NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

OPINION

THE COURT:*

The parties have reached a settlement in this action for quiet title and equitable relief, but, as part of the settlement, have filed a stipulated request to reverse the judgment because it includes a preliminary injunction enforcing a use restriction as sought by plaintiff, the original grantor. The injunction has the practical effect of precluding the defendant, a municipality, from selling surplus public property to allow for sale and development as commercial office space. As part of the settlement, the parties now agree that the use restriction has been rendered obsolete by changed circumstances. No third party has advanced any objection.

We grant the request. We have examined the joint application and the record on appeal, and determined that the stipulated reversal does not violate any third party's right or the rights of the public in general. (Code Civ. Proc., § 128, subd. (a)(8)1.) Without the settlement, we would have been called upon to interpret the parties' rights under pre-1990 law, when the use restriction was imposed. We forego the opportunity to opine on a historical legal question in a situation where the stipulated reversal comports with current California law.

I

In 1987, plaintiff Marbella Development Company (Marbella) sought approval from defendant City of San Juan Capistrano (City) to rezone its property to allow for construction of a 347 unit mixed-use multiple dwelling project surrounding a golf course. In early 1988, the City conditioned its approval of the development plans on the Marbella's dedication of a 4.6 acre parcel on Rancho Viejo Road to the City "in fee simple for public institutional purposes." The City anticipated using the parcel for a new fire station in place of the existing fire station in its downtown, which the City hoped to use for other purposes. Since fire services were provided by the County of Orange, this plan required a land swap between the two governmental entities.

The County and the City were unable to agree upon terms, and the new fire station was never built. In 2005, at a duly-noticed public hearing, the City adopted a resolution declaring the parcel to be surplus property, to be subject to a public bid sale.

In August 2006, the City entered into a purchase and sale agreement with a private developer, conditioned upon a rezoning from a public and institutional zone, to commercial office use. The City adopted the new zoning.

In April 2008, Marbella sued the City to quiet title to the parcel because of the City's failure to comply with the terms of the original dedication. Marbella sought either to have the parcel revert back to its ownership or alternatively to enjoin the projected use. No other person or member of the public joined in the litigation, or challenged the sale or rezoning.

In January 2010, following a summary adjudication and a one-day bench trial, the court issued its judgment. The court held that the City owned the parcel in fee simple, and that Marbella had no right of reversion. However, the court determined Marbella had standing to enforce the restriction in the final tract map dedicating the parcel to the City. The court issued a preliminary injunction prohibiting the City from using the parcel "for anything other than Public Institutional purposes." The court also enjoined the City "from conveying the property in question to a third party without a restriction in any deed restricting the use of [the parcel] to Public Institutional uses."

The parties have settled while the matter is pending on appeal and, as part of the settlement, have jointly requested that we reverse the judgment, including the preliminary injunction.

II

Before accepting the parties' stipulated request to reverse the judgment for punitive damages, we must find that the reversal will not adversely affect nonparties or the public, and that the positive reasons for reversal outweigh any potential negative consequences, including the erosion of public trust and impact on future pretrial settlements. (§ 127, subd. (a)(8).)2 We apply the statutory requirements "on a case-by-case basis." (In re Rashad H. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 376, 381.)

The stipulated reversal satisfies these statutory requirements and does not adversely affect the public interest. As the parties have pointed out, the permissible uses of the 4.6 acre parcel in question have been subjected to public scrutiny and comment over a 20-year period, including a public hearing where the City declared the property to be surplus and subject to sale. Apparently, only Marbella has objected.

We are not concerned here with public property, such as park land, that is currently subjected to a use imbued with a public benefit, or is gifted only for such purposes. (See, e.g., Big Sur Properties v. Mott (1976) 62 Cal.App.3d 99.) Instead, the parcel in question was dedicated to the City as part of planning and zoning exactions involving the City's police powers. It has sat vacant for decades since its dedication to the City. Both Marbella and the City agree that the original reason for the dedication (construction of a fire station) no longer exists. Both Marbella and the City further agree that Marbella, as the original grantor, should be able to release its interest in enforcing the use restriction to the City.

Indeed, had Marbella deeded the parcel to the City in 1990 rather than in 1988, there would be no question that the parcel would now be in private hands, without an enforceable use restriction. In 1990, the Subdivision Map Act was amended to give developers a right of reversion in property dedicated for public purposes if the public purpose for which the property was dedicated no longer exists. Government Code section 66477.5, subdivision (c) provides: "If a local agency has determined that the same public purpose for which the dedication was required does not exist, it shall reconvey the property to the subdivider or the successor in interest, as specified in subdivision (a), except for all or any portion of the property that is required for that same purpose or for public utilities."

The parties disagree about Marbella's rights to enforce use restrictions on this pre-1990 use restriction. But the 1990 amendment shows that the stipulated reversal does not violate California public policy, since reversion from public ownership is the designated statutory remedy.

Under these circumstances, the factors weighing in favor of a stipulated reversal outweigh any negative effect on the public trust. (Union Bank of California v. Braille Inst. of America, Inc. (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 1324.) Freed of the injunctive restrictions, the vacant parcel will finally be put to productive use, all to the benefit of the public fisc. As the parties have jointly declared, the settlement "will result in the economic use of valuable land, will generate income for the City of San Juan Capistrano, and will benefit the residents of the City." A stipulated reversal will save the parties and this court time and resources, and will put an end to this litigation. Under these circumstances, we find no realistic prospect that the stipulated reversal will adversely affect the nonparties or the public.

DISPOSITION

Pursuant to the parties' stipulation, the judgment is reversed. By accepting the parties' stipulation, we do not rule on the merits of the issues raised in the appeal, but restore jurisdiction to the trial court so that it may effectuate the settlement, which will render the action moot. The parties shall bear their own costs on appeal.