NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

CROSKEY, J.

Laura Ann DeCrescenzo appeals a judgment dismissing her complaint against Church of Scientology International (Scientology) and Religious Technology Center (collectively, defendants) after the sustaining of demurrers without leave to amend based on the statutes of limitations. Plaintiff contends she has adequately pled a combination of delayed discovery of her causes of action and a basis for equitable estoppel precluding defendants from asserting a statute of limitations defense. Our review of this record compels the conclusion that plaintiff has adequately alleged that (1) she was unable to comprehend the wrongfulness of the defendants' conduct for a period of time and that her causes of action did not accrue until she did so and (2) even after her delayed discovery of her causes of action, the defendants' threats and intimidation caused her to delay filing her complaint. In addition, we reject defendants' contention that plaintiff is collaterally estopped from prosecuting her action by a federal court judgment that equitable estoppel was inapplicable because the facts alleged in plaintiff's prior complaint were insufficient to demonstrate reasonable reliance on defendants' representations. We hold that her allegations of additional facts in the present complaint establish a basis for reasonable reliance and such new allegations are not precluded by the federal judgment. We therefore will reverse the judgment with directions.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff filed a complaint against Scientology in April 2009 alleging that she began working for that organization at the age of nine, became effectively a full-time employee at the age of ten, and later left her home and family in another state to work for Scientology in California. She alleged that she married a co-worker at the age of sixteen, became pregnant, and that Scientology forced her to have an abortion at the age of seventeen. She also alleged that during the time she was employed by Scientology, from 1991 to 2004, she was paid less than the minimum wage and worked under other illegal conditions.

Plaintiff further alleged that (1) Scientology severely restricted her personal freedom and applied repressive measures to enforce her loyalty to the organization; (2) she was allowed to leave her employment in 2004, at the age of 25, only after she had attempted suicide; (3) she had little formal education at that time, was unsophisticated, and had been isolated from mainstream society and culture; (4) she was subjected to a coercive exit interview and required to sign documents purportedly exculpating Scientology, and that the documents were illegal and unenforceable; (5) she was not given a copy of the documents that she signed and (6) Scientology falsely represented to her in the exit interview that she had no claims and no recourse against Scientology and others and that she owed Scientology approximately $120,000 for her job training.

Plaintiff's original complaint against Scientology pled six causes of action denominated as: (1) rescission; (2) unpaid wages; (3) discrimination and invasion of privacy; (4) human trafficking; (5) intentional inflicting of emotional distress; and (6) obstruction of justice. She filed a first amended complaint in May 2009 modifying some of her counts and adding a seventh count for fraud and deceit. Scientology removed the case to the United States District Court for the Central District of California and then moved to dismiss based on the statute of limitations and other grounds. Plaintiff opposed the motion.

The federal court concluded that the only federal claim in the first amended complaint was the fourth count for human trafficking and forced labor under 18 United States Code sections 1589 and 1595. The court stated that the cause of action had accrued no later than 2004 when plaintiff allegedly became free from Scientology's control, was able to learn of her rights, and had full knowledge of the factual allegations giving rise to her claim. The court concluded that the applicable limitations period under federal law was four years.

The federal court rejected plaintiff's argument that Scientology was equitably estopped from asserting the statute of limitations. The court first addressed plaintiff's argument that Scientology had concealed the facts giving rise to her claim. It stated that despite the allegations of coercion and deceit, plaintiff had failed to allege that the facts giving rising to her claim were concealed from her and, to the contrary, affirmatively alleged that she was aware of her mistreatment. It then addressed plaintiff's argument that Scientology had misled her as to her legal rights through coercion and intimidation. The court concluded that the factual allegations in the complaint compelled the conclusion that plaintiff was aware of the alleged wrongdoing and had made a calculated decision to leave Scientology, and that her continued reliance on the alleged representations as to her legal rights and obligations therefore was unreasonable as a matter of law. The court also rejected plaintiff's equitable tolling argument. It therefore granted the motion to dismiss the fourth count with prejudice and remanded the remaining state law claims to the superior court. The federal court entered a judgment accordingly in November 2009. Plaintiff did not appeal the federal judgment.

Following remand from the federal court, Scientology demurred to the first amended complaint based on the statutes of limitations and failure to allege facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. Plaintiff filed opposition. The trial court below concluded that plaintiff had failed to allege sufficient facts to avoid the statute of limitations bar for the period after 2004 and sustained the demurrer with leave to amend.

