NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
OPINION
GOMES, J.
Central Unified School District (District) appeals from an order staying its administrative decision to involuntarily transfer then high school seniors and District students Dustin Jackson, Kyle C. and Stephen M. (collectively the students) from their high school to a continuation school after they cut down two trees on a high school campus. The District contends both the appeal and the underlying action are moot because the students have graduated from the independent study program they were attending. The students contend we should dismiss the appeal as taken from a non-appealable order, while the District has moved for sanctions on the ground the motion to dismiss is frivolous. We conclude the order is appealable, and therefore deny the motion to dismiss. We also deny the motion for sanctions. We agree, however, the matter has become moot. Accordingly, we shall reverse the order with directions to the trial court to dismiss the underlying action. (Paul v. Milk Depots, Inc. (1964) 62 Cal.2d 129, 134 (Paul).)
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In February 2010, a group of District high school seniors, which included the students, cut down two trees on a high school campus as a senior prank.1 The District suspended the students for five days and, after holding a hearing, advised the students they were being involuntarily transferred to a continuation school. The students enrolled in a community day school and although they asked the District's Board of Trustees to provide an alternative to involuntary transfer, they received no response.
On February 26, the students filed both an "Ex Parte Application for Hearing on Petitioner's Request for a Stay" and an "Ex Parte Petition for Review/Administrative Writ of Mandate (CCP 1085)." In the ex parte application, the students requested the court stay the orders of suspension and involuntary transfer. In the petition, the students asserted they were denied due process, equal protection, and the right to confrontation when they were suspended and involuntarily transferred, and sought a writ of mandamus ordering the District to vacate the orders for suspension and involuntary transfer, and reinstate them to their high school.2 The District opposed the students' petition, arguing the writ could not be decided based on the information before the court and the students were afforded due process in both their suspensions and involuntary transfers.
A hearing was held on the ex parte application to stay, which took place over several days, whereby the students sought to be placed back into school pending litigation of the petition's merits. On March 15, after taking the matter under submission, the trial court issued an "Order Staying Administrative Decision" (the March 15 order). The trial court granted the ex parte request to stay the decision for the involuntary transfer of the students to the independent study program and ordered the District to stay the operation of its decision in the administrative proceeding for the involuntary transfer of the students pending the outcome in the administrative mandamus proceeding. The trial court found that the District was not likely to prevail on the merits, as it did not provide proper written notice of the involuntary transfers, the notice that was sent to the students' parents was insufficient since its language was vague and ambiguous, and the District's written decision ordering the students' involuntary transfers did not state the facts and reasons supporting the decision. The trial court found moot the ex parte request to stay the decision of suspension.
On March 16, the District filed a notice of the appeal from the trial court's written order under Code of Civil Procedure section 904.1, subdivision (a)(6).3 The students filed a motion to dismiss the appeal on March 23, arguing the March 15 order was not appealable because it was a prohibitory injunction. This court denied the motion to dismiss without prejudice, noting that while the students argued that cases involving injunctions applied to the March 15 order, they failed to explain why section 904.1, subdivision (a)(6) would not render such an injunctive order appealable. On April 15, the students filed a second motion to dismiss the appeal, asserting that we need not decide whether the trial court proceeding involved a prohibitory injunction because the March 15 order is a non-appealable interlocutory order. At this court's direction, the District filed an informal letter response to the motion to dismiss in which it contended the March 15 order operated as a mandatory injunction and therefore was appealable under section 904.1, subdivision (a)(6). We denied the motion to dismiss the appeal by a May 6 order.
The District filed its opening brief on August 31. The District asserts the appeal is moot because the students completed their independent study programs and received high school diplomas from the District while this appeal was pending. The District asks us to reverse the March 15 order and remand with directions to dismiss the action with prejudice.
The students did not file a respondent's brief. Instead, they filed a third motion to dismiss the appeal on May 25, 2011, arguing the March 15 order is non-appealable. We deferred ruling on the motion to dismiss until we considered the appeal on its merits, but gave the District the opportunity to file a responsive letter brief. On June 10, 2011, the District filed both an opposition to the motion to dismiss and a motion for sanctions on the ground that the motion to dismiss is frivolous. We deferred ruling on the motion for sanctions until the entire matter is considered on the merits and although we gave the students an opportunity to respond to the motion, they did not do so.
