NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

ALDRICH, J.

INTRODUCTION

Real party in interest William Taylor sued his former employer, petitioner City of Burbank, for retaliation, based on allegations he was demoted and eventually fired from the police department for reporting sexual harassment and racial discrimination in the department. Burbank, however, said Taylor was fired because he interfered with an internal investigation. Taylor therefore sought internal affairs investigation records under Evidence Code sections 1043 and 1045. After an in-camera hearing, the trial court ordered the records be disclosed. Burbank then filed this writ, claiming that the in-camera hearing was procedurally flawed and that the trial court ordered irrelevant documents disclosed. We issued a stay of the disclosure order and an order to show cause. We now find that the in-camera hearing was not flawed and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by ordering all of the documents disclosed. We therefore deny the petition.

BACKGROUND

I. Taylor sues the City of Burbank for retaliation.

Real party in interest Taylor was Burbank Police Department's deputy chief of police. In December 2007, Porto's Bakery was robbed. Allegations that officers committed misconduct during the investigation of the robbery surfaced and were internally investigated in 2008. That investigation led nowhere until 2009, when a witness came forward and another internal investigation was opened. Taylor was a subject of that investigation for allegedly obstructing the original 2008 investigation and failing to thoroughly investigate or act upon possible excessive force incidents committed by department employees during 2007-2009. In 2009, Taylor was told, "Since this present investigation regards events formerly examined in Internal Affairs Personnel Investigation No. 04-26-08-1, yet is broader in scope and regards subsequent conduct as well, Internal Affairs Personnel Investigation No. 04-26-08-1 shall be incorporated into this investigation 04-16-09-1."

Also in September 2009, Taylor sued Burbank for retaliation under Labor Code section 1102.5 and for retaliation in violation of California's Fair Employment and Housing Act. The complaint alleged that Taylor was demoted for reporting sexual harassment by a police department employee; complaining that Black and Hispanic employees were being fired because of their race; and requesting outside agencies investigate a theft at the police department that Taylor suspected was committed by someone in the department. Taylor was ultimately fired in June 2010, and he therefore amended his complaint in January 2011.

II. Taylor files a discovery motion.

In response to discovery asking Burbank to state why Taylor was demoted, Burbank responded that Chief of Police Tim Stehr lost confidence in Taylor due primarily to allegations that Taylor, who oversaw internal affairs investigations, had interfered in and attempted to influence an internal investigation. Taylor thereafter filed a motion, under Evidence Code sections 1043 and 1045, requesting, among other things, documents pertaining to any investigation into allegations that Taylor interfered with an internal affairs investigation and, specifically, internal affairs investigations 04-16-09-1 and 04-26-08-1.

In opposition, Burbank stated that after the December 2007 Porto's Bakery robbery, Burbank investigated alleged officer misconduct1 in connection with that robbery, and the investigation was given the number IA 4-26-08-1.2 The evidence uncovered did not, at that time, validate the misconduct claims. A year later, in 2009, however, a Burbank officer came forward as a witness to the misconduct, and a new investigation was initiated under No. IA 4-16-09-1. Investigation No. IA 4-16-09-1 investigated Burbank officers for "alleged misconduct related to the criminal investigation of the Porto[']s Bakery robbery and its aftermath (primarily using force against interview subjects and/or failing to report or trying to prevent the reporting of the use of force against subjects)." (Italics omitted.) That investigation, conducted from November 11, 2009 to March 5, 2010, examined the conduct of over 20 Burbank officers, including Taylor, who allegedly interfered with the earlier 2008 investigation. The investigation into Taylor concluded on March 31, 2010, and the investigation file about Taylor was given the subnumber IA 4-16-09-1 No. 34. According to Burbank, the investigation of Taylor "stemmed from his actions during the original internal investigation into misconduct during the Porto's criminal investigation, IA 4-26-08." (Italics in original.) It was found that Taylor obstructed the internal affairs investigation in the aftermath of the Porto's robbery to protect Lieutenant Omar Rodriguez.

The trial court granted Taylor's discovery motion and ordered Burbank to disclose the entire internal investigations file immediately, without any further in-camera hearing. The court found: "Burbank may not take the position that Taylor was removed from his position as deputy chief for good cause, and simultaneously deny Taylor the opportunity to conduct discovery concerning its alleged basis for his removal. [¶] Taylor also seeks the internal affairs investigation files of other officers." "Taylor was a subject of the 2009 internal affairs investigation because he [had] allegedly interfered with the 2008 investigation. Burbank has turned over to Taylor the documents from the 2009 investigation relating to Taylor, but has refused to turn over documents regarding other officers who were the subject of the 2009 investigation. . . . [¶] . . . Burbank accuses Taylor of interfering with the 2008 internal affairs investigation of misconduct in connection with the criminal investigation of the robbery. Taylor is entitled to examine the 2009 internal affairs investigation to determine how the investigation conducted in 2009 differed from the 2008 investigation to cause Burbank to conclude Taylor interfered with the 2008 internal affairs investigation. [¶] Taylor needs access to the complete 2009 file fully to understand the accusations levied against him in the context of the internal affairs investigations of the investigation of the robbery."

