NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

ALDRICH, J.

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Dewey Edward Chester appeals from the judgment dismissing his lawsuit entered after the trial court sustained the demurrer of defendant, Cedars-Sinai Medical Center (Cedars), and denied leave to amend. Plaintiff contends the trial court misapplied the provision of the Elder Abuse and Dependent Adult Civil Protection Act (the Act) (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 15600 et seq.)1 that grants immunity to mandated reporters of physical or financial abuse or neglect of an elder or dependent adult. (§§ 15630, subd.(a); 15634, subd. (a).) We conclude the trial court correctly applied the immunity. Plaintiff's entire complaint arises from a report of suspected elder abuse made by Cedars. As Cedars was a mandated reporter under the Act, it was absolutely immune from liability and so the trial court did not abuse its discretion in sustaining Cedars' demurrer without leave to amend.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff's operative, second amended complaint asserted four causes of action against Cedars for damages for fraud, defamation, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and malicious prosecution, and sought punitive damages. Plaintiff alleged in his first cause of action that in 2007, someone at Cedars made a report of possible elder abuse of plaintiff's 94-year old mother, Harriette Mercedes Tucker, to the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) and the Los Angeles County Adult Protective Services (LACAPS). As a result, a criminal complaint was filed with the Los Angeles District Attorney's Office. The district attorney's office brought a criminal proceeding against plaintiff that lasted 12 months, but that resulted in an adjudication in plaintiff's favor. The second cause of action, similar to the first, includes the allegation that Cedars filed fraudulent medical records with the LAPD and LACAPS. The third cause of action adds the allegation that Cedars published fraudulent medical records to the LAPD. In his fourth cause of action, plaintiff alleged that staff at Cedars was reckless and caused "emotional distress to plaintiff from care of plaintiff's Mother, Mrs. Harriette Mercedes Tucker, resulting in a decibitus bedsore wound . . . ."2

Meanwhile, during discovery, the court entered an order that the truth of the matters specified in Cedars' Requests For Admission, Set No. One is deemed admitted. Stated otherwise, the trial court deemed admitted: "(1) That in 2007 defendant Cedars . . . did not conspire with any other person to falsely accuse plaintiff . . . of causing injury to his mother; [¶] (2) That in 2007 defendant Cedars . . . did not falsify medical records; [¶] (3) That in 2007 defendant Cedars . . . did not file a false police report; [¶] (4) That in 2007 defendant Cedars . . . did not employ an untrained employee; [¶] (5) That in 2007 you [plaintiff] injured your [plaintiff's] mother."

Cedars moved to strike portions of the complaint and demurred on the ground that none of the four causes of action alleged facts sufficient to state a cause of action against it because, among other things, as a care custodian (§ 15610.17) and mandated reporter (§ 15630, subds. (a) & (b)), Cedars was immune to liability. (§ 15634, subd. (a).)

The trial court sustained Cedars' demurrer to all causes of action in the complaint without leave to amend and dismissed the complaint. Plaintiff filed his timely appeal.

CONTENTIONS

Plaintiff contends that (1) the trial court "misapplied" the immunity because (a) the statute only immunizes reports of financial abuse (§ 15634), (b) the term absolute immunity does not appear in the statute; and (2) the trial court failed to inform plaintiff that the immunity is "removed" when the reporter knowingly files a false report of elder abuse.

DISCUSSION

1. standard of review

"In reviewing a demurrer that is sustained without leave to amend, an appellate court assumes the truth of (1) all facts properly pleaded by the plaintiff, (2) all facts contained in exhibits to the complaint, (3) all facts that are properly the subject of judicial notice, and (4) all facts that reasonably may be inferred from the foregoing facts. [Citations.]" (Neilson v. City of California City (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 1296, 1305, citing Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.)

"The reviewing court must reverse the judgment if (1) the complaint, liberally construed, has stated a cause of action under any possible legal theory; or (2) the plaintiff shows there is a reasonable possibility any defect identified by the defendant can be cured by amendment. [Citations.] The burden of proving a reasonable possibility of cure is squarely on the plaintiff. [Citation.]" (Neilson v. City of California City, supra, 133 Cal.App.4th at p. 1305.)

2. Cedars was absolutely immune to liability for reporting suspected abuse of plaintiff's elderly mother.

The Act "represents the Legislature's response to the problem of unreported elder abuse which came to its attention in the early 1980's. [Citations.] The statutory scheme set out in the Welfare and Institutions Code follows the statutory model for child abuse by mandating that health care providers report suspected elder abuse and immunizing from civil liability those who are required to make such reports. [Citation.]" (Easton v. Sutter Coast Hospital (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 485, 490-491 (Easton).)

