NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

OPINION

FRANSON, J.

Appellant Florentino Felix Osuna appeals from his sentence of 25 years to life for possession of a firearm by a felon (Pen. Code, § 12021, subd. (a)(1)),1 imposed pursuant to the Three Strikes law (§§ 667, subd. (b)-(i), 1170.12). Appellant asserts the trial court abused its discretion in declining to strike six of seven prior serious and/or violent felonies constituting strikes for purposes of sentencing, and that his sentence constitutes cruel and/or unusual punishment under the Federal and California Constitutions. He also requests this court review the trial court's ruling on his Pitchess discovery motion. (Pitchess, supra, 11 Cal.3d 531.) For the reasons discussed below, we affirm the judgment.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

During a three-week period between December 1992 and January 1993, at the age of 17, appellant committed a series of armed robberies. He plead guilty to six counts of armed robbery (§ 211) and one count of assault with a firearm (§ 245, subd. (a)(2)). He also admitted to personally using a firearm in the commission of all the offenses, and personally inflicting great bodily injury in connection with the assault charge. He was sentenced to 11 years and eight months. Appellant was released on parole in 2001, but a violation returned him to prison until he was discharged in 2002. He began working for a construction firm shortly thereafter as a plasterer. In 2006, he was convicted of misdemeanor assault with force likely to cause great bodily injury (§ 245, subd. (a)(1)), and misdemeanor criminal threats (§ 422).

On the morning of November 5, 2009, appellant, driving Yvette Zendejas's car, sped through a school zone at approximately 55 miles per hour, passing Officer Brian Martens. Officer Martens attempted to pull appellant over, but appellant failed to stop. The officer observed appellant wearing a dark tank top and a beaded necklace, and that appellant had a beard and tattoos on his arms and face. Appellant sped up through the neighborhood before stopping abruptly at an intersection. He got out of the car, holding a black handgun in his left hand, and ran down the street before climbing over a wooden fence. Officer Martens, in pursuit, saw that appellant was wearing white gym shorts in addition to the dark tank top.

Officer Martens and other officers arriving on scene secured a perimeter, searched the car, and determined from paperwork in it that appellant may be in Zendejas's home, which was within the perimeter set up by the police. Approximately 20 minutes after appellant had disappeared over the fence, he stepped out of the house, carrying a small child in his arms, and wearing jeans, a T-shirt, and a jacket. He was clean-shaven, but had redness around his jaw line and nicks on his face, consistent with a recent shave.

Officer Martens positively identified appellant as the person who was driving the car, and who got out of it and ran. Speaking to a fellow officer within an earshot of appellant, Officer Martens commented appellant was the person he saw running with a gun. Appellant spontaneously responded that he did not have a gun, but rather that he was carrying a cell phone. A search of appellant after his arrest revealed underneath appellant's outer clothing a dark tank top, white gym shorts, and a beaded necklace, which matched Officer Martens's original description of appellant.

Officers searching the home found a nine-millimeter handgun in an air conditioning duct, with the magazine missing. They also found hair shavings and moisture in a bathroom sink, indicating a recent shave. Officers searching outside the home found a loaded nine-millimeter magazine in the direct path from the fence over which appellant climbed to the house. A certified police department range master testified the magazine and handgun fit together in such a way that he was of the opinion they were manufactured to fit together. Officers searching the car found a second nine-millimeter magazine and a coin purse containing additional live nine-millimeter ammunition.

Prior to trial, appellant filed a Pitchess motion requesting review of Officer Martens's personnel file for any documents and related information as to allegations of any illegal or false arrest, improper tactics, dishonesty, false imprisonment, false police reports, moral turpitude, or illegal search and seizure. The trial court granted the request and conducted an in camera hearing on the police records, but found no matters to disclose to the defense.

After appellant waived a jury trial on his prior convictions, a jury found appellant guilty of possession of a firearm by a felon, and obstructing a police officer in the performance of his duties. The trial court found appellant's seven prior felony convictions true and that they were serious and violent felonies. Appellant invited the trial court to strike six of the seven prior convictions in making its sentencing determination, pursuant to People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497 (Romero). The trial court declined and sentenced appellant to a statutory sentence of 25 years to life for a third strike offense. (§ 667, subd. (e)(2)(A)(ii).)

DISCUSSION

I. Pitchess Motion

On appeal, appellant asks this court to review the trial court's ruling on his Pitchess motion. (See People v. Mooc (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1216, 1228-1229; §§ 832.5, 832.7; Evid. Code, §§ 1043, 1045.) Respondent has no opposition to appellant's request.

Having reviewed the reporter's transcript of the in camera proceedings held on February 9, 2010, pertaining to appellant's Pitchess motion, we find no abuse of the trial court's discretion. (See People v. Jordan (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 349, 367-368.)