Burbank petitioned this court for a stay of that disclosure order, and we issued a Palma3 notice directing the trial court to hold an in-camera hearing.

III. The trial court conducts an in—camera hearing.

In compliance with our Palma notice, at a hearing on December 15, 2010, the trial court addressed the upcoming in-camera hearing to review the internal investigation files. The trial court described the "character" of the in-camera inspection: "My bottom line on this is that a custodian with attorney can be present but does not have a right to be present. Certainly, doesn't have a right to speak or to advocate, and the person's presence with counsel is there really to assist the Court rather than to argue to the [c]ourt. [¶] So that's going to be the role I ask the custodian of records to reflect. We will be creating a transcript as usual, but the phrase that I think got the plaintiff and the [c]ourt a little concerned was the repeated use of the colloquial phrase `quality time,' implying a lot of chatting and visiting and sharing. No. It's not going to be like that. If I need help, I'll ask for it. Otherwise, we'll proceed in silence. [¶] . . . [¶] . . . [T]he lawyer is there to speak with the custodian and not to make speeches to the [c]ourt. So the custodian, she or he, has a knowledgeable friend if she or he has questions and wants to say, `[w]hat should I [do] now,' but the lawyer is not to take over and not to use the session to advocate positions of substance."

The in-camera hearing then took place over the next two days, December 16 and 17, 2010. On December 16, the trial court, Burbank's custodian of records, and counsel for the custodian went into the jury room with the court reporter. The court asked the custodian to explain how it had assembled the materials, which were contained in three boxes. The custodian then explained, in some detail, what each box contained, including a box of interviews concerning 38 "sub-investigations" that resulted from the initial review and assessment of the Porto's robbery. Investigation No. 34 concerned allegations that Taylor obstructed the Porto's investigation.

The trial court, due to other matters on calendar, continued the in-camera hearing to the next day, December 17, 2010. The hearing began at 10:30 a.m., and present again were the custodian of records and his attorney. After spending more time going over what was in the three boxes with the custodian, the trial court, because it was going to silently review the records, told the custodian and his attorney they needn't waste their time watching the court read, but could instead go shopping. The custodian and attorney left the room. After reviewing the documents for several hours by itself, the trial court ruled that they should be turned over in their entirety. Describing the underlying situation as having mushroomed, the trial court found it was Taylor's claim that the records in the boxes were a pretext for his dismissal; hence, they were discoverable.

DISCUSSION

IV. Taylor's motion satisfied the statutory scheme, and the in-camera hearing was properly conducted under that scheme and under Mooc.

Our Legislature has established a statutory scheme to discover peace officers' records, and our California Supreme Court has outlined the procedure for their disclosure. Burbank contends that the in-camera hearing the trial court conducted flouted those procedures and resulted in an indiscriminate production of documents irrelevant to Taylor's case. We disagree.

To balance the conflicting interests of a moving party's right to a fair trial and an officer's interest in privacy, in any case, civil or criminal, in which discovery or disclosure of a peace officer's personnel records are sought, the party seeking disclosure must file a written motion, known in the criminal context as a Pitchess4 motion, that, among other things, describes the information sought and states good cause for the discovery, "setting forth the materiality thereof to the subject matter involved in the pending litigation and stating upon reasonable belief that the governmental agency identified has the records or information from the records." (Evid. Code, § 1043, subd. (b)(3); see generally, Evid. Code, §§ 1043, 1045; Pen. Code, §§ 832.5, 832.7, 832.8; Warrick v. Superior Court (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1011; People v. Mooc (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1216, 1226-1227 (Mooc).) The affidavit setting forth good cause "may be on information and belief and need not be based on personal knowledge [citation], but the information sought must be requested with sufficient specificity to preclude the possibility of a defendant's simply casting about for any helpful information [citation]." (Mooc, at p. 1226.) The good cause showing is a "`relatively low threshold for discovery.'" (Garcia v. Superior Court (2007) 42 Cal.4th 63, 70.) If the moving party fulfills these requirements, then the court examines the records in camera. (Mooc, at p. 1226.)