Under section 15630 of the Act, "Any person who has assumed full or intermittent responsibility for the care or custody of an elder or dependent adult, whether or not he or she receives compensation, including administrators, supervisors, and any licensed staff of a public or private facility that provides care or services for elder or dependent adults, or any elder or dependent adult care custodian, health practitioner, clergy member, or employee of a county adult protective services agency or a local law enforcement agency, is a mandated reporter." (§ 15630, subd. (a), italics added.)

"Any mandated reporter," the Act directs, "who, in his or her professional capacity, or within the scope of his or her employment, has observed or has knowledge of an incident that reasonably appears to be physical abuse . . . abandonment, abduction, isolation, financial abuse, or neglect, or is told by an elder . . . that he or she has experienced . . . physical abuse . . . abandonment, abduction, isolation, financial abuse, or neglect, or reasonably suspects that abuse, shall report the known or suspected instance of abuse by telephone immediately or as soon as practicably possible, and by written report sent within two working days . . . ." (§ 15630, subd. (b)(1), italics added; see also §§ 15610.65 [defining reasonable suspicion], 15610.57 [defining neglect], 15610.63 [defining physical abuse] & 15610.30 [defining financial abuse].)

Cedars is a mandated reporter because it is a "general acute care hospital" that provides 24-hour inpatient care. (Health & Saf. Code, § 1250, subd. (a).)3 That makes Cedars a "care custodian" as defined in the Act. (§ 15610.17.)4 As a care custodian, Cedars is a mandated reporter. (§ 15630, subds. (a) & (b).) Accordingly, Cedars is obligated to report suspected neglect, physical abuse, or financial abuse of an elder, when it reasonably suspects such abuse has occurred. (Ibid.)

"The focus of the Act has always been to encourage reporting of abuse or neglect. [Citation.]" (Easton, supra, 80 Cal.App.4th at p. 491.) Accordingly, the Act provides for immunity for mandated reporters. Section 15634, subdivision (a) reads, "No care custodian, clergy member, health practitioner, mandated reporter of suspected financial abuse of an elder or dependent adult, or employee of an adult protective services agency or a local law enforcement agency who reports a known or suspected instance of abuse of an elder or dependent adult shall be civilly or criminally liable for any report required or authorized by this article." (Italics added.)

Here, all four of the causes of action in plaintiff's operative complaint arise out of the report made by Cedars that it suspected plaintiff of abuse of his elderly mother. Although plaintiff did not specifically allege that his mother came to Cedars for medical care and treatment, a reasonable inference — from the existence of her medical records at Cedars — is that she did. (Neilson v. City of California City, supra, 133 Cal.App.4th at p. 1305 [on appeal from the sustaining of a demurrer, we assume the truth of all facts reasonably inferred from alleged facts].) Further, it is deemed admitted that plaintiff injured his mother. Thus, where Cedars was a care custodian (§ 15630, subd. (a)) who was mandated to report abuse and neglect (§ 15630, subd. (b)), it fell within the group of health care providers who are immunized from civil liability "as a result of any report [required or] authorized by this article[.]" (§ 15634, subd. (a).) The trial court did not abuse its discretion in sustaining the demurrer and denying leave to amend.

On appeal, plaintiff contends that Cedars is not absolutely immune because absolute immunity only applies to reports of financial elder abuse, which is separate and distinct from physical elder abuse. He focuses on the clause, "mandated reporter of suspected financial abuse of an elder" to argue apparently that where the report against him was for physical abuse, not financial abuse, the immunity does not insulate Cedars. Plaintiff is wrong.

The reason is that the first sentence of section 15634, subdivision (a) immunizes "reports [of] a known or suspected instance of abuse of an elder," without qualifying whether that reported abuse is financial, physical, or neglect. Also, the first sentence of the statute is written in the disjunctive and lists those who would be absolutely immune. Parsing section 15634, subdivision (a), the Act provides that "no care custodian" "who reports a known or suspected instance of abuse of an elder" "shall be . . . liable for any report required or authorized by [the Act]."

