NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

CROSKEY, Acting P. J.

Ladonne Cornelius appeals the dismissal of her complaint against Ecology Auto Parts, Inc. (EAP). The trial court granted EAP's oral motion to dismiss after granting its motions in limine to exclude (1) any trial testimony by Cornelius and (2) any evidence of her medical treatment or medical damages. Cornelius contends the granting of the motions in limine was error because the motions were untimely and not well founded. She also challenges the dismissal to the extent that it was based on her failure to prosecute the case, contending she diligently prosecuted her complaint. She also contends the court refused to consider evidence and argument presented by her counsel and displayed bias in favor of EAP's counsel and against her counsel. We conclude that Cornelius has shown no prejudicial error and will affirm the judgment.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Cornelius filed a complaint against EAP in March 2009 alleging counts for (1) negligence and (2) negligent hiring and entrustment. Both counts arise from a collision in which an 18-wheel truck driven by EAP's employee allegedly rear-ended Cornelius's car causing her severe injuries. EAP answered the complaint with a general denial.

The parties appeared for a case management conference in Department B of the Long Beach Courthouse before Judge Patrick T. Madden on August 17, 2009. The court scheduled a final status conference for March 5, 2010, and scheduled a jury trial to commence on March 8, 2010. EAP filed an ex parte application to continue the trial date on February 8, 2010, arguing that Cornelius had failed to appear for her noticed independent medical examination and had required the rescheduling of her noticed deposition on three occasions. The trial court denied the application.

Cornelius filed an ex parte application to continue the trial date on February 22, 2010, stating that counsel for both parties had stipulated to a trial continuance. Plaintiff's counsel also stated that he was engaged in a criminal trial at that time and represented that Cornelius was unable to attend an independent medical examination scheduled in January and that counsel required more time to reschedule the examination and Cornelius's deposition. The trial court denied the application.

EAP filed 11 motions in limine on February 25, 2010. EAP moved to exclude any testimony by Cornelius at trial on the grounds that she had repeatedly failed to appear for her noticed deposition (designated motion in limine No. 7). EAP also moved to exclude any evidence of Cornelius's medical treatment or medical damages on the grounds that she had failed to appear for her noticed independent medical examination (designated motion in limine No. 8). Cornelius filed written oppositions to these two motions in limine, among others, on March 2, 2010, arguing only that the motions were untimely under rule 7.9(h) of the Local Rules of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County (rule 7.9(h))1 and that the declaration by EAP's counsel that he had met and conferred with plaintiff's counsel concerning the motions was false.

Counsel appeared for the final status conference before Judge Patrick T. Madden on March 5, 2010. Plaintiff's counsel stated that Cornelius's lead counsel was still engaged in a criminal trial. The court ordered counsel to report to another department by phone on March 10, 2010, and trail for trial.

Counsel appeared before Judge Joseph E. Di Loreto in Department H on March 11, 2010. When asked if he was ready for trial, Cornelius's counsel stated that he was not ready because one witness was on vacation and another would not be available until the following week. The court proceeded to hear the above-mentioned motions in limine. Cornelius's counsel argued that the motions were untimely under rule 7.9(h). The court disagreed and stated:

After further argument, the trial court granted the two motions in limine and stated that it was precluding any trial testimony by Cornelius as a discovery sanction. The court then asked Cornelius's counsel if he was ready to proceed. He responded: "No, I'm not ready to proceed. I object to all the court's rulings. I will be filing a writ. I request the court stay this matter pending the resolution of that."

The court then invited an oral motion to dismiss the case and granted the motion, stating that that the case was "[d]ismissed based on the information stated in the record." The court denied the request for a stay. A minute order filed on March 11, 2010, stated that the court granted a motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute the case and ordered EAP's counsel to give notice and submit a proposed order and judgment.2

No signed order of dismissal appears in the appellate record. Cornelius filed a notice of appeal on October 12, 2010, and submitted a proposed order of dismissal, which was signed and filed by the trial court on October 26, 2010.3 Cornelius timely appealed.

