NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

PERLUSS, P. J.

Carlos Ureno appeals from the denial of his motion for relief from default judgment, contending the July 16, 2008 judgment entered in favor of Bridget Griffith for $170,000 plus attorney fees and costs is void on its face because he had filed an answer prior to the entry of his default. We affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Griffith, representing herself, filed a verified complaint for damages for breach of contract, breach of the implied warranty of habitability and related claims against Ureno, her landlord, on April 25, 2007. Griffith lived at 2647 Alice Street, Los Angeles; Ureno lived on the same property in the back unit, which had its own address, 2645 Alice Street, Los Angeles.

Ureno was properly served with the summons and complaint. On May 14, 2007, representing himself, Ureno filed an answer in the form of a general denial on the Judicial Council form with an attached set of affirmative defenses. He also filed a separate request to waive court fees. The copy of his answer in the record includes the handwritten notation, "fee waiver pending," and a similar entry appears on the court's civil case summary.

On May 29, 2007 Ureno's application for fee waiver was denied after he failed to appear at the hearing set to resolve evidentiary conflicts as to his income. The court's order denying the application contains the following printed admonition: "The applicant shall pay any fees and costs due in this action within 10 days from the date of service of this order or any paper filed by the applicant with the clerk will be of no effect." The superior court's file copy of the order contains the handwritten notation next to this warning, "from 6/11/07."1 On June 11, 2007 the clerk mailed Ureno at his Alice Street address a copy of the order denying the application for a fee waiver.

According to Ureno's subsequently filed declaration, he was not told when he filed his answer and fee waiver request that an evidentiary hearing would be scheduled and he did not receive written notice of either the hearing or the denial of his application. Ureno's declaration also claims court documents sent to him were intercepted by Griffith.

Griffith submitted a request for entry of default on July 5, 2007. That request was rejected by the clerk on July 16, 2007 because the court file indicated Ureno had filed his answer on May 14, 2007. Griffith submitted a new request for entry of default and a statement of damages on August 16, 2007. The court's file copy of these documents includes a signed proof of service on Ureno. The clerk entered Ureno's default on August 16, 2007.

Griffith's prove-up hearing was continued on several occasions due in part to her failure to provide the court with documentation necessary to support a default judgment. Griffith retained counsel and submitted supplemental materials. The hearing finally proceeded on July 16, 2008, and the court entered a judgment by default, explaining, "Defendant was properly served with a copy of the Summons and Complaint. Defendant's Answer and Request for Fee Waiver was held pending a hearing for defendant to show and resolve an evidentiary conflict to his income. Defendant failed to appear at the hearing regarding the evidentiary conflict as to his income. As a consequence, the Court issued an Order denying in whole defendant's Answer and request to proceed in forma pauperis." Based on the evidence presented at the prove-up hearing, the court entered judgment in favor of Griffith in the sum of $50,000 in special damages, $120,000 in general damages, $9,421 in attorney fees pursuant to the parties' lease agreement and Civil Code section 1717 and costs in the sum of $45. Ureno has acknowledged he received a document from Griffith on July 19, 2008, which advised him "the case was over."

Fifteen months after entry of the judgment, Ureno, still representing himself, moved to vacate the default judgment. The motion sought relief under Code of Civil Procedure sections 473, subdivision (b), and 473.5, subdivision (a), as well as under the court's inherent equitable power based on extrinsic mistake. Ureno was granted a fee waiver in connection with the filing of this motion.

In his supporting declaration Ureno testified he had not appeared in the proceedings because he suffered several heart attacks during the relevant time period and was also going through a difficult separation from his wife. Ureno's declaration also asserted he had a meritorious defense to Griffith's action: "Before I leased the premises I fixed the entire house and remo[del]ed the kitchen. The tenant repeatedly denied me entry into the house unless an inspector was present. When I did come to do repairs, she would call the police and claim I [was] harassing her." This initial declaration did not claim Ureno had failed to receive documents served by Griffith or sent from the court.

After multiple continuances of the motion to set aside default, on March 25, 2010 Ureno, now also represented by counsel, filed a supplemental motion to set aside void judgment. In his supplemental declaration Ureno insisted he had not received any notices from the court after he filed his answer and fee waiver request. Ureno's counsel argued the lack of notice of the denial of his request for a fee waiver constituted lack of actual notice of pending litigation within the meaning of Code of Civil Procedure section 473.5, subdivision (a). Ureno also argued the judgment was void because Ureno had, in fact, answered the complaint prior to the entry of the default and default judgment and that answer remained on file.

The court heard oral argument on April 27 and May 18, 2010 and denied Ureno's motion. The court found wholly unsupported Ureno's contention that Griffith had stolen his mail and ruled the bare claim he was unaware of the proceedings did not constitute excusable neglect or extrinsic mistake. The court also rejected Ureno's argument that his filing of a general denial, notwithstanding the subsequent rejection of his fee waiver request and failure to pay the required filing fee, precluded entry of a default and default judgment.

CONTENTION

Although Ureno asserted a number of statutory and equitable bases for vacating the default judgment in the trial court, on appeal he contends only that the judgment in favor of Griffith is void as a matter of law because an answer was on file when the court entered his default.

DISCUSSION

Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (d), authorizes the trial court to set aside any void judgment or order. While a motion to vacate a default and default judgment generally must be brought within six months of entry of the default judgment (Code Civ. Proc., § 473, subd. (b); see Lee v. An (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 558, 563), there is no time limit to attack a judgment void on its face. (Lee, at p. 563; Plaza Hollister Ltd. Partnership v. County of San Benito (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 1, 19.) A judgment is void on its face only when the record affirmatively shows the court was without jurisdiction to render the judgment. (Canadian & American Mortgage & Trust Co. v. Clarita Land & Invest. Co. (1903) 140 Cal. 672, 674; Rochin v. Pat Johnson Manufacturing Co. (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1228, 1239.)

Ureno is generally correct that "a default entered after the answer has been filed is void." (Heidary v. Yadollahi (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 857, 863; compare Code Civ. Proc., § 585 [default and default judgment may be entered if the defendant fails to answer the complaint after being properly served] with Code Civ. Proc., § 594, subd. (a) [authorizing uncontested hearing if answering defendant fails to appear for trial after proper notice]; see generally Wilson v. Goldman (1969) 274 Cal.App.2d 573, 576 ["[s]ection 585 of the Code of Civil Procedure does not authorize the entry of any default in cases where an answer is on file, whether the defendant does or does not appear at the time the action is called for hearing"].) But here, after denying Ureno's application for a waiver of court fees and costs, the court expressly ordered his answer would "be of no effect" if the required filing fee was not timely paid. This order was served on Ureno and is fully consistent with Government Code section 68634, subdivision (g), which provides, "If an application [for an initial fee waiver] is denied in whole or in part, the applicant shall pay the court fees and costs that ordinarily would be charged . . . within 10 days after the clerk gives notice of the denial . . . . If the applicant does not pay on time, the clerk shall void the papers that were filed without payment of the court fees and costs."

Although no separate order was entered striking Ureno's answer after the time for payment of the filing fee had elapsed, no additional order was required. The initial, May 29, 2007 order was clear: Absent payment of the required fees (or a new waiver application), Ureno's answer was void. When the court acted in August 2007 and again in July 2008, there was no longer a valid answer on file that precluded entry of default or a default judgment.

DISPOSITION

The order denying the motion for relief from default judgment is affirmed. Griffith is to recover her costs on appeal.

WOODS, J. and ZELON, J., concurs.