At the in-camera hearing, the custodian of records should bring all potentially relevant documents for the trial court to examine. (Mooc, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 1226.) The trial court then examines that information in chambers "`out of the presence and hearing of all persons except the person authorized [to possess the records] and such other persons [the custodian of records] is willing to have present.'" (Ibid., quoting Evid. Code, § 915; see also Evid. Code, § 1045.)5 "A court reporter should be present to document the custodian's statements, as well as any questions the trial court may wish to ask the custodian regarding the completeness of the record." (Mooc, at p. 1229.) The trial court should make a record of what documents it examined by, for example, photocopying them, listing them, or simply stating for the record what documents it examined. (Id. at pp. 1228-1229.)

Here, Burbank describes an in-camera hearing that violated these procedural requirements. It was a hearing, Burbank charges, at which a "gag order" was placed on the custodian of record's attorney "effectively . . . precluding [him] from objecting to or correcting the improper procedures that followed"; at which the custodian of records and his attorney were "barred" from being present during the trial court's review; at which no "contemporaneous detailed record" was made; and at which the trial court spent an "inadequate amount of time" reviewing the production. Such a hearing would certainly violate Mooc, if such a hearing occurred. It didn't.

There was no "gag order" precluding the custodian of record's attorney from speaking, objecting or otherwise performing his role. The trial court simply precluded a repeat of argument it had heard several times before. At a hearing before the in-camera proceedings, Burbank's counsel repeatedly said she needed to spend "some quality time" with the court in chambers to explain why the investigations of the other officers had nothing to do with Burbank's conclusion that Taylor interfered with the investigation to protect Lieutenant Rodriguez. Taylor filed an objection to any such ex parte communication, leading the trial court to clarify that the custodian's attorney was not acting as an advocate but was there to assist the court rather than to argue: "Certainly, [the custodian of records] doesn't have a right to speak or to advocate, and the person's presence with counsel is there really to assist the [c]ourt rather than to argue to the [c]ourt. [¶]So that's going to be the role I ask the custodian of records to reflect. We will be creating a transcript as usual, but the phrase that I think got the plaintiff and the [c]ourt a little concerned was the repeated use of the colloquial phrase `quality time,' implying a lot of chatting and visiting and sharing. No. It's not going to be like that. If I need help, I'll ask for it. Otherwise, we'll proceed in silence. [¶]. . . [¶] . . . [T]he lawyer is there to speak with the custodian and not to make speeches to the [c]ourt. So the custodian, she or he, has a knowledgeable friend if she or he has questions and wants to say, `[w]hat should I [do] now,' but the lawyer is not to take over and not to use the session to advocate positions of substance." (Italics added.)

The trial court merely said that the in-camera hearing was not an opportunity for Burbank's custodian of records and attorney to argue the merits of the case. This was completely proper. There thus was no "gag order" precluding counsel from objecting to anything he thought might be improper or from advising his client.6 In fact, the custodian of records engaged in a detailed discussion with the trial court at the hearing and consulted with his attorney multiple times. The trial court even said it would leave the room to facilitate those consultations. Given these facts, Burbank's statement that the custodian of records was "effectively denied the assistance of counsel," is hyperbolic, even with the qualification of "effectively."

Next, the trial court did not "bar" the custodian of records and the attorney from the room during its review. Judge Wiley proposed a procedure that, given the unwieldy nature of the production, made sense and was in accord with both his obligations under Mooc and his notion of professional courtesy. After an in-depth review with the custodian of records of the materials produced, the court said it thought the best way to proceed was for it to review the documents silently. The court proposed that the custodian and attorney return at 2:00 p.m., to give the court a couple of hours to review the materials. The court then asked where it should begin review, and the custodian gave further direction. Thanking the custodian for his help, the court asked him to return at 2:00 p.m. The custodian said he was happy to stay, but the court suggested he "do some holiday shopping." The custodian of record and attorney, without objection, left the room. At 2:20 p.m., the matter went back on the record and the court ruled.

Before the custodian of records and attorney were supposedly "barred" from the room, the contents of the three boxes had been identified sufficiently to allow both the trial court and an appellate court to conduct a review, and a substantive conversation had taken place between the custodian and the court about those documents, leaving nothing more to be done but for the court to review the documents silently. It is a strained reading of the record indeed that converts this judicial courtesy and commonsense procedure into an order "barring" the custodian and attorney from the room. Moreover, the court reporter was present during the relevant proceedings. That the court reporter was not present while the trial court read silently to itself in no way violates Mooc. The court reporter recorded the conversation between the court and the custodian of records, including the identification of the documents, and Mooc requires nothing more.7

