Plaintiffs and appellants Pauline Fairbanks and Michael Cobb appeal from an order denying their motion for class certification in their action against Farmers New World Life Insurance Company and Farmers Group, Inc. (collectively, Farmers). Plaintiffs' action alleges violations of the unfair competition law (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200; henceforth UCL)
As substantial evidence supports the trial court's factual finding, we affirm. On appeal, plaintiffs argue that the order denying class certification can be
As we will discuss, the theory on which plaintiffs ultimately sought class certification is key to our resolution of this appeal. Plaintiffs took a very broad brush approach in their complaint, alleging innumerable wrongdoings of Farmers in connection with the universal life insurance policies at issue in this case. Similarly, the evidence submitted by plaintiffs in support of their class certification motion suggested a myriad of improprieties. However, plaintiffs' briefing in support of the class certification motion narrowed plaintiffs' theory of the case to a manageable handful of arguments. Having failed in obtaining certification on the narrow theory on which certification was actually sought, plaintiffs, on appeal, attempt to broadly redefine their theory of the case, relying again on the allegations of their complaint and the evidence submitted, even when those allegations and supporting evidence were not presented to the trial court as a basis for class certification. This circumstance presents a problem on appeal. Plaintiffs cannot argue now that the trial court erred in failing to rule on a theory plaintiffs failed to pursue before that court.
Before we discuss the particular policies at issue, a brief introduction to the topic of life insurance is helpful. The simplest type of life insurance is term insurance. Term insurance provides a level death benefit, for a set term of years, in exchange for the payment of a fixed premium. If the policyholder outlives the term of the policy, there is no payout. As a general rule, the annual cost of insurance (also known as the risk rate) increases as a person ages. Thus, if a person were to buy a series of annual life insurance policies, that person could anticipate paying a higher premium each year. Term insurance allows the payment of equal premiums over the set term; the policyholder "overpays" for insurance in the earlier years and "underpays" in
We are concerned in this case with an insurance product known as universal life insurance. With universal life, the policyholder's premium payments are paid into the policyholder's accumulation account. The insurance company credits the accumulation account with interest on its balance, and deducts from the accumulation account the annual cost of insurance. The purported advantages of universal life, over term insurance, include (a) premium payments may be skipped, as long as there is a sufficient balance in the accumulation account to cover the cost of insurance; (b) the death benefit can be increased or decreased without writing a new policy; (c) the money in the accumulation account can be withdrawn as needed; (d) interest accrues on the accumulation account on a tax-deferred basis; and (e) if desired, the policyholder can keep the policy to maturity (age 95 or 100), and receive its cash value at that time.
There are also two different death benefits possible with a universal life policy. One, like term insurance, is a level death benefit. The other, which is another purported advantage of universal life, is an increasing death benefit. Consider a hypothetical policy value of $500,000. When a universal life policyholder chooses an increasing death benefit, the amount paid the beneficiary at the policyholder's death is the set policy value ($500,000) plus the amount then in the policyholder's accumulation account. In contrast, when a universal life policyholder with a level death benefit dies, the accumulation account partially offsets the policy value, and the insurer is therefore required to pay only the difference between the accumulation account and the policy value ($500,000). Put another way, the total policy benefit would be $500,000, including the amount in the accumulation account.
This distinction between death benefits is important when considering the costs of insurance deducted annually from the policyholder's accumulation account. As discussed above, the cost of insurance generally increases as a policyholder ages. Thus, with an increasing death benefit, the cost of insurance deducted from the account will increase each year; that is, the cost to provide the policyholder with a hypothetical $500,000 in coverage goes up as the policyholder ages. With a level death benefit, however, as long as the
We are concerned in this case with two types of universal life insurance sold by Farmers, both of which permitted the policyholder to choose between level and increasing death benefits. These are Farmers's universal life policy (FUL) and Farmers's flexible universal life policy (FFUL). The bulk of the evidence in this case pertained to the FFUL, which contained another purported advantage over term insurance: the premium was set by the policyholder, and could be changed at any time. Within broad limits, the policyholder could pay as much, or as little, as the policyholder wanted.
