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GUEVARA v. VENTURY COUNTY COM. COLLEGE DIST., B225218. (2011)

Court: Court of Appeals of California Number: incaco20110713009 Visitors: 7
Filed: Jul. 13, 2011
Latest Update: Jul. 13, 2011
Summary: NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS GILBERT, P.J. Larry Guevara appeals a judgment denying his petition for writ of mandate (Code Civ. Proc., 1094.5) against defendants Ventura County Community College District (District), the Personnel Commission of the Ventura County Community College District (Commission), James Botting, James Meznek and Sue Johnson. He filed the petition to set aside the Commission's decision to terminate his employment as a District police officer. We conclude,
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NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

GILBERT, P.J.

Larry Guevara appeals a judgment denying his petition for writ of mandate (Code Civ. Proc., § 1094.5) against defendants Ventura County Community College District (District), the Personnel Commission of the Ventura County Community College District (Commission), James Botting, James Meznek and Sue Johnson. He filed the petition to set aside the Commission's decision to terminate his employment as a District police officer. We conclude, among other things, that: 1) substantial evidence supports the findings that Guevara made false statements to the District's chancellor and to a misconduct investigator, and 2) the decision to terminate Guevara is not an abuse of discretion. We affirm.

FACTS

Guevara was a District police officer and the president of the Police Officers Association (POA), a union representing District police officers. At a POA meeting, a majority of the members voted that they had no confidence in Chief of Police James Botting.

On September 22, 2004, Guevara met with District Chancellor James Meznek and District Trustee Arturo Hernandez. Guevara gave Meznek a list of 52 issues regarding Botting's unsatisfactory performance as chief of police. At the top of the list was a notation, "Vote of No Confidence 10 to 2." Meznek heard Guevara say that the list was the basis for the no confidence vote.

The District appointed Jeffrey Love, an Irvine police officer, to conduct an investigation to review the 52 allegations and determine whether Botting had committed misconduct. During the investigation, Love discovered that the list was never presented to the POA for a vote, and the no confidence vote was not 10 to 2; it was 8 to 5.

Point 12 of the 52-point list contained an allegation that Botting had yelled at cadet Adam Romo. Guevara told Love that he had recently learned during a conversation with Romo that this accusation was false. Love contacted Romo who said, "I've never talked [to] Officer Guevara about this incident."

The District issued a notice of intent to terminate Guevara's employment on the grounds that he had falsely represented to Meznek that the 52-point list had been presented to the POA. In that notice the District alleged, "This deliberate untruth on your part had the foreseeable effect of causing the Chancellor to believe that the vote was taken based on these 52 allegations even though you knew that this was not true." It also alleged that Guevara told Love that he had discussed the allegation in point 12 with Romo, but Guevara "had never at any time discussed that allegation with" him.

Guevara appealed. His case was assigned to a hearing officer for the Commission.

At the hearing Meznek testified that Guevara told him that the list of 52 points was the basis for the no confidence vote and that the vote tally was 10 to 2. Guevara testified, "I never made such a representation." Guevara said he visited Romo and asked, "`I heard you got yelled at by the chief.'" He said Romo responded, "[I]t really wasn't that big of a deal. It kind of got blown out of proportion, and that he really wasn't yelled at."

Trustee Hernandez testified that he did not hear Guevara tell Meznek that the 52-point document had been presented to the POA. On cross-examination, a copy of a phone interview between Love and Hernandez was introduced. In that conversation, when Love asked Hernandez whether Guevara made the statement to Meznek, Hernandez responded, "No I don't remember."

At the hearing, Romo was shown a transcript of his conversation with Love where Romo is quoted as saying he never discussed the yelling incident with Guevara. Romo testified, "Yeah, that's what it says in the transcript. I really don't remember." On cross-examination, counsel asked, "Is it possible you talked to Officer Guevara and just didn't remember it because it wasn't an issue in your mind?" Romo responded, "Like I said, I don't remember. It was such a long time ago. . . . It could have come up, but it has been so long ago I don't remember."

The hearing officer ruled that Guevara should be reinstated. The Commission reversed. It found, "Guevara was untruthful in his communications with . . . Meznek and with the investigator who conducted the internal investigation . . . ."

Guevara filed a petition for writ of administrative mandamus. The trial court denied the petition and found, among other things, that: 1) it had made an "independent review" of the administrative record; 2) there was no vote by the POA on the 52-point list; 3) any representation that there was such a vote is "a falsehood"; 4) Guevara "allowed a false . . . statement to be acted upon" by Meznek; 4) Hernandez's testimony was "inconsistent"; and 5) Romo's statement to Love during the investigation was unequivocal, but his testimony at the administrative hearing was "equivocal at best." The court upheld the Commission's decision that the punishment should be employment termination rather than suspension. It said, "It's entirely legitimate for an entity that decides whether they're going to retain the services of a peace officer to decide . . . we don't want a guy with a history of dishonesty."

DISCUSSION

Substantial Evidence

Guevara contends there is insufficient evidence to support the findings that he engaged in dishonest conduct. We disagree.

