NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

ROTHSCHILD, Acting P. J.

Saou Ting Chu appeals from the summary judgment entered against him on his medical malpractice complaint against Dr. U Soe Myint. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

On December 27, 2006, Dr. Ted C. Wei performed surgery on Chu's left eye to remove a pterygium.1 Later that day, Myint administered radiation treatment to Chu's left eye. Approximately one week after the surgery, Chu consulted Wei because of discomfort and a "scar" in his left eye. Myint administered additional radiation treatments through January 8, 2007.

Chu last consulted Myint at a follow-up appointment on March 7, 2007. He continued to consult Wei for his left eye until October 23, 2007.

On November 1, 2007, Chu began consulting Dr. Meei-Ling T. Wu concerning the discomfort, pain, and scar in his left eye. According to Chu's deposition testimony, when Chu first went to Wu, Wu informed him that the pain and discomfort in his left eye was caused by both the surgery performed by Wei and the radiation treatment administered by Myint.

Chu filed suit against Wei and 20 Doe defendants on September 24, 2008. According to Chu's deposition testimony, he filed suit against Wei alone, rather than against both Wei and Myint, because he could not pronounce or perhaps could not remember Myint's name and because he thought Wei "was primarily responsible," so Chu decided to "sue him first."

On March 20, 2009, Chu amended his complaint against Wei to substitute Myint for one of the Doe defendants. On April 10, 2009, Chu requested that his entire suit—all causes of action as to all parties—be dismissed without prejudice, and the trial court granted his request on the same day.

On December 4, 2009, Chu filed the instant complaint against Myint. Myint moved for summary judgment on the grounds that the action was barred by the statute of limitations under Code of Civil Procedure section 340.5 and that his treatment of Chu did not breach the applicable standard of care.2

The trial court granted the motion on the ground that the action was untimely. The court entered judgment on November 18, 2010, and Chu timely appealed.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The trial court's ruling on a motion for summary judgment is reviewed de novo. (Buss v. Superior Court (1997) 16 Cal.4th 35, 60.)

DISCUSSION

Chu argues that his action is timely because he neither suspected nor should have suspected Myint of negligence until early 2009, when two experts he retained in his suit against Wei told him that he suffered from "scleral thinning" as a result of the radiation treatments. We disagree.

"In an action for injury or death against a health care provider based upon such person's alleged professional negligence, the time for the commencement of action shall be three years after the date of injury or one year after the plaintiff discovers, or through the use of reasonable diligence should have discovered, the injury, whichever occurs first." (§ 340.5.) "`[T]he statute of limitations begins to run when the plaintiff suspects or should suspect that her injury was caused by wrongdoing, that someone has done something wrong to her.'" (Dolan v. Borelli (1993) 13 Cal.App.4th 816, 822, quoting Jolly v. Eli Lilly & Co. (1988) 44 Cal.3d 1103, 1110 (Jolly).)

Chu suspected or should have suspected that Myint had done something wrong to him when Wu told Chu that the pain and discomfort in his eye were caused by both Wei's surgery and Myint's radiation treatments. The one-year statute of limitations therefore began to run on November 1, 2007, so Chu's December 4, 2009, complaint against Myint is untimely.

Chu's argument to the contrary is based on the following evidence: In his declaration, Chu states that after his initial consultation with Wu, both Wu and several other doctors told him that the "discomfort, pain and scar resulted from Dr. Wei cutting too deep on [Chu's] left eye during the surgery." Chu states that, on the basis of those opinions, he believed "that Dr. Wei—and not [Myint]—was responsible for any injuries which [Chu] suffered." Chu gave similar testimony at his deposition—both Wu and the other doctors told him that the doctor who had performed the surgery had "cut it too deep."

On that basis, Chu argues that until the experts he retained in his suit against Wei told him about the scleral thinning, he neither suspected nor had reason to suspect Myint of wrongdoing. Until then, he claims, both Wu and other doctors had told him that only Wei was at fault.

We reject Chu's argument for the following three reasons: (1) The evidence he presents is insufficient to create a triable issue of fact; (2) his own testimony establishes that his reasons for not suing Myint at the same time he sued Wei were only that he could not remember or pronounce Myint's name and thought Wei was "primarily responsible," so he wanted to "sue him first"; and (3) "failure to discover, or have reason to discover, the identity of the defendant does not postpone the accrual of a cause of action." (Norgart v. Upjohn Co. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 383, 399 (Norgart).)

First, as regards Chu's evidence, his declaration and deposition testimony never state that Wu ever retracted her initial statement that his injuries were caused by both Wei and Myint. Rather, Chu's declaration states that Wu told him "that the discomfort, pain and scar in [Chu's] left eye resulted from Dr. Wei cutting too deep on [Chu's] left eye during surgery." But that statement is consistent with Wu's original statement that the discomfort, pain, and scar resulted from Wei's surgery and also from Myint's radiation treatments. Similarly, Chu's reports of what the other doctors told him do not indicate that those doctors excluded Myint's radiation treatments as a contributing cause. Indeed, Chu's declaration and deposition testimony never state that those other doctors were even aware of Myint or the radiation treatments. In sum, Chu has presented no evidence that Wu or any other doctor ever told him that, contrary to Wu's initial assessment that Chu's injuries were caused by both Wei and Myint, the injuries were actually caused by Wei and not by Myint.

Second, it is undisputed that Chu filed suit against Wei after his initial consultation with Wu, when Wu told him that both Wei and Myint were responsible for his injuries. And Chu testified that his reason for not filing suit against Myint at that time was not that he did not suspect Myint of wrongdoing. Rather, he chose to sue Wei "first" because he thought Wei was "primarily responsible," and he could not remember or pronounce Myint's name. Thus, even if Chu had presented evidence that Wu and other doctors had caused him to doubt Wu's initial assessment that his injuries were caused by both Wei and Myint, Chu's own testimony establishes that such doubts were unrelated to his decision not to file suit against Myint.

Third, the Supreme Court has held that "failure to discover, or have reason to discover, the identity of the defendant does not postpone the accrual of a cause of action." (Norgart, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 399.) Rather, the cause of action accrues "when the plaintiff suspects or should suspect that her injury was caused by wrongdoing," regardless of whether the plaintiff knows the identity of the wrongdoer. (Jolly, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 1110.) As the Supreme Court has also noted, a plaintiff who is uncertain about the identities of possible wrongdoers can protect his or her rights "by filing a Doe complaint, within the one-year limitations period applicable thereto" and then amending the complaint to substitute additional defendants as long as they are identified within three years of the original filing. (Norgart, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 408; see also Jolly, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 1118.) Indeed, that is the procedure Chu originally used in this dispute, filing suit against Wei and 20 Does and then amending his complaint to substitute Myint for one of the Doe defendants. Unfortunately, Chu decided to dismiss that action and file a new one against Myint. But he fails to explain why his decision to proceed in that manner should exempt him from the rule that "failure to discover, or have reason to discover, the identity of the defendant does not postpone the accrual of a cause of action." (Norgart, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 399.) Thus, even if we agreed that Chu had presented sufficient evidence to create a factual dispute as to whether he suspected or should have suspected that Myint had caused his injuries, and even if Chu had presented evidence that his doubts about Myint's responsibility had caused him to refrain from filing suit against Myint when he sued Wei, we would still have to affirm. Ignorance of the identity of the wrongdoer does not postpone accrual.

For all of the foregoing reasons, we must affirm the judgment.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. Respondent shall recover his costs of appeal.

CHANEY, J. and JOHNSON, J, concurs.