Plaintiff filed a second amended complaint in February 2010 which added Religious Technology Center as a defendant. She alleged counts for (1) forced abortion in violation of her right to privacy under the California Constitution; (2) forced abortion in violation of her right to privacy under California common law; (3) deprivation of liberty in violation of her rights under the California Constitution; (4) false imprisonment; (5) intentional infliction of emotional distress; (6) wage and hour violations; and (7) unfair business practices. She restated the factual allegations in her prior complaint and then alleged additional facts concerning her continued involvement with Scientology from 2004 to July 2008, purported threats and intimidation by Scientology during that time period, and her continued vulnerability to such threats and intimidation.

Scientology demurred to the second amended complaint based on the statute of limitations. Scientology argued that plaintiff had failed to allege a basis for delayed discovery after 2004. It also argued that equitable estoppel and equitable tolling were inapplicable and that, under the doctrine of collateral estoppel, the federal court's decision precluded plaintiff's reliance on either equitable estoppel or equitable tolling. Plaintiff again filed opposition. At the hearing on the demurrer, the trial court stated that (1) collateral estoppel was inapplicable, (2) each cause of action accrued on January 1, 2005, at the latest, and (3) the facts alleged in the complaint compelled the conclusion that plaintiff had reason to suspect wrongdoing at that time. The court therefore concluded that the limitations period had run on each count before the filing of the original complaint in April 2009 and sustained the demurrer to all counts, this time without leave to amend.

Religious Technology Center then filed its demurrer to the second amended complaint based on the same grounds asserted by Scientology. The trial court sustained that demurrer as to all counts without leave to amend and dismissed the complaint in its entirety. Plaintiff filed a timely appeal from the order of dismissal.1

CONTENTIONS

Plaintiff contends (1) she adequately had alleged delayed discovery of each count alleged in the complaint, so the causes of action did not accrue until 2004; (2) defendants are equitably estopped from asserting the statute of limitations for the period from 2004 to July 2008 because (a) they falsely represented that the documents she signed released them from liability and (b) they threatened and intimidated her; (3) she is entitled to leave to amend her complaint to allege additional facts establishing a basis for equitable estoppel, if necessary; and (4) collateral estoppel is inapplicable.

DISCUSSION

1. Standard of Review

"A demurrer tests the legal sufficiency of the factual allegations in a complaint. We independently review the sustaining of a demurrer and determine de novo whether the complaint alleges facts sufficient to state a cause of action. (McCall v. PacifiCare of Cal., Inc. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 412, 415 [106 Cal.Rptr.2d 271, 21 P.3d 1189].) We assume the truth of the properly pleaded factual allegations, facts that reasonably can be inferred from those expressly pleaded, and matters of which judicial notice has been taken. (Schifando v. City of Los Angeles (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1074, 1081 [6 Cal.Rptr.3d 457, 79 P.3d 569].) We construe the pleading in a reasonable manner and read the allegations in context. (Ibid.) We will affirm the judgment if it is correct for any reason, regardless of the trial court's stated reasons. (Aubry v. Tri-City Hospital Dist. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 967 [9 Cal.Rptr.2d 92, 831 P.2d 317].)" (MKB Management, Inc. v. Melikian (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 796, 802.)

It is an abuse of discretion to sustain a demurrer without leave to amend if there is a reasonable probability that the defect can be cured by amendment. (Schifando v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 1082.) The burden is on the plaintiff to demonstrate how the complaint can be amended to state a valid cause of action. (Ibid.) The plaintiff may make that showing for the first time on appeal. (Careau & Co. v. Security Pacific Business Credit, Inc. (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 1371, 1386.)

