NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

GRIMES, J.

SUMMARY

This is the second appeal of Wanda Armstrong (Armstrong) concerning her employment with the Burbank Unified School District (district). In the first appeal, this court resurrected her claim for wrongful termination from her position as principal of the Luther Burbank Middle School, after the trial court sustained the district's demurrer to her complaint without leave to amend. (Armstrong v. Burbank Unified Sch. Dist. (April 22, 2008, B193192) [nonpub. opn.] (Armstrong I).) This second appeal concerns the denial of Armstrong's petition for a writ of mandate requiring the district to reinstate her as principal. She contends she was wrongfully terminated after the district failed to comply with Education Code section 44951, which requires a notice of termination to be sent by registered mail or signed by the affected employee no later than the 15th of March preceding the following school year. She claims the district hand-delivered the notice, and that she did not sign it before March 15, 2005. The trial court found that the district complied with section 44951 because Armstrong timely signed the notice. Because we conclude that substantial evidence supports the trial court's finding, we affirm.

FACTS

The following facts are derived from the proceedings involving Armstrong's writ petition, as well as from her prior appeal. Armstrong was principal of the Luther Burbank Middle School in the district. In March 2005, she was hand-delivered a letter advising her that she was being terminated from her position as principal beginning the 2005-2006 school year, and was being reassigned to a teaching position. After she was terminated from her position as principal, she sued the district for breach of contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The district demurred to the complaint, contending the contract claims were barred because public employment is governed by statute and not contract, and the emotional distress claim was barred because the termination of Armstrong was not extreme and outrageous. The trial court agreed and sustained the demurrer without leave to amend. (Armstrong I, supra, B193192 [pp. 2-3].) Armstrong appealed the ruling, and this court reversed in an unpublished opinion, concluding that Armstrong should have been granted leave to amend her complaint because she had demonstrated facts on appeal that would support an action seeking reinstatement to the position of principal based on the district's violation of Education Code section 44951. (Armstrong I, supra, B193192 [pp. 7-9].)

After the case was remanded to the superior court, Armstrong filed a petition for a writ of mandate seeking reinstatement to her former position. Her initial petition advanced a theory that the notice of termination provided by the district was defective because it was hand-delivered, and not sent by registered mail. The district's responsive pleading acknowledged this defect in service, but asserted that Armstrong was terminated for cause, and therefore compliance with Education Code section 44951 was not required. Armstrong later amended her petition to include an additional theory that the district's notice was defective because she had not timely signed the termination letter. Specifically, in her second amended petition (the operative petition) Armstrong alleged that "[i]n or about March, 2005, Assistant Superintendent Dr. Alexis Sheehy and Director of Human Resources Nancy Gascich . . . approached Petitioner and hand delivered her a note advising her that she was being terminated from her position as principal . . . . Respondent failed to comply with the notice requirement of Section 44951 by merely hand delivering said note . . . . They did not send it by registered mail nor did they get her signature by March 15, 2005 as mandated by 44951." (Italics added.)

During discovery, the district "den[ied]" Armstrong's request for an admission that the district did not comply with Education Code section 44951. The district's explanation for its denial (in response to form interrogatory 17.1) was that Armstrong was terminated for cause, and therefore compliance with section 44951 was not required. The district identified Armstrong's personnel records as its source of information in response to Armstrong's discovery. Responding to Armstrong's special interrogatories, the district stated that it hand-delivered the termination notice to plaintiff on March 4, 2005, and that she signed it.

Armstrong filed a "Motion for Writ of Mandate," setting forth evidence in support of her petition, including declarations, discovery responses, an unsigned copy of the termination letter, and other documentary evidence. Armstrong's declaration in support of the motion averred that "I definitely do not remember signing this document on or before March 15, 2005." (Boldface and italics omitted.) In its opposition to Armstrong's motion, the district produced a notice of possible release and reassignment, dated March 4, 2005, with Armstrong's signature appearing above an acknowledgment providing, "I hereby acknowledge receipt of this Notice." There was no date appearing next to her signature. The district also included a declaration from its director of personnel services, Nancy Gascich, stating that she hand-delivered the notice to Armstrong on March 4, 2005, and that Armstrong then signed it in her presence. In its opposition, the district contended that it had complied with Education Code section 44951 because Armstrong signed the notice of reassignment on March 4, 2005, prior to the March 15 cutoff.

Following a hearing on Armstrong's motion, the petition was denied by the trial court. The court concluded that "the defendant has provided evidence in the declaration of Nancy Gasch [sic] showing the plaintiff signed a written notice by March 15, 2005, in which the defendant provided notice to the plaintiff that she would be reassigned from her principal position . . . . [¶] And since the evidence shows that the defendant complied with the notice requirement of Education Code section 44951, there are no grounds to issue a writ of mandate." This timely appeal followed.

