) 41 Cal.3d 564, 574-575.) The appellant has the further duty to present arguments supported by record citations and legal authority—the appellate court is not required to discuss or consider points that are not adequately presented. (Kim v. Sumitomo Bank (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 974, 979.) "Pro. per. litigants are held to the same standards as attorneys." (Kobayashi v. Superior Court (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 536, 543 (Kobayashi).)
Phyllis's opening brief is largely indecipherable. It contains no clearly delineated legal issues, virtually no citations to relevant legal authorities, and no citations to the record to support her factual claims. We, therefore, will only briefly address the points we can glean from her brief. In short, she has failed to carry her appellate burden of demonstrating any error.
1. Phyllis's Attack on the Underlying Judgment
Although Phyllis's appeal is from the October 26, 2009, order, she uses the appeal to attack the underlying stipulated judgment entered June 27, 2008. She argues the trial court abused its discretion by ordering the clerk to sign documents to effectuate sale of the family residence because the judgment directing the house be sold was inequitable. Phyllis asserts the 2008 judgment was based upon an agreement she and Frank made in 2005 for her to buy his interest in the house, and the equalization payment was based upon an appraisal performed around that time. Phyllis complains it was Frank who did not comply with the buyout agreement, and the trial court should have canceled it. She complains the property should have been reappraised in 2008 and any equalization payment ordered should have been based on its decreased value.
Phyllis's attacks are almost entirely based on matters outside the record on appeal. Furthermore, she cannot use this appeal to challenge the judgment. Not only did Phyllis stipulate to the judgment, but the time for appeal from the judgment has long since past.4 On appeal from a post-judgment order, a party may not raise issues that could have been raised in an appeal from the judgment had it been appealed. (Lakin v. Watkins Associated Industries (1993) 6 Cal.4th 644, 651; Guillemin v. Stein (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 156, 161.)
2. Phyllis's Claims of Judicial Bias, Racial Discrimination, and Mistreatment by Court Staff and Her Attorneys
Much of Phyllis's brief is devoted to assertions the various judicial officers involved in this case were biased and discriminated against her because of her race. She also complains she never had a clear understanding of what was happening in the trial court and the trial court allowed her attorneys to abandon her.
Phyllis cites absolutely nothing in the record to support her claims. We will not consider unsupported and inscrutable arguments. (See Wright v. City of Los Angeles (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 683, 689 ["Generally, asserted grounds for appeal that are unsupported by any citation to authority and that merely complain of error without presenting a coherent legal argument are deemed abandoned and unworthy of discussion"]; City of Lincoln v. Barringer (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 1211, 1239 [arguments not supported by adequate citations to record need not be considered on appeal].)
We have read the entire reporter's transcript and there is simply nothing that supports Phyllis's scurrilous attacks on the impartiality of the various bench officers who considered this case. The mere fact their rulings were adverse to her does not establish a charge of judicial bias. (People v. Guerra (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1067, 1112.) Furthermore, at no time were these claims of bias raised in the trial court. For that reason as well, they are waived. (Roth v. Parker (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 542, 548 [nonstatutory claim that final judgment is constitutionally invalid due to judicial bias may be raised on appeal from judgment, but in civil cases, issue must be raised at earliest opportunity or will be considered waived].)
3. Denial of Phyllis's Motion to Require Frank to Pay Mortgage
Phyllis complains the court abused its discretion by denying her request to require Frank to pay the mortgage on the house. Given that the house has been sold, the point is moot. Furthermore, it is completely meritless.
On August 15, 2008, when the court on an ex parte motion by Frank gave him possession of the house to prepare it for sale, the court ordered that he maintain the mortgage pending hearing. Ten days later, Phyllis filed an OSC to compel Frank to make payments on the mortgage apparently believing the court's order required him to pay the mortgage arrearages—she had not paid the mortgage in three months. The request was denied. A few weeks later, Phyllis filed another OSC again attempting to compel Frank to pay the mortgage arrearages. On September 26, 2008, the trial court not only denied the request, but upon being apprised by Frank and Phyllis that the property was badly "upside down," with no hope of being salvaged due to the negative amortization mortgage, stated it would not order Frank to make any payments on the mortgage (past or current) on the grounds that it would constitute economic waste.
Phyllis's attack on the September 26, 2008, post judgment order is untimely, and for that reason alone we need not consider it further. But even if the challenge was timely, discretion is abused only when "`in its exercise, the court exceeds the bounds of reason, all of the circumstances before it being considered.'" (Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 566.) Under the circumstances, we cannot say the order constituted an abuse of discretion.
THE MOTION FOR SANCTIONS
Frank filed a motion to dismiss the appeal and for sanctions against Phyllis for pursuing a frivolous appeal. In view of our disposition affirming the order, the motion to dismiss is moot. We decline to impose sanctions.
An appellate court may impose sanctions against a party for an appeal that is frivolous or taken solely for delay. (Code Civ. Proc., § 907; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.276(a).) Although in propria persona litigants generally are not entitled to any greater consideration and are held to the same standard as an attorney (Kobayashi, supra, 175 Cal.App.4th at p. 543), courts are reluctant to impose sanctions against in propria persona litigants for filing frivolous appeals (Kabbe v. Miller (1990) 226 Cal.App.3d 93, 98). Generally, courts have imposed sanctions against in propria persona litigants only in cases where in addition to lack of merit, the record also revealed some additional improper motive (see, e.g., Leslie v. Board of Medical Quality Assurance (1991) 234 Cal.App.3d 117, 121; In re Marriage of Stich (1985) 169 Cal.App.3d 64, 78.) Moreover, sanctions on appeal "should be used most sparingly to deter only the most egregious conduct." (In re Marriage of Flaherty (1982) 31 Cal.3d 637, 650-651.) Although we agree Phyllis's appeal is devoid of merit, the record does not establish it was prosecuted for an improper purpose. Accordingly, we decline the request for an award of sanctions.
DISPOSITION
The post-judgment order is affirmed. The motion to dismiss the appeal and impose sanctions is denied. Respondent is awarded his costs on appeal.
WE CONCUR:
RYLAARSDAM, ACTING P. J.
BEDSWORTH, J.