When marketing FUL or FFUL policies to prospective purchasers, Farmers agents often used computer-generated illustrations, which would—for any death benefit and premium
Policyholders were sent annual statements from Farmers, which set forth the balance in their accumulation account, and the then applicable interest rate and risk charges. Although there was language in the annual statements indicating how long the policy would remain in force under current rates,
The operative complaint is the fourth amended complaint.
The complaint set forth a litany of alleged facts misrepresented or concealed from policyholders, including, but not limited to, the following: (a) Farmers marketed the policies as permanent insurance, but the policies would actually lapse before maturity; (b) computer printout sales illustrations used by Farmers's agents were ambiguous and contained inadequate disclaimers and definitions; (c) the illustrations hid relevant information and were based on unrealistic assumptions; (d) Farmers encouraged setting the premium for FFUL policies no higher than a "target" rate, by its commission structure; however, policies would lapse when only the target premium was paid; (e) certain terms in the sales materials or insurance policies were not defined; (f) Farmers failed to disclose that all FFUL policies where anything less than the maximum premium was paid would self-destruct; (g) allowing the policyholder to set the FFUL premium after the first year made the policies likely to self-destruct; (h) Farmers failed to disclose that it set its interest rates based on the rates its competitors were using; (i) Farmers failed to disclose that it lowered interest rates paid existing policyholders while it increased "teaser" interest rates for new customers; (j) Farmers solicited customers on a fraudulent sales pitch which stated that, at some point, the policyholders' obligation to pay premiums would vanish; (k) Farmers knew or should have known that interest rates would be less than those it projected; (l) Farmers failed to disclose the nature and extent of the commissions it paid its agents; (m) Farmers failed to disclose that much of the premium payments made would pay for the insurance, commissions, and administrative charges, and would therefore not remain in the accumulation account earning interest; and (n) Farmers failed to disclose that it could change rates for its own benefit.
Additionally, plaintiffs alleged that many practices of Farmers constituted unfair business practices. These included, but were not limited to: (o) The FUL policies were "inherently defective" as their premiums were set on the premise of an 11.5 percent interest rate, while Farmers did not have a good
When plaintiffs moved for class certification, they considerably narrowed the bases on which they sought relief. That is, they argued that common issues of fact existed only with respect to several issues related to a single unified theory.
Preliminarily, we note that plaintiffs' motion for class certification sought relief for fraudulent misrepresentations and concealments. Thus, to the extent the motion for class certification addressed the UCL, it was based on allegations of fraudulent business practices, not unfair ones. On appeal, however, plaintiffs now assert that the trial court erred in failing to consider its arguments that a class should be certified with respect to the "unfair" business practices prong of the UCL. Farmers correctly responds that this argument was waived, as plaintiffs failed to pursue unfair business practices in its motion for class certification.
Plaintiffs argued that proof of this fraudulent scheme could be established by common, rather than individual, proof, based on a combination of common policy language, common language in annual policyholder statements, and a common marketing scheme.
Plaintiffs' specific argument regarding the underfunding of FFUL policies depended in large part on the existence of a "target" premium—for all premiums up to the target premium, agents received a commission of 50 percent, but for every premium dollar in excess of the target premium, agents received only a 3 percent commission. Plaintiffs took the position that this commission structure encouraged agents to set the premiums at or below target, and that if a policyholder wanted to pay more than the target, the agent would instead suggest raising the face amount of the policy (which would therefore increase the target, and the agent's commission). Plaintiffs also noted that Farmers's computerized rate-setting program would inform agents of the minimum and target premiums, thus suggesting that the premium be set between these two numbers, and no higher.
Plaintiffs' argument regarding the underfunding of the FUL policies was more direct. As Farmers set the premiums on these policies, it was solely within Farmers's control to establish initial premiums high enough to accrue sufficient interest so that the policies would be on track to last until maturity.
