NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

PERREN, J.

A dying father terminates a certificate of deposit (CD) which names his daughter as beneficiary. Two days later, father dies. The daughter dies one year later. Seven years later, Olga Hauser, the mother of the child and the former wife of the father, filed a complaint alleging that respondent Wells Fargo Bank wrongfully terminated the CD. Wells Fargo was granted summary judgment on its claim that California Uniform Commercial Code1 section 3118, subdivision (e) imposing a six-year statute of limitations on actions to enforce the obligation of a CD barred recovery. Hauser appeals the order of the trial court granting summary judgment. We affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Hauser is the former wife of Mario Rosenberg, now deceased. Rosenberg was a customer of respondent Wells Fargo Bank. Rosenberg had four children. One of the children, Cynthia, was Hauser's daughter.

On December 14, 1995, when Hauser and Rosenberg were married to each other, Rosenberg established a trust account at Wells Fargo for Cynthia's benefit, entitled "Mario Rosenberg ITF Cynthia Rosenberg" (Cynthia's CD). The trust was funded with a CD in the amount of $75,000. In seven years, the account grew to $200,000. Paula Stevens had been Rosenberg's personal banker for many years and processed the transaction for Wells Fargo. Rosenberg lived in Venezuela, and many of his transactions with Wells Fargo were done telephonically with Stevens.

In late 2001, after Rosenberg and Hauser ended their marriage, Rosenberg was diagnosed with terminal cancer. On or around June 20, 2002, Rosenberg instructed Stevens to terminate Cynthia's CD and open a new CD under different ownership. At Rosenberg's direction, Stevens prepared a debit slip transferring the funds from Cynthia's CD to the new account on July 23, 2002. Rosenberg died two days later. Subsequently, the funds in the new CD as well as money in other accounts were consolidated at the direction of Rosenberg's son into one of Rosenberg's existing checking accounts. In September 2002, the funds were distributed and Cynthia received approximately $122,000, slightly more than one-third of the total amount of funds in Rosenberg's estate. Hauser did not believe that Rosenberg authorized termination of Cynthia's CD. She hired counsel to investigate the transactions. Cynthia died in an accident in 2003 at the age of 17.

On February 3, 2009, Hauser filed a complaint against Wells Fargo seeking to recover the full amount of Cynthia's CD. Each party filed a motion for summary judgment. It was not until Hauser's deposition was taken in January 2010, that she acknowledged that she knew that Cynthia had received $122,000 from Rosenberg's estate in September 2002. Following this disclosure, Hauser reduced her demand from $200,000 to $77,651.72.

Wells Fargo based its motion for summary judgment on Code of Civil Procedure section 340, subdivision (c), which provides a one-year statute of limitations for an action by a depositor against a bank for the payment of a forged or raised check,2 or a check that bears a forged or unauthorized endorsement.

Hauser opposed the motion on the ground that her claim was not time barred because Code of Civil Procedure section 348 applied. That section states that no statute of limitations applies "[t]o actions brought to recover money or other property deposited with any bank, banker, trust company, building and loan association, or savings and loan society or evidenced by a certificate issued by an industrial loan company or credit union." Subsequently, Hauser contended that the applicable statute of limitations was six years as provided in section 3118, subdivision (e), and that period began to run on the maturity date of Cynthia's CD. Alternatively, Hauser argued that Wells Fargo was not entitled to summary judgment because there was a question of fact as to whether Rosenberg authorized the termination of Cynthia's CD because Wells Fargo could produce no writing from Rosenberg authorizing termination of the account.

The trial court granted Wells Fargo's summary judgment motion on the ground that section 3118, subdivision (e), applied. The court found that Rosenberg had made a demand for payment no later than July 23, 2002. The statute of limitations began running on that date, and, as Hauser had not filed her complaint within the six-year period, her claim was time barred.

On appeal Hauser asserts that Wells Fargo terminated Cynthia's CD without proper authorization from Rosenberg. She argues that an alleged improper authorization was not a demand for payment within the meaning of section 3118, subdivision (e). In the alternative, she argues that, if section 3118, subdivision (e) applies, the statute of limitations ran from the maturity date of the CD, and her complaint was filed timely. On appeal, she makes two additional arguments that were not raised in the trial court: (1) Code of Civil Procedure section 366.1 applies and is subject to the delayed discovery rule, and (2) Cynthia was 16 years old on July 23, 2002, and her minority tolled the statute of limitations pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 352, subdivision (a). As these issues were not raised in the trial court, they are waived on appeal. (Burden v. Snowden (1992) 2 Cal.4th 556, 570.)