2. Plaintiff Adequately Alleges Delayed Discovery Until 2004

"A cause of action ordinarily accrues when the wrongful act occurs, the liability arises, and the plaintiff is entitled to prosecute an action. (Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Assn. v. City of La Habra (2001) 25 Cal.4th 809, 815 [107 Cal.Rptr.2d 369, 23 P.3d 601]; Norgart v. Upjohn Co. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 383, 397 [87 Cal.Rptr.2d 453, 981 P.2d 79].) In other words, a cause of action accrues `"`"upon the occurrence of the last element essential to the cause of action."'"' (Howard Jarvis, supra, at p. 815.) The common law delayed discovery rule is an exception to the general rule and provides that a cause of action does not accrue until a plaintiff discovers, or reasonably should discover, the cause of action. `A plaintiff has reason to discover a cause of action when he or she "has reason at least to suspect a factual basis for its elements." [Citations.]' (Fox v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. (2005) 35 Cal.4th 797, 807 [27 Cal.Rptr.3d 661, 110 P.3d 914].) The elements that the plaintiff must suspect are the generic elements of wrongdoing, causation, and harm. (Ibid.) A plaintiff who suspects that he or she has suffered an injury caused by the wrongdoing of another is charged with the knowledge that a reasonable investigation would reveal, and the limitations period begins to run at that time. (Fox, at pp. 807-808 & fn. 2.)" (Ovando v. County of Los Angeles (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 42, 66, fn. omitted.)

The delayed discovery rule may apply in cases where, due to some disability or other circumstances, the plaintiff is unable to comprehend the wrongdoing or the resulting injury. (Parsons v. Tickner (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 1513, 1526.) In some circumstances, the nature of the relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant, and the plaintiff's dependency and vulnerability, may prevent the plaintiff from becoming aware of the wrongfulness of the defendant's conduct.

K.J. v. Arcadia Unified School Dist. (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1229 involved an action for damages for childhood sexual abuse. The plaintiff alleged that her dependency on and affection for her former school teacher prevented her from realizing the wrongfulness of his conduct. We held that those allegations were sufficient to invoke the delayed discovery rule for pleading purposes. (Id. at p. 1243.) Similarly, Curtis T. v. County of Los Angeles (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 1405, 1421-1423, held that an alleged childhood molestation victim should be granted leave to amend his complaint to allege that his youth, ignorance, and inexperience, and his foster parent's alleged complicity in the abuse, prevented him from realizing the wrongfulness of the conduct, so as to invoke the delayed discovery rule.

The trial court here assumed without deciding that the delayed discovery rule applied and that, as a result, the causes of action accrued on January 1, 2005, at the latest. We conclude that plaintiff had adequately alleged that, because of her isolation from a young age, limited education, and restrictions on her personal freedom, she had no reason to suspect that she was injured by defendants' wrongdoing until at or about the time that she left the facility in 2004. Her causes of action therefore accrued in 2004 at the latest, and the limitations periods began to run at that time. The timeliness of her complaint therefore depends on whether she had adequately alleged a basis for equitable estoppel precluding defendants' reliance on a statute of limitation defense.

3. Plaintiff Has Adequately Alleged Conduct by Defendants Establishing A Basis for Equitable Estoppel After 2004

A defendant may be estopped from asserting a limitations period as a defense if the defendant's representation or other conduct caused the plaintiff to refrain from filing a timely suit and the plaintiff's reliance on the defendant's conduct was reasonable. (Lantzy v. Centex Homes (2003) 31 Cal.4th 363, 384-385 (Lantzy).) In order to support an estoppel, the defendant's representation must be a representation of fact, rather than a representation of law or denial of legal liability. (Id. at p. 384, fn. 18; Vu v. Prudential Property & Casualty Ins. Co. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1142, 1152 (Vu).)

"One aspect of equitable estoppel is codified in Evidence Code section 623, which provides that `[w]henever a party has, by his own statement or conduct, intentionally and deliberately led another to believe a particular thing true and to act upon such belief, he is not, in any litigation arising out of such statement or conduct, permitted to contradict it.' [Citation.] But `"[a]n estoppel may arise although there was no designed fraud on the part of the person sought to be estopped. [Citation.] To create an equitable estoppel, `it is enough if the party has been induced to refrain from using such means or taking such action as lay in his power, by which he might have retrieved his position and saved himself from loss.' . . . `. . . Where the delay in commencing action is induced by the conduct of the defendant it cannot be availed of by him as a defense.'"' [Citations.]" (Lantzy, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 384.)

