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PEOPLE v. RAMIREZ, B225331. (2011)

Court: Court of Appeals of California Number: incaco20111007029 Visitors: 6
Filed: Oct. 07, 2011
Latest Update: Oct. 07, 2011
Summary: NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS KLEIN, P.J. Defendant and appellant, Felipe Ramirez, appeals the judgment entered following his conviction for continuous sexual abuse of a minor, rape (2 counts) and lewd acts on a child (2 counts). (Pen. Code 288.5, 261, subd. (a)(2), 288, subd. (c)(1).) 1 He was sentenced to state prison for a term of 34 years. The judgment is affirmed. BACKGROUND Viewed in accordance with the usual rule of appellate review ( People v. Ochoa (1993) 6 Cal.
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NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

KLEIN, P.J.

Defendant and appellant, Felipe Ramirez, appeals the judgment entered following his conviction for continuous sexual abuse of a minor, rape (2 counts) and lewd acts on a child (2 counts). (Pen. Code §§ 288.5, 261, subd. (a)(2), 288, subd. (c)(1).)1 He was sentenced to state prison for a term of 34 years.

The judgment is affirmed.

BACKGROUND

Viewed in accordance with the usual rule of appellate review (People v. Ochoa (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1199, 1206), the evidence established the following.

1. Prosecution evidence.

Fifteen-year-old BB2 testified her mother's boy friend, defendant Ramirez, molested her over the course of several years beginning when she was twelve. Ramirez had been in a relationship with BB's mother since BB was three years old, and he was like a father to her.3

BB testified the sexual abuse started with Ramirez doing "small things, like he would be . . . touching my butt, like putting his hand under my clothes touching my butt." "[Later he began] reaching down the front of my pants to touch me in my private parts. [¶] And then . . . he would start asking me to take off my clothes, and he would start giving me oral sex." BB testified Ramirez would "take off his pants and his underwear and start like pushing against me with his penis, like, and simulating sex, but without having his penis go inside."

Ramirez occasionally exposed his penis to BB and asked her to touch it: "[H]e would get my hand and like put it towards his penis, and then ask if I could grab it. I would be like `No.' I would try to pull my hand away, but he would hold it there, and he . . . wouldn't let go until I grabbed his penis."

Regarding the times Ramirez put his penis into her vagina, BB testified as follows:

"Q. These times that the defendant would be rubbing his penis against your vagina, would even the tip of his penis go passed, even lightly passed [sic] the outermost part of the opening of the vagina? "A. Yes. "Q. And when you say it wouldn't go inside, are you saying it wouldn't go all the way? "A. Yeah. Yes, it wouldn't go all the way in. But he would try to get it in, and he would ask me if he could. And I would say `no.' "Q. And as far as what you were feeling, could you feel it at least going passed [sic] that outermost part? "A. Yes. And it would hurt. "Q. Were you ever in fear? "A. Yes. "Q. And what were you afraid of? "A. I was afraid that he would try to rape me. That he would try to forcibly put his penis inside."

BB testified she confronted Ramirez after her mother discovered she had been harming herself: "I started to cut myself because of him doing those things to me. And my mom, she had seen the cuts and she asked me why I was hating myself. And I made up some reason saying it was because stress from like school and stuff. And then he came and asked me when I was alone, `Why are you cutting yourself?' And I told him, `It's because of what you're doing to me, that I can't take it anymore.' And I hate it when he does that. And I wanted him to stop." After that, Ramirez stopped "doing the oral and rubbing his penis," but he kept touching her with his hands. The jury was shown a photograph of scars on BB's wrist she said were the result of her self-abuse.

BB acknowledged Ramirez never threatened her or anyone else in the family.

Emily R., age 14, was BB's godsister. In January 2010, she told police she had seen "one touching in a place that wasn't suppose [sic] to be touched." At trial, Emily testified to what she had seen: "I was coming out of the restroom, and from the restroom you could see to the living room. And then I was going there, I was going to go on the computer, and then I saw [Ramirez's] hand going into the back, and it was going to the front to [BB's] private area. And then I walked in and . . . I said, like, I went `Whoa,' and I walked out, and he took his hand out."

BB's mother testified she and Ramirez had been in a relationship for 13 years. She first heard about the alleged offenses in January 2010. She testified that, in retrospect, she had been uncomfortable about Ramirez's relationship with BB because he was always having her sit on his lap or lie down next to him on the couch. "And I would tell her, `Don't do that, [you are] too old to be doing that.' And he would always say, `It's okay, she's my baby,' or `it's okay because she's my daughter,' and he would still want to . . . hold her and make sure that she would stay there."

2. Defense evidence.

Ramirez testified in his own behalf. He had considered BB to be his daughter ever since she was five years old. He never molested her. He testified BB had reacted badly to the news her mother was pregnant, and that she also got upset when Ramirez told her to return some clothes she had received as gifts because he felt they were inappropriate. He threatened to take away her phone, credit card, Ipod and other privileges. Six days later he was arrested.

CONTENTION

There was insufficient evidence to sustain Ramirez's rape convictions.

DISCUSSION

While not contesting his convictions for child molesting, Ramirez contends there was insufficient evidence to sustain his rape convictions. This claim is meritless.

a. Legal principles.