DISCUSSION

Standard of Review

Summary judgment is appropriate where "all the papers submitted show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).)

"We review de novo the trial court's decision to grant summary judgment" (City of Vista v. Robert Thomas Securities, Inc. (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 882, 886), and "consider all of the evidence set forth in the papers, except that to which objections have been made and sustained by the court, and all [uncontradicted] inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence . . . ." (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).) The defendant moving for summary judgment bears the burden of persuasion that one or more elements of the cause of action in question cannot be established or, as with the statute of limitations defense here, that there is a complete defense to the action. (See Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850.)

The Action is Time Barred

Section 3118, subdivision (e) contains a six-year statute of limitations pertaining to actions for payment of a CD. It states: "An action to enforce the obligation of a party to a certificate of deposit to pay the instrument shall be commenced within six years after demand for payment is made to the maker, but if the instrument states a due date and the maker is not required to pay before that date, the six-year period begins when a demand for payment is in effect and the due date has passed."

The Uniform Commercial Code comment to section 3118 states: "Subsection (e) covers certificates of deposit. The limitations period of six years doesn't start to run until the depositor demands payment. Most certificates of deposit are payable on demand even if they state a due date. The effect of a demand for payment before maturity is usually that the bank will pay, but that a penalty will be assessed against the depositor in the form of a reduction in the amount of interest to be paid. Subsection (e) also provides for cases in which the bank has no obligation to pay until the due date. In that case the limitations period doesn't start to run until there is a demand for payment in effect and the due date has passed." (23A, pt. 2, West's Ann. Com. Code (2002 ed.) foll. § 3118, p. 236.)

We agree with the trial court that section 3118, subdivision (e) is the applicable statute of limitations and that the statute began to run no later than July 23, 2002, the date the money in Cynthia's CD was transferred to the new account. Hauser's argument is that the statute did not begin to run until its due date, November 15, 2003. We disagree. Where, as here, the depositor can withdraw funds before the due date, the first clause of section 3118, subdivision (e) applies and the statute begins to run from the date of demand.

On appeal, Wells Fargo asserts, as it did in the trial court, that Code of Civil Procedure section 340, subdivision (c), controls. We disagree. Two primary rules of statutory interpretation are that a specific statutory provision prevails over a general statutory provision and that later enactments supersede earlier ones. (Collection Bureau of San Jose v. Rumsey (2000) 24 Cal.4th 301, 310 ["If conflicting statutes cannot be reconciled, later enactments supersede earlier ones . . ., and more specific provisions take precedence over more general ones"]; Estate of Mason (1990) 224 Cal.App.3d 634, 638 [more specific Prob. Code, § 2333 statute of limitations prevails over more general Code Civ. Proc., § 337 statute of limitations].) Section 3118 specifically deals with CD's whereas Code of Civil Procedure section 340 deals generally with "checks." Section 3118 was adopted in 1992, much later than Code of Civil Procedure section 340.

Hauser's contention that a triable issue of fact exists because she disputes whether Rosenberg himself instructed Stevens to withdraw the funds from Cynthia's CD is without merit. The limitations period in section 3118, subdivision (e), begins to run from the date "demand for payment is made by the maker." Wells Fargo submitted Stevens' declaration stating that she spoke with Rosenberg on several occasions between June 20, and July 23, 2002. She also testified that due to Rosenberg's residency in Venezuela, they often conducted banking transactions by telephone. The undisputed evidence is that the money was withdrawn from Cynthia's CD according to usual and customary bank practice no later than July 23, 2002. (See § 1103 ["This code shall be liberally construed and applied to promote its underlying purposes and policies, which are: . . . [¶] (2) to permit the continued expansion of commercial practices through custom, usage, and agreement of the parties"].)

The judgment is affirmed. Respondent shall recover costs on appeal.

YEGAN, Acting P.J. and COFFEE, J., concurs.