NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

ALDRICH, J.

Conchita Vanghert and her adult children initiated this slander lawsuit against the managers of their mobile home park based upon an eviction notice prepared by a lawyer for the park that accused them of illegal drug use and indecent exposure on the park premises. The managers moved for summary judgment on their affirmative defense that the litigation privilege (Civ. Code, § 47, subd. (b)) barred this action. In opposition, Conchita Vanghert submitted a declaration, stating she "found out about the slanderous statements from other individuals." This statement, according to the trial court, did not demonstrate a triable issue of fact that the managers made any slanderous statements regarding Vanghert or her adult children to someone other than legal counsel. Upon our independent review of this evidence, we find no triable issue of fact and affirm the judgment entered following the trial court's order granting summary judgment.

BACKGROUND

This slander lawsuit arises from the contents of an eviction notice to Conchita Vanghert and her adult children Michael, Jayson, and Connie Sunga (collectively referred to as Vanghert), residents of space 81 at the Hi Lea Village Mobile Home Park (the Park). The eviction notice states: "The reasons relied upon for the termination of your residency . . . is [sic] that you have repeatedly played loud music and have been observed drinking and using illegal drugs in the Park by the managers and many neighboring residents, you have repeatedly used profane language in the Park as witnessed by the managers and many neighboring residents, and one of you was observed on April 4, 2008 by residents of Space 18 exposing genitals and masturbating in a common area of the Park."

1. The Slander Lawsuit

The complaint states a cause of action for slander against the Park managers, Juan and Martha Quintana (the Quintanas). The Quintanas allegedly spoke the following words: "the Plaintiffs were `using illegal drugs in the Park' and one of the Plaintiffs `was observed on April 4, 2008 by residents of Space 18 exposing genitals and masturbating in a common area of the Park.'" Residents of the Park allegedly heard these words along with several other persons "whose names are not known to Plaintiffs."

The Quintanas' answer to the complaint asserted as a defense the litigation privilege (Civ. Code, § 47, subd. (b)), which bars all tort causes of action except malicious prosecution based on conduct or statements protected by the privilege.1

2. Summary Judgment on Affirmative Defense of Litigation Privilege

The Quintanas filed a motion for summary judgment, contending that the litigation privilege (Civ. Code, § 47, subd. (b)) barred this lawsuit. The following evidence was presented in support of, and in opposition to, the summary judgment motion.

Before filing the eviction notice, the Quintanas received written and verbal complaints from other residents about Vanghert.2 These complaints included observations by other residents that "some of the residents of Space 81 [Vanghert's residence] were drinking, playing loud music, using profanity, and taking illegal drugs on park premises." A resident at the Park also complained that "on April 4, 2008 a member of the household was observed by them to be masturbating and exposing his genitals on park property."

Martha Quintana stated in her declaration that she discussed these complaints with the Park's attorney and authorized an eviction notice. She did not repeat these accusations against Vanghert to anyone other than legal counsel for purposes of the eviction proceedings.

Juan Quintana stated in his declaration that he did not repeat the accusations against Vanghert "that formed the basis for the eviction to anyone."

Vanghert opposed the motion by offering evidence that the slanderous statements were made to third parties not connected with the eviction proceedings. Conchita Vanghert stated in her declaration that the Quintanas made slanderous statements, and she "found out about the slanderous statements from other individuals."

Based upon this evidence, the trial court found the Quintanas had established their defense and there was no triable issue of fact that the Quintanas made slanderous statements to third parties outside of the eviction proceedings. The trial court characterized the opposition evidence as speculative and without foundation based upon the assumption that the "other individuals," referred to in Conchita Vanghert's declaration, heard slanderous statements from the Quintanas.

Vanghert appeals from the judgment entered following the trial court's order granting the summary judgment motion.

DISCUSSION

1. Standard of Review

Vanghert contends that upon our de novo review we will view the evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom as creating a triable issue of fact on the issue of whether the Quintanas made slanderous statements not protected by the litigation privilege.3

Summary judgment is properly granted when there are no triable issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).) The Quintanas moved for summary judgment on the grounds that the litigation privilege of Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b), was a complete defense to the slander lawsuit. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).) A defendant has met his or her burden of showing that a cause of action has no merit if that party has established an affirmative defense to that cause of action. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subds. (o)(2), (p)(2); see Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co., supra, 25 Cal.4th at pp. 850-851.) Once the defendant has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to that defense. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2); Mirzada v. Department of Transportation (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 802, 806-807; Bacon v. Southern Cal. Edison Co. (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 854, 858.)

