NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

OPINION

MOORE, J.

Appellant Gregory Alan Jones was arrested for driving under the influence and ultimately had his driver's license suspended for one year for refusing to submit to a chemical test. Arguing that he was given the required admonition under confusing circumstances and did not refuse to test, he filed a petition for a writ of mandate, which the trial court denied. We conclude that substantial evidence supports the trial court's finding that appellant was properly admonished yet refused to test, and we therefore affirm the judgment.

I

FACTS

One evening in March 2010, Officer Wong of the Irvine Police Department observed Jones's vehicle from his patrol car. He noticed that Jones's vehicle was "weaving" between two lanes in violation of Vehicle Code section 21658, subdivision (a).1 Upon contact with Jones, Wong observed that Jones's eyes were red and watery and his face was flushed. As they spoke, Wong detected an odor of alcohol coming from Jones's breath.

Wong asked if Jones knew why he had been pulled over, and Jones became defensive and stated he did not know. Wong informed him that in addition to weaving between lanes, the license plate light on his vehicle was not functioning, in violation of section 24601. Jones stated he did not realize he was weaving and that his was not the only vehicle on the road with the license plate light out.

When asked how much alcohol he had consumed that night, Jones initially replied "nothing." When asked again, he responded, "one or two beers." Wong continued asking related questions, but Jones refused to answer. Wong ordered Jones out of his vehicle to administer field sobriety tests, but Jones refused. Based on Jones's driving, the observed symptoms of intoxication, and his refusal to participate in field sobriety tests, Wong arrested Jones for driving under the influence in violation of section 23152, subdivision (a). While Jones was in the police vehicle, Wong advised him four times of the implied consent law and asked if he would consent to a chemical blood or breath test. Jones refused to answer, and was taken to the Irvine Police Department.

Once at the station, approximately one hour after the original stop, Wong gave Jones yet another admonition which was video recorded by another officer. Wong read the entire admonition from a standardized form2 and again asked Jones if he would consent to a chemical test. Jones again refused to answer, instead arguing the basis upon which he was pulled over and stating that he "would like more time." A forced blood draw was then taken. The test established that Jones's blood-alcohol level was .04, and the district attorney did not prosecute.

Pursuant to sections 13353.2 and 13353.3, Wong served Jones with a suspension order and temporary driver's license and filed a sworn statement with the Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) stating that he had reasonable cause to believe that Jones had been driving under the influence and had refused to submit to a chemical test. An administrative per se hearing was held at Jones's request to determine whether the suspension was justified. The DMV admitted Wong's sworn statement and arrest report into evidence.

Jones submitted the recorded admonition at the police station into evidence. He also testified that he did not refuse to take a chemical test, but started addressing the camera as to why he had been pulled over. He stated he was being asked different questions by different officers. When he said that he needed more time, he said he wanted additional time to answer the officer holding the camera before responding to Wong. He did not address the admonitions he received in the car on the way to the police station.

The DMV issued a decision suspending Jones's license for one year. The DMV concluded that Jones "did refuse or fail to complete the chemical test or tests after being requested to do so by a peace officer." The video, the DMV concluded, showed that Jones was "demonstrative of someone who did not wish to be admonished. He was looking upwards towards the ceiling (several seconds), then looked down towards the floor (several times) and continued to engage the CAMERA officer in an oral debate as to the merits of the observed Probable Cause and continued to speak into the CAMERA, which was on his right side. This placed [Jones's] line of sight looking totally away from Officer Wong. [Jones] kept looking into the CAMERA and seemingly repeated `I MADE A LANE CHANGE!' Officer Wong continued to FACE [Jones's] body (now twisted to the right and looking away from Officer Wong). Officer Wong was observed to have properly admonished the unwilling [Jones], who by his observed unwillingness to listen, impeded his own admonition and was unwilling to answer the straight forward questions posed to him . . . . Therefore, based upon the totality of [Jones's] unwilling behavior, demeanor, and perpetual verbal debate over the observed probable cause during the reading of the admonition and limited testimony from [Jones], it shall be determined that Officer Wong . . . did properly admonish [Jones]. [Jones] then and of his own volition, decided to wantonly and willfully refuse to listen to the admonition, where his demeanor, actions and obstreperous behavior leads a reasonable person to believe that [Jones] refused all chemical tests."

Jones filed a petition for a writ of mandate, again arguing he was not properly admonished, did not refuse to submit to a chemical test, and was confused. The court denied the petition, concluding that Jones refused to submit to a chemical test after having been admonished by Officer Wong. Jones now appeals.

II

DISCUSSION

Standard of Review

DMV administrative decisions under section 13353 are reviewable by administrative mandamus under Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5. "In ruling on an application for a writ of mandate following an order of suspension . . . a trial court is required to determine, based on its independent judgment, `"whether the weight of the evidence supported the administrative decision."' [Citations.]" (Lake v. Reed (1997) 16 Cal.4th 448, 456-457.) "On appeal, we `need only review the record to determine whether the trial court's findings are supported by substantial evidence.' [Citation.]" (Id. at p. 457.)

Upon review for substantial evidence, "[w]e view the evidence most favorably to the prevailing party, giving it the benefit of every reasonable inference and resolving all conflicts in its favor. [Citation.] Substantial evidence is evidence of ponderable legal significance, reasonable, credible and of solid value. [Citation.]" (Oregel v. American Isuzu Motors, Inc. (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 1094, 1100.) "`"Where the evidence supports more than one inference, we may not substitute our deductions for the trial court's. [Citation.] We may overturn the trial court's factual findings only if the evidence before the trial court is insufficient as a matter of law to sustain those findings. [Citation.]"' [Citations.]" (Lake v. Reed, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 457.)

