NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

MANELLA, J.

Appellant Pari Michail sued respondents Antoine and Gracia Alti, contending they had failed to return funds she had given them for safekeeping and/or for investment purposes.1 After a nonjury trial, the court entered judgment for the defense under Code of Civil Procedure section 631.8. The primary issues raised on appeal are procedural — whether the trial court abused its discretion in refusing appellant's counsel's requests to (a) recall Antoine to the stand after he had been examined and excused, and (b) call a witness not on appellant's witness list. Appellant's sole substantive contention is that substantial evidence does not support the court's findings on her claim for conversion. Finding no merit to appellant's procedural or substantive contentions, we affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Complaint

In December 2009, appellant brought suit against respondents for fraud, unjust enrichment, breach of contract, and conversion. The complaint alleged that in 1986, appellant loaned $70,000 to respondents, that respondents used the funds to purchase a liquor store, and that respondents had not repaid the amounts owed. The complaint further alleged that in September 2009, Antoine signed a reaffirmation of the debt. The fraud claims alleged that appellant was induced to enter into the loan agreement by respondents' misrepresentations. The conversion claim alleged that appellant was the owner of "[i]nterest and [p]rincipal owed on the [1986] loan" and that "[w]hile [respondents] originally came into the possession of the converted property legally, they then improperly retained it despite the demand by [appellant] for return of the property."

B. Evidence at Trial

The case was tried to the court. Both appellant and Antoine testified. They did not dispute that in 1986, Antoine borrowed $70,000 from appellant.2 Nor was there any dispute that sometime prior to 1995, appellant won $15,000 gambling at a casino and asked Antoine to hold it for her.3 The parties disputed how much of either sum was repaid in the intervening years.4 There was no dispute that in 1995, Antoine informed appellant that according to his calculations, he still owed her $27,000 and that appellant did not object or suggest that any different amount was due.5

In August 1995, Antoine enabled appellant to purchase an interest in a liquor store by paying the seller (his brother-in-law) the $27,000 the parties agreed he still owed her. A month later, appellant signed a document stating "[t]his is to certify that as of September 1st, 1995, Antoine Alti has paid in full all the money and interest that he owes to Pari Michail." Within a few months of purchasing the interest in the liquor store, appellant quarreled with her partner (her other daughter, Carol Mehdipour, who had purchased the remaining interest in the store) and Mehdipour returned appellant's $27,000 investment to her. Appellant gave the $27,000 to Antoine.

The parties disputed why appellant gave the $27,000 to Antoine and what transpired in the ensuing years. Antoine testified that appellant was continuing to receive government benefits and gave him the $27,000 to hold because having money in her name in a bank account would interfere with her ability to receive such benefits. He testified that thereafter, he gave her cash as she needed it to pay her living expenses, and continued to do so until 2009.

Appellant testified that she gave Antoine the $27,000 with the understanding that he would find her another investment that would provide an income. For several years thereafter, she was sick, depressed, and in and out of the hospital. In 2000, she asked Antoine what had happened to the money and he replied, "that was a long time ago." Two years later, she invited Antoine to her home to "put the numbers down," "tell [her] what [she] ha[d]," "give it to [her] and finish it." However, they did not reach an agreement and she never saw him again.6 According to appellant, Antoine did not purchase any investments or gifts for her after 1995, or repay any of the $27,000.

There was no dispute that in 2009, nearly 15 years after appellant's investment in the liquor store fell through and she returned the $27,000 to Antoine, Damavandi met with Antoine, having prepared for his signature a document stating that he acknowledged and agreed to repay loans totaling $93,000. The document specified that Antoine received $8,000 from appellant in 1985, $70,000 in 1986, and $15,000 in 1990. Antoine refused to sign the acknowledgment. Instead, in September 2009, he signed a document which he had prepared himself. It stated: "For various considerations, Antoine Alti agrees to pay Ms. Pari Michael [sic] the sum of $93,000[;] Antoine Alti will do his best to pay this amount as soon as possible or when he sells the business." The document went on to state: "After today's date[,] if [appellant] harass[es] Antoine Alti or any member of his family directly or indirectly, or discuss[es] this agreement or any matter related to Antoine Alti['s] personal and private life with anyone other than [Damavandi], Antoine Alti has the right to cancel this agreement and consider it as null and void."7