CONTENTIONS

Cornelius contends (1) the motions in limine were filed with insufficient notice under rule 7.9(h), so the trial court had no authority to consider them and the dismissal based on the exclusion of evidence was error; (2) alternatively, the court should have denied the motions in limine on the merits; (3) she diligently prosecuted this case, so the dismissal of her complaint based in part on the failure to prosecute was an abuse of discretion; and (4) the court failed to consider the evidence and argument presented by her counsel and displayed bias in favor of EAP's counsel and against her counsel.

DISCUSSION

1. An Appealed Judgment Is Presumed Correct and the Appellant Must Affirmatively Show both Error and Prejudice

An appealed judgment is presumed correct, a reviewing court must indulge all intendments and presumptions in favor of the judgment on matters on which the record is silent, and the appellant must affirmatively demonstrate error. (Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564.) Accordingly, we must presume that the evidence supports the judgment unless the appellant affirmatively demonstrates to the contrary. (Ibid. )

An appellant bears the burden to show not only that the trial court erred, but also that the error was prejudicial in that it resulted in a miscarriage of justice. (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13; Code Civ. Proc., § 475.) An error is prejudicial and results in a miscarriage of justice only if the reviewing court concludes, based on its review of the entire record, that it is reasonably probable that the trial court would have reached a result more favorable to the appellant absent the error. (Cassim v. Allstate Ins. Co. (2004) 33 Cal.4th 780, 800.)

2. Cornelius Has Shown No Prejudicial Error Regarding Inadequate Notice

Civil cases in the Los Angeles County Superior Court are either assigned to an individual judge for all purposes, known as an individual or direct calendar judge, or assigned to a master calendar court, or a combination of the two. (Super. Ct. L.A. County, Local Rules, rules 7.1, 7.4.) In individual calendar cases, the court clerk at the time the case is filed indicates the name of the judge assigned for all purposes, and the plaintiff must serve a notice of case assignment naming the assigned individual calendar judge. (Id., rule 7.3(b), (c).) Cases assigned to a master calendar court, in contrast, are assigned to a judge for trial as late as the time of trial. (Id., rule 7.1(c).)

A final status conference ordinarily must be held within 10 days before the scheduled trial date. (Rule 7.9(h).) In individual calendar cases, the final status conference is held before the assigned individual calendar judge. (Ibid.) Rule 7.9(h) also states:

Code of Civil Procedure section 1005, subdivision (b) generally requires the filing and service of a motion at least 16 court days before the hearing date unless otherwise specifically provided by law or ordered by the court.

Cornelius contends this is an individual calendar case governed by the rule 7.9(h) requirement of statutory notice for independent calendar cases. But she cites no evidence or records supporting her contention that this is an individual calendar case, and there is no indication in the appellate record that the case was assigned to a judge for all purposes. Despite Cornelius's failure to provide an adequate record to support her contention, we have obtained the complete trial court record. Our review of the trial court record shows that the case was assigned for all purposes to Judge Di Loreto at the time the complaint was filed. We judicially notice the notice of case assignment dated March 20, 2009. (Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (d).)

A procedural defect is not reversible error unless some prejudice is shown. (Code Civ. Proc., § 475.) A party objecting to a defect or irregularity in a notice of motion must show prejudice resulting from the defective notice. (Reedy v. Bussell (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 1272, 1289.) Cornelius made no effort to show prejudice in the trial court, but instead limited the argument in her written oppositions to the existence of a procedural defect and the purported falsity of the declaration by EAP's counsel that he had met and conferred with plaintiff's counsel before filing the motions. At the hearing on the motions, her counsel again objected to the untimely notice and argued the merits of the motions without arguing that any prejudice resulted from the untimely notice. Cornelius argues prejudice for the first time in her appellant's reply brief, where she argues that she was prejudiced by the granting of the motions in limine and dismissal of her complaint. Her belated argument fails to show that the inadequate notice of hearing prejudiced her ability to respond to the motions on the merits and therefore fails to show any cognizable prejudice.

