NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

OPINION

DETJEN, J.

This is an appeal from a judgment denying a petition for writ of administrative mandate. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 1094.5.) The employment of Chris Coleman (appellant) as a police officer for the City of Fresno (respondent City) was terminated by the City of Fresno Civil Service Board (respondent Board). Appellant contends the trial court erred in denying his petition, which sought to overturn respondent Board's administrative order. We conclude the issues appellant raises on appeal are without merit; accordingly, we affirm the judgment.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Appellant does not contend the evidence received at the administrative hearing is insufficient to support the findings of respondent Board. Accordingly, we will summarize the facts only briefly.

Appellant, an 11-year veteran of the Fresno Police Department, was involved in the apprehension of a domestic violence suspect at about 2:00 a.m. on October 10, 2005. After the suspect had been brought to the ground by a police dog and the dog had been disengaged from the suspect's ankle, appellant shot the suspect five or six times with a "less lethal" weapon, namely a shotgun that fired beanbag projectiles. (Appellant asserted that the suspect was not fully compliant with appellant's commands that he raise his hands above his head. Although the suspect initially raised his hands to about shoulder level, he thereafter brought them down to his waist and to his ankle, which had been injured when the police dog attacked the suspect.) After the final shot, appellant told another officer that appellant should shoot the suspect "in the nuts" because "he's not listening to me." The other officer spread the suspect's legs, telling appellant to take the shot. Appellant laughed and declined to do so.

After an internal affairs investigation, which included two interviews with appellant during which he acknowledged all the foregoing facts but contended he had acted appropriately because of the suspect's noncompliance with appellant's commands, the police chief served appellant with an order of termination of employment. The notice specified that termination was based on excessive use of force, unprofessional conduct at the scene of the incident, and dishonesty in the preparation of a subsequent police report.

As permitted by the Fresno Municipal Code, appellant appealed his termination to respondent Board. As provided by that code, evidence was heard by a hearing officer selected by the parties. (See Fresno Mun. Code, § 3-283.) After four days of hearings, the hearing officer issued an extensive (40-page) recommended decision. The hearing officer found the final two shots by appellant "constituted an abuse of authority and excessive use of force in violation of policy." The hearing officer found that appellant's statement and his laughter about shooting the suspect in the groin "was not appropriate and constituted lack of professionalism in violation of policy." The hearing officer did not make a misconduct finding concerning the false police report, stating only that appellant had corrected the report before anyone told him to do so. The hearing officer concluded "there is just cause for the discipline of Appellant," but termination of appellant's employment was not appropriate. He recommended instead that appellant be "reinstated ... without a break in service and without a break in any benefit provisions to which he is entitled, but without any back pay." The net result would have been a suspension without pay for approximately 20 months.

In accordance with municipal code procedures, respondent Board received the hearing officer's findings and recommendation. (See Fresno Mun. Code, § 3-283, subd. (a).) By unanimous vote of its members, respondent Board determined there was just cause for imposition of discipline upon appellant. It concluded appellant "engaged in misconduct by exercising excessive use of force in violation of policy against a suspect by discharging more rounds than necessary from a less-lethal weapon striking the suspect." It also concluded appellant "engaged in inappropriate conduct and exhibited a lack of professionalism in violation of policy at the scene." By a three-to-one vote, respondent Board concluded that discipline would consist of "removal of Appellant from his position as a police officer with the City of Fresno." The dissenting board member would have imposed the discipline recommended by the hearing officer.

Appellant filed a petition for writ of administrative mandate (which neither party designated for inclusion in the record on appeal). The matter was brought for trial on January 8, 2010, and submitted on that date. The parties agree that this proceeding was unreported, and the parties failed to designate the minute order of the hearing for inclusion in the record on appeal. On March 3, 2010, the trial court issued a judgment denying the petition for writ of mandate; the judgment included a statement of decision.

As to the question of misconduct, the trial court first acknowledged that it was required to exercise its independent judgment on the evidence. The court then stated that, "[u]pon independent review, this court agrees that misconduct did occur." As to the question of the level of discipline imposed, the court acknowledged that the applicable standard of review required that the discipline imposed by the agency not be disturbed unless shown to have been a manifest abuse of discretion. The court found respondent Board had not abused its discretion. Further, the court found "the transcript of the administrative hearing support[s] `reasonable cause' for [appellant's] termination from the Fresno Police Department."

Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal.

DISCUSSION

Appellant raises two limited issues in this appeal. Notably, he does not contend the evidence fails to support respondent Board's findings, nor that the findings fail to support the discipline imposed by respondent Board. Instead, he contends the trial court's statement of decision was inadequate and that the trial court misunderstood the nature of its power to review the level of discipline imposed by respondent Board.

Appellant's first contention is that the trial court's statement of decision is inadequate under Code of Civil Procedure section 632 (hereafter, section 632). Section 632 is applicable to proceedings on a petition for writ of administrative mandate in which the trial court is required to exercise its independent judgment in reviewing the record. (Kazensky v. City of Merced (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 44, 67 (Kazensky).) Section 632, as relevant to this appeal, provides: "The court shall issue a statement of decision explaining the factual and legal basis for its decision as to each of the principal controverted issues at trial upon the request of any party appearing at the trial." If the trial is concluded within one calendar day, as it was in this case, a request for a statement of decision "must be made prior to the submission of the matter for decision." (Ibid.) "The request for a statement of decision shall specify those controverted issues as to which the party is requesting a statement of decision." (Ibid.)

Appellant contends the statement of decision in the present case did not "address the material issues," which he then enumerates, apparently based on the argument presented at trial of the case. This contention fails for several reasons.

First, the record does not demonstrate that appellant requested a statement of decision before the matter was submitted (or at any other time). After respondent City's brief pointed out this flaw, appellant's reply brief appended a declaration by Francesca Gianuario. She declared that she was the attorney who represented appellant in the trial court. "At the end of my oral argument, I requested that Judge Hamilton issue a Statement of Decision." Respondent City and respondent Board filed a joint motion to strike the declaration. This court deferred ruling on the motion. We now grant the motion to strike appellant's attachment to the reply brief. The California Rules of Court provide two alternative methods to bring before the appellate court matters that occurred in unreported proceedings in the trial court. A party may, in a timely manner, provide an agreed statement (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.134) or may seek from the trial court a settled statement of the proceedings (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.137). No rule or other provision of law permits a party to augment the record through declarations appended to the party's brief. Accordingly, appellant has failed to establish on this appeal that he invoked section 632 in the trial court.

Second, even if the declaration of counsel were taken to have any significance, the declaration only states, as relevant here: "At the end of my oral argument, I requested that Judge Hamilton issue a Statement of Decision." Such a request, failing to "specify those controverted issues as to which the party is requesting a statement of decision" as required by section 632, is insufficient to entitle a party to a statement of decision. (Conservatorship of Hume (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 1385, 1394.)

Third, appellant failed to file a motion as provided by Code of Civil Procedure section 634, objecting to the sufficiency of the court's statement of decision. Accordingly, appellant has waived any objection to the statement of decision. (In re Marriage of Arceneaux (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1130, 1133-1134.) We infer on appeal that the trial court decided in favor of respondent Board all issues necessary to the judgment rendered. (Ibid.)

As noted, appellant does not contend the evidence received at the administrative hearing is insufficient to support the findings of respondent Board. Nor does he dispute that the trial court found that "[u]pon independent review, this court agrees that misconduct did occur." On appeal, we review the judgment under the substantial evidence test. (Fukuda v. City of Angels (1999) 20 Cal.4th 805, 824.) Having reviewed the record, we conclude ample evidence supports the trial court's express and implied findings concerning excessive use of force and unprofessional conduct by appellant.

Appellant's second contention on appeal is that the trial court applied the wrong standard of review when it considered the level of punishment imposed on appellant. He contends the trial court determined that it was without jurisdiction to order modification or reconsideration of the agency's penalty determination. However, the trial court expressly recognized its power to remand the matter to respondent Board for reconsideration of the discipline imposed if the court, upon examination of the administrative record, determined the agency had committed a manifest abuse of discretion in imposing termination. (Kazensky, supra, 65 Cal.App.4th at p. 73.) Instead of determining that it was without power to correct an abuse of discretion as suggested by appellant, the trial court concluded that there had been no abuse of discretion by respondent Board. Accordingly, the trial court denied the petition for administrative mandate.

Having reviewed the record on appeal, including the administrative record, we conclude the trial court correctly perceived and applied the applicable standard of review of an administrative order such as the one before the court.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. Respondents are awarded costs on appeal.

CORNELL, Acting P.J. and DAWSON, J., concurs.