NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

CHANEY, J.

Jose Luis Pavon, Sr. and Maria Del Carmen Herrera (Plaintiffs) filed this action, seeking to recover damages for the loss of their son, Jose Luis Pavon, Jr. (decedent), who was electrocuted while working at the home of defendants Peter and Kristine Glaeser. Plaintiffs sued the Glaesers, Glaeser Builders, Inc. and Glaeser Management Company (Defendants). In their complaint, Plaintiffs alleged a right to recover under two theories: one based on general negligence and one brought under Labor Code section 37061 based on a purported employment relationship between decedent and Defendants.

The trial court granted summary judgment for Defendants. The trial court found that at the time of the accident decedent was an independent contractor, not an employee of Defendants, and therefore an action brought under section 3706 was barred. The trial court concluded that all of Plaintiffs' causes of action were premised on section 3706.

Plaintiffs appeal, arguing that only their first cause of action was brought under section 3706, and their other causes of action were based on a general negligence theory. Plaintiffs contend that summary judgment was improperly granted because Defendants failed to address Plaintiffs' right to recover under a general negligence theory. We agree and reverse the judgment.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On August 16, 2006, decedent was killed by electrocution while performing concrete work at the home of defendants Peter and Kristine Glaeser. Defendants Glaeser Management Co. and Glaeser Builders, Inc. are remodeling and construction businesses associated with the Glaesers. Plaintiffs are decedent's parents and heirs.

1. The Complaint

On August 15, 2008, Plaintiffs filed their complaint against Defendants, using a Judicial Council form complaint for "Personal Injury, Property Damage, Wrongful Death." In paragraph 10 of the form complaint, Plaintiffs checked two boxes, indicating that they were asserting causes of action for "General Negligence" and "Other." Plaintiffs described the latter cause of action as "Negligence by an employer without Worker's Compensation coverage (Labor Code Section 3706)."2

Plaintiffs attached to their form complaint the Judicial Council form for a general negligence cause of action. Under the title, "Cause of Action-General Negligence," Plaintiffs inserted the words, "Pursuant to Labor Code Section 3706." The cause of action alleges that decedent was an employee of Defendants, and was electrocuted during the course and scope of employment due to "the negligence of his employer[,] fellow employees[,] and failure to provide a safe equipment [sic] and safe place to work." Plaintiffs also assert that Defendants did not have workers' compensation insurance. They allege: "Pursuant to Labor Code, Section 3700 et seq., including Labor Code, Section 3706, plaintiff for decedent are [sic] permitted to maintain this civil action against the above-mentioned defendants, who were negligent in creating, allowing, permitting, failing to correct or warn of the dangerous condition causing decedent's injuries and subsequent death and otherwise failed to maintain a safe workplace, all of which was the legal and proximate cause of [decedent's] injuries and untimely death."

Plaintiffs also included two additional causes of action in their complaint. The second cause of action, entitled "For Survival Based on Negligence," incorporates the allegations of the first and third causes of action and alleges that "plaintiffs incurred monetary costs, funeral and burial expenses" as a "legal and proximate result of the defendants' actions as herein alleged." The third cause of action incorporates the allegations of the first and second causes of action and alleges that Plaintiffs "have suffered and will continue to suffer the loss of Jose Luis Pavon, Jr.'s love, companionship, comfort, affection, society, solace, and moral support and have forever lost the physical assistance of decedent in the care, operation and maintenance of the home."

2. The Motion for Summary Judgment and/or Motion for Summary Adjudication

Defendants moved for summary judgment, or in the alternative, summary adjudication of the first cause of action. Defendants maintained that at the time of electrocution, decedent was working as an independent contractor and therefore was not an employee of any defendant. Defendants argued that without the requisite employer-employee relationship, an action under section 3706 could not proceed. Defendants also claimed that the entity that hired decedent as an independent contractor, Glaeser Management Co., had workers' compensation insurance and therefore section 3706 was inapplicable. In opposition to the motion, Plaintiffs argued that triable issues of material fact existed as to whether decedent was an employee or an independent contractor at the time of the accident.

At the hearing on Defendants' motion, the parties argued about whether decedent was an employee and if so, who hired him. Plaintiffs' counsel pointed out, "If he's an independent contractor, then what we're left with essentially is a negligence cause of action." Defendants did not address the general negligence claim in their papers or at the hearing.

The trial court granted the motion for summary judgment. The court found that decedent was working as an independent contractor at the time of the accident and therefore Plaintiffs could not establish a prima facie case in an action based on section 3706.

3. Objection to Summary Judgment

After the trial court granted summary judgment, Plaintiffs filed an objection to Defendants' proposed judgment, arguing that the court should have granted Defendants' motion for summary adjudication with respect to the "First Cause of Action for Negligence" only. Plaintiffs suggested that only the first cause of action sought relief pursuant to section 3706. The trial court overruled the objection with a handwritten note stating, "All causes of action premised on Labor Code § 3706." The court entered judgment for Defendants.3

4. Issue on Appeal

Plaintiffs do not contend that the trial court erred in its determination that no triable issue of fact existed as to whether decedent was an employee of Defendants at the time of the accident. Accordingly, Plaintiffs are not opposed to summary adjudication of a cause of action brought under section 3706. Plaintiffs argue that their complaint asserts two causes of action based on general negligence in addition to a cause of action based on section 3706. Plaintiffs maintain that summary judgment was inappropriate because Defendants failed to show that they were entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the causes of action based on general negligence.