Pertinent Law

Under section 23612 (the implied consent law), "A person who drives a motor vehicle is deemed to have given his or her consent to chemical testing of his or her blood or breath for the purpose of determining the alcoholic content of his or her blood, if lawfully arrested for an offense allegedly committed in violation of Section 23140, 23152, or 23153." (§ 23162, subd. (a)(1)(A).)

Section 13353 states, in relevant part: "If a person refuses the officer's request to submit to, or fails to complete, a chemical test or tests pursuant to Section 23612, upon receipt of the officer's sworn statement that the officer had reasonable cause to believe the person had been driving a motor vehicle in violation of Section 23140, 23152,3 or 23153, and that the person had refused to submit to, or did not complete, the test or tests after being requested by the officer, the department shall do one of the following: [¶] (1) Suspend the person's privilege to operate a motor vehicle for a period of one year."

As pertinent here, under subdivision (d), the scope of the DMV's review of a suspension under section 13353 shall include: "(1) Whether the peace officer had reasonable cause to believe the person had been driving a motor vehicle in violation of Section . . . 23152 . . . . [¶] (2) Whether the person was placed under arrest. [¶] (3) Whether the person refused to submit to, or did not complete, the test or tests after being requested by a peace officer. [¶] (4) Whether . . . the person had been told that his or her driving privilege would be suspended or revoked if he or she refused to submit to, or did not complete, the test or tests."

The only issues present in this case are whether there was substantial evidence that Jones was properly admonished and whether he indeed refused the chemical test.

Proper Admonition

An officer has a duty to take steps to communicate the admonition required under section 13353 "in a manner comprehensible to the driver." (Thompson v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1980) 107 Cal.App.3d 354, 363.) Setting aside the additional admonitions that Wong offered to Jones in the car for a moment, we conclude there is more than substantial evidence that the required admonition was properly and effectively communicated to Jones at the police station. Contrary to Jones's arguments, there was nothing confusing or misleading.

The videotape shows that Wong read the required admonition nearly word for word from the sworn statement. No one else was speaking as Wong spoke. There was no significant background noise. The admonition clearly stated that Jones was 1) required to take a chemical test and had a choice of blood or breath, 2) his failure to do so would result in the suspension of driving privileges, and 3) he was not entitled to a lawyer before the test. The following exchange then occurred:

Jones claims that the video recording shows the mere presence of the officer recording the admonition rendered him "confused and distracted." While he was certainly looking at the video camera, there is nothing from the circumstances to suggest that the mere presence of the camera while Wong read the admonition rendered it ineffective. There was more than substantial evidence that Jones was capable of hearing Wong speak — he did not, for example, interrupt Wong while he was speaking. Jones asked no questions. Indeed, the video recording does not indicate any confusion at all. What it does reveal, as the DMV hearing officer indicated, was a person far more interested in arguing about the reasons for the initial traffic stop than in addressing the matter at hand. Jones's decision to argue with the officers was a choice, and it does not prevent Wong's near-verbatim reading of the statutory admonition from being effective.

Further, the trial court had undisputed evidence from which it could conclude that Jones was admonished in the car four separate times. Wong's report, which was admitted into evidence at the administrative hearing, stated: "I advised Jones, four times, of the implied consent law and asked if he would consent to a chemical blood or breath test, however, Jones refused to answer." Jones argues that the evidence that these admonitions were effective is insufficient because the report fails to give details as to the circumstances of the admonitions.

Under the substantial evidence standard of review, however, "[w]e view the evidence most favorably to the prevailing party, giving it the benefit of every reasonable inference and resolving all conflicts in its favor. [Citation.]" (Oregel v. American Isuzu Motors, Inc., supra, 90 Cal.App.4th at p. 1100.) Further, Evidence Code section 664 creates a presumption that an "official duty has been regularly performed." This presumption "effectuates the policy of relieving governmental officials from having to justify their conduct whenever it is called into question." (Jackson v. City of Los Angeles (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 769, 782.) While the presumption is rebuttable, Jones failed to do so. He neither called Wong to testify at the administrative hearing nor testified himself about the admonitions in the car. Unrebutted by Jones, the DMV is entitled to the benefit of the presumption that the admonitions in the car were properly given.4 Thus, whether the admonitions are viewed together or separately, there was more than substantial evidence from which the trial court could conclude that Jones was properly admonished.

Refusal to Test

Substantial evidence also supports the trial court's conclusion that Jones refused to comply with the testing requirement. To comply with the law, a "driver should clearly and unambiguously manifest the consent required by the law. Consent which is not clear and unambiguous may be deemed a refusal." (Carrey v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1986) 183 Cal.App.3d 1265, 1270. Further, "[a] motorist's silence in the face of a police officer's repeated requests that he submit to a chemical test and that he choose a test to determine the alcohol content of his blood, constitutes a refusal to submit to a chemical test under section 13353. [Citation.]" (Buchanan v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1979) 100 Cal.App.3d 293, 299.)

There is no real question here that Jones refused consent. He remained silent, refused to answer, and asked for more time. His consistent lack of cooperation as reported by Wong in the field continued through the recorded conversation in the police station. Instead of answering the question posed to him, Jones's evident desire was to continue to argue about the initial traffic stop. His words and his conduct both manifest refusal, and therefore the trial court's decision is supported by more than substantial evidence.

III

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. The DMV is entitled to its costs on appeal.

BEDSWORTH, ACTING P. J. and FYBEL, J., concurs.