"In assessing a claim of insufficiency of evidence, the reviewing court's task is to review the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence — that is, evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value — such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citation.] The federal standard of review is to the same effect: Under principles of federal due process, review for sufficiency of evidence entails not the determination whether the reviewing court itself believes the evidence at trial establishes guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, but, instead, whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citation.] The standard of review is the same in cases in which the prosecution relies mainly on circumstantial evidence. [Citation.] `"Although it is the duty of the jury to acquit a defendant if it finds that circumstantial evidence is susceptible of two interpretations, one of which suggests guilt and the other innocence [citations], it is the jury, not the appellate court[,] which must be convinced of the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. `"If the circumstances reasonably justify the trier of fact's findings, the opinion of the reviewing court that the circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding does not warrant a reversal of the judgment."' [Citations.]"' [Citation.]" (People v. Rodriguez (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1, 11.) " `An appellate court must accept logical inferences that the [finder of fact] might have drawn from the circumstantial evidence.' [Citation.] `Before the judgment of the trial court can be set aside for the insufficiency of the evidence, it must clearly appear that on no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to support the verdict of the [finder of fact].' [Citation.]" (People v. Sanghera (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 1567, 1573.) "Perhaps the most fundamental rule of appellate law is that the judgment challenged on appeal is presumed correct, and it is the appellant's burden to affirmatively demonstrate error. [Citation.] Thus, when a criminal defendant claims on appeal that his conviction was based on insufficient evidence of one or more of the elements of the crime of which he was convicted, we must begin with the presumption that the evidence of those elements was sufficient, and the defendant bears the burden of convincing us otherwise. To meet that burden, it is not enough for the defendant to simply contend, `without a statement or analysis of the evidence, . . . that the evidence is insufficient to support the judgment[] of conviction.' [Citation.] Rather, he must affirmatively demonstrate that the evidence is insufficient." (Ibid.)

b. Discusssion.

Section 261, subdivision (a), provides: "Rape is an act of sexual intercourse accomplished with a person not the spouse of the perpetrator, under any of the following circumstances: [¶] . . . [¶] (2) Where it is accomplished against a person's will by means of force, violence, duress, menace, or fear of immediate and unlawful bodily injury on the person or another." Subdivision (b) of section 261 provides: "As used in this section, `duress' means a direct or implied threat of force, violence, danger, or retribution sufficient to coerce a reasonable person of ordinary susceptibilities to perform an act which otherwise would not have been performed, or acquiesce in an act to which one otherwise would not have submitted. The total circumstances, including the age of the victim, and his or her relationship to the defendant, are factors to consider in appraising the existence of duress."

In the analogous context of forcible child molestation, various factors have been held to signal the presence of duress. "Duress can arise from various circumstances, including the relationship between the defendant and the victim and their relative ages and sizes. [Citations.] `Where the defendant is a family member and the victim is young, . . . the position of dominance and authority of the defendant and his continuous exploitation of the victim' is relevant to the existence of duress. [Citation.]" (People v. Senior (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 765, 775.) "`The total circumstances, including the age of the victim, and [her] relationship to defendant are factors to be considered in appraising the existence of duress.' [Citation.] Other relevant factors include threats to harm the victim, physically controlling the victim when the victim attempts to resist, and warnings to the victim that revealing the molestation would result in jeopardizing the family. [Citations.]" (People v. Cochran (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 8, 13-14, disapproved on another ground in People v. Soto (2011) 51 Cal.4th 229, 248, fn. 12.)

Although Ramirez acknowledges BB "testified that she was afraid [he] would try to rape her and forcibly try to put his penis inside her," he argues she "at no time testified that she submitted to any act because she was forced, was afraid, or was under duress. In fact, according to [BB's] testimony, when she said `no,' appellant desisted." Ramirez argues "[BB's] actions do not suggest that she was afraid of appellant in any way, or that she was under duress," and "[m]ost significantly, [BB] never testified that she submitted to any act because she was afraid."

We disagree. The jury could have reasonably interpreted BB's testimony to mean she allowed Ramirez to penetrate her very slightly with his penis only because she was afraid that otherwise he was going to forcibly penetrate her fully.4 In addition, BB testified that on other occasions Ramirez did use force when he made her touch his penis against her will. Given all the circumstances in this case, which include the facts Ramirez was like a father to BB and had already been molesting her for two years, the evidence amply showed BB acquiesced in the acts of sexual intercourse against her will and because of duress.

Ramirez cites People v. Hecker (1990) 219 Cal.App.3d 1238, 1250-1251, for the proposition that psychological coercion alone cannot establish duress. However, not only do we disagree with the idea that duress cannot be constituted solely by psychological factors, we note the court that authored Hecker subsequently disavowed its reasoning in an opinion written by Presiding Justice Kremer, who had concurred in Hecker. (See People v. Cochran, supra, 103 Cal.App.4th at p. 15 ["We believe this language in Hecker is overly broad. The very nature of duress is psychological coercion."].)

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

KITCHING, J. and ALDRICH, J., concurs.

FootNotes


1. All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise specified.
2. These initials have been arbitrarily chosen to protect the victim's identity.
3. Asked by defense counsel whether, prior to everything that happened, she had wanted Ramirez to adopt her, BB testified: "I've never really thought about it, because I've always considered him to be my dad, and me to be his daughter."
4. We read BB's testimony to mean she mistakenly believed it would only be rape if Ferguson fully penetrated her. "The essential guilt of rape consists in the outrage to the person and feelings of the victim of the rape. Any sexual penetration, however slight, is sufficient to complete the crime." (§ 263.)
Source:  Leagle

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