"[W]e `"liberally construe the evidence in support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party."' [Citations.]" (Hughes v. Pair (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1035, 1039.) "There is a triable issue of material fact if, and only if, the evidence would allow a reasonable trier of fact to find the underlying fact in favor of the party opposing the motion in accordance with the applicable standard of proof." (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co., supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 850.)

We review a grant of summary judgment de novo, and decide independently whether the facts not subject to a triable dispute warrant judgment for the moving party as a matter of law. (Intel Corp. v. Hamidi (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1342, 1348.) We conclude, upon our independent review of the evidence, that the Quintanas are entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

2. No Triable Issue of Fact Exists to Defeat the Litigation Privilege Defense

Slander is a false and unprivileged oral publication. (Civ. Code, § 46.) "To establish a prima facie case for slander, a plaintiff must demonstrate an oral publication to third persons of specified false matter that has a natural tendency to injure or that causes special damage." (Mann v. Quality Old Time Service, Inc. (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 90, 106.) Publication means communication to a third person who understands the meaning of the statement and its application to the referenced person or persons. (Smith v. Maldonado (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 637, 645.) Certain statements are deemed to constitute slander per se, including, among others, oral publication to a third person charging "any person with crime, or with having been indicted, convicted, or punished for crime[.]" (Civ. Code, § 46, subd. (1).)

Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b), commonly known as the "litigation privilege," protects statements made in the course of judicial proceedings and "in any other official proceeding authorized by law[.]"4 The privilege "applies to any publication required or permitted by law in the course of a judicial proceeding to achieve the objects of the litigation, even though the publication is made outside the courtroom and no function of the court or its officers is involved." Silberg v. Anderson (1990) 50 Cal.3d 205, 212.) The litigation privilege applies if the communication is logically related to the proceedings. (Wise v. Thrifty Payless, Inc. (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 1296, 1302.) If there is no dispute as to the operative facts, the availability of the privilege is a matter of law, which the court may determine on summary judgment. (Susan A. v. County of Sonoma (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 88, 93.)

The trial court correctly determined that the Quintanas had presented evidence to establish the litigation privilege as an affirmative defense. The communications they made were to their counsel for purposes of the eviction proceeding, and were logically related to those proceedings. This was sufficient to establish the affirmative defense. The Quintanas carried their burden on summary judgment.

Vanghert then had the burden of showing a triable issue of fact on the question of whether the Quintanas made statements to a third party. The privilege does not protect the republication to persons not connected to the proceedings. (Silberg v. Anderson, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 219; Susan A. v. County of Sonoma, supra, 2 Cal.App.4th at pp. 93-94.) Conchita Vanghert stated she "found out about the slanderous statements from other individuals."5 She does not state these other individuals attributed the slanderous statements to the Quintanas, and she does not present any evidence from these "other individuals" attesting to hearing the slanderous statements made by the Quintanas. At most, this evidence shows statements were made outside the eviction proceedings; it does not raise a triable issue that the Quintanas made these statements. As stated in the eviction notice, the Quintanas received complaints from other Park residents before initiating the eviction proceedings.

Vanghert contends that for purposes of summary judgment, we must read Conchita Vanghert's declaration and draw the reasonable inferences in her favor. (Miller v. Department of Corrections (2005) 36 Cal.4th 446, 470.) The reasonable inference, as Vanghert argues, is the "other individuals" referred to in the declaration must have heard the slanderous statements from the Quintanas because these individuals were not present when Martha Quintana spoke to legal counsel. This is not a reasonable inference.

Inferences based upon speculation, guesswork, or conjecture cannot defeat summary judgment. (See Mortgage Associates, Inc. v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Maryland (2002) 105 Cal.App.4th 28, 35-36.) It is unreasonable to speculate or guess that the "other individuals" in Conchita Vanghert's declaration told her that they heard the statements from the Quintanas. The eviction notice states the Quintanas received complaints from residents, thus any inference that the Quintanas and the Park's counsel were the only ones privy to the information in the eviction notice is contrary to the evidence presented in this summary judgment motion.

Vanghert has not presented evidence to raise a triable issue of fact as to the defense that this slander lawsuit is barred by the litigation privilege. Thus, based upon the evidence presented on these undisputed facts, we conclude the trial court properly relied on the litigation privilege (Civ. Code, § 47, subd. (b)) to grant summary judgment.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. Costs to respondents.

We concur:

CROSKEY, Acting P. J.

KITCHING, J.