Equitable estoppel ordinarily arises from misleading statements about the need for or advisability of bringing suit, but estoppel can also arise from the defendant's threats or intimidation that prevent the timely filing of a suit. (John R. v. Oakland Unified School Dist. (1989) 48 Cal.3d 438, 445; Doe v. Bakersfield City School Dist. (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 556, 567.) The plaintiff's reliance on the defendant's conduct must be reasonable to justify an estoppel, and the plaintiff must file suit within a reasonable time after the effect of the events giving rise to the estoppel has ended. (Lantzy, supra, 31 Cal.4th at pp. 384-385; John R., supra, 48 Cal.3d at p. 446.) These are questions of fact for the trier of fact to decide based on the evidence. (John R., supra, at p. 446; Driscoll v. City of Los Angeles (1967) 67 Cal.2d 297, 305; see Vu, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 1153.) A factual basis for equitable estoppel must be alleged with sufficient particularity to disclose the facts relied upon. (Sofranek v. County of Merced (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 1238, 1250.)

Plaintiff alleged in her second amended complaint that she worked and resided at Scientology's facilities from the age of 12 until she was 25 years old, that she was isolated from mainstream society and deprived of her personal freedom, and that she was "brainwashed" and did not comprehend her legal rights. She alleged that (1) she was forced to work in harsh conditions and subjected to punishment; (2) at the time she terminated her employment and left the facility in 2004, she was required to sign documents purporting to exculpate defendants and requiring her to keep certain information confidential or suffer penalties and fines; (3) defendants knew that those documents were contrary to law and unenforceable, and that defendants intended to intimidate her into believing that she had no legal rights against them; (4) she was told at that time that she owed defendants approximately $120,000 for her job training; (5) she remained a loyal Scientology follower until July 2008 and that, as a loyal follower, she was forbidden from reading or thinking anything negative about Scientology; (6) she was threatened with harassment and banishment from her family and friends who remained at the Scientology facilities if she were deemed an enemy of Scientology; (7) after leaving the facility, she made payments on her purported debt for some time because she believed that she was obligated to do so and she reasonably believed that she had no legal rights or claims against defendants because of their representations concerning the documents that she had signed; and (8) she first realized in July 2008 that she might have legal claims against defendants despite the documents she had previously signed, when she happened upon some information on the Internet and her family members then shared their concerns.

While it is arguably true that defendants' alleged representations concerning the legal effect of documents that plaintiff signed amount to a denial of legal liability — which is not sufficient to support a claim of equitable estoppel (Lantzy, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 384, fn. 18; Vu, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 1152) — plaintiff has alleged more than simply defendants' denial of liability. She has also alleged threats of banishment and harassment. Plaintiff has further alleged that she was particularly vulnerable to defendants' influence, both during her formative years as a child and young adult, and after the time that she left the facility when she remained an adherent. In these circumstances, including particularly the context of her long subservient relationship with Scientology, we believe that the alleged intimidation and threats of banishment and harassment, if true, may preclude defendants, in equity, from asserting the statute of limitations as a defense. Although plaintiff does not expressly allege that the threats caused her to delay filing her complaint, the complaint reasonably construed clearly so implies.2

We therefore conclude that the factual allegations of the second amended complaint are sufficient for pleading purposes to support an equitable estoppel. Whether plaintiff's reliance on the alleged threats was reasonable is a question of fact for the trial court to decide based on the evidence produced at trial.

4. The Federal Judgment Does Not Establish Collateral Estoppel

Scientology argued in its demurrer to the second amended complaint that the federal court's decision that Scientology was not equitably estopped from asserting the statute of limitations as a defense was binding in this action under the doctrine of collateral estoppel. The trial court concluded that collateral estoppel was inapplicable. Whether collateral estoppel applies is a question of law that we review do novo. (Jenkins v. County of Riverside (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 593, 618; Roos v. Red (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 870, 878.)

Collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, precludes the relitigation of issues argued and decided in prior proceedings. (Hernandez v. City of Pomona (2009) 46 Cal.4th 501, 511.) "`Traditionally, we have applied the doctrine only if several threshold requirements are fulfilled. First, the issue sought to be precluded from relitigation must be identical to that decided in a former proceeding. Second, this issue must have been actually litigated in the former proceeding. Third, it must have been necessarily decided in the former proceeding. Fourth, the decision in the former proceeding must be final and on the merits. Finally, the party against whom preclusion is sought must be the same as, or in privity with, the party to the former proceeding. [Citations.]' [Citation.]" (Ibid.) "`The "identical issue" requirement addresses whether "identical factual allegations" are at stake in the two proceedings, not whether the ultimate issues or dispositions are the same. [Citation.]' [Citation.]" (Id. at pp. 511-512.)