Plaintiffs submitted in excess of 1,200 pages of documentation in support of the motion. While plaintiffs relied in part on the language of the policies
We note, however, that plaintiffs submitted evidence beyond that relied upon by them in their motion for class certification. For example, they presented evidence that the FUL policies contain a minimal, if any, surcharge on policy payments if policyholders make their payments semi-annually or monthly, but a 20 percent surcharge if payments are made quarterly. But, plaintiffs did not seek to certify a class (or subclass) of all FUL policyholders who made quarterly payments and were assessed this charge. Similarly, plaintiffs submitted an internal Farmers memorandum suggesting that, to increase FUL sales, Farmers should increase the interest rate paid and offset the expense by increasing risk rates. Plaintiffs did not seek to certify a class (or subclass) of all FUL policyholders whose risk rates were increased to offset a higher interest rate.
In opposition to the class certification motion, defendants argued that plaintiffs' theory of relief would require independent, not common, proof. First, Farmers argued that, even if the policies were represented as "permanent," the materiality of such a representation would vary by policyholder. In this respect, Farmers introduced the testimony of an expert in risk management and insurance who testified that many, if not most, owners of universal
As to the issue of underfunding, defendants asserted that it is impossible to argue that a policy is "underfunded" in the abstract; a policy can only be underfunded if it lacks the funds to meet the specific policyholder's needs at any given time. Defendants argued that it is impossible to know, without considering each policyholder separately, how long each one intended to keep the policy, how much the policyholder could afford to pay, whether the policyholder expected to pay increased premiums in the future, whether the policyholder intended to cash out the policy at retirement, and so forth. In any event, Farmers argued, as each FFUL policyholder set his or her own premium, the issue of underfunding of the FFUL policies was, of necessity, not capable of common proof. As to plaintiffs' argument that the "target" premium commission structure encouraged the setting of premiums at or below target, Farmers introduced evidence that while plaintiffs' description of the commission structure was accurate, it did not result in premiums being set below target. Indeed, Farmers's evidence indicated that over 173,000 FFUL policies, 26 percent of the total FFUL policies at issue, had premiums set by the policyholder which exceeded the target premium.
Finally, as to the allegations of a misleading marketing plan, Farmers submitted substantial documentation indicating that its marketing was not subject to common proof. All purchasers of FUL or FFUL policies, except those who, like Fairbanks, were Farmers agents themselves, purchased their policies from Farmers agents. The FUL and FFUL policies were not sold by television commercials, magazine advertisements, or some other marketing campaign directed to the general public. Instead, each FUL or FFUL policy was sold as the result of an individual sales presentation from the agent to the prospective policyholder. While Farmers created brochures setting forth some of the advantages of the policies, the brochures did not stand alone, and, in any event, agents were not required to use them.
Farmers also disputed plaintiffs' evidence regarding sales scripts, and introduced testimony from various agents and supervisors to the effect that no scripts were prepared. They testified that the agents themselves were not uniformly trained as to the policies, and that, although Farmers prepared hypothetical sales presentations as training tools, Farmers neither expected nor mandated that these presentations be used when talking to potential policyholders.
Farmers also introduced evidence that its agents were not required to use computer-generated illustrations in selling the policies and did not always do so; that when they used the illustrations, agents input different data and printed out different scenarios; and that agents did not explain the illustrations
In their reply, plaintiffs explained the issue at the heart of the certification motion as follows: "Fundamentally, the problem is that Farmers sold systematically underfunded universal life policies as `permanent insurance,' when in fact they could not provide the life-long security which policyholders expect from permanent life insurance." Plaintiffs again argued that the marketing of the policies was uniform, and supported their reply with an additional 3,000 pages of documents attempting to demonstrate that Farmers agents learned about the policies from uniform scripts, and they, in turn, told their prospective policyholders about the policies in a uniform manner.
Farmers then responded with a surreply, and additional evidence that the marketing was not uniform.
The hearing on the motion took place over several hearing dates over the course of several months. At the hearing, plaintiffs' counsel explained that plaintiffs' theory of the case was that Farmers failed to disclose the true risks of the policies. Plaintiffs' counsel argued that Farmers's argument that every sale was different did not matter because "this lawsuit, this civil action, does not arise for events that occur at the point of sale. [¶] What is important for the court to understand is that the focus and the core of this case is what takes place at the point of origin because Farmers designed the policy, designed the schedule, designed the marketing, and it is from that core of facts that each and every policyholder is affected from the misrepresentations."