DISCUSSION

1. Standard of Review

A trial court should grant summary judgment when no triable issue exists as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).) We review the trial court's ruling on a motion for summary judgment de novo. (Adams v. Explorer Insurance Co. (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 438, 445.) To obtain summary judgment, a moving defendant must show that one or more elements of each cause of action cannot be established or that there is a complete defense to each cause of action. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).) Once the moving defendant has met its burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that a triable issue of material fact exists as to each cause of action or asserted defense. (Ibid.)

"`"[A] motion for summary judgment must be directed to the issues raised by the pleadings."'" (County of Santa Clara v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 292, 332-333.) Therefore, "[a] defendant's motion for summary judgment necessarily includes a test of the sufficiency of the complaint." (American Airlines, Inc v. County of San Mateo (1996) 12 Cal.4th 1110, 1117.) "In the construction of a pleading, for the purpose of determining its effect, its allegations must be liberally construed, with a view to substantial justice between the parties." (Code Civ. Proc., § 452.)

2. A General Negligence Claim Was Asserted in the Pleadings

Plaintiffs argue that their complaint alleges one cause of action based on section 3706 and two causes of action based on a general negligence theory. Plaintiffs contend that the finding that decedent was an independent contractor only bars their cause of action based on section 3706. Therefore, summary judgment was inappropriate.

As set forth above, Plaintiffs used a Judicial Council form complaint to assert their causes of action. On the form, Plaintiffs checked the box indicating they had attached a "General Negligence" cause of action. They also checked the box "Other," with a written description stating, "Negligence by an employer without Worker's Compensation coverage (Labor Code Section 3706)." These checked boxes indicate that Plaintiffs were alleging two theories for relief: one based on general negligence and one based on section 3706.

Plaintiffs included sufficient allegations in the attached causes of action to state a general negligence claim, regardless of decedent's employment status. They alleged that Defendants were "negligent in creating, allowing, permitting, failing to correct or warn of the dangerous condition causing decedent's injuries and subsequent death and otherwise failed to maintain a safe workplace, all of which was the legal and proximate cause of decedent's injuries and untimely death." All causes of action in the complaint incorporate these allegations regarding Defendants' negligent conduct. Thus, the complaint contains the requisite elements to sufficiently plead general negligence. (See Hoyem v. Manhattan Beach City School Dist. (1978) 22 Cal.3d 508, 514 ["Under well established principles, such general allegations of negligence, proximate causation and resulting injury and damages suffice to state a cause of action . . . ."].)

Plaintiffs also included other allegations supporting a cause of action based on section 3706 — that decedent was Defendants' employee and Defendants were not insured. If the trial court found that decedent was an employee of Defendants, Plaintiffs would have a negligence claim pursuant to section 3706. Alternatively, if the trial court found that decedent was not an employee of Defendants, Plaintiffs would be left with a general negligence claim.

3. Summary Judgment Was Improperly Granted Because the General Negligence Claim Was Never Addressed

Plaintiffs contend that Defendants did not meet their burden on summary judgment because they did not demonstrate that they were entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Plaintiffs' causes of action based on a general negligence theory. We agree.

Defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that decedent was not an employee of any defendant. Defendants also asserted that the company which hired decedent as an independent contractor, Glaeser Management Co., had workers' compensation insurance at the time of the accident. Therefore, a cause of action under section 3706 failed as a matter of law. Plaintiffs opposed the motion, arguing that decedent was an employee of uninsured defendant, Glaeser Builders, Inc. Plaintiffs maintained that summary judgment should not be granted because there was a triable issue as to whether decedent was an employee of Defendants at the time of the accident. At the hearing, Plaintiffs' counsel argued that if the court made a finding that decedent was an independent contractor, Plaintiffs were left with their general negligence claim. Defendants did not address Plaintiffs' general negligence claim in their moving papers or at the hearing. Nevertheless, the court granted summary judgment.

Defendants claim that Plaintiffs waived their right to challenge the summary judgment on this ground because they did not raise the argument about their general negligence theory in written opposition to the motion. However, Plaintiffs argued orally at the hearing that they had a general negligence claim that was independent from the claim brought under section 3706. Moreover, even if Plaintiffs did not adequately address the issue in their written opposition to the summary judgment motion, it was not Plaintiffs' burden to do so. Because Plaintiffs sufficiently asserted a right to relief based on a general negligence theory in their complaint, Defendants had the burden of demonstrating that Plaintiffs could not recover on this theory. However, Defendants never asserted that they were entitled to judgment as a matter of law as to the causes of action based on general negligence. "[S]ummary judgment may not be granted on a ground not asserted by the moving party . . . ." (Cordova v. 21st Century Ins. Co. (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 89, 109.) Therefore, summary judgment was erroneously granted.

Plaintiffs concede that their first cause of action was based on section 3706, and the trial court properly granted Defendants' motion as to that cause of action. Plaintiffs argue that their second cause of action for survival and their third cause of action for wrongful death were based on a general negligence theory that was not addressed in the motion for summary judgment. These causes of action incorporate the allegations regarding Defendants' negligent conduct. We agree with Plaintiffs that these causes of action should have survived Defendants' motion, regardless of decedent's employment status, because Defendants did not address Plaintiffs' general negligence theory.

We express no opinion as to whether Plaintiffs' remaining causes of action are valid and can withstand a subsequent summary judgment motion. Rather, we conclude that it was improper for the trial court to dismiss these causes of action, which were based on a general negligence theory, when Defendants failed to address them in the summary judgment motion.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded. The trial court is directed to enter an order granting Defendants' motion for summary adjudication of the first cause of action brought under Labor Code section 3706, and denying the motion as to the second and third causes of action in Plaintiffs' complaint. Plaintiffs are entitled to recover costs on appeal.

MALLANO, P. J. and JOHNSON, J., concurs.