This brings us to Burbank's next contention: the trial court made an inadequate record of the materials produced and reviewed. Mooc does not mandate how that record must be made, but gives examples of how it might be done: a court could photocopy the documents, list them or state for the record what documents it examined. (Mooc, supra, 26 Cal.4th at pp. 1228-1229.) Mooc neither requires a trial court to list every document it reviews nor would that be feasible where, as here, the production is voluminous. Rather, the purpose of the record is to facilitate appellate review. The trial court's record here achieved that purpose. The trial court specified that there were three boxes, each of which contained a category of documents. The custodian of records, after providing background into the Porto's Bakery robbery and the internal investigations it prompted, described what was in each box; the first box contained Skelly8 documents for each fired employee; the second box contained six 3-ring binders about the administrative investigation into the Porto's Bakery robbery that led to 38 sub-investigations into officers (No. 34 of which concerned Taylor); and the third box contained audio interviews of witnesses and employees done in the course of the investigation and the investigator's notes. This categorical description of the materials satisfies Mooc. It is nothing like the problematic, cursory record made by the trial court in Mooc where the trial court merely referred to "`an entire evidence box of files, forms, folders and records' "but only a small envelope was later given to the Court of Appeal for review. (Mooc, at p. 1228.)

Burbank, however, also argues that the court failed to comply with Mooc because the court "made no contemporaneous detailed record" of what it reviewed. Certainly, a trial court could choose to "contemporaneously" state for the record the document it is then reviewing. But Mooc neither requires a contemporaneous review nor does one necessarily make sense where, as here, the trial court reviews boxes of documents as opposed to just a few pages. All that Mooc requires is the trial court to identify, with sufficient description, the documents it reviews to facilitate appellate review. The trial court, by having the custodian of record detail what was in each of the three boxes produced complied with Mooc.

Finally, Burbank questions whether the trial court even reviewed the materials, claiming that several hours were insufficient to review records that included a box of audio compact discs. The second day of the in-camera hearing began at 10:30 a.m. After spending some time with the custodian of records, the court reviewed the contents of the three boxes until 2:20 p.m. The record does not show at what time the custodian of records and attorney left, but it was some time before lunch. When the trial court went back on the record at 2:20 p.m., Judge Wiley said he'd grabbed a bite to eat, but had otherwise worked through the lunch hour. The review, including the time the trial court spent with the custodian of records, therefore lasted over three hours.

Three hours, however, was not enough time to listen to the "hundreds of hours" of recorded interviews, Burbank argues. We will assume that the trial court did not listen to each and every compact disc from beginning to end. But we do not find that doing so was either a prerequisite or a necessity to determine their discoverability. It was the trial court's job to decide if the discs and other materials might contain relevant information admissible at trial or facts that could lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. (Haggerty v. Superior Court (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 1079, 1087; Evid. Code, § 1045.) The custodian explained at length that the discs were witness interviews arising out of the Porto's Bakery internal investigation. From the in-camera discussion between the court and the custodian about those interviews and what they arose out of, the trial court could have, within its discretion, decided that the audio discs concerning investigations into officers other than Taylor might contain relevant information or facts that could lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. That the trial court engaged in a careful review is made even clearer by the trial court's knowledgeable discussion about the difficulty in photocopying some of the records, which included internal cellophane, plastic envelopes containing originals, and sketches, and noting that some volumes were missing tabs. Simply put, the transcript from the hearing and the substantial time the trial court put into reviewing the materials show that the court conducted a meticulous review.

The in-camera hearing that in fact took place thus bears little resemblance to the one Burbank portrays in its petition. The attorney for Burbank's custodian of records was allowed to speak and to advise his client; the custodian and attorney spent a significant amount of time with the trial court and were not barred from the room; the trial court made an adequate record of the documents that allowed for appellate review; and the trial court spent a substantial amount of time reviewing those documents. Mooc requires nothing more.

V. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by ordering disclosure of all three boxes.

After this procedurally proper in-camera review, the trial court ordered all three boxes to be turned over to Taylor. Burbank contends that Taylor's discovery motion failed to establish good cause for discovery and that the "Gardiner Investigations" are irrelevant to the subject matter of Taylor's litigation. Again, we disagree.