On April 9, 2009, the trial court denied certification. In considering the motion for class certification, the trial court found the proposed class ascertainable and sufficiently numerous. However, it concluded that predominant common questions of fact or law did not exist, thus defeating the community of interest element necessary for class certification.
The court considered the plaintiffs' argument that the language of the policies themselves was misleading. The court stated that the design of the policies was only relevant to the extent that (1) Farmers marketed the policies as permanent insurance; (2) the class members wanted permanent insurance; and (3) the class members relied on Farmers's representations of permanence.
There is an apparent contradiction in the trial court's order—the court first concluded that whether Farmers marketed its policies as permanent was amenable to common proof, but later concluded that the issue of which representations were conveyed to prospective policyholders was not. Having reviewed the court's order in detail, it appears that the court concluded that whether marketing materials produced by Farmers made representations of permanence was subject to common proof, but whether those materials were conveyed to prospective policyholders, or other representations of permanence were made, was not. This conclusion is supported by the findings of fact made by the trial court. The trial court discussed, at length, Farmers's evidence that any materials describing the policies as "permanent" insurance were not, in fact, uniformly provided to prospective insureds. The trial court found, based on Farmers's evidence, that agents "did not make standardized, uniform oral sales presentations by rote to all of their prospective FUL or FFUL purchasers," and that the agents "did not uniformly represent to prospective customers that the FUL or FFUL policies were `permanent insurance.'" The court expressly stated, "[t]here is no evidence that the same material misrepresentations have actually been communicated to each member of the class." As such, the court could not possibly have concluded that the issue of whether the policies were marketed to consumers as permanent was amenable to common proof.
In short, the trial court concluded that common questions of fact and law do not predominate because, among other things: (1) the representations made to prospective policyholders were not common; and (2) whether any particular misrepresentation was material was also not common, as resolution of the issue would depend on the particular needs of the prospective policyholder.
On May 12, 2009, plaintiffs filed an ex parte motion to vacate the order denying class certification, on the basis that Tobacco II was pending before the Supreme Court, and the trial court should therefore vacate its order and schedule the motion to be rebriefed once the Supreme Court decided Tobacco II. The motion was denied. On May 28, 2009, after Tobacco II had been decided, plaintiffs filed a second ex parte motion to vacate the order denying class certification. The trial court denied the motion on the basis that there was no emergency requiring ex parte relief; the court directed plaintiffs to file a noticed motion to vacate and set it for hearing. Plaintiffs declined to do so, and instead filed a notice of appeal.
Having lost the motion for class certification on the basis on which it was brought, plaintiffs attempt to redefine their theory of the case on appeal. Thus, while plaintiffs concede that the "core" of their case is that the FFUL and FUL policies were sold as permanent insurance but were, in fact, underfunded, plaintiffs now attempt to revive arguments based on dozens of purported flaws in the policies as set forth in their expert declarations, and their cause of action based on the unfairness prong of the UCL. The problem is that none of this was argued as a basis for class certification. We decline to consider any of these arguments, which were not before the trial court when it ruled on the motion for class certification. Instead, we limit our consideration of whether the trial court erred in its ruling on the motion for class certification to the theory on which plaintiffs pursued class certification.
We acknowledge, as does Farmers, that the intervening opinion of the Supreme Court in Tobacco II renders immaterial the trial court's finding that the issue of reliance is not subject to common proof.
The class certification motion was based on plaintiffs' allegations of fraudulent business practices under the UCL and related common law causes of action. As the elements a plaintiff must prove to establish a fraudulent business practices cause of action under the UCL are more favorable to plaintiffs than those for common law fraudulent inducement and negligent misrepresentation (see Tobacco II, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 312) we limit our discussion to that cause of action.