In administrative mandamus actions involving the termination of public employees, the "trial court exercises its independent judgment on the evidence and examines the entire administrative record . . . ." (Deegan v. City of Mountain View (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 37, 45.) It "resolves evidentiary conflicts and is required to assess witnesses' credibility and to arrive at its own independent findings of fact." (Ibid.) "On appeal, we review the record to determine whether substantial evidence supports the trial court's conclusions, and we resolve all conflicts and indulge all reasonable inferences in favor of the prevailing party." (Ibid.)

False Statement to Meznek

Here there is substantial evidence that Guevara falsely represented to Meznek that the 52-point document was voted on by the POA. Meznek testified that Guevara repeatedly told him that the document was the basis of the no confidence vote. He said Guevara told him, "It was brought to their police officers meeting and it was voted 10 to 2." The top of the document contains a notation, "Vote of No Confidence 10 to 2."

The trial court found that there was no POA vote on the 52-point list. That finding is supported by the record. Love interviewed officers who were at that meeting. They said, "[N]o document was presented to them upon which to vote." There was a POA no confidence vote. But it was not on this document, and it was not 10 to 2. The notation on the list that the vote was 10 to 2 was false; the vote "was actually 8 to 5."

Guevara cites to portions of the record that he claims support his position. But the issue is not whether some evidence supports Guevara, it is whether substantial evidence supports the judgment.

In the trial court, Guevara argued that Hernandez's testimony corroborated his position. Hernandez said he did not hear Guevara tell Meznek that the 52-point document was presented to the POA and voted on. But in an earlier interview with Love, Hernandez said he did not remember. As to this inconsistency, the trial court said, "[I]t really fights logic to assume that one's recollection is better later in time than earlier in time." This was a negative credibility finding that we may not disturb, and, unlike the trial court, we may not weigh the evidence. Only the trial court could resolve the evidentiary conflicts. Guevara has not shown why it could not reasonably infer that he made the representation about a 10 to 2 vote with the intent to deceive.

False Statement To Investigator Love

In upholding the Commission's decision, the trial court adopted the finding that Guevara made a false statement to Love during his investigation. Point 12 contained the accusation that Botting yelled at Romo. Guevara told Love he had recently spoken with Romo, and "it was only then that he learned that the Chief did not yell" at him. But Romo told Love, "I've never talked [to] Officer Guevara about this incident." (Italics added.)

Guevara contends there is no substantial evidence to support a finding that he lied about having the conversation with Romo. He claims Romo made a "retreat" at the hearing by stating, "I really don't remember." Romo testified that his conversation with Love "was so long ago" that he could not recall what he told him. Guevara claims this supports his testimony about having the conversation with Romo. But the trial court resolved the conflict. It found that Romo "unequivocally" denied that any conversation about point 12 took place when talking with Love, but his later testimony "was equivocal at best." The trial court gave no weight to his equivocal testimony. It could reasonably infer that his earlier statement to Love was entitled to more weight when his recollection was better. We do not reweigh the evidence or make credibility findings. Guevara has not shown a lack of substantial evidence.

Termination of Employment

Guevara contends the decision to terminate his employment was an abuse of discretion. He suggests that there was no evidence of "public harm" and consequently the penalty of dismissal is inappropriate. The District responds that termination was proper because Guevara held a position of trust where dishonesty cannot be tolerated.

A "`police officer must be held to a higher standard than other employees. A police officer is expected to tell the truth.'" (Nicolini v. County of Tuolumne (1987) 190 Cal.App.3d 619, 629.) Where an officer's conduct falls below that standard, termination of employment is appropriate. (Ibid.) "`Dishonesty in such matters of public trust is intolerable.'" (Id. at p. 628.)

Here Guevara made false statements to the chancellor and an investigator. The trial court found that these were material misrepresentations because the list "became an accusatory document" and it initiated an investigation. It found the penalty of dismissal fell within the Commission's range of discretion.

Guevara suggests the trial court abused its discretion by upholding his termination. But "[w]ith respect to the question of penalty, the superior court's powers of review are quite limited, and are exercised only with great deference to the administrative agency's findings." (Deegan v. City of Mountain View, supra, 72 Cal.App.4th at p. 45.) "Neither the trial court nor the appellate court is entitled to substitute its discretion for that of the administrative agency concerning the degree of punishment imposed." (Ibid.) "`It may be that others might have decided that a term suspension rather than discharge was the appropriate sanction but "[t]he fact that reasonable minds may differ as to the propriety of the penalty imposed [will fortify] the conclusion that the administrative body acted within the area of discretion."'" (Nicolini v. County of Tuolumne, supra, 190 Cal.App.3d at p. 629.) Guevara has not shown an abuse of discretion.

We have reviewed Guevara's remaining contentions and conclude he has not shown error.

The judgment is affirmed. Costs on appeal are awarded in favor of respondents.

We concur.

COFFEE, J.

PERREN, J.

Source:  Leagle

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