II. Romero Request Denial

Appellant contends the trial court abused its discretion in failing to strike six of appellant's seven prior serious felony convictions for sentencing purposes. A trial court's discretion to strike prior felony conviction allegations is limited to those instances "in furtherance of justice." (§ 1385, subd. (a); Romero, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 530.) Exercise of such discretion is subject to review for abuse. (Romero, supra, at p. 530.) A court's refusal to strike a prior conviction allegation is also subject to review under the deferential abuse of discretion standard. (People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 374 (Carmony).) "[A] trial court does not abuse its discretion unless its [sentencing] decision is so irrational or arbitrary that no reasonable person could agree with it." (Id. at p. 377.)

Furthermore, the Three Strikes law "creates a strong presumption that any sentence that conforms to these sentencing norms is both rational and proper." (Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 378.) Thus, a court abuses its discretion in failing to strike a prior felony conviction allegation in only limited circumstances, such as when it was not aware of its discretion to dismiss, considered impermissible factors in declining to dismiss, or failed to correct an arbitrary, capricious or patently absurd result of application of the Three Strikes law under the specific facts of a particular case. (Ibid.)

In considering a defendant's invitation to strike a prior felony conviction allegation, both the trial court and the reviewing court, "must consider whether, in light of the nature and circumstances of his present felonies and prior serious and/or violent felony convictions, and the particulars of his background, character, and prospects, the defendant may be deemed outside the scheme's spirit, in whole or in part." (People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 161.)

The purpose of the Three Strikes law is expressly set forth within its provisions: "to ensure longer prison sentences and greater punishment for those who commit a felony and have been previously convicted of serious and/or violent felony offenses." (§ 667, subd. (b); see People v. Strong (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 328, 338 (Strong).) Accordingly, "extraordinary must the circumstance be by which a career criminal can be deemed to fall outside the spirit of the very scheme within which he squarely falls once he commits a strike as part of a long and continuous criminal record, the continuation of which the law was meant to attack." (Strong, supra, at p. 338.) "[T]he circumstances where no reasonable people could disagree that the criminal falls outside the spirit of the three strikes scheme must be even more extraordinary." (Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 378.)

We fail to find such extraordinary circumstances here. Appellant contends the current offense, appellant's personal circumstances, and the circumstances of the prior convictions fail to justify appellant's inclusion within the Three Strikes scheme. He emphasizes the non-violent nature of the current offense, that no one was physically injured or threatened with the firearm, and that his actions stemmed from drug abuse and addiction. While appellant concedes the trial court "conscientiously considered and ruled on appellant's dismissal motion," appellant asserts he is not "yet" the type of offender to which the Three Strikes law was intended to apply, as he has not "repeatedly commit[ted] violent felonies threatening the public at large." (Original italics.) We are not persuaded.

While appellant would have us believe he suffered merely from a "single period of aberrant behavior," we note the record indicates appellant's criminal history extends back to 1991, over a year prior to his strike offenses, and involves weapons and aggressive behavior.2 He was on probation when he embarked on three weeks of armed robberies and carjackings. He broke a woman's wrist when he hit her with a gun while stealing her purse in a grocery store parking lot. While participating in a carjacking, appellant shot into the air with a gun in front of the victim. Nearly 17 years later, he was found to be once again in possession of a gun and ammunition, demonstrating a lack of reform in his behavior from his youth.

With respect to appellant's contention that the strikes were remote, with the last occurring in 1993, and not followed by a continuous life of crime, we note appellant has only been out of prison since late 2002, and has failed to remain offense-free since that time. He was convicted and served jail time in 2006 for misdemeanor offenses of assault with means likely to cause great bodily injury, and criminal threats.

As to the current offense, while appellant admits it is a serious offense, he contends it does not justify a 25 years to life sentence. Under similar circumstances this court has in the past disagreed with this premise. As we stated in People v. Cooper (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 815, 824 (Cooper): "the California Legislature views the possession of a handgun by an ex-felon to be a serious offense. The intent underlying section 12021, subdivision (a) was to limit the use of instruments commonly associated with criminal activity and to minimize the danger to public safety arising from the free access to firearms that can be used for crimes of violence. [Citation.] The law properly presumes the danger is greater when the person possessing the firearm has previously been convicted of a felony. [Citation.]" We agree with the trial court that this was not a relatively minor offense, given the nature of the weapon, the circumstances of its possession, the volume of ammunition possessed with it, and its readiness for use.

