NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

BIGELOW, P. J.

The juvenile court sustained two petitions filed pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 602,1 and found minor I.M. committed the offenses of felony second degree robbery (Pen. Code, § 211) and misdemeanor battery (Pen. Code, § 242). The juvenile court ordered appellant home on probation, but set a maximum term of confinement. Appellant contends, and we agree, that the court's order setting a maximum term of confinement was improper and must be stricken. Appellant further contends the juvenile court miscalculated his predisposition custody credits. We agree and modify the order.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Appellant's arguments on appeal concern dispositional issues, thus we provide only a brief summary of the facts. In April 2010, the People filed two section 602 petitions regarding appellant. In the first petition, the People alleged appellant committed robbery and personally used a knife in the commission of the crime. The petition was based on allegations that appellant robbed a classmate of his cell phone. In the second petition, the People alleged appellant committed misdemeanor battery and misdemeanor vandalism. The second petition was based on allegations that appellant spit on his mother during an argument, then slammed a door at their house, breaking a window. The juvenile court sustained the first petition and the misdemeanor battery count of the second petition. The court placed appellant home on probation. The court also announced a maximum term of confinement of eight years and two months. The court awarded appellant 62 days of custody credits.

DISCUSSION

I. Maximum Term of Confinement

Although the juvenile court placed appellant home on probation, it also set a maximum term of confinement. The parties agree that this term of confinement had no legal effect. Section 726, subdivision (c) generally requires that the juvenile court specify a maximum term of confinement that cannot exceed the time of confinement allowable for an adult convicted of the same offense. But when a minor is not removed from the physical custody of his parents, section 726, subdivision (c) does not apply. (In re Matthew A. (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 537, 541 (Matthew A.); In re Ali A. (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 569, 573-574 (Ali A.).) The juvenile court's order setting a maximum term of confinement has no legal effect and was not authorized by statute. (Matthew A., at p. 541.)

In Matthew A., this court concluded juvenile courts that specify a term of confinement "may have the best of reasons, such as `sending a message' to the juvenile that the transgression was serious. But if the Legislature thought that this should be done, it would have been easy to write the statute to permit this practice. We think it should cease." (Matthew A., supra, 165 Cal.App.4th at p. 541.) We therefore found striking the improper term of confinement was proper. The People cite Ali A. for the proposition that an improper designation of a maximum confinement term does not prejudice a minor and need not be stricken because it has no legal effect. However, striking the confinement term avoids the possibility that it might be used as a benchmark in future proceedings, and provides the appellant with an accurate dispositional order. As we explained in Matthew A., we believe the better practice is to strike the statutorily unjustified order setting a maximum term of confinement.

II. Custody Credits

Appellant also contends the juvenile court miscalculated his predisposition custody credits. Section 726 has been interpreted as entitling a minor to credit for time previously spent in physical confinement when the court subsequently selects confinement as a disposition. (In re Emilio C. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 1058, 1067; In re Randy J. (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 1497, 1503.) Here, since the juvenile court placed appellant home on probation instead of ordering physical confinement it was not required to determine the predisposition custody credits. The People argue the juvenile court erred by awarding any predisposition credit at all, and anything awarded is "irrelevant."

Because the court calculated appellant's custody credits and entered the number of credits into the record, we will review the court's determination. We see no reason to allow an incorrect calculation of credits to remain on the record. Should appellant violate the terms of his probation, the juvenile court's previous determination of the number of predisposition custody credits to which he is entitled may become relevant.

We agree with appellant that he was entitled to 65 days of predisposition custody credits rather than 62.2 He was taken into custody and detained on April 20, 2010. The record indicates he was detained until June 24, 2010, a total of 65 days. The dispositional order must be modified accordingly.

DISPOSITION

The June 24, 2010 order is modified as follows: The maximum term of confinement is stricken. The number of predisposition custody credit is modified to reflect 65 days of credit. As modified, the order is affirmed.

RUBIN, J. and FLIER, J., concurs.