C. Section 631.8 Motion and Court's Findings

After the conclusion of appellant's case in chief, respondents moved for judgment under Code of Civil Procedure section 631.8.8 Respondents' counsel argued that the statutes of limitations applicable to the claims appellant had asserted — oral contract, written contract, negligent misrepresentation, conversion, and fraud — had expired, and that her claims were barred by laches. Counsel also argued that the document signed by Antoine in 2009 was the product of blackmail and duress and that it could not serve as an acknowledgment or reaffirmation of a prior debt because it was not unqualified and unconditional. Counsel further argued that the evidence established that Antoine had repaid all amounts appellant loaned him or gave him to hold. Appellant's counsel argued that the statute of limitations was tolled by Antoine's reassurances of repayment or financial assistance, and that the document he signed in 2009 restarted the limitations period.

The court granted the motion, finding that appellant had failed to meet her burden of proof on any cause of action. Preliminarily, the court found that the parties had entered into a loan agreement in 1986, when appellant gave $70,000 to respondents. At the same time, it was undisputed that from 1986 to 1991, appellant was paid $1,000 per month, or between $60,000 and $72,000 at a minimum. The court noted that Antoine admitted owing appellant $27,000 in 1995, but with respect to any amount remaining due, found appellant "less than credible" and possibly even "willfully false." The court stated that it "disregarded much of what [appellant] testified [to] based on her unwillingness to answer simple and direct questions that were put to her."9 Referring to the gambling winnings appellant gave Antoine to hold, the court found that "to attempt to enforce this agreement would be the court enforcing an illegal contract, which is against the law" because the evidence established appellant gave the money to Antoine to "mislead the government" in order to continue to receive government assistance.

Judgment was entered for respondents. This appeal followed.

DISCUSSION

A. Requests to Recall Antoine and to Call a Witness not on Appellant's Witness List

1. Background

When trial commenced, two attorneys were present to represent appellant — Carlos Lloreda and Andrew Reback. On the first and second day of trial, Lloreda gave the opening statement and examined respondents. At the end of the second day, the direct examination of appellant began, conducted by Reback. It was not concluded that day. On the third day of trial, a Friday, Lloreda informed the court that appellant was ill and had been hospitalized. Lloreda further informed the court that he had only recently been associated in as counsel and wished to withdraw.10 The court denied the motion, stating the request could not be made orally and that withdrawal required appellant's consent, but continued the trial to the following Monday to give Lloreda an opportunity to follow proper procedures. Appellant appeared at that time, but Lloreda reported telephonically that he was suffering chest pains and would be unable to attend. Reback asked for a continuance, contending he was unable to proceed because he had never before conducted a civil trial and did not have the case file. The court instructed him to continue his examination of appellant and promised to revisit the matter if Lloreda continued to be unwell and additional witnesses were called. Several days later, during the cross-examination of appellant, the court received and reviewed a physician's letter confirming Lloreda's disability but indicating no estimated date for his recovery. Reback requested a one or two-week continuance so that Lloreda could conduct the final portion of the trial. Noting that Reback had been counsel of record since the beginning of the case and that the doctor's note did not indicate that Lloreda would ever be sufficiently recovered to appear, the court denied the request.

After the conclusion of appellant's testimony, Reback examined Damavandi and thereafter requested permission to recall Antoine and to call Mehdipour, who was listed on respondents' witness list but not on appellant's. The court denied both requests, noting that although counsel had estimated a two or three-day trial, it had been going on for almost a week, and that Antoine had been examined by prior counsel. Appellant contends the court erred in refusing these requests, particularly when viewed in light of Lloreda's alleged abandonment.11

2. Analysis

Under Evidence Code section 774, "[a] witness once examined cannot be reexamined as to the same matter without leave of the court." Evidence Code section 778 provides that "[a]fter a witness has been excused from giving further testimony in the action, he cannot be recalled without leave of court." Whether to grant or withhold leave is "in the court's discretion." (Evid. Code, §§ 774, 778.) Antoine was the first witness called by appellant. His examination consumed nearly a day of trial. Our review of the record indicates he was thoroughly questioned by attorney Lloreda on all relevant matters before being excused. Attorney Reback offered no reason for recalling Antoine, other than the fact that he had not personally examined him, and identified no new matter or line of inquiry he wished to explore. We find no abuse of discretion in the court's denial of appellant's request to recall Antoine.