Nonetheless, a class action cannot proceed for a fraudulent business practice under the UCL when it cannot be established that the defendant engaged in uniform conduct likely to mislead the entire class. (Knapp v. AT&T Wireless Services, Inc. (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 932, 942-943 [124 Cal.Rptr.3d 565], petn. for review filed June 1, 2011; Kaldenbach, supra, 178 Cal.App.4th at p. 850.) Specifically, when the class action is based on alleged misrepresentations, a class certification denial will be upheld when individual evidence will be required to determine whether the representations at issue were actually made to each member of the class. (Knapp v. AT&T Wireless Services, Inc., supra, 195 Cal.App.4th at pp. 944-945; Kaldenbach, supra, 178 Cal.App.4th at p. 850; see also Pfizer Inc. v. Superior Court, supra, 182 Cal.App.4th at p. 632.) "`[W]e do not understand the UCL to authorize an award for injunctive relief and/or restitution on behalf of a consumer who was never exposed in any way to an allegedly wrongful business practice.'" (Knapp v. AT&T Wireless Services, Inc., supra, 195 Cal.App.4th at p. 945; see also Pfizer Inc. v. Superior Court, supra, 182 Cal.App.4th at p. 632.)
The Kaldenbach case, which was issued while the instant case was pending on appeal, is virtually identical to this case. In Kaldenbach, the plaintiff brought suit against an insurance company, alleging violations of the UCL and common law fraud in connection with its sale of a universal life insurance policy by means of a vanishing premium sales tactic. In allegations very similar to the allegations in this case, Kaldenbach alleged that the insurance company defendant "provided computer illustrations and uniform sales materials to its agents that allowed [Kaldenbach's agent] to mislead him into believing a low cost of actual insurance combined with a very high rate of interest to be earned on the cash accumulation component of his premium payment would act in concert to generate adequate returns to cover the cost of his life insurance until the maturity date of the policy. But, he alleged, in reality (given a higher [risk rate] and declining interest rates), the policy could not perform in the manner represented to him. [The defendant] did not advise policy purchasers of the inherent risks in purchasing the [policy]." (Kaldenbach, supra, 178 Cal.App.4th at p. 836.) Kaldenbach sought to certify a class of all policyholders who had purchased the policy between certain dates, based on his evidence that all sales "were based on the same scripted sales presentations and computer illustrations that were misleading and omitted material facts." (Id. at p. 836.) Kaldenbach argued that all sales presentations were uniform in all respects, and agents were specifically
The Kaldenbach court affirmed, stating that there were myriad individualized issues, including "whether any given agent took [the defendant's] training, read its manuals, and routinely followed the training and materials; and what materials, disclosures, representations, and explanations were given to any given purchaser. These individualized issues go not to the injury suffered by a purchaser, but to whether there was in fact an unfair business practice by [the defendant]." (Kaldenbach, supra, 178 Cal.App.4th at p. 848.) The court stated: "[S]eparate from whether any individual purchaser relied on alleged misrepresentations, or suffered injury as a result, here the determination of what business practices were allegedly unfair turns on individual issues. The trial court could properly conclude there was no showing of uniform conduct likely to mislead the entire class, and the viability of a UCL claim would turn on inquiry into the practices employed by any given independent agent—such as whether the agent involved in any given transaction took [the defendant]'s training and read [the defendant]'s manuals or used the training and materials in sales presentations, and what materials, disclosures, representations, and explanations were given to any given purchaser. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding those issues predominated and could not be proven on a classwide basis." (Id. at p. 850.)
As do plaintiffs in this case, Kaldenbach relied on Massachusetts Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 1282 [119 Cal.Rptr.2d 190] (Massachusetts Mutual), a case in which an order certifying a class of policyholders was upheld. In Massachusetts Mutual, however, the representations made to the class were common. (Id. at p. 1291.) The Kaldenbach court distinguished Massachusetts Mutual on the basis that Massachusetts Mutual "involved identical misrepresentations and/or nondisclosures by the defendants made to the entire class." (Kaldenbach, supra, 178 Cal.App.4th at p. 849.) The court explained, "In other words, there was no issue about the defendants' uniform business practices giving rise to the UCL claim." (Ibid.) In Kaldenbach, and in this case, there is such an issue.