"Where the record demonstrates that the trial court balanced the relevant facts and reached an impartial decision in conformity with the spirit of the law, we shall affirm the trial court's ruling, even if we might have ruled differently in the first instance." (People v. Myers (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 305, 310.) The record before us demonstrates the court understood its discretionary authority and weighed the competing facts to reach a reasonable conclusion in conformity with the spirit of the law. In view of these facts and circumstances, appellant has failed to show this was an irrational or arbitrary exercise of discretion.

III. Cruel And/Or Unusual Punishment

Appellant argues his sentence of 25 years to life for possession of a handgun constitutes cruel and/or unusual punishment under the state and federal Constitutions.3 We disagree.

A. Standard of Review

Under California law, a punishment is cruel or unusual if it is "so disproportionate to the crime for which it is inflicted that it shocks the conscience and offends fundamental notions of human dignity. [Fn. omitted.]" (In re Lynch (1972) 8 Cal.3d 410, 424 (Lynch).) Lynch suggests three techniques courts may use to aid in administering a disproportionality analysis: 1) consideration of the nature of the offense and the offender; 2) a comparison with the punishment imposed for more serious crimes in the same jurisdiction; and 3) a comparison with the punishment imposed for the same offense in different jurisdictions. (People v. Norman (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 221, 230 (Norman); Smith v. Municipal Court (1978) 78 Cal.App.3d 592, 596 (Smith).) Disproportionality need not be established in all three areas. (Norman, supra, at p. 230.) These techniques are not mechanically applied; if the latter two Lynch techniques indicate disproportionality, but the first test finds no disproportionality, the first test is nonetheless dispositive. (People v. Gayther (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 79, 90; Smith, supra, at p. 599.)

Similarly, under federal law, the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution proscribes "cruel and unusual punishments" and "contains a `narrow proportionality principle' that `applies to noncapital sentences.'" (Ewing v. California (2003) 538 U.S. 11, 20 (lead opn. of O'Connor, J.) (Ewing), quoting Harmelin v. Michigan (1991) 501 U.S. 957, 996-997 (conc. opn. of Kennedy, J.).) That principle prohibits "`imposition of a sentence that is grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime.'" (Ewing, supra, at p. 21, quoting Rummel v. Estelle (1980) 445 U.S. 263, 271.) "A proportionality analysis requires consideration of three objective criteria, which include `(i) the gravity of the offense and the harshness of the penalty; (ii) the sentence imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction; and (iii) the sentences imposed for commission of the same crime in other jurisdictions.' (Solem v. Helm (1983) 463 U.S. 277, 292.) But it is only in the rare case where a comparison of the crime committed and the sentence imposed leads to an inference of gross disproportionality that the second and third criteria come into play. (Harmelin v. Michigan, supra, 501 U.S. at p. 1005 (conc. opn. of Kennedy, J.).)" (People v. Meeks (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 695, 707 (Meeks).) Thus, we perform substantially similar analyses for appellant's state and federal constitutionality arguments. (See Mantanez, supra, 98 Cal.App.4th at p. 359 ["when discussing the proportionality of a sentence, the Supreme Court [of the United States] in Solem set forth as guidelines the same factors as expressed in In re Lynch, supra, 8 Cal.3d 410. Thus, Solem adds no additional analysis to Lynch"].)

"[A] punishment which is not disproportionate in the abstract is nevertheless constitutionally impermissible if it is disproportionate to the defendant's individual culpability." (People v. Dillon (1983) 34 Cal.3d 441, 480 (Dillon), abrogated on other grounds as stated in People v. Chun (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1172, 1186.) "To determine whether a sentence is cruel or unusual as applied to a particular defendant, a reviewing court must examine the circumstances of the offense, including its motive, the extent of the defendant's involvement in the crime, the manner in which the crime was committed, and the consequences of the defendant's acts. The court must also consider the personal characteristics of the defendant, including age, prior criminality and mental capabilities. [Citation.]" (People v. Hines (1997) 15 Cal.4th 997, 1078.)

B. California Standard

1. Nature of Offense

We recognize, as appellant contends, there was no violence in the commission of the instant offense. We reject, however, appellant's assertion that because the current offense does not involve violence, imposition of a term of 25 years to life is cruel or unusual. As noted in part II, ante, the California Legislature views the possession of a handgun by an ex-felon to be a serious offense. Thus, the Legislature could with good reason conclude that appellant's crime was felonious and deserving of a substantial punishment, regardless of the presence or absence of violence. (Cooper, supra, 43 Cal.App.4th at pp. 824-825; see also People v. Ingram (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 1397, 1415, disapproved on other grounds by People v. Dotson (1997) 16 Cal.4th 547, 558-559 ["[s]ociety's interest in deterring criminal conduct or punishing criminals is not always determined by the presence or absence of violence"].) It is not this court's role to second guess the Legislature. "Under the three strikes law, defendants are punished not just for their current offense but for their recidivism." (Cooper, supra, at p. 823.) "By enacting the three strikes law, the Legislature acknowledged the will of Californians that the goals of retribution, deterrence, and incapacitation be given precedence in determining the appropriate punishment for crimes. Further, those goals were best achieved by ensuring `longer prison sentences and greater punishment' for second and third `strikers.' Such determinations are questions of legislative policy." (Id. at p. 824.)