A judgment of dismissal after the sustaining of a demurrer establishes res judicata, or claim preclusion, but only to a limited extent. "(1) A judgment entered after a general demurrer has been sustained `is a judgment on the merits to the extent that it adjudicates that the facts alleged do not constitute a cause of action, and will accordingly, be a bar to a subsequent action alleging the same facts.' (2) `[E]ven though different facts may be alleged in the second action, if the demurrer was sustained in the first action on a ground equally applicable to the second, the former judgment will also be a bar.' (3) `If, on the other hand, new or additional facts are alleged that cure the defects in the original pleading, it is settled that the former judgment is not a bar to the subsequent action whether or not plaintiff had an opportunity to amend his complaint.'" (Crowley v. Modern Faucet Mfg. Co. (1955) 44 Cal.2d 321, 323, quoting Keidatz v. Albany (1952) 39 Cal.2d 826, 828; accord, Wells v. Marina City Properties, Inc. (1981) 29 Cal.3d 781, 789.)

Absent a compelling reason to apply a different rule, substantially the same analysis should apply with respect to collateral estoppel. Thus, a judgment after the sustaining of a demurrer is a decision on the merits to the extent that it adjudicates that the facts alleged in the complaint do not constitute a valid cause of action. But if the facts alleged in the later proceeding cure the defects of the complaint in the prior proceeding, the issues in the two proceedings are not identical. The determination of an issue in connection with the sustaining of a demurrer does not establish collateral estoppel if additional facts are alleged that cure the defects of the complaint in the prior proceeding with respect to that issue.3 Because a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted (Fed. Rules Civ. Proc., rule 12(b)(6), 28 U.S.C.) is the federal equivalent to a demurrer for these purposes, this same rule applies to a judgment after the granting of such a motion to dismiss.

A federal court ruling on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim decides whether the complaint alleges facts sufficient to support a claim under a cognizable legal theory. (Johnson v. Riverside Healthcare System, LP (9th Cir. 2008) 534 F.3d 1116, 1121-1122.) If the statute of limitations and equitable estoppel are at issue, the court decides whether the complaint alleges facts disclosing a limitations bar and whether it alleges facts showing a basis for equitable estoppel. (Trans-Spec Truck Service, Inc. v. Caterpillar Inc. (1st Cir. 2008) 524 F.3d 315, 320.) A federal court ruling on such a motion does not decide whether the requirements for equitable estoppel are established as a matter of fact, but only decides whether the facts alleged in the complaint, if true, could warrant the application of equitable estoppel. (Ibid.)

The federal court in this case concluded that the facts alleged in the first amended complaint compelled the conclusion that plaintiff's reliance on Scientology's representations was unreasonable. The federal court made no factual finding as to the reasonableness of plaintiff's reliance. In her second amended complaint, plaintiff has alleged additional facts concerning her reliance apart from those alleged in the first amended complaint that was before the federal court. She alleges for the first time in her second amended complaint that (1) during the time of her employment by Scientology she was "brainwashed" by defendants and had no comprehension of her legal rights; (2) she remained a loyal follower of Scientology from 2004 to July 2008; (3) as a loyal follower she was forbidden from reading or thinking anything negative about Scientology and was threatened with banishment and harassment if she were deemed an enemy of the organization; (4) she reasonably believed that she had no legal rights or claims against defendants because of their representations concerning the documents that she signed; and (5) she overcame her fears and first realized that she might have legal claims against defendants, despite the documents that she signed, in July 2008, when she discovered information on the Internet and discussed the matter with family members.

These additional facts, together with the facts previously alleged and restated in the second amended complaint, plead a basis for reasonable reliance sufficient to support a claim of equitable estoppel. Any deficiency in the first amended complaint as to reasonable reliance is cured by the additional allegations in the second amended complaint. In light of the additional allegations, the issue decided by the federal court based on the prior allegations is not identical to the issue presented here, so collateral estoppel does not apply.4

DISPOSITION

The judgment is reversed with directions to the trial court to vacate the order sustaining the demurrer to the second amended complaint without leave to amend and enter a new order overruling the demurrer to each count. Plaintiff is entitled to recover her costs on appeal.

WE CONCUR:

KLEIN, P. J.

KITCHING, J.