The legislative history supports this conclusion. In 2005, the Legislature created a new liability for financial abuse, in addition to the existing liability for physical abuse and neglect. The Legislature did so by enacting section 15630.1, which defines "mandated reporter of suspected financial abuse of an elder . . ." (Stats. 2005, ch. 140, § 4, operative Jan. 1, 2007.) At the same time, the Legislature added the phrase "mandated reporter of suspected financial abuse of an elder" to the existing list of those who are immune to liability under section 15634, subdivision (a). Prior to the addition of mandated reporters of suspected elder financial abuse, the immunity in section 15634, subdivision (a) read, "No care custodian, clergy member, health practitioner, or employee of an adult protective service agency or a local law enforcement agency who reports a known or suspected instance of elder or dependent adult abuse shall be civilly or criminally liable for any report required or authorized by this article." (Italics added.) The absolute immunity provision in section 15634, subdivision (a) was always intended to immunize a care custodian "who reports a known or suspected instance of abuse," regardless of the type of abuse in the report. The 2005 amendments did not limit application of that immunity to financial abusers. Rather, the amendments expanded the list of those absolutely immune, to include the newly created mandated reporter of financial abuse.

Plaintiff next argues that section 15634, subdivision (a) does not use the term "absolute" immunity and so, presumably, the immunity is not absolute. Not so. Easton reviewed that language of the statute and the legislative history and held that the "privilege created by the section [15634] is absolute rather than qualified" for mandated reporters. (Easton, supra, 80 Cal.App.4th at p. 491.) Easton explained, "[t]he language of section 15634 distinguishes between mandated reporters of abuse who make required or authorized reports and nonmandated reporters. As to those who must report, the rule is sweeping in its breadth-no health practitioner who reports shall be civilly liable for any report. However, the section goes on to create only a qualified privilege for `[a]ny other person reporting.' Such nonmandated reporters `shall not incur civil or criminal liability as a result of any report authorized by this article, unless it can be proven that a false report was made and the person knew that the report was false.' (§ 15634, subd. (a).) The plain meaning of the statutory language is that for mandated reporters the truth or falsity of the report is of no moment-the privilege is absolute." (Id. at pp. 491-492, italics added.) In short, as a mandated reporter whose report of elder financial or physical abuse or neglect is absolutely privileged, Cedars is absolutely immune from liability for its report concerning plaintiff's mother.

As the immunity under the Act is absolute for mandated reporters such as Cedars (Easton, supra, 80 Cal.App.4th at p. 491), plaintiff's further contention that the immunity is "removed" when the reporter knowingly files a false report, is unavailing. The quality of the report does not alter Cedars' immunity as a mandated reporter. (Ibid.) The falsity of a report is only relevant if the reporter is not mandated. (Ibid.) In any event, we note that here, the report was not false; the trial court deemed admitted that Cedars (1) did not falsify medical records, (2) did not file a false police report, and that (3) plaintiff abused his elderly mother.

Next, although unclear, it appears plaintiff is arguing that he, as the caretaker for his mother was a mandated reporter under section 15630, subdivision (a), and that he alleged that Cedars abused his elderly mother. We have reviewed all of the versions of plaintiff's complaint and are unable to discern any allegations of a cause of action for elder abuse against Cedars or abuse of plaintiff. Not only did Cedars not have the care and custody of plaintiff, but plaintiff's complaint did not allege that Cedars neglected him (§ 15610.57) or physically abused him. (§ 15610.63) The complaint does not even assert plaintiff's age, such that he would qualify as an elder. (See § 15610.27 [elder is any person 65 years of age or older].) Nor does the complaint state a cause of action alleging Cedars abused plaintiff's mother. There are simply no allegations of abuse as defined in the Act by Cedars of plaintiff or his mother.

In his brief on appeal, it appears that plaintiff would like to amend his complaint. He states that he would like this court to "amend the decision of [the trial court] so that plaintiff Chester can show clear and convincing evidence, under the rules and regulations of the [Act]." Hence, plaintiff proposes to amend his complaint to allege the standard of proof under the Act. However, plaintiff carries the burden of proving a reasonable possibility he could cure the defects in his pleadings. (Neilson v. City of California City, supra, 133 Cal.App.4th at p. 1305.) Plaintiff's brief does not show in what way he would amend to cure the defects in his second amended complaint that were identified by the trial court or here. Nor does his brief show how he would amend to allege facts sufficient to state a cause of action for damages for elder abuse against Cedars. (Ibid.) Amendment to state the standard of proof does not aid plaintiff in this endeavor.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. Each party to bear their own costs on appeal.

CROSKEY, Acting P. J. and KITCHING, J., concurs.