Here, appellant carried two magazines and 25 rounds of live ammunition, in the front seat of a car, easily accessible, and ready to use. Instead of yielding to police when found speeding through a school zone during school hours, he chose to flee, alter his appearance in an attempt to mislead the police about his true identity, and hide evidence. The offense posed a serious danger to the public. (See Mantanez, supra, 98 Cal.App.4th at pp. 359, 366.)

2. Nature of Offender

Appellant was 34 years old at the time of the offense, and gainfully employed, with a significant work history after being discharged from parole. This fact, however, fails to demonstrate that appellant's sentence is unconstitutional. Appellant places great weight on the fact he was a 17-year-old juvenile at the time of the three weeks encompassing his prior strike offenses. He contends he was less culpable for his actions because of his youth, and should therefore receive leniency for his actions now, as a 34-year-old. We are not persuaded. As discussed in part II, ante, the record fails to indicate appellant was the victim of youthful indiscretion during those three weeks. His actions were not those of an immature, unsophisticated juvenile. (Cf. Dillon, supra, 34 Cal.3d at p. 488.) We further note the Three Strikes law specifically brings within its scheme juvenile convictions committed by juveniles over the age of 16 and meeting certain criteria as to severity of offenses, which appellant's offenses meet here. (§ 667, subd. (d)(3).) If the Legislature and the people of California wanted less culpability for juvenile convictions of the type of offenses appellant committed, they could have easily done so, but chose not to. Furthermore, appellant, although a juvenile at the time of his offenses, was tried as an adult, and committed as an adult.4 The court felt at that time it appropriate to treat appellant as an adult. We find no reason to disregard this decision now. Appellant has failed to learn from his past mistakes and continues to pose a significant degree of danger to society.

3. Comparative Analyses

Because we find no inference of gross disproportionality in comparing appellant's crime and sentence, we need not perform further comparative analysis. "`[O]ne factor may be sufficient to determine the constitutionality of a particular sentence,' [citation.]" such as where "the gravity of [defendant's] crime alone was such that `a comparison of his crime with his sentence does not give rise to an inference of gross disproportionality ....'" (Mantanez, supra, 98 Cal.App.4th at p. 363.) In such case, comparative analysis of a defendant's sentence need not be performed. (Ibid.)

For the sake of argument, we find appellant's comparison of his sentence to that received for a single offense of voluntary manslaughter inapposite. As respondent points out, appellant's argument fails to take into account the recidivism underlying his sentence. As to a comparison to other jurisdictions, we reiterate our past position that despite other jurisdictions' imposition of shorter terms for recidivists whose current offense and criminal history are comparable to those of appellant, this fact alone fails to compel the conclusion that appellant's sentence is disproportionate to his criminal status. Nothing in the prohibition against cruel or unusual punishment per se prevents a state from responding to changed social conditions and increasing the severity of treatment of recidivist felons differently than other states. (Cooper, supra, 43 Cal.App.4th at p. 827; see also Ewing, supra, 538 U.S. at p. 25.)

C. Federal Standard

Similarly, for the same reasons set forth above under the California standard discussion, an analysis of the gravity of the offense and the harshness of the penalty fails to lead us to infer gross disproportionality as between the two. As Justice O'Connor stated in her lead opinion, "[r]ecidivism has long been recognized as a legitimate basis for increased punishment. [Citations.]" (Ewing, supra, 538 U.S. at p. 25.) In considering the gravity of the offense, the Supreme Court looked not only to Ewing's current felony, but also to his long criminal felony history, stating "[a]ny other approach would fail to accord proper deference to the policy judgments that find expression in the legislature's choice of sanctions. In imposing a three strikes sentence, the State's interest is not merely punishing the offense of conviction ... `[i]t is in addition the interest ... in dealing in a harsher manner with those who by repeated criminal acts have shown that they are simply incapable of conforming to the norms of society as established by its criminal law.' [Citations.]" (Id. at p. 29.) Applying the proportionality test in light of Ewing, we conclude that defendant's sentence of 25 years to life in prison for possession of a handgun cannot be considered a sentence that is grossly disproportionate to his crime in light of his inability to conform to the norms of society.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

WE CONCUR:

Levy, Acting P.J.

Cornell, J.