With respect to the court's denial of appellant's request to call Mehdipour, there can be no dispute that the decision to exclude Mehdipour's testimony due to appellant's failure to identify her as a witness in pretrial proceedings was a matter within the court's discretion. Trial courts "`have fundamental inherent equity, supervisory, and administrative powers, as well as inherent power to control litigation before them'" and "possess inherent rulemaking authority as well as rulemaking authority granted by statute." (Elkins v. Superior Court (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1337, 1351, quoting Rutherford v. Owens-Illinois, Inc. (1997) 16 Cal.4th 953, 967.) Under this authority, trial courts have the power "to implement and enforce effective conduct of [pretrial] proceedings" (Mellone v. Lewis (1965) 233 Cal.App.2d 4, 12), and "`to make orders [that] prevent the frustration, abuse, or disregard of the court's processes.'" (Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. v. Superior Court (1988) 200 Cal.App.3d 272, 287, quoting Conn v. Superior Court (1987) 196 Cal.App.3d 774, 785.) "The court's inherent power to curb abuses and promote fair process extends to the preclusion of evidence." (Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. v. Superior Court, supra, at p. 288.)

Moreover, even assuming the court erred in refusing to permit appellant to call Mehdipour, reversal is not required unless appellant establishes prejudice. (See In re Marriage of McLaughlin (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 327, 336, quoting Waller v. TJD, Inc. (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 830, 833 ["`When the trial court commits error in ruling on matters relating to pleadings, procedures, or other preliminary matters, reversal can generally be predicated thereon only if the appellant can show resulting prejudice, and the probability of a more favorable outcome, at trial. Article VI, section 13 [of the California Constitution] admonishes us that error may lead to reversal only if we are persuaded `upon an examination of the entire cause' that there has been a miscarriage of justice.'"] (Italics deleted).) Neither at trial nor in her briefs on appeal has appellant set forth the expected testimony of Mehdipour or suggested how it would have led to a different outcome.12 Because appellant has failed to show prejudice, any error in refusing the request was harmless.13

B. Conversion Claim

The only substantive issue raised on appeal is appellant's contention that substantial evidence does not support the court's finding for the defense on the conversion claim. Appellant contends the "decisive facts" proving the essential elements of conversion were undisputed. For the reasons set forth below, we disagree.

"[C]onversion is any act of dominion wrongfully exerted over another's personal property in denial of or inconsistent with his rights therein." (Gruber v. Pacific States Sav. & Loan Co. (1939) 13 Cal.2d 144, 148.) The elements of conversion are (1) "`plaintiff's ownership or right to possession of property'"; (2) "`defendant's wrongful act toward or disposition of the property, interfering with plaintiff's possession'"; and (3) "`damage to plaintiff.'" (PCO, Inc. v. Christensen, Miller, Fink, Jacobs, Glaser, Weil & Shapiro, LLP (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 384, 395.) Money can be the subject of conversion if there is "`a specific, identifiable sum involved'" (ibid.), and California courts permit an action for conversion where the defendant has "misappropriated, commingled, or misapplied specific funds held for the benefit of others." (Id. at p. 396.) However, actions for the conversion of money are not permitted "when the amount of money involved is not a definite sum." (Ibid.)

Preliminarily, we note that although appellant alleged in her complaint that respondents' converted a specific sum — $70,000 — at trial, she claimed that an additional $23,000 had been given to respondents and conceded that some part of the $93,000 total had been repaid.14 The issue was whether any additional principle or interest remained due. Because that amount was not a "definite sum," a conversion claim was not the appropriate method for obtaining recovery.15 (See PCO, Inc. v. Christensen, Miller, Fink, Jacobs, Glaser, Weil & Shapiro, LLP, supra, 150 Cal.App.4th at p. 397 [assertion of conversion claim based on theft of duffel bags containing cash was inappropriate because plaintiffs were unsure how many duffel bags were taken and how much cash each contained].)