3. Cornelius Has Shown No Error on the Merits of the Exclusion of Evidence

Cornelius challenges the merits of the exclusion of evidence by arguing that the evidence presented by EAP in support of the motions in limine was false and misleading and the truth is that she unilaterally canceled her deposition on only one occasion and never refused to reschedule her independent medical examination after informing EAP's counsel of a conflict in her schedule. She maintains that her deposition was rescheduled on other occasions by agreement, that EAP's counsel unilaterally canceled her deposition on one occasion after she had arrived at the building, and that EAP's counsel failed to reschedule her independent medical examination after she notified him of a conflict in her schedule.

We generally review the exclusion of evidence on a motion in limine for abuse of discretion. (Dillingham-Ray Wilson v. City of Los Angeles (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 1396, 1403.) The same is true of a ruling on a motion to exclude evidence at trial that effectively imposes an evidence sanction for misuse of the discovery process. (Thoren v. Johnston & Washer (1972) 29 Cal.App.3d 270, 273.) Any factual findings in connection with the ruling are reviewed under the substantial evidence standard. (Haraguchi v. Superior Court (2008) 43 Cal.4th 706, 711.)

Cornelius cites only her counsel's argument at the hearing to support her version of the events. Argument by counsel is not evidence. (Fuller v. Tucker (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 1163, 1173.) Cornelius filed no declaration stating her version of the facts in opposition to the two motions in limine. Absent admissible evidence supporting her version of the facts, the trial court had no basis to believe and certainly was not required to believe her version of the facts. We conclude that she has shown no error on the merits of the exclusion of evidence.

4. Cornelius Has Shown No Error in the Dismissal of Her Complaint

Cornelius argues that she diligently prosecuted this case and the trial court's statement that she "never did anything at all to move this case along" was groundless. She argues that Judge Di Loreto was not the judge at the final status conference and was mistaken in his assumption that he had issued a standard pretrial order in this case. She argues that the dismissal of her complaint was error because it was based in part on her purported failure to prosecute the case, which she in fact diligently prosecuted, and her purported failure to file trial documents in accordance with a pretrial order that in fact was never issued. She also argues that the dismissal was excessive because lesser sanctions were available.

Cornelius states in her opening brief that the trial court dismissed her complaint because she had no evidence to prove her case after the granting of the motions in limine. She also states that the dismissal was based in part on her failure to prosecute the case. She does not contend the court had no legal authority to dismiss her complaint on these grounds, so we will not address that question. Instead, we will presume that the court had the discretion to dismiss the case on these grounds on a proper showing.

Cornelius cites documents in the record purportedly showing that she diligently prosecuted this case by propounding discovery, serving a statutory offer to compromise, designating experts, and filing pretrial documents.4 Assuming for purposes of argument that she took those actions, we conclude that the record does not compel the conclusion that she diligently prosecuted the case, particularly when her counsel stated that he was not ready for trial at the time the case was called for trial. Moreover, having shown no error in the exclusion of evidence, Cornelius does not argue and has not shown that any error in the court's recollection regarding either the pretrial order or the historical facts concerning the prosecution of her complaint was prejudicial. In other words, she fails to rebut the presumption that the broad exclusion of evidence alone justifies the dismissal, akin to a nonsuit.5 We conclude that she has shown no error in the dismissal.6

5. Cornelius Has Shown No Judicial Bias

Cornelius contends the trial court's statements and rulings show that the judge was biased in favor EAP's counsel and against her counsel. She notes that the office of EAP's counsel is only a short distance away from the Long Beach Courthouse. She apparently seeks a reversal of the judgment based on judicial bias, although she offers no discussion of and fails to cite any legal authority. Her contention is premised on the trial court's commission of egregious errors, which she has not shown, and in part on unfounded supposition. We conclude that she has shown no error.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. EAP is entitled to recover its costs on appeal.

KITCHING, J. and ALDRICH, J., concurs.