DISCUSSION

In an ordinary mandamus proceeding, a trial court may compel "any inferior tribunal, corporation, board, or person" to perform "an act which the law specially enjoins, as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or to compel the admission of a party to the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which the party is entitled, and from which the party is unlawfully precluded by that inferior tribunal, corporation, board, or person." (Code Civ. Proc., § 1085, subd. (a).) A trial court's "`[r]eview by ordinary mandamus is confined to an examination of the agency proceedings to determine whether the action taken is arbitrary, capricious or entirely lacking in evidentiary support, or whether it failed to conform to procedures required by law. [Citation.]'" (Jefferson v. Compton Unified School Dist. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 32, 37.) "On appeal, the trial court's factual findings must be upheld if they are supported by substantial evidence. [Citation.] However, legal issues present a question of law that [the reviewing] court reviews de novo on appeal." (Shelden v. Marin County Employees' Retirement Assn. (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 458, 463, italics omitted.) The reviewing court does not reweigh the evidence when determining whether substantial evidence supports the trial court's finding. (California Oak Foundation v. Regents of University of California (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 227, 258.)

Education Code section 44951 provides in pertinent part: "Unless a certificated employee holding a position requiring an administrative or supervisory credential is sent written notice deposited in the United States registered mail with postage prepaid and addressed to his or her last known address by March 15 that he or she may be released from his or her position for the following school year, or unless the signature of the employee is obtained by March 15 on the written notice that he or she may be released from his or her position for the following year, he or she shall be continued in the position." (Ed. Code, § 44951.) Strict compliance with the notification procedures set forth in the statute is required. (Hoyme v. Board of Education (1980) 107 Cal.App.3d 449, 455 (Hoyme) [finding personal delivery of a notice without obtaining the employee's signature did not comply with the statute].)

It is not disputed that Armstrong is within the class of employees entitled to notice under Education Code section 44951. The only question on appeal is whether substantial evidence supports the trial court's finding that the district complied with the notice requirements of the section. Armstrong argues that the signature on the notice is not dated, and that Gascich's declaration lacks credibility. Further, she contends that the signed letter was discovered under suspicious circumstances, because the district did not produce the letter until years after the original complaint was filed even though it was assertedly contained in her personnel file. Armstrong contends that contrary evidence, such as the district's discovery responses, its responsive pleading to her first amended writ petition, and her evidence that the letter was not signed, vitiate the trial court's finding that the district complied with section 44951. We disagree.

The trial court determined the school district complied with Education Code section 44951 when Armstrong signed the termination notice before March 15, 2005. The record supports this conclusion. It includes a March 4, 2005 termination letter bearing the signature of "Wanda Liddell Armstrong," and a declaration attesting that the letter was signed by Armstrong on March 4, 2005, in the presence of the director of personnel services, Nancy Gascich. That this evidence first surfaced after years of litigation does not establish the trial court erred in finding it proved the district complied with section 44951, and Armstrong has not cited to a single rule of evidence or principle of law precluding the admission of the letter solely because it was produced late in discovery. (McComber v. Wells (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 512, 522 ["`[E]very brief should contain a legal argument with citation of authorities on the points made. If none is furnished on a particular point, the court may treat it as waived, and pass it without consideration.' [Citation.]"].) The 11th-hour production of the signed letter and the reliability of Gascich's declaration go to the weight and credibility of the evidence, which was for the trial court to determine. The effect of conflicting evidence, such as Armstrong's equivocal declaration and unsigned copy of the letter, was for the trial court to resolve.

Armstrong has also seized upon an "admission" in the district's October 2008 response to her first amended writ petition (not the operative petition at issue in this appeal), where the district acknowledged that hand delivery of the notice of termination was technically deficient under Education Code section 44951.1 This purported admission is irrelevant, as it pertains to a superseded pleading that did not raise the issue of Armstrong's signature. Although it is well settled that hand delivery of a notice of reassignment without the recipient's signature on the written notice does not comply with section 44951 (Hoyme, supra, 107 Cal.App.3d at p. 455), here there is evidence to support the trial court's conclusion that Armstrong signed the termination notice on March 4, 2005, in compliance with section 44951, permitting the district to release Armstrong from her position as principal. Therefore, substantial evidence supported the denial of Armstrong's petition, and the judgment is affirmed.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. Due to the late production of the signed letter of reassignment, which resulted in significant continued litigation of this dispute, the parties shall bear their own costs on appeal. (Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(5).)

WE CONCUR.

RUBIN, Acting P. J.

FLIER, J.