Plaintiffs argue, however, that the class action must be allowed to proceed because it cannot be disputed that the language in the policies themselves which suggests permanence is indisputably amenable to common proof. While policy language clearly is amenable to common proof, plaintiffs did not seek class certification on the basis that the policy language standing alone was misleading; they alleged that it was misleading in the context of the entire marketing scheme. Indeed, plaintiffs' motion for class certification stated, "[L]iability depends . . . on the combination of illustration, policy design, annual statements[,] agent training, and marketing materials, all emanating from [Farmers] in Los Angeles, and all directed at persuading policyholders to buy underfunded term insurance policies in the belief that they would offer the kind of permanent protection whole life policies provide at a lower cost [citations]." (Italics added.)
In any event, even if plaintiffs were permitted to now raise the argument that they seek to proceed with a class action based solely on the allegedly misleading language of the policies, it is still impossible to consider the language of the policies without considering the information conveyed by the Farmers agents in the process of selling them. (See Knapp v. AT&T Wireless Services, Inc., supra, 195 Cal.App.4th at p. 944 [individual issues prevailed when many of the class members may have received information explaining the allegedly concealed fact].) Plaintiffs are implicitly aware of this; their opening brief identifies a policy reference which is allegedly improper "[w]ithout further explanation"; Farmers's evidence is that such further explanations were provided to many members of the prospective class, and
In this case, we are concerned with alleged misrepresentations of policy permanence. The trial court found, on substantial evidence, that the materiality of such representation to any given policyholder is a matter of individual proof. While we acknowledge that materiality is considered pursuant to the objective standard identified above, we agree with the trial court that the issue is nonetheless subject to individual proof under the circumstances of this case. Universal insurance differs from term insurance in a variety of ways. Plaintiffs assume that anyone who purchases universal insurance does so because of one such difference: a universal policy (if sufficiently funded) can be permanent, while term insurance is not. But there are many other ways in which universal insurance varies from term insurance, and FUL and FFUL policyholders may have purchased their insurance for any of these reasons, including: the ability to skip payments and not lose coverage; the ability to increase or decrease FFUL premiums as financial circumstances require; the ability to change the death benefit without obtaining a new policy; and the ability to accrue tax-deferred interest. To a policyholder who purchased the FUL or FFUL with the goal of obtaining insurance for a fixed term, but with the flexibility offered by universal life, permanence would be irrelevant.
This is not a mere hypothetical scenario. Farmers submitted expert testimony indicating that "many, if not most" buyers of universal life do not intend for the insurance to be permanent or do not have an expectation one way or the other as to policy permanence. Moreover, Farmers relied on plaintiffs' own evidence that roughly half of the FFUL policyholders surveyed would have purchased the policy even if they had been told that the premiums were not guaranteed to keep the policy in force to maturity. Given this evidence, we agree with the trial court that it is impossible to determine, as a matter of common proof, whether the allegedly misrepresented permanence of the FUL and FFUL policies was material to the entire class of FUL and FFUL policyholders. While it may have been material to a sizeable
Plaintiffs next argue that policy underfunding negatively affects all policyholders, and is actionable regardless of how long the policyholder expects to keep the policy. As plaintiffs did not specifically seek certification on the basis of underfunding standing alone, the trial court did not address it.
Plaintiffs argued that Farmers set the premiums for the FUL policies so low that the policies would lapse even if the policyholders paid all of the premiums. Farmers disagreed, stating that, despite policy language which could be interpreted to the contrary, Farmers's practice was to keep the policies in force if the required premiums were paid, regardless of whether the accumulation account dropped to a zero balance. We express no opinion as to the merits of this issue. Plaintiffs have not attempted to certify a class of FUL policyholders whose policies lapsed even though they paid all required premiums.
We have already noted other areas in which plaintiffs proffered evidence of further alleged Farmers's misconduct, such as the 20 percent surcharge imposed on policyholders paying their premiums quarterly. Plaintiffs have not sought to certify a class challenging any of these practices, nor does it appear that either of the named plaintiffs were actually subject to them. As we have already noted, we leave it to the trial court's discretion, on remand, to determine whether it should consider any subsequent motion for class certification, should plaintiffs choose to proceed on an alternative basis.
The order denying class certification is affirmed, and the matter remanded for further proceedings consistent with the views expressed in this opinion.
Klein, P. J., and Kitching, J., concurred.
