NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

ZELON, J.

Parmanand Kumar sued Dongsik Benjamin Park and other defendants (collectively Park) in 2009 for breach of contract and common counts arising from a commercial lease. Park cross-complained for breach of contract and breach of a settlement agreement. The trial court entered judgment in Park's favor, and Kumar appeals. We affirm the judgment.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

We summarize the facts as found by the trial court after trial. Park leased a retail space from Kumar in 2004 and operated a restaurant there. In 2006 Park closed the restaurant. In 2008 Park attempted to sell the business to Myung Sik Park, who was willing to pay $80,000 for the business and to take over the existing lease. Kumar demanded that Park pay $20,000 outside the escrow before he would consent to the lease assignment. When Park refused to pay, Kumar refused to consent. The trial court concluded that Kumar's monetary demand was "closer to an extortion demand than to a premium request," and that Kumar was holding up the transaction and not acting reasonably or in good faith. The purchaser, the trial court found, was "a legitimate prospective purchaser."

Later in 2008 Park found another prospective buyer for the business, Sam Lee. Kumar demanded that the entire $80,000 purchase price be given to him (Kumar) or he would not consent to the lease assignment. The trial court found that the potential buyer was a legitimate prospective purchaser, and also found that Kumar had acted unreasonably and in bad faith.

Accordingly, the trial court concluded that Park had established the affirmative defense that Kumar breached the lease agreement by unreasonably withholding consent to a lease assignment. The court found for Park and against Kumar on the two causes of action in Kumar's complaint. Based on the same facts, the trial court ruled that Kumar had breached the contract for purposes of the cross-complaint. The court found that Park had sustained damages in the amount of $80,000. The court awarded that amount in damages, plus prejudgment interest. Kumar appeals.

DISCUSSION

I. Park's Alleged Breach of Lease

In his first claim on appeal, Kumar contends on appeal that he established that Park breached the lease. He asserts that he is entitled to receive damages as set forth in Civil Code section 1951.2, and he sets forth that statute in its entirety. Kumar claims he presented evidence of each type of damages he should have been awarded, that his evidence was undisputed, and that he "therefore clearly established a right to judgment for the unpaid rent, subject to Respondents' defenses."

Kumar has not established any error in the judgment. The trial court concluded that the defendants had established an affirmative defense to Kumar's claims: that Kumar had breached the lease himself by unreasonably withholding consent to a lease assignment. Even accepting all of Kumar's assertions about Park's breach of lease and the resultant damages, in light of the finding that Park established a complete affirmative defense, Kumar has not demonstrated any basis for reversal here.

II. Sufficiency of the Evidence that Kumar Acted Unreasonably

Kumar next claims that there was not sufficient evidence that either prospective buyer of the business was ready, willing, and able to complete the purchase of the business as was required to demonstrate that Kumar acted unreasonably in refusing consent to the assignment of the lease. There was, however, sufficient evidence to support the trial court's determination that, in the words of the trial court, they were "legitimate" prospective buyers. Prospective buyer Lee testified that he had at the time about $15,000 in his bank account, $7,000 in investments, monthly receipts of more than $10,000, and a commitment from his father to lend him any additional money required. Kumar contends that "the naked assertion" of a familial loan does not constitute substantial evidence, relying upon Am-Cal Investment Co. v. Sharlyn Estates, Inc. (1967) 255 Cal.App.2d 526. Nonetheless, the proof needed to show ability depends on all the surrounding circumstances, and it has long been held that one need not have the funds in hand or a completed loan to be financially able to perform. (Henry v. Sharma (1984) 154 Cal.App.3d 665, 672; Hersh v. Garau (1933) 218 Cal. 460, 468-469.) Kumar also points to evidence in Lee's financial documents that tended to suggest less financial capability; while we acknowledge that there was a conflict in the evidence, on a substantial evidence review we must resolve evidentiary conflicts in favor of the judgment. (Lenk v. Total-Western, Inc. (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 959, 968.)

Prospective buyer Myung Sik Park testified that at the time of his offer, he possessed $68,000 in bank accounts, owned a restaurant worth between $800,000 and $1,000,000, and had a credit score above 700. Kumar attempts to undermine the evidence of financial ability by alleging that Myung Sik Park could not authenticate financial documents due to an inability to read English, but through his testimony Myung Sik Park provided evidence of his financial ability independent of documentation. The evidence produced at trial was sufficient to establish the buyers' ability to pay, and Kumar has not established that there was insufficient evidence to demonstrate that the two potential buyers were able to purchase the business.