Taylor's discovery motion, with sufficient specificity, described the information sought, stated good cause for the discovery, and set forth the materiality of the information sought to the subject matter involved in the pending litigation. (Evid. Code, § 1043, subd. (b)(3); see generally, Mooc, supra, 26 Cal.4th at pp. 1226-1227.) Burbank, however, argues that Taylor's motion never requested what Burbank refers to as the "Gardiner Investigations," namely, the investigation into misconduct by Burbank officers, including Taylor, arising out of the Porto's Bakery robbery that led to 38 sub-investigations, of which No. 34 concerned Taylor. The argument is meritless. Taylor's original discovery motion specifically requested those documents. The motion asked for, among other things, all documents concerning internal affairs investigations 4-16-09-1 and 04-26-08-1 and all documents pertaining to the allegation that he interfered with an internal affairs investigation. These requests encompassed the Gardiner Investigations.9

Burbank also argues that production of those documents was unsupported by Taylor's counsel's declaration or by materiality.10 The standard for disclosure is that the information must be relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending litigation and comply with statutory limits on disclosure. (Mooc, supra, 26 Cal.4th at pp. 1226-1227.)11 A trial court has broad discretion in ruling on disclosure, and a reviewing court should reverse the trial court's determinations only on a showing that the trial court abused this discretion. (Haggerty v. Superior Court, supra, 117 Cal.App.4th at p. 1086; People v. Prince (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1179, 1286.)

Christopher Brizzolara, Taylor's counsel, said in his declaration that Taylor reported sexual harassment and racial discrimination to his superiors in the police department. In retaliation, Taylor was demoted, and the stated reason was he obstructed the initial 2008 investigation into the Porto's Bakery robbery.12 That initial investigation led nowhere until 2009, when an officer came forward and said he witnessed the use of excessive force. A second investigation was therefore launched in 2009 and resulted in 38 sub-investigations, of which No. 34 specifically pertained to Taylor.

Burbank's theory of the case therefore is Taylor was fired for interfering with the 2008 investigation; under that theory, Taylor should be limited to discovering sub-investigation file No. 34, which concerns only him. This, however, is not Taylor's theory of the case. As the trial court aptly explained, it is Taylor's position that Burbank's stated reason for firing him was a sham. In fact, he was fired for reporting misconduct: "[Taylor's] theory makes perfect sense. It is that Burbank says that they are firing Taylor on account of something having to do with these two investigations and Taylor's lawyers say, `Well, that is just a pretext. There is absolutely nothing to that and if we have access to the files, we will relitigate or litigate' I guess in the first instance `how valid this investigation was and show it to a jury that it's simply a sham.' " The sub-investigation files are relevant to Taylor's theory of the case or might lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Those files are connected to and arose out of the original 2008 Porto's investigation, a point Burbank has conceded. Burbank's notice to Taylor informing him he was being investigated stated he was being investigated for, among other things, obstructing the 2008 internal investigation and for failing to investigate or act on possible excessive force incidents committed by department employees during 2007-2009. The noticed added, "Since this present investigation regards events formerly examined in Internal Affairs Personnel Investigation No. 04-26-08-1, yet is broader in scope and regards subsequent conduct as well, Internal Affairs Personnel Investigation No. 04-26-08-1 shall be incorporated into this investigation 04-16-09-1."

The original 2008 internal affairs investigation led nowhere. But when new evidence came to light in 2009, a second investigation was opened that resulted in 38 sub-investigations concerning alleged officer misconduct. These sub-investigations concerned officers who allegedly committed misconduct during the 2008 investigation for failing to report misconduct or lying about what they saw during the investigation. Although Burbank denies that Taylor was interviewed in connection with or was the focus of the 37 sub-investigations not targeted directly at him, that denial does not preclude mention of Taylor in a context pertinent to his case. It is certainly possible that other officers or witnesses made statements about Taylor that would be relevant to what he did during the 2008 investigation (or perhaps even about sexual harassment and discrimination) that would substantiate either his or Burbank's theory of the case. The sub-investigations might contain, for example, statements made by the officers concerning Taylor and/or Rodriguez, who Taylor was allegedly protecting. Those sub-investigations might also show that he was treated differently for similar or more egregious conduct, and therefore he was fired, not because he engaged in any misconduct in connection with the investigation into the Porto's Bakery robbery, but because he blew the whistle on sexual harassment and racial discrimination in the department. More to the point, those sub-investigations might be relevant to Burbank's claim that Taylor generally failed to investigate misconduct committed during 2007-2009.

The trial court therefore did not err in granting Taylor's motion and ordering disclosure. We have only this to add: the trial court, at the original hearing on Taylor's discovery motions, said it would enter a suitable protective order. At oral argument before this court, Taylor's appellate counsel conceded that a protective order is appropriate. We agree but leave it to the trial court to fashion the order.

DISPOSITION

The petition is denied. Petitioners' request for judicial notice is granted. The stay issued on January 19, 2011 is lifted. Real party in interest William Taylor is to recover his costs from petitioner City of Burbank. The court shall issue an appropriate protective order.

We concur:

KLEIN, P. J.

CROSKEY, J.