DISCUSSION
We begin with the motion to dismiss. While this court has previously denied two motions to dismiss the appeal, which the students made on the grounds that the March 15 order is not appealable, we are not precluded from reconsidering the issue since those motions were summarily denied. (Kowis v. Howard (1992) 3 Cal.4th 888, 900.) The students now argue the March 15 order is not appealable because it was issued in a writ of mandamus proceeding, which is a special proceeding. The District counters that the March 15 order was not issued during a writ proceeding and asserts that because the order required affirmative action by the District, namely removal of the students from the independent study program and placement back in the high school, thereby changing the status quo, the order operated as a mandatory injunction which was immediately appealable pursuant to section 916, subdivision (a)(6).
We agree with the District. The students do not deny that the March 15 order acted as a mandatory preliminary injunction, i.e. the order compelled the District to return the students, who were no longer attending the high school and were enrolled in an independent study program, to the high school. (See, e.g. Hayworth v. City of Oakland (1982) 129 Cal.App.3d 723, 727-728 ["an injunction is considered to be mandatory where it requires affirmative action and changes the status quo"].) Since an order granting a preliminary injunction is appealable (see Waremart Foods v. United Food and Commercial Workers Union, Local 588 (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 145, 148, fn. 1; § 904.1, subd. (a)(6)), the March 15 order is appealable. The case the students rely on, Veyna v. Orange County Nursery, Inc. (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 146, does not compel a different result because it did not address the issue of appealability of an order such as the one at issue here. As the March 15 order is appealable, we deny the students' motion to dismiss.
Turning to the issue of mootness, an appellate court decides only actual controversies and, thus, will not render opinions on moot questions that cannot affect the matter on appeal. (Giles v. Horn (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 206, 226-227 (Giles).) Accordingly, if an event occurs while an appeal is pending and the event makes it impossible for the appellate court to grant effectual relief, the case becomes moot and the issues will not be considered. (Giles, supra, at p. 227; Wilson v. L.A. County Civil Service Com. (1952) 112 Cal.App.2d 450, 453.) "The policy behind a mootness dismissal is that `courts decide justiciable controversies and will normally not render advisory opinions.'" (Giraldo v. Department of Corrections & Rehabilitation (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 231, 257.)4
As noted above, during the pendency of this appeal the students completed their independent study programs and graduated from high school. By the March 15 order, the trial court, in effect, ordered the District to return the students to the high school. Since the students have graduated, that relief can no longer be granted. Accordingly, the appeal is moot.
The District acknowledges the appeal is moot and requests that we not only dismiss the appeal, but also reverse the March 15 order and remand for the trial court to dismiss the underlying action as the trial court can no longer provide the relief the students seek by way of their writ of mandate, i.e. reinstatement to high school. The District correctly points out that we may avoid impliedly affirming an order that we have not reviewed on the merits by, instead of dismissing the appeal, reversing the judgment with directions to the trial court to dismiss the case as moot. (Paul, supra, 62 Cal.2d at pp. 134-135, see Giles, supra, 100 Cal.App.4th at p. 229 [when an appeal is disposed of on the ground of mootness without reaching the merits, in order to avoid ambiguity, the preferable procedure is to reverse with directions to the trial court to dismiss the action]; County of San Diego v. Brown (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 1054, 1090.) A reversal with directions to the trial court to dismiss the action as moot eliminates the judgment, review of which was prevented by subsequently occurring events. (United States v. Munsingwear, Inc. (1950) 340 U.S. 36, 39-40.) "When that procedure is followed, the rights of all parties are preserved; none is prejudiced by a decision which in the statutory scheme was only preliminary." (Id. at p. 40.)5 We will follow this procedure here and vacate the order of the trial court granting the stay with directions to the trial court to dismiss the underlying action as moot.
Finally, we turn to the District's request that we impose sanctions on the students' counsel in the amount of $1,920 for attorney fees the District incurred in opposing the students' motion to dismiss. The District argues the students' motion to dismiss was frivolous. Considering the circumstances of this case, we exercise our discretion to deny the District's motion for sanctions. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.276(a)(3); Dana Commercial Credit Corp. v. Ferns & Ferns (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 142, 146-147; In re Marriage of Flaherty (1982) 31 Cal.3d 637, 649-650.)
DISPOSITION
The trial court's March 15, 2010 "Order Staying Administrative Decision" is vacated and the matter is remanded with directions to the trial court to dismiss the underlying action as moot. The students' motion to dismiss and the District's motion for sanctions are both denied. We express no opinion on the merits of the appeal. The parties will bear their own costs on appeal.
Hill, P.J. and Dawson, J., concurs.