III. Sufficiency of the Evidence of Damages

Kumar next observes that the cross-complaint was brought by Dongsik Benjamin Park and contends that there was no evidence that Dongsik Benjamin Park personally suffered any damages from Kumar's failure to consent to the lease assignment. Specifically, with respect to the prospective sale to Myung Sik Park, Kumar contends that the contract to purchase the business was between Myung Sik Park and KJIB, Inc., a corporation of which Dongsik Benjamin Park was president, and so if damages were suffered, they were suffered by nonplaintiff corporation KJIB. Even if accepted, this argument does not impact the damages award because Park attempted to sell the business to a second prospective buyer and the court found that absent Kumar's refusal to consent to the assignment, the business would have been sold for $80,000 to one of the two prospective buyers.

Kumar claims there are four reasons that Park was not damaged by the failure to approve the lease assignment to Lee: (1) there was no evidence that Lee could pay for the business; (2) if there had been a sale contract, by "implication" it would also have been with KJIB; (3) Lee thought the restaurant was a sit-down restaurant and did not want a take-out only restaurant; and (4) Lee did not want his wife to be a party to the lease. None of these contentions has merit. As we have already discussed, the evidence may have been in conflict, but there was sufficient evidence that Lee was able to purchase the business. Kumar assumes that the sale contract would have specified KJIB and not Dongsik Benjamin Park personally, but as Kumar concedes, the record does not contain evidence of what persons or entities would have been the contracting parties if the sale had been completed. The evidence that Dongsik Benjamin Park signed the lease personally and as the president and/or chief executive officer of the business entities, and that he was the operator of the restaurant business, supports the trial court's implicit conclusion that he personally suffered damages from the failure to approve the lease assignment. With respect to the final two issues, the obstacles to the completion of the transaction identified by Kumar here are part of the conflicting evidence presented at trial. The court has already resolved that conflict by concluding that the sale would have occurred absent Kumar's breach of contract, and this finding is supported by the evidence. (In re Marriage of Ruelas (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 339, 342 [when a statement of decision sets forth the factual and legal basis for the court's decision, any conflict in the evidence or reasonable inferences to be drawn from the facts will be resolved in support of the decision].)

IV. Mitigation of Damages

Kumar notes that the trial court stated that he did not mitigate his damages, but argues that the judgment is flawed because the trial court did not determine "how much of the rent damages could have been mitigated." The trial court found for Park and against Kumar on Kumar's breach of contract and common counts claims because Park proved the affirmative defense that Kumar breached the lease agreement by unreasonably withholding consent to proposed lease assignments. No determination of what damages could have been mitigated, or whether Kumar mitigated his damages from Park's failure to pay rent, is necessary to uphold the judgment in light of the court's ruling. Kumar acknowledges this in his reply brief: he observes the issue of mitigation of damages only becomes an issue on appeal if this court "overturns the Judgment both on the Cross-Complaint and on the Complaint." As that is not the case here, Kumar has not established any basis for reversing the judgment with this argument.

V. Prejudgment Interest

Kumar alleges that the trial court made multiple errors in its award of prejudgment interest.

First, Kumar claims that no prejudgment interest award could properly have been made because interest was not properly and timely sought. This argument lacks merit, because the very case on which Kumar relies states that: "[a] general prayer in the complaint is adequate to support an award of prejudgment interest" (North Oakland Medical Clinic v. Rogers (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 824, 829), and here the general prayer in the cross-complaint included a general prayer for "such other and further relief as the court may deem just and proper."

Next, Kumar contends that the award of prejudgment interest dating from a date prior to the commencement of the action was improper because the damages here were not certain or capable of being made certain by calculation within the meaning of Civil Code section 3287, subdivision (a). Kumar claims that the amount of damages was uncertain because it was not certain that either prospective buyer would have purchased the business, and because Myung Sik Park would have paid corporate entity KJIB rather than Dongsik Benjamin Park personally. We have already rejected the contention that there was no substantial evidence that the prospective buyers had the financial ability to purchase the business, and the amount of damages here is quite simple to calculate: the purchase price for the business, $80,000. The damages here fall within the scope of Civil Code section 3287, subdivision (a), and therefore the award of prejudgment interest dating to the date of the breach of the second lease assignment was proper.1

VI. Attorney Fees

Kumar's final section of his opening brief contains a request that if this court overturns the ruling on the cross-complaint but leaves the ruling on the complaint intact, we should also vacate the award of costs and attorney fees. As we affirm the judgment in its entirety, we need not address this issue.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. Respondents shall recover their costs on appeal.

PERLUSS, P. J. and JACKSON, J., concurs.