More fundamentally, the conversion claim failed because the evidence conclusively established that the $70,000 lent in 1986, as well as the $8,000 allegedly lent to Antoine prior to that date and the $15,000 given to Antoine to hold sometime between 1986 and 1995, were fully repaid in 1995, when appellant signed the document indicating that all sums owed to her had been repaid. There was no dispute that later in 1995, appellant gave $27,000 to Antoine either to hold for investment purposes or to pay appellant's living expenses. But neither in the complaint nor at trial did appellant contend that the $27,000 given to Antoine in 1995 represented the sum certain necessary to establish her conversion claim. Moreover, had she asserted such a claim, we could not find as a matter of law that she was entitled to that sum. The evidence whether all or any portion of that sum was paid to or for the benefit of appellant by Antoine was disputed at trial. Antoine testified that he continued to pay appellant's expenses and to give her cash long after she gave him the $27,000 to hold for her. The only evidence that Antoine had not fully repaid the amounts due came from appellant, whose testimony the court found unworthy of belief.16

It is also true, as respondents argue, that any possible claim for conversion of the $27,000 or any other amount expired long ago under the applicable statute of limitations. Conversion claims are subject to the three-year statute of limitations found in Code of Civil Procedure section 338, subdivision (c)(1) (First Nat. Bank v. Thompson (1943) 60 Cal.App.2d 79, 81-82), which begins to run when "the aggrieved party discovers or ought to have discovered the existence of the cause of action for conversion." (Bennett v. Hibernia Bank (1956) 47 Cal.2d 540, 561.) According to appellant's testimony, Antoine made clear by 2000 or 2002 that he had no intention of paying her any more money. Appellant did not bring suit until 2009, well past the statutory deadline.

Appellant contends the document signed by Antoine in 2009 reaffirmed the existence of the debt and revived her conversion claim against respondents. A clear written acknowledgment or promise, signed by the party to be charged, may revive a claim or prevent the statute of limitations from running. (Code Civ. Proc., § 360; Kaichen's Metal Mart, Inc. v. Ferro Cast Co. (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 8, 14-15.) Where, as here, however, the purported acknowledgment is executed after the original debt or claim has been barred by the statute of limitations, it does not serve to revive the original debt or claim, but "creates a new contract and a new obligation dating from the acknowledgment" (id. at p. 15, citing Eilke v. Rice (1955) 45 Cal.2d 66, 73); any ensuing action must be on the breach of the promise to pay contained in the acknowledgment, not the original default. (Vassere v. Joerger (1938) 10 Cal.2d 689, 692-693; Southern Pacific Co. v. Prosser (1898) 122 Cal. 413, 416-417.) Appellant's complaint failed to assert a claim for breach of contract or promise to pay based on the alleged acknowledgment. All the causes of action in her complaint were based on the original barred debt.

Moreover, under the standards governing acknowledgments, the 2009 document was deficient. First, the document was signed by Antoine alone, and could not create a new claim against Gracia. (Bemer v. Bemer (1957) 152 Cal.App.2d 766, 773 ["`[T]he promise of one of several joint obligors cannot avail to revive as against the others a cause of action barred by limitation, or to suspend the running of the statute.'"].) Even as to Antoine, it represented a conditional promise at best, stating not an immediate promise to pay, but that Antoine would "do his best to pay . . . as soon as possible or when he sells the business." An acknowledgment containing a conditional promise, such as a promise to pay when able is insufficient to restart the statute of limitations. (Maurer v. Bernardo (1931) 118 Cal.App. 290, 294.) In addition, the document stated that Antoine's promise would be "null and void" if appellant continued to harass Antoine or his family. Antoine testified that appellant continued to call and threaten him after he signed the document. Accordingly, the document failed to provide appellant with an enforceable right against respondents.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. Respondents are awarded their costs on appeal.

EPSTEIN, P. J. and SUZUKAWA, J., concurs.